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ABSTRACT 
The creation of a group taxation fi-ainework to subject affiliated entities 
resident in more than one EC Member State to a single set of rules is all experiment 
without precedent. Group taxation normally deals witli tax liability in the context of 
a single jurisdiction. There is no system of group taxation worldwide w1licli 
embraces more than one fiscal jurisdiction under a single regulatory umbrella. This 
thesi, s explores the prospect for creating a group taxation systen-i extending across 
national N)rders in the EC. The objective is to specify what shape the elements of 
such a system should take as well as to identify the areas of complexity ol- probable 
impasse. 
The first two chapters set the background: the jurisprudential and 
legislative fi-ainework of the EIM within. which any potential group taxation project 
should develop. 
The third cliaptei- surveys the tax systems of Canada, Switzerland and the 
US with a focus on the principles pertaining to the division of power betweell the 
federal and sub-federal tiers. 
Cliapter 4 presents and debates the policies for corporate taxation in 
integrated niarkets. An attempt is made to answer whether regulation Should be 
treated as a prerequisite for coiT-)oi-ate tax coorditiation. The objectives of the EIM 
and possible i11St1-LH1-1e11tS leading to their attaiiiii-ient are placed within the fi-aniewol-k 
of a group taxation scheme. 
Cliapter 5 classifies the issues relevant to the administration of the scheme 
into four cateoroi-ies: compliance, enforcei-iient, dispute resolutioii and re-jsscssnient 
of tax liability. As the unique constitLitional structure of the EIM cannot easily be 
linked to a precedent, the discussion is more about setting tile principles ()f a new 
construction ratliei- than proposing adjusti-nents to existing schemes. 
Chapter 6 ainis at setting forth a test for entitlement to group n-lembel-sllip. 
It discusses established tests and advances at-OLIMeITS for an ownership criterion ý7 
based on a holding percentage. 
Cliapter 7 focuses on tax base hitegi-ation. The approach taken is in favoul- 
of a broad definitioji which does not introduce a distinction between business and 
non-business income. 
The territorial delineation of the group is explored in cliapter S. The 
discussion starts fi-oi-n the assumption that 'water's edge' is applicable. This cliapter 
exan-tines the interaction between formulary apportion-nient (FA) and the 
international tax law principles of source/residence. 
Chapter 9 explores FA. The specific formulation of the n-leclianis-111 for 
apportionment is primarily an economists' responsibility. This thesis limits itself to 
coii-niients of a legal nature, such as the amount of diversity that should be allowed, 
without causing distortion, in the formulae applicable across the EC. 
Finally, conclusion,, are drawn about the research questions posed. 
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INTRODUCTION' 
Group taxation is a fundan-iental element fOUnd In many corporation tax sYste"Is. - 
This is a mecl-tanism for computing liability to tax wl-tich, depending on the. shape it 
takes, grants certain fiscal advantages to affiliated entities. The creation of a group 
taxation frail-iework to subject affiliated entities resident in ii-iore than one Member 
State under a single set of rules is an experinient without precedent. This may elthei- 
be shaped as a single set of uniform rules for the European Internal Market (EIM) or 
conui-ion provisions applicable across each cross-border group. 
The Objective 
This thesis explores the prospect for creathig a group taxation systern of this form. 
The objective is to specify what shape its elements should take as well as to identify 
the areas of complexity or impasse. 
The novelty of such a group taxation scheine orighiates in a combination of features. 
One aspect is the ii-itilti-jurisdictional nature of the group, as it is meant to 
incorporate entities fi-om different Member States. Group taxation normally deals 
with tax liability in the context of a single jurisdiction. In practice, there is no system 
' Citations in this thesis follow 'The Oxford Standard for Citation of Legal Authoritics' (OSCOLA 
2006). This is available at <http-//deiiiiiiiy-. It",,. c)x., tc. uk/published/oscol,, t-2006. pdf>. 
2A similar scheme also exists in the ficld of VAT wider the term 'VAT Groupin, -'ý see Chapter 6, 
Part A, Section IV. 
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of group taxatioii worldwide which embraces more thaii one fiscal jurisdictioli ulider 
a single regulatory umbrella. It will be showi-i iii this thesis that schernes operated hý, 
a few EC Member States (i. e. Austria, Denmark, (partly) France and Italy), 'w'hicll 
allow foreign residents into theh- domestic groups, are not geuuinely cross-border 
structures. 3 US unitary taxatioii is closer to involving inore than one Jurisdiction at 
sub-federal level. 4 Still though, there is no facility to have the tax liability of each 
group computed once amojig the States eligible for part of the tax base. Rather, each 
State carries out its owii calculations. 
Secondly, the scheme will operate in the EIM, being a structure without international 
precedent, which functions through a fine balance between state sovereignty and 
n-iarket integration objectives. Those two concepts often clash, as they usually reflect 
conflicting interests. 01-1 the one haDd, the Member States enjoy sovereigglity M tile 
areas where competence has not been conferred on the EC .5 Considering that the 
power to levy taxes in principle falls within the exclusive competence of the 
Men-lber States, " the latter retain their full sovereignty in fiscal matters. On the otlier 
hand, integration (through the abolition of obstacles) is a fLuidaillental objective of 
the EIM .7 It will be explained in this tliesi,, 
8 that market integration in the EC 
presupposes a certaiii degree of m4orinity to he achieved throLigh eiiactmg commmi Z7 
rules. That would force the Member States to concede aspects of their soverelgilty, 
wh-ich would raise resistance, especially ma jimi-harmoiiised area such as dii-ect 
taxation. 
The idea of devising a group taxation system applicable within the unique 
coDstitutional framework of the EIM is iiot an orig-inality of tl-tis thesis. Rather, this 
3 Chapter 7, Rart A, Section 11. 
4 Chapter 6, Part A, Section III and Chapter 8, Part A, Section 1. 
5 The competence ofthe EC may be exclusive or, subject to the principle of subsidiarity, shared with 
the Member States (EC Treaty (hereinafter TEC) (Treaty of Rome, as amended) art 5). It follow,,, that 
na certain. field, the less sovereil, --ni the more extensive the concession of competence to the EC I the 
Member States ill that regard. 
6 Case 6/60 Jean-E. fluniblel v Belgian State [ 1960] ECR 00559. 
TEC arts 3(l)(c) & 14(2). 
Chaptel- 4, Part B, Section 1. 
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i,, -, a policy choice which is broadly set out in the Europewi Commission Staff 
Workiiig Paper 9 on company taxation. The contribution of this fliesis is to reacli 
certai-ti conclusions on what should be the content of each of the group's eleinents. 
In some case,,,, the feasibility of iniplenienting specific aspects will also be debated. 
This work does not treat the systems proposed irt the Staff Paper as a startim, point 
of the analysis. Obviously, account is takeri of the CCCTB'0 and HST, I' havilla been 
the two schemes promoted in the aftennath. of the Staff Paper's reception by experts 
and the industry. 12 However, this is done in the context of a discussion which starts 
exploring the issues from the very first principles. Those basically touch upoil the 
nature of the EIM and its objectives for inarket integration 13 as well as the 
jurisprudential precedent of the European Court of Justice (ECJ ). 14 
The proposal for subjecting multiiiational enterprises (MNEs) to a single set of rules 
in the EC is aimed at tackling a series of disadvantages that create obstacles for 
businesses. Those have been identified in the Staff Paper but cannot be struck down 
by the ECJ, as they do notbreach. directly effective provisions of the EC Treaty. 
It will be shown in Chapter I that, to qualify for a breach of EC Law, tile facts of a 
case should be either 'discrin-iinatory' or 'restrictive' (as per the constructimi of the 
ECJ). 1ý S Those tests are of a bilateral nature. They inay take the form of a comparisoll 
betweeri a doinestic and a cross-border intra-EC situation leading to disadvantageous 
treatment of the latter. In addition, it ofteii suffices that there is a finding of 
impedin-lent to free movement with an intra-EC dimensimi. 
Commission (EC), 'Conapanv Taxation in the Intemal Market' (ConuTussion Staff Working Paper) 
SEC (2001) 168 1,23 October 2001 (Iiercinqfter Staff Paper). 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: see Staff Paper 375 et seq. 
Home State Taxation: see SO Lodin and M Gan-mile, Home Staic Taxation (IBFD Publications, 
Amsterdam 200 t) (heremqffer HST (Lodin and Gainmte))-, Staff Paper 373. 
12, Con-m-Ussion (EC), 'Aii Nternal. Market without Company Ttx Obstacles, achievenients, onaoin(-, 
initiatives and reinaffling challenges' (Comi-nunication) COM (2003) 72)6 final, 24 November'2003,5 
(heremqfter COM(20031)726). 
13 Stafl'Paper 25 et seq., Chapter 4, Part B, Sectlon 11, Title 1. 
14 Chapter 1. 
'-5 Chapter 1, Part A, Section 11. 
II 
It will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis that the provisions of the EC Treaty (m 
the fwidainemal fi-eedon-is do not themselves place a requiremelit for umform 
regulation. Thus, those are given a bilateral structure. The disadvantageous aspects 
of the EC identified in the Staff Paper go far beyond these bilateral tests and what 
can be held illegititnate by the ECJ. For instarice, the costs of complyilig with 
transfer pricing formalities do not In principle qualffy as an infriiigemelit of the 
freedon-Ls. Still though, tMs is a serious obstacle deterring commercial activity in the 
EIM- 
The Research Questions 
The oeneral research questioii of this thesis has ah-eady been stated: NvIiat shape 
given to the elements of a group taxat' should be ion system extending beyond the tý Z- 
contours of a single jurisdiction- across the entire EC. This can be broken down into a 
IILIIIII. )el- Of 11-101-C specific questions wfých constitute separate items of research in this 
t1lesis. 
One crucial matter is how the group should be defined. There are two aspects in this. 
The first aspect involves how it Should be determin-ed which entitles are ellgible for 
group ii-iembership. This primarily concerns the required degree of affiliation. 
Different approaches to affiliation. tests can be identified worldwide. One key 
question is whether the choice should be for an ownership- or control-based test or. 
alternatively, more substantive requiremems pointiiig to business unity should be 
laid down. The decision is significant because it may have an impact oa the function 
of the mechanism for allocating the group tax base to the eligible Member States. 
More precisely, it all boils down to whether an ownership or control test is 
Comp -i by apportiomi-ient. . atible with allocatioi 
I -) 
A second aspect to group definition deals with the territorial scope. Should the group 
extend beyond the EC? If not, what about diird-country located PEs of EC resident 
group affiliates'? Conversely, should EC-located PEs of thn'"d-country affiliates be 
iticorporated into the group'? A critical elemerit in providing answers to all these 
questions is linked to the following 'uneasy' interaction: Formulary Apportionn-ient 
(FA), applying intra-group, is not in principle con-1patible with the system of DTCs 
which is in place between Mernber States and th-ird countries. 
Another elen-ient setting, forth i. SSLIeS for research concerns the methods of integration 
of the, individual tax bases into a single group tax base. Clarifyingg concepts such as 
consolidation and poohno is part of the process leading to the policy choice. One 
question here i-nvolves the degree of urdformity reqUired for accouiplishim, the 
objectives initially set. Finally, a key inatter is to deten-yune which reVeIILIeS ShOLLId 
be admitted as part of the tax base. 
This thesis attempts to explain how FA is beneficial to the EIM. III doillu, this, 
comparisons ai-e drawii with the method of pricing at ann's length. The required 
degree of ui-ill'ormity of the rules oi-i FA across the EC is also all ISSUe fOF 
consideration. Sin ce this thesis is only meant to examine the researcli qLiestl()Il from 
a legal point of view, no extensive discussioii will be carried out (-)ver the content of 
the forn-iula factons,. Still. thougti, some thoughts will be made on the future of the 
'Massachusetts' Forniula', being a standard in the US. 
In connection witli the administratioi-i of the system, a number of topics relevant to 
compliance and enforcement will be analysed. Specific focus will be placed on 
proposing an effective and workable ftarnework for the settlement of disputes. In a 
group taxation system extending beyond a single jurisdiction, fiscal disputes are 
expected to give rise to challenges. Thus, disagreement will not Surface only 
between taxpayers and the Member States but also in a Member State to Membet- 
State context. The latter should notably be expected to arise between a parent 
emity's state and any of the subsidiaries' states. 
The thesis does not deal with tax abuse matters. This becaii-ie clear in the course of 
researcli that a comprehensive approach to tax avoidance in a group taxation scherne 
is itself a disthict area. That normally extends beyond a single chapter and should 
therefore be a separate research project. 
Methodology 
This thesis is almost exclusively based on a bibliographical research of primary and 
secondary resources. 
The foriner includes i-tun-ierous policy documents of the European institutions in 
coii-ipany taxation and also the documents of the Working Group on the CCCTB 
project. By way of background, the jurisprudence of the ECJ is also extensively 
discussed to the extent that it bears a relevance to group taxation. In specific parts 16 1 
there is also reference to a smaller amount of case law by the US Supreme Court and 
few US State Courts. That is Iii-nited to the fields where the US federal tax system or 
certain state systerns are used as comparators to a potential EC scheme. Where 
necessary, legislation is also cited. This extends beyorid national parliamentary acts 
and EC Directives and Regulations. Thus, it also includes adirdnistrative measure,,,. 
The most illustrative case in this thesis is the short references made to sorne US 
" More precisely, those parts are: (i) The discussion on the Con-u-nerce and Due Process Clauses at 
Chapter 3, Part C, Section 11; (n) lbe definition of a unitary business at-Chapter 6, Part A, Section IIL 
(111) The discussion on the Uniform Definition ofIncome for Tax Purposes (UDITPA) at Chapter 7, 
Part C, Section 1. (iv) 'water's edge' in the US at Chapter 8, Part A, and (v) Formulary 
Apportionment (FA) in the USA at Chapter 9, Part B, Section 1. 
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unitary states' administrative regh, yies in connection with return filing, the taxable 47ý 
periods and registration. 
17 
Iii terms of secondary materials, a large imi-iber is relevant to EC institutional 
n-iatters. Another part touches on EC Tax Law and primarily focuses mi the ECJs 
jurisprudence. Further, since the US is a comparator country in this thesis, it is 
normal that extensive US literature, mainly derived from law reviews, features 
high-ly in the text. 
Conclusions on the structural con-1ponetits of an EC-wide group taxatioll scheme 
have been reached fl-wough assessing ' ut derived fi-on-1 the company tax systems of tý inp 
three countries. That is, Canada, Switzerland and the US. The decision to focus on 
these systems has been a result of the following series of thoughts: 
(i) The data should be relevant to the peculiarities of chargiiig corporation tax at sub- 
federal level. It may be true that a system of group taxation applyi across the EC 
will consist of a single tier at which tax is levied. This is due to the fact that no 
central authority is furnished with taxing powers iii the EC. Still though, sub-federal 
scheme,, -., are highly relevant to an EC project because formulary apportionment (FA) 
is a common feature of both. Thus, the taxing clain-is over a group tax base are due 
to be sharýd by apportionment rather than throLigh international tax nonns of 
source/residence. 
(ii) The jurisdictions used as comparators were chosen following initial research. 18 
The aini has been to identify legal systems which apply corporation tax at Sub- 
17 Chapter 5 contains information on certain features of the adn-ýjiistrative laws and practices of the 
following unitary US States: California, Illinois, New York and Texas. it should be noted that it has 
been very difficult to trace information in this field. The wtb-pages of state revenue authorities on the 
internet have been the only Source to derive data from. Still though, that was made available in a 
frao, mented manner, which rendered systematic research impossible. Taking this into account, the 
information found is used in this thesis only for the purpose of supplementing other findings. It Cý Z71 
should definitely not be treated as a piece of comprehensive evidence. 
18 Research also covered Australia, Brazil and Germany, which were not found to levN,, corporation 
tax at sub-federal level. The outcorne of the research is also confirmed by documents on the prospect 
of implementing FA in the EC which also limit. their survey to Canada, Switzerland and the US: 
Commission (EQ, Rej)ort (? f the, Conunittee of Mdependent Evj)erts on Colnpan. v, TtLyation (Office for 
official Publications of the European Con-mitinities, Luxembourg 1992) Annexes 9A, B&C 
(hereinafter The Ruding Report)-, JM Weiner, 'Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the 
15) 
tI ederal level and all, ocate the taxable base by FA. The above states appeared the only 
major jurisdictions worldwide that fulfilled these criteria. 
(iii') It is noteworthy that Canada and Switzerland do not operate (Yl, oup taxation 
systems. Inevitably, therefore, comparison of those two systen-Ls witli the EC is 
liniited to the general debate on harmonisation or de-regulation/tax competition and 
the sliaring meclianism. In contrast, the US has a presence ill different parts of the 
thesis where substantive elements of group taxation are discussed. 
Con-iparative data on national group taxation systems is also given in specific parts 
of this thesis. In particular, these include: (i) the details of ownership tests for 
entitlement to group 1-Ilembership; (ii. ) the different ways to achieve tax base 
integration, and (iii) certain- rules on admiýnistratlve fori-nalities, sucli as registratioll, 
the term of a group or retuni filing detaits. The comparative information was, in 
some cases, derived from. the country surveys comalned iii one of the IFA Cahlers 
volumes of 2004'9 and has been checked for updates. 2') 
Further, three n-iajor company law systen-is (i. e. the UK, France and Germany) are 
considered in the context of the control crIterion. for group membership. 2' The 
specific choice of systen-is relied on the following: 
(i) A presence of the comn-ioi-i law tradition in the testý, assessed, which is reflected 
in the UK; 
(11) Pie two continental sYsten-is (i. e. FraDce and GernT. Any) have been created 
throughout a long tradition in conin-iercial law, which has had a definite influence on 
the rerfiain ing civil law jurisdictions. 
European Union: hisights from the United States and Canada' Workim, Paper No 8 (Taxation Papers, 
European CommEssion, 2005) (hereinafter Weiner (2005)). 
19 Y Mast-ii, 'General Report on Group Taxation' in IFA (ed), Cahler, ý de droitfiscal international vol 
89b (Cahiers de droit I, iscal international, IFA, 2004) 21 (hereinafter IFA Cahlers' General Report 
2004). 
nc key changes involve the enactment of new group taxation systerns, in Italy and Austria. Both 
st. em --ave way to Organschaft - svstems accommodate a cross-border dimension. The Austrian sy I 
I avour ofconsolidation. For details, see later in the thesis at: Chapter 6, Part A, Section 1. 
21 See later in the thesis at, Chapter 6, Part A, Section 11. - 
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It Should also be noted that, at the early stages of research, a meeting was held with 
relevant staff at the Ettropean Comn-iission and discussed broadly the imminent and 
ongoing company tax proýject S. 22 Over the session, more weight was placed on the 
CCCTB initiative. Clarification was also given on how slinultaneous work on 
'coinprehensive' and 'targeted' approaches to company taxation fit together. Much 
of the information collected over this meeting wa,; niade available online, through 
the documents of the Working Group on the CCCTB, shortly later. The meeting was 
helpful in advanciiig the research process at the tbi-le it was held. However, the 
results do not contain new data; that is, namely, items not otherwise considered 
through later official documents. This is why no separate section 111 this thesis will 
be dedicated-to analysilig the outcome of the meeting with the Commission. 
An Outline of the Chapters 
This thesis coinprises alne chapters. Its core devek)ps througlIOUt the five 
SUbstantive chapters (i. e. 5-9). Cliapter 5 sheds light oil the admi 11 i strat loll of the 
sclieme whilst the remammg, four delve into one group element each. 
,, I It should be noted that F July 2007 is set as a cut-off date for this thesis, which 
means that developments occuiTing later thau that date are not covered. 
The first two cliapters set the background of the analysis. That is namely the 
jurisprudential and legislative framework of the EIM withIll which any potential 
group tax ation project should develop. 
2-? The meeting was Ileld oil -')S'h 
November 2005 in the building of the Directoratc General 1'()r 
Taxation wld the Custonis Union (DG TAXUID). 
17 
The third chapter provides surveys of the tax systems of Canada, Switzerland and 
the US with a particular focus on the principles pertallihicy to the division of power L- 
between the federal and SUb-federal tiers. 
Chapter 4 briefly presents and debates the policies for corporate taxation ill 
integrated markets. Ali attempt is made to answer whether regulation should be 
treated as a prerequisite for corporate tax coordination in tile EC. Finally, tile 
objectives of the EIM and possible il-istrumenis leading to their attahu-nent are placed 
within the framework of an EC-wide group taxation scheme. 
Chapter 5 classifies the issues relevant to the adn-iinj,, --', tratIoji of the scheme into four 
categories: cornpliance, enforcement, dispute resolutioii and re- asses sn-lem of tax 
liability. The unique constitutional structure of the EIM cannot easily be linked - Ilot 
even ii. idirectty - to a precedent troin which exan-iples can be derived. So, especially 
the part on dispute resolution is more about setting the principles for a new structure 
rather than proposing adjustments to existing schen-les. 
Chapter 6 aims at setting forth a test for entitlement to group n-iembership. It should 
be stressed that this thesis doesDot feature any analysis on the types of entities to he 
allowed group n-ien-ibership. Instead, it is only concerned with tests that detei-mine 
the appropriate degree of affiliation among potential groLil) n-leml-m-s. The reason for 
this policy choice is only a practical one.. A corriprehemsive analysis of the eligible 
types of entities can-not he limited to the contours of a section in a thesis' chapter. In 
contrast, this can be a separate piece of research on its own, as it requires extensive 
comparative work coupled with a study of tax avoidance challenges. 
Chapter 7 focuses on tax base integration. This thesis takes an approach in favour of 
a broad definition whicli does not introduce distinctioll between business and noii- 
business income. 
is 
The territorial delineation of the group is explored in chapter 8. The discussioii kicks 
off from the assumption that (water's edge' is applicable. Based oil that, this thesis 
exam-ines the interaction between FA and the international tax law principles of 
source/re, sidence. The analysis concentrates on the le0al matters which attach to 
crossing the 'waters edge'. Not all possible corporate structures have been 
considered. This is because, in most cases, reachýiiig a decision oii which schen-ies 
qualify for the EC-wide group taxation system is purely a matter of policy choice 
with no bearing on the legal front. 
Finally, chapter 9 explores FA. The specific formulatim of the mechaiiism for 
app6rtionn-ient is jiormally an ecown-iists' responsibility. Therefore, the focus of this 
thesis is on the legal aspects of group taxation, rather thaii oii econol-nics-bas'ed 
analysis of the fori-i-mla used for apportionnient. 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss the structural. elements of groups Without 
aimlysing the content of individual features in detail. The latter would be an 
investment in the wrong direction at this stage. Thus, newly-created schemes first zn 
need to be given shape, this can norn-ially be achieved through consideration in a 
broader context. It is that frainework wl)ich is the focus of this thesis. 
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1, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ RELEVANT 
To GROUPS 
Introduction 
The project of the Internal Market in the field of direct taxation has primarily been 
brought forward througli the case law of the ECJ. Only few legislative initiatives 
have reached success over the past fifty years. The reason has largely been the 
unanimity rule 23 which consistently caUses deadlock at the Council. 
The aiin of this chapter is to focus primarily on the aspects of the ECJ's case law 
which are of relevance to MNEs withiii the EIM. Enactim, leorislatioii iiormally ltý 
involves compreheiisive rqyulatioii hi a specific field. This is clearly a more far- 
reachim-Y effect thaii that created by the Court's jurisprudence since the latter may 
only rule on the specific facts brought forth for adjudication. Still though, knowledge Zn 
of the case law is an essential background to positive flitegratioii initiatives. This is 
because all EC SeCODdary tegislation is judiciable before the ECJ and should 
therefore comply with its rLdings. 
The analysis is divided into two parts: (A) an outline of the ii-lain principles 
established throu0i the ECJ's case law; (B) an examMation of selected areas which, 
for the purposes of this work, have been categodsed into four fields: (i) distributions-, 
(ii) group loss relief, (iii) the treatment of permaimit establisImients (PEs) by the 
host state-, and (iv) intra-group asset transfers. It should be noted that the 
23 TEC art 94. 
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jurisprudence oil anti-avoidance (i. e. CFCs, Thin Capitalisation and Tralisfer 
Pricing) is not covered in the analysis that follows. 'nie reasoll is that, III line with 
the research objectives set out in the Introduction, this thesis will not touch upon 
matters of tax abuse relevant to groups. 
Part A: The Principles 
1. The Concepts of 'Allocation' and 'Exercise' 
The jurisprudence of tlie ECJ confirms Member States' sovereignty in tax mattei-s 
and makes an attempt to define the limits placed on that by the EC Treaty. This is' 
illustrated in the following quotation, which appears ýi almost every tax 11111112: 
... it should 
be noted that, according to settled case-law, 
although direct taxation falls witliiii tlieir competence, the 
Member States must none the less exercise that competence 
consistently with. Con-ununity law ......... and avoid any -14 
discrin-lination on grounds of iiationality.. . 
The above alludes to the disthiction between two fundamental concepts which 
delineate the contours of ECJ's jurisprudence in direct taxation: 
(i) The 'allocation' of taxing power aiuoiLg the Member States falls under their 
exclusive con-1petence. Further, it is not reviewable by the ECJ for conformity with 
the Freedoms. 
(ii) The 'exercise' of allocated tax jUrisdiction, which should comply with tile 
Freedoms of the EIM, as construed in the EC Treaty and through the ECFs case law. 
III the context of aii EC-wide group taxation scheme, clarifying the Iiii-Ilts of the EC 
Treaty is vital iii delineating what can be subjected to the scrutiny of the ECJ. 
Gill. )72.5 is t1le landmark case in connection with 'allocation'. It contains 
acknowledgment that it is ýthe contracting parties' competence to define the criteria 
for allocating their powers of taxation as between themselves, with a view to 
eliminating double taxation'. 2 0' hi principle, the rule should be that the 'allocation' of 
tax jurisdiction falls outside the an-ibit of the EC Treaty. Therefore, no discussion of 
disci-iiiii-iiation/i-estrictioii can be relevant. 
The validity of the above position. has recently been confirn-ied by tile ECJ ill two of 
its rulings on dividends (i. e. ACT IV GL027 and Denkai. Jt France). Both cases dealt 
with the tax treatment of recipients of foreign-S-01.1rce dividends in the state of soul-cc. 
More specifically, the Court treated the non-resident recipient's subjection to a tax 
charge as a prerequ i site for comparability. -)ý That is, if the state of source were found 
to have exercised no tax jurisdiction over the noii-resident taxpayer, the facts Would 
not be reviewable foi- compliaDce witli the Freedon-is. h-ldeed, tile ECJ arrived at 
different conclusions in each of the two cases. Namely, in ACT IV GLO, it was 
found that the imposition of ACT on a distribution did not qualify as a tax char(-, e. -' 
By contrast, the ruling in Denhti, it France coiffirmed that an exercise of tax t__ 
30 
jurisdiction over the non-resident taxpayer had taken place . 
Case C-170/05 Soc0e' Denkavit [inernational BV and Denkavii France Sarl v Minivre d(, 
I'll, I Conomie, des hnalices ef de l7rielustrie [2006] ECR 1-11949 para 19 (hereinelfter Denkcivit 
France). 
25 Case C-336/96 Mr and Mr, ý Robert Gill v Directeur de. ý Service, ý Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin [ 19981 All 
ER (EC) 826, [1998] 3 CMLR 60 (herchitifter Gilly). 
26 
ibid para 30. 
27 Case C-374/04 '1ýsl Claimams in Class IV qf the ACTGroup Litiganon v Commissioners of hiland 
Reveime [20061 ECR 1- 11673 (heremafter ACT IV G LO). 
28 ibid paras 52 and 56; lkiikavit Fran ce para 35. 
21) A CTIV GLO 1), U-, l 56. 
30 Denkavit France para 37. 
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The above judgn-lents reaffirm the principles set out in Gill 
, v. 
This could indicate that 
the ECJ has remained firi-ii to the fundarnental concepts Of its jUriSl')rUdence over the 
years. The truth, though, is that the accuracy of any SUCII staternent can be 
Iý challenged, especially in light of the ruling in M&S31 mid Ritter Coulais--, . III the 
afterniath of those judgments, the distiDctioD between 'allocation' and 'exercise' 
cannot be defined on absolute ternis any longer. 
The outcon-ie of M&S was to place the allocation of taxing power - even withill a 
very lin-tited scope - under the scrutiny of EC Law. This is clearlyhTeconcilable with 
Gilly. Briefly, the Court fOUDd that, where consideration of losses ill the state of 
source has been rendered in-1possible, the origin state should take actioii to provide 
relief. This was so, regardless of the absence of origin-state jurisdiction to tax the 
revenue out of which the, losses arose. It may thus be held that the ruling all-iounts to 
subordinating the Member States' competence to allocate taxim, jLtrisdictioii to the 
review of the ECJ. 
A case highlighting grey areas in the distinction between 'allocation' and 'exercise' 
is Ritter Coulats. Germany was called LIJ-)OD to consider 'negative income' (i. e. 
losses) deeiiied to have arisen from property held in another Men-iber State. Pursuant 
to the Franco-German DTC, Germany was entitled to take account of revenues 
earned fi-om property located in Frai-ice In determining the tax rate applicable to its 
resident,;. The facts of the case did not, however, involve property letting, which 
would produce positive income. By contrast, the taxpayers made self-use of the 
house as a dwelling. In a domestic context, they would have been entitled to take 
account of a deerned loss iii computing their income tax rate. However, under the tr 
DTC, that facility did not extend to property located in the other contracting state. 
That was found by the ECJ to infrijige the Free Movement of Workers (TEC arts 39 
31 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer v David Halsey (11M hispectol- of '1-(. Lye. ý) ['2005] ECR 1-10837 
(hercinafter M&.. S). 
32 Case C- 152/0-3 Hans-Argen atid Monique Ritter- Coulais ), Finank-atill Gern-terscheirn [20061 ECR 
1-0 1711 (hereinafter Ritter Coldais). 
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et seq. ). Consequently, Germany was condemned to take account of the losses, 
despite the DTC provisions. 
In th-is case, Germany was entitled by the DTC to relieve positive incoine earned 
fi-orn foreign- located property through exemptim with progression. It did not impose 
any tax charge on the relevant amounts. On that basis, the consideratim of 'negative 
income' affected the allocation of taxing jurisdictimi between the two states. Still 
though, the, an-iounts could possibly qualify as aji indirect tax charge, since, through 
progression, they contributed to detern-iiiiiiig the tax rate applicable at residejice. If 
this second interpretation were endorsed, then no issue of EC Law interference NA, Ith 
the concept of 'allocation' would con-le to the fore. 
11. The Test for 'Equal Treatment' 
A group taxafioii schen-te applyino unifori-n rules across the EC is not likely to raise 
issues of discrindnatimi or restriction imernally. Further, it will, be explained ill 
Chapter 7 that, in its alternative version of HST, the scheme should not run a risk of 
being found disci-iiiiiiiatory/resti-ictive. -ý'-' HOWeVer, eCjUaI treatinent is of relevaiice 
when it comes to relations between group entities and EC-resident non-affifiates. Z-7 
Still diough., comparability of situation Should be established before arguments of 
disc. i-iiiiiiiati. oii/i-e, ý,,,, tricti, oii can be advanced. That caii be hard to sustain, especially 
when a difference in treatment is grounded on the degree of affili. ation. 
? 34 (1) Discrimination or Restriction . 
33 Chapter 7, Part B, Section 1. 
,t detailed analysis Lind categorisation of the types of Judgements issued by the Court. - P Farmer, 3' For ( 
'The Court's case law on taxation- a castle built on shifting sands'. 1' (2003) 12 EC Tax Review 75- L 
Hinnekens, 'The search for the framework conditions of Ilic fundanitntal EC Treatv principles is 
applied by the European Court to Member-States' 
direct taxation' (2002) 11 EC Tax ReN, je%%- 112, 
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The test is applied once it is concluded that the facts of the case involve the 
4exercise' of taxing jurisdiction and, therefore, fall within the scope of the fi-eedom. s. 
The relevant provisions of the EC Treaty lay down the foundation stones of the EIM. 
Based on that assuniption, they have been broadly construed by the ECJ. It is settled 
jurisprudence of the ECJ that findings of Treaty infi-inglement 11-lay be inade oil a 
ground of either discriii-tination or restriction. Each time, connection should be built 
with the specific. freedom at stake. Further, there are few default provisions in the 
EC Treaty: Arts. 
-3)(1)(c) (abolition of obstacles to the Freedoms), 12 (discrill-tination 
by reason of nationality) and 14(2) (definition of the EIM). Article 12 should, in 
principle, be employed, as a legal basis, in conjunctimi with one of the Freedom, " 
and not individuall Y. 35 
Discrimination could generally be defined as the outcome of treating equivalent 
sittiations in a dissinfilar man-ner or, conversely, different s1tuations similarly. The 
test on discrimmation is nonnally structured as a comparison between a domestic 
sitLiation and its equivalent cross-border one, resLilting In a disadvailtageOLIS 
treatnient of the latter. If comparability cannot be SLIstamed, then differential 
treatment shall be allowed. The most frequentty stated exan-iple of i-ncon-iparabi lit y is, 
between tile situations of residents mid non-residents. It kvas put forward in 
Schitmacker' for the first time, and ever sjjice has been made the starting point in 
111ally jUdginents. 
Two forms of discri-nimation have been identified by the jurispi-Lidence of the ECJ. 
overt/direct and cover-thnolirect discrin-linatiOn. The foriner concems discr4nination 
by reason of nationality which may only escape illegitin-iacy through grounds for 
114, R Lyal, 'Non-discrimination and direct tax in Community Lmv' (2003) 12 EC Tax Review 68 et 
seq., see also- S van Thiel, 'Removal of income tax barriers to market integation in the European 
Union: litigation by the Community citizen instead of harmonization by the Con-u-nunity legislature'. " 
(2003) 12 EC Tax Review 4,9. 
35 This is implicitly derived from Schernpp: Case C-403/03 Egm Schempl) v Finanzan-ll Millchell 
12005] ECR 1-6421 para 15 (herchiqf1ei-Schernpp). 
ý6 Case C-279/93 I'man. -aint KNn-Altstadt v Roltui. d Schuinackcr [19951 ECR 1-2-125 Para 31 
(hereiiiqflel- Schumacker). 
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37 justification explicitly inentioned hi the EC Treaty. Covert/indn-ect d, scr, ini nat 1011. 
recognised since 1974 38 , inakes use of criteria for differentlation, other than 
nationality, which in fact lead to the same result . 
39 Here, the ii-iost common 
discrin-iinatory criterion is residence, as most residents in. a Member State are also 
rtationals of that state. The crucial difference between the above two types of 
discrimination lies iii the fact that covert discrimination is justifiable on grounds of 
the rule of law. 40 Thus, there is no requirement that those grounds are expressly 
derived fi-om the wording of the EC Treaty. 
Restriction, pointhig to a second generation of cases, is a broader concept. It 
illustrates the existence of an obstacle which hinders/discourages intra-EC, as 
opposed to doinestic, corrimercial activity. 
A coriiparison betweeii domestic and similar cross-border facts may, in cases, be 
4 
present implicitly, even withbi. a setting of restrictio 11.1 For instance, such a 
comparlson could clearly be drawn iii M&S, a case involving restriction considered 
fron-i an origin-state viewpoint. The two sides dealt with the treatment of losses 
hicurred by group subsidiaries domestically and across border. 
It still is possible, though, that an obstacle case iS SýUstaiiied Nk4110L, tt 1-M-111gilIg iDan y 
con-iparison. That is, a restriction arises OUt of a SitUatiou which sirriply deals with 
'measures applicable without di's tjjj(ýtloll 42 (even-handed rules). The measures 
37 Fpr instance, the prohibition of all discrin-miation based on nationality between workers of the 
Member States may be limited by virtue of justifications on grounds of public policy, public security 
and public health (TEC art 39(2) & (3)). 
38 Ca, se 152/73 Gloiýanni Maria Sotgiii iý Detitsche Bittidespost [19741 ECR 153 (herein(ffier. Soigim). 
ibid para 11. 
40 -nil s is the so-called Cassis justification: Case 120/78 Rewc-Zemral A(; I, 
Biiti. de, ýi-ii. oliopoli, ten, i,, a. 1i'titig ftir Brann1weiii [1979] ECR 00649 (Cassis de Dijon) paras 9-14 
(herelnqfirr Casms). 
41 Cast 81/87 R 17 TIM Treasury, ex parte Dail -y 
Mail & General Trusi P/c [19881 ECR 5483 
(hereinqfler Dail. v Mail), Case C-264/96 Iny)erial Chenucal Indiistries plc (/('I) i- Keimcili Hall 
Wl). M&S, C. t.,, Colmer (11(, r Mairsh, s Inspector of Taxes) [19981 ECR 1-04695 (herehi(4iet ;t C- 
436/00 X mid Y i, Riksskatteierkel [2002] ECR 1- 10829 (herelnqfter X and 1ý. 
42 Case C-80/94 G. II. E. J. Wielockx v Inspecteur (ler Direcie Belastingeii [1995] ECR 1-2493 
(hercinqfler WiCIOCkX). 
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should have the effect of impeding/discouraging the exercise of the EC Fundamental 
Freedoms. This is a typical structure of restriction case. 
Bosnian 43 
,a non. -tax case, led the way here. 'flie 'tran, ýfýr. training or developinent 
fie 44 payable upon a football player's transfer into a new spo rt club was equally due 
in both domestic and cross-border transactions. No difference in treatment was 
identifiable between the two. Yet, the fee due was treated as W-1 illegitimate chai-ge 
whicli amounted to an obstacle iii the EIM. A breach of TEC art 39 on the free 
moven-ient of workers was established. It follows, therefore, that the prohibition of 
discrimination is coupled with the more far-reaching concept of restriction which 
broadens the anibit of the freedoms. 
(ii) The Orighi and Ho,. st State 
Direct tax cases on discrili-iiiiatioiVresti-ictioii which reach the ECJ normally deal 
with facts considered fi-om the perspective of either an origin state or a liost state. lz: ý 
The commercial activity under scrutiny should have a Community elument to 
qualify as an exercise of the EC Treaty treedonis. Thus, a Purely dOIIIe, tIC 
dhiiension doesnot bring a case witl-iin the scope of EC Law. 
The origin state is ( ften attached to a cornparison taking the form of a 'nilgrant/non- 
ii-ý, grantl teSt. 45 The corriparators are two nationals (or resident.,; ) of a Member State, 
I 
one of whoin crosses the border to become comi-nercially active abroad. M principle, 
that is iii another Member State. The extent - if any - of relevance of the Freedoii-Ls 
to a third-country context has not yet been clarified by the ECJ. ExamInatimi of a 
43 Case C-415/93 (i) Union Royale Belge des SoclCiýs de Football Association ASBL v Mr Bosman 
(ii) Royal Club LtWgois SA v Mr Bosman, SA dTEconomie Mixte Sportive dc l'Union Spormw du 
Littoral de Dunkerque, URBSI-A and Utiion des Associations Europýennes de Football (UEPA) 
(iii) UEPA v Mr Bonnan [ 19951 ECR 1-0492 1 (hereinafler Bosnian). 
44 ibi d para H 4. 
45 For an explaiiation test: T O'Shea, 'Marks and Spencer v Halsey (HM 
Inspector of Tixes)- Restriction, Justil ication and Proportionality' (2006) 15 EC Tax Re\ ie\\ 66 
case from an origui-state perspective means that the comparison will place the fiscal 
situatioii iii that state as the point of reference. Namely, it should juxtapose tile tax 
treatment at home of a taxpayer establishing, investing or providing services 
domestically to that of another who engiaged in the , same actions elsewhere in the 
EC. The case may involve either discrimination or restriction. The state of migin is 
always in the positioii of what is defined as 'residence' in International Tax Law (i. e. 
where final tax liability arises). 
Cases considered from a host-state viewpoint may deal with the tax status of a non- 
resident EC taxpayer who becomes engaged in comn-iercial. activity iii the host state. 
To establish di. scrimination, a comparison often needs to be drawn. In that process, 
the tax treatment reserved to residents being iii sin-dlar circun-istances is takeii into 
account. An issue has lately con-ie to the fore in relation to the structure of this 
comparison. The recent judgmems in ACT IV GLO and Denkai. 1t France placed a 
requirement that the non-resident taxpayer's final tax liability be considered in 
deciding on the existence of breach. 4" A host state is the state of source in 
4iternational tax. 
It is noteworthy that identifying the origin and host states may not be a 
straightforward process within a gyroup taxation system applying across border. It I- 
will be explained later in this thesis that certain intra-group transactions are meant to 
be eliniiiiated. Further, the group tax base will be allocated to eligible 'urisdictions Zý, i 
by apportionment, which eliminates links to the concepts of source and residence. 
(iii) Grounds. ftv iustýfication 
(hereinafter O'Shea (2006)), idem 'Dividend Taxation Post-Mann*ne ina Sands or Solid 
Foundat, ions? ' ['2007] Tax Notes Intl (Doc'2007-3338) 887,914.1 
n: Shifti 
will be discussed in detail II 46 This approach and its potemial il"Pli II later -n this chapter in Part 
B, Section 
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A finding of discrin-lination or restriction may not lead to infringement of the EC 
Treaty if it is 'objectively. justified by an m, erriding reason in the public interest. ' 
This staten-ient appears in the vast majority of ECFs rulings contaninig analysis oil 
justificatioll. It is based oil the rule of reason, which implies that it may only be used 
ill cases of covert discrimination aild of restriction. A brief outline of Justification 
arguments, often raised in direct tax cases, is given below. Discussion will not 
extend to further analysis, as it is only marginally relevant to this thesis. 
Various grounds for justification have been proposed in the field of direct taxes. The 
ECJ has consistently rejected a couple among them. For instance, the risk of revenue 
loss has, never been accepted as a valid justification . 
47 Further, coherence, despite 
being extensively used as a ground for justification, has not proved successful for 
48 -ice and the Member States in the vast majority of case" By contrast, tax avoidai 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision are, in principle, admissible arguments. Yet, those 
are often found disproportionate to the airns they pursue and are ruled out to be 
replaced by less restrictive measure S. 49 Territoriality was a successful ground in 
Futlira- 50 but failed irt Bosal5l, M&S_ and Revve Zentraffinanz-5" . 
Finally, the risk of 
double-dip in the case of losses and the so-called 'balanced allocation of taxi . ng 
power between Metnber States' have featured in the corporate cases of M&S, Qi, 
AA- 54 and Rewe Zentralfinanz. 
(lv) Situations Engaging Third Countries 
47 By indication: ICI para 28; Case C- 168/01 Bosal Holding BV v Smatssecretaris van Fintuici - ell 
120031 ECR 1-09409 para 42 (hereinq[ter Bosal); Case C-324/00 Lankhorv-11ohorst GinbIl v 
Finarizamt Steinfurt 120021 ECR 1- 11779 para 36 (hereinafier Lankhorst), Case C-319/02 Manninen, 
Peirl Mikael [2004] ECR 1-7477 para 49 (Iiercinqfier Matillinell). 
48 So far, the only successful tax case has been Bachmann- Case C-204/90 Hann. ý-Martin BacInnann 
Belgian State [1992] ECR 1-002249 (hercinqfiter Baclimalill). 
49 Case C-250/95 Futura Parlicipalions SA and Singer v Administration des cowributions [19971 
ECR 1-247 1. paras _3 )6 et seq. 
(1wreitiqfter Fwura). 
51) 
ibid para 22. 
51 Bosal paras 37-38. 
M&S paras 36-40. 
Case C-347/04 Reive Zenlraýfinanz eG v, Finaw, aini Keiln-Mitte [2007] ECR 1-00000 paras 68-70 
(hereiri(Ifter Reive Zentraýfinanl. ). 
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FII- is the first case in direct taxation where the ECJ expressly acknowledged that 
TEC art 56(l) on the Free Moven-ient of Capital extends its benefits to third 
50 countries. This was directly confirn-ied in Holb&-k . It could also be claimed that 
F11 has been indirectly approved by Thin Cal) GL057 , Laserter"' and A and 
B59. 
I 
Up until FII, there was no certainty about whether the free movement of capital was 
applicable in fiscal relations with third countries. The wording of TEC art 56(l) may 
seern straightforward but the situation ren-mined vague. This is noteworthy, 
consideriýng that, outside taxation, such extension has been settled case law of the 
ECJ si-nce the, 1990S. 60 In taxation, indirect references 61 to the matter were made 
occasionally but they poi-wed to nothing substantial. In principle, the position was in 
favour of consideri-iig inti-a-EC transactions in a different context fi-om transactions 
with third countries. Thus, in Manninen, it was explicitly held that the, fi-eedom did 
not require, that third-country situations be treated under the san-le terms as capital 
movements between. Men-lber States. Further, van Hilten 02 turned down the 
expectations for a landmark rulhig. 
Iii the afterinath of FII, the scope of the free movenient of capital remained unclear. 
The Court made a finding of restrictio 1163 but did not clarify Wider what terms thlrd 
54 Case C-231/05 Ov AA v Keskusverolaulakunia 12007] ECR 1-00000 (hercutafirr OvAA). 
-55 Case C-446/04 Test Claimanrý in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioll 
.e rs of Inland Revenue 
120061 ECR I- 11753 (hereinafter 1, H). 
56 Case C-157/05 Winfried L HoWick v Finanzanit Salzbujýg-Land [2007] ECR 1-00000 para 31 
(hercinqfter Holbi)ck). 
57 Case C-524/04 Test Claimaras in the ThIn Cal) Group Litigation v Commissioners of hiland 
Revenue [2007] ECR 1-00000 paras 33-34 In coiijuncticm with 101 (heremqftr 1hin Cap GLO). 
58 Case C-492/04 Laserfec GeselIschaft fiir Sianzfiormcn mbII (fortnerly Ries, ý Laser 
Band. stah1schnitte GmbH) v Finanzamt Emmendingen [2007] ECR 1-00000 para 28 (hereinafter 
Laserlec). 
ýf 
59 Case C- 102/05 SkatteverIcei vA and B 1_2007] ECR 1-00000 para 27 (herema ter A and B). 
60 jý)ill t C,, SeS C-358/93 Lind C-416/93 Cruninalpmccedings against Aldo Bordessa and Vicenle Marf 
Mellado and Concepciori. Barbero Maestre [1995] ECR 1-03611 Joint Cascs C-163/94, C-165/94 & 
- de Lera, Raunundo Dfaz Jirn&ic_- and C-250/94 Criminal proceedings against Lucas Eniilio San.. 
Figen Kapanoglu J 1995] ECR 1-48' 1. 
" l, cjj. - pana 17, Manninen para 51 & A. G. 's Opinion para 79. 
62 Case C-5 13/03 Heirs of M. E. A. van Hilten-van der Heýjden v Inspecteur van de Belastingthensi 
120061 ECR 1-01,957 (hereinaftr van Hilten). 
" 1,11 para 168. 
IW 
countries are entitled to protectiom That is, whether the scope of the fi-ee movement 
of capital should be downsized vis-a-vis third states. One n-latter that seems to ha,,, 'e 
been solved concerns the overlap between the two fi-eedon-hs: establishment and 
capital. It is now certaiii that establishment does not extend to third countries 
64 through its possible overlap with capital. The concept of 'overlapping area also 
seems to have been renounced, as the Court lately insists on the applicability of only 
one fi-eedom each time . 
65 In identifying the applicable fi-eedom, it is crucial to 
conclude which concept is targeted by the restriction and which is merely all 
hievitable consequence of the f6mier. 
It could be expected that capital is interpreted restrictively vis-ý-vis third countries. 
An indication may be the reference made by the ECJ to the Exclian, (=)e of Information 
Directive. 66 It is thus, acknowledged that taxing intra-EC ecoiloi-nic activities may be 
incomparable to taxiiig equivalent activities in a Member State - third-country 
context. 67 This is due to the degree of integration withiii the EC, being the result of 
the existence of conimon rules in specific areas. The Directive mi the Exchange of 
fi-iformation is an example of this. 
It is interesting that, in FII, the Court in pi-Mciple accepted the al'gLI111eilt Of the UK 
referring to the above Directive and rejected it only on proportionality (H'01.1nds. 
68 
Judgingf fi-orn this approach of the ECJ, wi atteinpt could possibly be made to 
speculate on future developnients in the field. It cannot be excluded that the ECJ 
restricts the third-country aspect of TEC art 56(l ) through the use of argun-lents 
toucliijig upoii the exchange of Mformatiom Indeed, most DTCs that follow the 
OECD Model contain a provision on the exchange of iiiformatiom 69 Considering 
this, the ambit of the freedom vis-a-vis third countries could potentially be 
64 ibid para 165, Laserfec para 28; A and B para 29. 
65 'I'llijl GLO paras 33-34-, Lasertec p, 7Ta. 28-, A (111d B para 27. 
66 Council Directive (EEC) 77/799 of 19 December 1977 conceming mutual assistance by the C, 
competent authorities of the Member States in the field ofolirect taxation 1-1977] OJ L336 (hereinqfter 
Exchang-e of Information Directive). 
67 FII para 170. 
68 
ibid para 1722. 
69 OECD Model Double Tax Convention (OECD Model DTC) art 26. 
detennined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the content of the specific DTC 
clause. It is also probable that the national courts will be entrusted with the task to 
check whether a specific DTC allows a degree of exchange of information 
equivalent to that of the EC Directive. 
Further developn-ient is now anticipated in the pending case of C-101105 
70 
Zý 
If the ECJ had found in favour of the existei-ice of an overlappilig area between 
establishment and capital, that would have had a large impact on groups. 111 Such 
case, a group lij. mted to the territory of the EC would be likely to create a 
discriminatory/re strict i ve setting in coluiection with tliird-coui-itry affiliates. Leaving 
those entities outside the group would place them in a disadvantageous position, as 
compared to the ones resident in the EC. 
Part B: The Specific Areas 
The discussion of ECJ's 'Urisprudence which follows is ýitended to give an OLItlille i Z17 
of the key issues being of relevaiice to groups of companies. Analysis is not meam to 
be comprehensive, since this chapter only aims at setting the background of where 
we stand, by virtue of the case law, in corporate taxes at EC level. 
1. Distributions 
70 Case C- 101105 Skalici-crket vA Reference OJ C 
f06,30 April 2005 (pendilig), 
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The treatment of cross-border dividend distributions in a group taxation scheme 
extendiýng across more than one jurisdiction requires specific adjustn-lents. It should 
be decided which jurisdiction i-ntra-group distributions have to be allocated to. 
Further, the tream-lent of inK)und and outbound distributions, notably their 
incorporation into, or exclusion from, the group tax base, is another area which 
requires regulation. In both cases (i. e. iiitra-group and inbound/outIX-)und 
distributions), compliance with the tests of 'equal treatment' may become an issue. 
The Rules in the Origin State 
Verkooij - en 71 is the first origin-state case which dealt with restriction arisilig, fi-om 
dividend distribmions. Despite the Court having inade an attempt to expressly hillit 
the scope of its answer to individuals 72, Verk, 00ijen indeed proved of a wider 
significance . 
73 The ruling is, therefore, of relevance to the field of corporate taxzItIon. 
Further, the later judginents of Len-7 74 wid Manninen follow the same 11ne of 
thinkiiig. Finally, M the cases of Kerckhaert -and Morre 'S. 
75 and F11, the Court 
delmeated the scope of restriction. Lin-iits were placed to what n-lay qualify as Treaty 
infringement iii inboLind divideiid distributions. 
The first three cases (i. e. llerkooijen, Lenz and Manninen) share a common 
underlyllig feature. That is, they deal with schemes ain-led at elimmatimy, or ý7 
reducing, economic double taxation in dividend distributions. Within such a context, 
the question which can-le to the fore was whether a differential treatfnent of foreign- 
71 Case C-35/98 Swatssecrelaris van Financiý*n v Verkooijen [2000] ECR 1-4071 (herchiqfier 
Verkooýjcn). 
72 
ibid para 5. 
73 An illustration of the significance of Verkooýjcir in Mcilicke, Germany, in the position of' 
defendant, made -in attempt to use Vcrkooý cii as the point of reference, for the purpose oflinuting the I Z7, 
temporal effects of the judgment. The aim was to admit refund claims only for the years following Cl - 
Verkooijen. (Case C-292/04 W Mcilicke, IIC Wey-de, M. 5týf ýr v Finan, -. aml Bonn-Innciivadi [2007 
ECR 1-00000). 
74 Case C-315/02 Anneliese Letiz. v lý'itiaiizlande, ýdii-ektioi-i. ffir Tirol [20041 ECR 1-7063 para 17 
(hrremajier LrItZ. ). 
source dividend payments is allowed by the EC Treaty. The rulings contain a 
restriction analysis fi-orn the perspective of the origin state. 76 
In Verkooýjen, the exen-iptioD, available to dividend recipients in a domestic context, 
was not extended to foreign-source distribution,,,. In Lenz, a disadvantage arose 
against taxpayers, fully taxable in Austria, when receiving i-licome fi-om a foreign 
source. Namely, residents receiving domestic revenues could opt for a charge at 
either a fixed rate of 25 percent or the ordinary progressive rate reduced by hal f. 77 
By contrast, revenue fi-om capital originating in another Men-iber State was subject 
to the application of ordinary income tax, the rate of which may have been as high as 
50 percent . 
78 Discrimination in Manninen arose fi-om refusing extension of the 
miputation credit to fore ig ii- SO Urce dividends. By contrast, doinestic distributions 
benefited Ii-orn an ii-nputation credit intended to offset the corporation tax paid at 
company level. 79 The effect was thus to elin-iiiiate econon-dc double taxation ill 
internal situations whereas the same was not the case for foreign-derived revenues. 
The judgii-lents delivered in the above cases are a straightforward demoilstratioll of 
the 'i. i-iigraijt/i-ioii. -i-nigraiit test', dealing with equal treatment in a context of 
restriction. The facts involved a con-iparison between the tax treatil-lent of a domestic 
situation and of an equivalent cross-I)order one. The foreign elemei-it consist,,, of a 
resident investing abroad-, that is, in a coinpany resident in another Men-iber State. 
'Me rules in the cases mentioned put forward no discrimination oil grounds of 
nationality or residence. Thus, both sets of the con-iparison involve residents in the 
origin state ai-id the taxpayer's nationality is irrelevant. 
75 Case C-513/04 M Kerckhaerl and B Morres v BeIgisclie Slwat [20061 ECR 1-10967 (1-wreinafter 
Kerckliaert and Morres). 
76 It should be i-nentioned that, in all three cases, reference is also made to an additional restriction. 
'Mus, companies established in other Member Stýttes are faced with an obstacle to raise capital in tile 
specific state where the dividends' recipient is resident. The reason is that, due to the disadvantageous 
treatment of dividend distributions origniatinc, abroad, shares in companies residing in another 
Member State are lv-ss attractive to investors (Verk-ooijen para 35; Leiilz para 21; Manuinen pTa 23)ý 
77 Lenz para 20. 
78 Ibid. 
71) Manninen paras 8-9. 
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The above rulings; are typical examples of the practice of negative integgration. 
Decision is based on the interpretation of the EC Treaty's provisions on the Free 
Movement of Capital. The underlying objective is to achieve equal treatment. That 
is: since relief for economic double taxation is given doinestically, it should also be 
extended to cases in. wl&h one invests across border (in another Member State). 
The effect of applyiiig the pi-iiiciple of equal treatryient to the cases discussed above 
has been to extend relief for economic double taxation to hitra-EC situations. That 
should not., however, be understood as a step towards a more hitegrated market 
functioning within a setting of neutrality of i-mestment decision. Thus, a neutral 
envirom-nent should provide a framework for engaging into intra-EC con-linercial 
activity at no additional cost to that incurred hi a don-lestic context. Clearly, this is 
not part of the concept of equal treati-new. It is also illustrated by Advocate General 
Geelhoed, W11-o explicitly distinguislied between disparity and 
disci-iiiiiiiatioii/i-estriction and excluded the former from the scope of the Freedoms. 80 
Cases Lin4fors and Schempjý read: 
... the Treaty offers no guarantee to a citizen of the Union that 
transferi-ing his activities to a Member State otlier than that in 
which lie previously resided will be neutral as regards 
taxation. 81 
It follows that econoi-ific double taxation is allowed in mtra-EC transactions, except 
for cases where: 
(i) the Parent -S ubsidiary Directive 
82 is applicable; oi- 
(ii) there is a finding of unequal treati-nent between a domestic situation which 
relieves economic double taxation, and a similar mtra-EC one which deprives the 
taxpayer of such benefit. 
'ýO A CTIV GLO Paras 46-47. 
81 Case C-365/02 Marie brieffiors [2004] ECR 1-7183 para 34 (hereinafter Lindfors), Case C-403/03 
IL-goll schempp v Finanzarnt Mfincheii [2005] ECR 1-6421 para 45. 
'ý'2 Council Directive (EEC) 90/435 of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in 
ti, it case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States [1990] OJ L225 
(hercmqfter P-S Directive). 
Economic double taxation falls within the arnbit of TEC art 293, which urges the 
Mernber States to enter i-nto negotiatiow-, for the abolition of double taxation. 
However, any such claim cannot be brought before the ECJ on that legal. basis, as 
the provision does not produce direct effect over taxpayers. Despite, therefore, the 
provision of TEC an 29-3), combating economic double taxation is primarily placed 
within the contours of the Freedonis. It may thus be a separate objective of the 
Treaty offly within a fraii-iework of positive i-ntegration. Otherwise, the ECJ deals 
with double taxation as part of the requirement for equal treatment which poiýits to 
an intergovernmental. understandhi(Y of the, EIM. 
The n-iore recent judgment in FII co Dfirms the above thinking. It thus places 
(economic and juridical) double taxation within the context of equal treatment and 
distinguishes between allocation and exercise of taxing power: 
The mere fact that it is for a Member State to determine for 
such holdings whether, md to what extent, the imposition of a 
series of charges to tax on distributed profits is to be avoided 
does not of itself mean that it may operate a systen-I LiDder 
which foreign-sourced dividends and nationally-sourced 
dividends are not treated m the same way. "' 
Oae, of the questimis discussed hi FII concerned the con-1patibility with EC Law of 
the systern of relief for double taxatioa. 84 As expected, the facts of the case are 
examined from the viewpoint of the origin state. A number of conclusions were 
reached by the Court concerning the extent to which relief should be granted by the 
state of residence. The rulings delivered contained reference to equal treatment and 
to Men-iber States' sovereigrity in, tax matters. 
One question dealt with relief given, doinestIcally, for economic double taxat]()II 
whereas only for juridical double taxation in intra-EC situations. It was found that 
"3 MI para 69. 
"-I ibid paras -333 et seq. 
this an-iounts to unequal treatnient. '5 Such a national rule is, therefore, in breach of 
the Freedonis. 
Another issue involved the amount Lip to which double tax relief Should be granted 
by the state of residence. It should be noted that the facts concerned ecoiloi-nic 
double taxation. 86 The ECJ stayed fir-ni to an intergoverni-nemal approach to the 
Freedoms which, by effect, confin-iled the absence of neutrality requirements. It was 
thus held that, in a credit system, the state of residence assun-les no obligation to 
relieve beyond the amount of corporation tax borne by the dividends' recipient. 87 
This is in line with the position takeii by the Court in outbound dividend 
distributions. 88 In those cases, the exercise of tax jurisdictiori by the state of source 
has been a prerequisite for placing aii obligation for relief. Furtlier, the judgmem iii 
FII is also compliant with. the position that becoti-ling commercially active abroad 
does not guarantee that fiscal costs will be equal to those in internal dealings. 
Kerck-haert and Morres contributes an additional aspect to delineating the contours 
of equal treatment hi hibound dividend distributions. TI-tis is a case of juridical 
double taxation which remanis unrelieved following payinent of dividends by a 
French coinpany to Belgian-resident individuals. A tax rate of 25 percent applied to 
both doinestic and foreign dividend distributIoDs. " The Belglum-Fraiice DTC 
provided for relief for the withholding tax imposed at the norn-ial rate. 90 That was, 
however, refused to the clainiaElls because the benefit was withdrawn by the Belgian 
legislature unilaterally. 91 By effect, Belgian-resident individuals investing in France 
had to bear a higher tax burden than those staying doi-iiestical. ]Y. 
The Court foLind that the facts did not point to unequal treatment. It sLifficed that 
both internal and cross-border situations were subject to the sarrie tax rate. The 
I bid Para 63. 
16 
lb'd paras 51-52. ,I 
ibid para 52. 
See the 1*()] j()wmg, Title entitled: Outbound Dividend DisiributionS. 
Kerckhaco and Morres para 3. 
()o 
ibid para S. 
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additional tax burden suffered by those individuals who invested in France was an 
outcome of the absence of liarmonisatiOD in Member States' tax system. s. It falls 
within the concept of allocation of Member States' taxing powers and confirms the 
absence of neutrality in the context of equal treatment and the Freedoms. 
The outcome in Kerckhaert and Morres highlights one of the niany impas,, es to 
which the system of the Freedoms jxiay lead. It is thus clear 92 that, where economic 
double taxation is, elin-iinated domestically, the benefit should also be extended to 
intra-EC transactions. That triggers the following thought: where juridical double 
taxation its, absent don-iestically (Kerckhaert and Morre, ý), why should it be tolerated 
in distributions originating m another Member State'? 
Tackling double taxation in the EIM is a very complex i-natter-, at its current state of 
integration, the ii-iarket is full of such features. However, as those are mamly 
attributed to disparities among Member States' tax systen-is, they cannot be tackled 
through. negative integration. This is because they Involve reghi-les which, i-eL)-ardless, 
of con-ipatibility with the broader objectives of the EIM, are not M breach of the 
Treaty provisions. The ECJ n-my only act in a number of those cases and, more 
specificatly, where there is an inconsistency with the EC Treaty. Otherwise, most of 
the above concerns can receive appropriate treatti-lent only throtigh positive 
imegration initiatives. A (Yroup taxation scheme, of consolidated base applying across 
the EC can provide solutions to double taxation. complexities. 
Outbound Dividend Distributions 
91 ibid para 12. 
92 Vcrkooýjeil; Lcllý-,; MWITll-le"; 
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Discrimination or restriction in the field of outbound dividend distributions may 
concern either of the folloWýIg93: (i) the corporation tax. liability of the distributing 
(subsidiary) company; or (ii) the tax treatment of the dividends' recipient in the state 
of source. Cases under category (i) contain an exarnii-iation of facts fi-om an origin- 
state viewpoint. Category (ii) involves host-state situations. The discussiOn below 
will follow this classification. 
(i) The tax position of the distributing subsidiary 
The leadii. ig corporate authority in this regard is Metallgesellschqft. 94 It involved a 
refusal by the UK Goveriunent to grant UK-resident subsidiaries of Gerillan-resident 
parents ail exemption from Advance Corporation Tax ('ACT'). That was an advance 
payment of corporation. tax, which, up until 1999, was due upon dividend 
distributions. Under the UK group taxation system, no ACT was payable upon 
distributions between entities that had opted for the group illcorne election. 
However, the election was made available only between entities resident in tile UK. 
The arguii-ient set forth by the defendant UK Government pointed out that UK 
subsidiaries, held by foreign parents, were subject to UK corporation tax. So, in 
principle, they should be in a position to offset ACT payments agaii-ist their annual 
corporate tax liability. Nevertheless, the Court found the scheme to be still 
disadvantageous vis-a-vis the foreign-held UK subsidiaries. The reason related to the 
cash-flow disadvantage, which was the result of exclusion from entitlement to a 
group income election. The Court found in favour of the UK subsidiaries and even 
opei-ted. up the way for rei-iiedies. 
This case is significant because, together with ICI, it seems to have paved the way 
for M&S. Here, the ECJ did not go any further than in ICL It certaý-dy made no 
93 SO U-)din, 'The Imputation Systems wid Cross-Border Dividends - the Need for new Solutions' 
(1998) 7 EC Tax Review 229,230 (hereinafter Lodln (1998)). 
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statement requiring an extension of the UK group income election across border. In 
a sh-nilar manner to ICI, the court was called upon to deal with domestic companies 
held by fore ign-resident parents. Further, the specific factual setting of the case "_n 
allowed the ECJ to avoid a debate on the prospect of cross-border group taxation. 
Namely, the matter in issue involved the tax treatment from a UK viewpoint (i. e. 
UK-resident subsidiaries and UK-derived benefits). 
This is where the distinction inust be drawn with M&S. Here, the tax liability of a 
UK parent was associated with an item of income (i. e. losses) generated across 
border. So, on this occasion, consideration of the cross-border situation could not be 
escaped. However, it should perhaps be noted that, even in Meta 11geselIsch qft, the 
Court niade a broader statement in rejecting cohesion as an argument for 
justification: '.. -refusal to allo-vt,, resident subsidiaries of non-resident parents to 
make a group income election... '. 95 That appears to be more than an exeniption fi-om 
ACT. Indeed, it envisages an extension of domestic group taxation systems to 
foreign entities. 
(ii) The tax position of the recipient company 96 
This is an area in wNch development in the case law took place exclusively in the 
21" century. The framework has been forn-ied by the ECJ's judgii-mits iii ACT IV 
GLO and Denkavit France. Apart fro. in the Court',, rulings, Advocate General 
Geelhoed's Opinions have been of particular sigiiificaiice. Thus, interesting ideas 
were set forth on how equal tream-ient should be understood within the EIM wheil 
dealing with the status of a dividend's reciplent. The two cases contaill a new 
structure of the tests on equal treatinent. Nainely, Treaty compatibility appears to 
94 Joint Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 MetallgeselIschaft Limited, Hoechsi AG and Hoechst UK 
fbiland Revenue, II. M. Altorncv Goieral [2001 ] ECR 1-4727 (here' af c Limited v Conavissioners oMI 
Metallgesell, schaft). 
Q5 Metallgesellshaft para 73. 
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have n-ioved away fi-om setting one single Member State as point of reference. That 
is, consideration is not limited to the recipient's tax liability in the state of source. 
Rather, focus is now placed on its final tax liability, whicli inevitabl brings the yI 
situation at residence into consideration before reaching a decision. 
97 FokuS ,a case of the EFTA Court, preceded the above i-yientioned decisions of the 
ECJ. The outcon-ie of this case has been striking and appears to have implicitly been 
denounced by the ECJ, which abstamed from any reference to it. The facts involved 
a claim placed by a parent coulpaDy to the host state for a tax credit. That was meant 
to offset the withholdnig tax due upon a dividend distribution. The Court found 
illegiti. ii-lacy in excluding a non-resident parent company from the credit, otherwise 
available to resident recipients. There was, naniely, an. infi-ingenient of Article 40 of 
tfie EEA Agreement (, free movemei-it of capital). It followed that con-ip liance with 
the EEA Agreen-ient would require that the, grant of relief should be extended to non- 
residents. In this, the EFTA Court took no account of the non-resident recipients' 
final tax liability, which would require consideration of their fiscal obligations at 
home. 
ACT IV GLO dealt, amongy other questions, with. whether the Freedom of 
Establishment (or Free Movement of Capital) was breached by the UK provislolls oil 
ACT. More specifically, a tax credit equal to the an-lount of ACT paid by the 
dividends' distributor was allowed to UK-residerit recipients of the dividends. By 
contrast, the credit was, in principle, reftised to non-resident recipients. Ali exception 
to this applied only where provision for a credit was ii-icorporated Into a DTC 
concluded between the UK wid the state of residence of the divideuds' recipient. 
'Fhe ECJ, in line with the Advocate General, established con-iparability betweeii a 
resident and a non-resident recipient of the dividends, where the latter is subjected to 
96 -J Eng, "hisch, 'Shareholder Relief and EC Treaty Law - Supraiiational "Ain is and E11'ecks""' sec also C, 
(. 2005) 33 Intertax 200,204; M Persoff, 'Marks & Spencer More Questions than Aiisxcrs' (ct,,; c 
C()j-nj,, ejj 1) 1-1005] British Tax Review 260,261-161. 
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income tax in the Member State of source. The exercise of taxing jurisdiction over 
the dividend,, -; ' recipient by the state of source is consequently a prerequisite for 
con-iparability. Otherwise, differential treatinent is allowed. 98 
In the particular set of facts, the Court found that UK legislation, making ACT due 
upon dividend distributions, did not aniount to a tax charge. That rendered the 
situation between residents and non-residents incomp arable, wl-licli iniplied the 
unequal treatment was allowed. 
In Denkai,, it France, the Court followed the principles set out in ACT IV GLO. 
However, in this case, the facts allowed comparability to be established. That led to 
a finding of discrimination. Comparability was premised on the finding that the 
imposition, by France, of a tax charge on dividend distributions could be sustailled. 99 
'H-tis has been the crucial point of distinctioji from ACT IV GLO where differential 
treatment was allowed iii the absence of a tax charge. 
Comparability allowed the comparison to be drawn, for the purpose of reaching a 
conclusion on whether there was unequal treatment. The two ends were, oil the one 
hand, the. position of a Frenc ti-res] dent dividend recipient and, on the othel-, a 
recipient resident in the Netherlands. Both received dividends derived in France. The 
OLItCOD'Ie was to find the French regime applying to dividend distributions Z-- 117, 
discriminatory. Consequently, to the extent that the relief granted cloinestiCally was 
not n-lacle available to tion-resident recipients, the latter were discrini-inated against. 
To the end of reaching conclusion on discrunination, both ACT IV GLO and 
Denkavit France discuss the process to be followed. 
97 Case E- 1/04 (EFFA Court) Fokus Bank ASA v Dic Norwegian State, repre-willed bY Me 
1, )ir(, ctor(il(, (? f Taves of 23 November 2004 (hcreinqfter Fokils). 
98 A CTIV GLO para 68. 
"9 Denkavil Fran. ce paras 36-37. 
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Ili the former, the ECJ, having already established incomparability, the analysis was 
of theoretical value only. It was, thus, left to the national court to deternlilie whether 
a tax charge iniposed on the. dividends' recipient cornplies with equal treatment. ")') 
The Court clarified that it does not suffice to consider the fiscal situation ill the state 
of source. Instead, referring to Bouanich'01, it explained that DTCs in force between 
the Member States of source and residence should also be examined. 102 The aiin 
should be to make use of possible tax relief allowed at DTC level. Indeed, the A. G. 
noted that unequal treatment would be eliýnii-nated if the state of residence, in a DTC 
context, relieves 'economic double taxation resultingfirom the imposition ol'ACT 
and UK income taX,. 103 
In Denkavit France, the Court looked at the DTC between France and the 
Netherlands. Yet, a step ffirther was taken here, compared to ACT IV GLO. That is, 
the relevant Netherlands' legislation 104 was additionally checked to ensure that no 
relief was provided unilaterally. The outconie has been as follows. The Netherlailds 
exempted foreign dividends. That did not allow tax withlield at source to be relieved 
by the state of residence - either under the DTC or uni laterally. 
' 05 Therefore, 
following consideration of the payee's fiiial tax liability, the discriminatory result 
reinained. Consequently, the COUrt placed the burden of rectifying discrimination 
onto the state of source. 
To sum up, the test for equal treatment developed in the two ECJ cases oii dividends 
is essentially the followi-ng: where a Member State charges income tax on dividend 
distributions to no j: i-re side nts,, whereas not on distribution,,, made to resIdents, it 
bears the obligation to rectify unequal tream-ient. To decide on the existence of 
unequal treatn-ient, it should be examined whether (or, to what extent) --4-iequafity 
is 
loo ibid. para 7 1. 
101 Case C-265/04 Margaretha Bouatuch vSkatteverkei ['2006] ECR 1-00923. 
102A CTIV OLO para 7 1. 
103 
ibid (A. G. 's Opinion) para 89. 
1(14 it)](-l p1ra 47. 
*105 Ibid para 46. 
I- 
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relieved by the state of the recipient's residence. Thus, the test is structured oil the 
preinise of the following: 
(i) There is a requirement that taxing jurisdiction has been exercised over the non- 
resident taxpayer. 106 That is a condition for establishing comparability between 
resident and non-resident recipients. It could be asserted that, placing one single 
requirement for comparability (i. e. tax charge), creates a broad test. 
In any case, ever since the 'Aivir Fiscal 107 lille of cases, criteria for comparability 
have beeii relaxed. It was then required that identical rules exist for con-1puting the 
tax base. hi inore recent source-state cases, though, such as Asscher and Gerritse, a 
change in the above strict construction appears to have occurred. The mere fact of 
eiVgagitig into corm-nercial activity at source seenis to suffice for eatitleinent to a tax 
treatment equal to residents. In Fokus, the EFTA Court extended coniparability to 
holdings. 108 Citing RBS, it made the following bold statement: 
... the mere 
fact that the, resident shareholders have general tax 
liability in Norway while non-resident shareholders are 
subject to tax in. Norway only with respect to profits which 
they earn there, is not sufficient to prevent the two categories 
from being considered as comparable situations. 109 
(ii) The test involves a con-1putation of the non-resident's final tax liability ill 
coniiection with the. distribution in questimi, It thus consists of examining both DTC 
provisions and unilateral domestic i-neasw-es of the state of residence. 
The judgments in ACT IV GLO and Denkai. lit France do not deal with the possibility 
of absence of a DTC. It is not, therefore, certain whether, in that case, domestic law 
in the state of -residence should still be considered on ail individual basis. Yet, 
arguments in favour of an affirmative answei- could be derived fi-om the Court's 
106 A CTIV GLO paras 56 &61, -, Denkavit. France para 36. 
107 Case C-2170/83 Con-unission c? f the European Cotnmttnllir. ý v, French Republic [19861 ECR 273 
(hereinafter 'Avoir Fiscal). 
'" 1--okits paras 29-30. 
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approacli to the two already decided cases. lu the Denkm4t France decision, 
delivered two months after ACT IV GLO, the ECJ was indeed explicit in stating that 
dornestic provisions of tile state of residence should be considered. "') In that way, 
the Court went further tl-tan the Advocate General, who did not expressly refer to 
domestic law of the state of residence (pursuant to the applicable DTC, or 
oth envise " "). 
The recent judgments ort dividends put forward new tests on equal treati-iient. They 
illustrate that traditional rules of interpretation fail to provide solutions when it 
comes to the status of non-residents. The new scheme, in principle, confirms the 
inter-governryiental nature of the comparisons attached to the Freedoms. In addition, 
it respects the allocation of taxing jurisdiction, as determined by the Member States 
of source and residence. Namely, the state of source has to adjUSt its rules to rectify 
unequal treati, iient of non-residents only when refief at residence does not offset the 
disadvantage at source. 
It. Group Loss Relief 
An EC-wide group taxation system of consolidation allows loss-maknig, group Z-1 
men-ibers to surrender their losses to profitable group entities. That is an immediate 
outcome of consolidation. In light of this, an outline of the current situation in 
connection with loss relief is useful in, identifying the 'restrictioD' that the EIM is 
beino faced with. This is a background to any positive i-ntegratioi-i initiative launched 
to remedy con-iplexities. The judgment in M&S is the. focus in outlining the regime 
of losses in the EC. 
109 ibid para '29. 
"0 I)enkavii France para 47. 
II tr lk 11 bI cl A. G. 's Op i nion p, a5 
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A. Domestic Group Losses in a Multinational Consortium Structure 
The way to M&S, the landmark case on group loss relief, was opened tip iii the late 
1990s by IC. I. ICI concerned group relief within a consortittin of compaiiies of which 
the majority were resident outside the UK. However, complex issues, such as those 
relating to the allocation of taxii-ity powers and taxin jLirisdictioii in the EIM, were 9 
not raised. The claim involved transfers of losses between n-iembers of the 
consoi-tium which were all. resident in the UK. The case was solved through 
n. -mirtstream argimiewation on i-tiffingement of the Freedom of Establishmem caLls-ed 
due to inequality of treatment. Still though, the key point has beell that the idea of 
making loss relief available witl-fin a multinational consorthim was broadly 
considered for the first time. Further, a facet of the repercussions of ICI was the UK 
Finance Act 2000, which extended the UK Group Relief to losses sm-eildered by 
UK-located PEs of (YrOLIP companies resident in other EC Member States. 
B. Consideration qj'Foreign Group Lo, ýse, ý. - the M&S Litigation 
M&S has been one of the n-iost extensively discussed litigation cases ill direct 
corporate taxes. It probably attracted a 'public eye' more than any other tax case 
before the ECJ. 112 The decision was issued on I'Dt" Decen-iber 2005. Further, the 
112 The following Lire aniong the main articles published on M&S: S Dourna and C Naurnbur. g, ? __ 4_71 'Marks & Spencer. Are National Tax Systems EcIaWT 12006] European Taxation 4-3) 1, M Ganirnie, 
'The Impact of Marks &, Spencer Case on US-European Planning' (2005) 33 Intertax 485, D 
Gutmann, "Me Marks & Spencer case: proposals for an alternative way ofreasoning' (2003) 12 EC 
Tax Review 154; H van den Hurk, 'Cross-Border Loss Con-tpensation -The ECJ's Deci,, ion in Marks 
& Sj. )encer and How It was Misinterpreted in the Netherlands' [20061 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 178; M Lang, 'Marks and Spencer - more questions than answers- an analvsis of the 
Opinion delivered by Advocate General Maduro' (2005) 14 EC Tax Review 95 (herehlqfter Lang 
(2005)), ideni 'The Marks & Speiwer Case - The Open Issues Following the ECF,, F nt] Word' 
[2006] European Taxation 54. 'P Martin, 'The Marks & Sj)encer EU Group RellefCase -, t RehLittal 
of the 'Taxing Jurisdiction Argument' (2005) 14 EC Tax Rev ew 61 (hercimifter Martin). 
GTK 
I Z_ 
I 
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Opinion of the Advocate General was delivered half a year earlier (7th April 2005). 
just two inonths after the hearing. 
Briefly, M&S challenged the compatibility of the UK group taxation system Clos-ý 
relief") with the EC Treaty Freedona of Establishment. The facts of the case 
concerned the utilisation, by a UK-resident parent company, of losses incurred by 
companies of the group in other Member States (i. e. Gerniany, France and Belgium). 
The UK group taxation system granted loss relief through. transfers of losses. Those 
were allowed aniong corripanies resident in the UK or, since April 2000,1 13 UK- 
located PEs of EC-resident group companies. 
Two grounds were put forward by the c1ah-fiants to support their allegations of EC 
Law fiffringement: (i) a UK-resident parent is entitled to consider UK-resident 
-subsidiary losses whereas this is not possible if a subsidiary is resident in another EC 
Member State; (n) loss offset is possible if a taxpayer opts for establisliment abroad 
throLigli a branch or agency whereas this opportunity is disabled in the event of a 
subsidiary. 
The case was 1"efelTed to the ECJ for a preliniiiiary ruling by the High 
COLIJ t1 14, 
before which the case was brought following an appeal against the Special 
Cornn-ýssioners" 1 decision. The latter had rejected the claim for cross-border loss 
relief set forth by M&S. 
The Special Commissioners Decision 
Meussen, 'The Marks &Spencer Case: The Final Countdown Has Begun' [20051 European Taxation 
160-163; O'Shea (2006); MP Scheunemann, 'Decision in the Marks & Spencer Case- a Step 
Forward, but No Victory for Cross-Border Group Taxation in Europe' (2006) 34 Intertax 54. 
113 see earlier in this chapter A. Douiestic Group Losses in a Consortium of Multinational Structure- 
UK Finance Act'-1000. 
114 Marks&SI)encer p1c v David Halse -v 
(11M Mspector (? fTaxes) (CH/2003/APP/0181) 2003 WL 
2 1729353 (Ch D); referral made on 2 Mav 2003. 
1j5 Marks&SI)encer p1c v David Halsey (PIM Inspector of Taxes) (SpC 352) [2003] STC (SCD) 70 
(hercinqfter M&S (SPC)). 
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The Special Cominissioners rejected comparability of situation between losses 
ari'Silig ftom activities chargeable to tax 11i the UK and losses which pertain to 
coiYunercial acts falling outside the UK tax jurisdiction. 116 Therefore, losses of 
17 tOreigII SUbsidiaries, normally' being part of the second category, could 
legitimately be deprived of the beDefit of equal treatinent (TEC arts 43 & 48). 
Further, non-comparability was found as regards the difference ill tax treatment, by 
the origin , state, of two types of secondary irivestment. That is, treatment differs 
depeuding on the structure for es-tablislin-ient: brancli or subsidiary. The 
Cornmissioners understand the comparison to be drawn between a donlestic and a 
cross-border situation rather than between the. two choices of legal forill for 
establislunent: 
... neither rule should have the effect of treating nationals of 
the, state of origin less favourably when establishing abroad 
through a branch or subsidiary thaD is the case for the 
comparable don-lestic situation M which the freedom is not 
exercised. '18 
Despite leading to the sarrie outcome, this is a different approach fi-om that taken by 
the Advocate General in connection with this comparison. 
The Opinion qf the Advocate General 
The Advocate General examined both grounds which the taxpayer put forward, for 
urpose of proving that the UK systern of group relief infrinsyes the EC Treaty. t lie p 
The first comparison, which led to a finding of breach, was between the tax position 
of a UK company with local subsidiaries and one with subsidiaries III another 
116 M&, ý (S, ýC) para 99. 
II Z-1 I ies. 111 'n-lis is to the exceptioll that CFC legislat on app] 
M&S (SpQ para 60. 
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Member State. The UK group taxation systen-1 allows transfers of losses amongy UK- 
resident companies of a group. This is an advantage which, however, is not allowed 
ill connection with losses incurred by group subsidiaries resident in other Member 
States. 119 The Advocate General found that the outcome of this disadvall. tkgeous 
treatti-ient qualifies as an 'exit restriction'. It namely 'creates an obstacle such as to 
dissuade companies established in the United Kingdom firom establishing 
, 120 subsidiaries in other Member States . 
Contrary to the Court's judgi-iieut, the Opinion of the Advocate General also 
examined the secoi-id defence ground. The ii-latter involved whether the choice of 
legal forii-i for investment can be of relevance in surreaderi. ng losses to thepriýniary 
establish-ment. Thus, the, claimants challenged the fact that the parent company was 
treated differently, depending on the legal form of its secondary establishment (i. e. 
subsidiarY or PE). The Advocate General considered the features of the UK system 
of group relief as well as cases of PEs' discriminatory treatment in the state of 
source. 12' In M&S, however, that case law could only establish comparability of 
situation on specific conditions. For instance, UK law contains specific provision 
which grants to UK-located PEs of foreign con-Tanies aii equal tream-lent to UK- 
resident subsidiaries. Wbeii it comes to UK group relief, equal treatinem betweeii 
foreign-located PEs and subsidiaries appears out of the question. Thus, PEs' mcoine 
is consolidated with, that of the Head Office whereas subsidiaries under (Troup relief 
retain their independence. 122 Consequemly, the tax regimes wl-Lich the UK, as an 
origin state, applied to subsidiaries and PEs were clearly distinguishable. This 
difference of legal situation rendered the facts incoi-yiparable, which did not allow the 
Advocate General to take his thoughts any further in this field. The result has been 
that the UK could niaintaiýn a differential. treatment between Subsidiaries and PEs of 
UK companies resident/located in another Mernber State. 
AMS (A. G. 's Opin, 011) para 52 
ibld (A, G. 's Opliliot) para 53. 
Tbat is the A voir Fiscal litie of cýises. 
M&S (A. G. 's Opinioii) para 48. 
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It should also be noted that, pursuant to the OECD Report on the Attribution of 
Nofits to PEs, issued in December 2006' 23 
, the fiscal treatment of PEs shall be 
closer to that of independent con-1panies. Under such circumstances, the distinction 
betweeii the two types of secondary establishment does not appear self-evident. In 
any case, however, this is a matter of limited signifficance. Thus, reggardless ot 
comparability and findings of restriction, a Treaty breach is unlikely to be 
established. This is because the set of tt-wee grounds for justification accepted by the 
ECJ, as part of the first ground for defence, would also be applicable here. 
The Judgment qfthe Court 
The ECJ broadly followed the Opinion of the Advocate General and made a finding 
of restriction. This consisted of depriving parent companies with loss-makin(i =1 
subsidiaries, resident in another Member State, of the cash advantagge of group 
I. elief. 
124 Yet, that facility was available to groups fii connectimi with lOSSC', '. " ilICUITed 
by domestic SUbsidiarles. It was held that the restrictioji was 'qfsuch a kind (is to 
, 12- 5 hinder the exercise by that parent company of itsfireedom, of establishment . 
The Court then followed the pattern established in GebharýC' The min of the 
process, was to explore whether there are justificatory gyrounds which render the 
restriction permissible. Allowable justifications were then placed under the scrutiny 
of a proportionality test. 
The ECJ acknowledged territoriality as a valid priiiciple of international taxation aDd 
Cornniunity Law. It clarified, however, that this could Dot justify a lin-litatiOn of 
group relief to losses incurred by resident companies. ' 27 
123 OECD (ed), Report on the Attribution of Prolits to Pe"nanew Establishments (Centrc for Tax 
Policy and Adn-nnistration, Paris 2006) 26 et seq. 
M&S para 32, 
'25 
ibid para 33. 
126 2006) 76. O'Shea Q 
127 M&S pw-a 40. 
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The Court considered the following three grounds for justifying the restriction: 
(i) There I]-ILI,, -, t be protection of the. 'balanced allocation qfthe povver to impose 
taxes' between the different Member States concerned. Thus, profits and losses are 
two sides of the same coin and must be treated syrn. metrically in. the same tax 
systern, 
(ii) The losses may be taken into account twice (i. e. double-dip): 
(iii) There is a tax avoidance risk, mainly the result of loss traffickijig, 
The Justifications under (ii) and (iii) above incorporate straightforward concepts. It 
was, though, the first time that the 'balanced allocation qf the pmver to impose 
taxes' was brought before the ECJ as an argun-ient for justification. Ever since, the 
same ground has reappeared in Rewe Zentraýflnanl, another case of losses, as well as 
in the Opinion of the Advocate General in pending case Oy AA. By contrast, 
coherence is mentioned nowhere in the judgi-nent of M&S, despite the fact that the 
Advocate General primarily based his Opinion on that ground. 
It should be noted that the precise meannig of a 'balanced allocation of taxing 
pmver' reinains vague. The literature which followed the jUdginent set forth 
diverging views. Those ranged fi-om drawing no difference between the concepts of 
'balanced alk)catlon' and 'coherence" 28 to speculations on the system's 
symmetry. 129 Discussion on this will. follow. 
The Court went through each of the justificatory arguments separately and reached 
the following Conclusion: 
12S M Isenbaert and C Vahemark, 'M&S 'udument. the ECJ caught between a rock and a hard place' 3jý 
(2006) 15 EC Tax Review 10,13 (herelliqfter Isenbaert). 
121) P Farmer, 'Tax Law and Policy in an Adolescent European UnioW [2007] BLI116111 for 
Internatioi-ial. Taxation 42,44 (hereltiqfter Farmer (2007))-l M Lana, 'Direct Taxation- 1,; the ECJ 
Heading in the New Direction'. 1- [2006] European Taxation 421 (herema er Lamy (2006)). F . 
ft L, 
Vanistendael, 'The ECJ at the Crossroads- Balancing Tax Sovereignty agamst the Imperatives of the 
Sing-le Market' [2006] European Taxation 413,416 (hercinafter Vaii, stendael (2007)). 
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... restrictive provisions such as those at issue in the main 
proceedings pursue legit4nate objectives which are 
compatible with the Treaty and constitute oveffidiýig reasons 
in the public interest. 130 
There was a novelty in this. Thus, for the first tinie, the ECJ considered the three 
proposed justifications jointly. 13 1 This practice was later confirryied in Revi,, e 
Zentralfinanz, which elaborated further on the concept of Member States' 'balanced 
allocation of power to impose taxes'. It was stressed that this justification was 
accepted in M&S 'only in con* , junction with 
two other grounds, based on the taking 
, 132 into accotint oftax losses twice and on tax amidance . 
Having established that there are valid grounds for justification, the ECJ proceeded 
with the test of proportionality. That is the final stage in the process of establishin(, 
Treaty ii-ifriiigernent. The claimants, together with the Con-miission, set forth two 
arguii-letits 133 in an. effort to convince the Court that the. UK rules were 
disproportioiiatý-. It was thus suggested that any of the following - less restrictive - 
rules could instead apply, for the purpose of tackling the risks of intra-EC loss relief. 
More specifically: 
(i) The foreign subsidiary should have taken full advantage of tile possibilities 
available in its Member State of residence to have the losses taken into account; or 
(ii) A loss recapture takes place once the non-resident lOSS-SUrrendCring subsidiary 
becomes profitable; the an-iount should be incorporated into the taxable profits of the 
coi-lipany which set off the losses. 
The Court did not take up the point on loss recapture. It instead agreed that, in 
specific circumstaiices under point (i), the disallowance of loss relief is a measure 
disproportionate to the objectives pursued. Therefore, according to the ruling in 
130 M&S para 5 1. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Reive Zemraý, finanz, para 41 & the A. G. 's Opinion para 32. 
133 M&S para 54. 
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&S 134 
,a parent coinpany shall be liable to consider losses incurred by group 
subsidiarie-s, resident in other Member States, provided that: 
(1) The, possibilities of loss carry-back or consideration of current-year losses in the 
state of the subsidiary's residence have been exhausted-, and 
(i]) Loss carry-forward in the state of the subsidiary's residence is impossible, even 
by a third party, in particular where the subsidiary has been sold to that tfitird party. 
It follows that, according to the judgment iii M&S, 'refusing cross-border loss relief 
was, in principle, found to be a legitimate restrictimi to the Freedom of 
Establishment. There is only a narrow scope of exceptioii to this. That is, where 
losses cannot be used in the state of the subsidiary's residence anymore. 
Impossibility of use covers both losses' carry-back and carry-forward as well as tax 
losses incurred in the Current year. 
Commentary 
The ruling in M&S has given rise to speculation in. corniection with a number of 
issues relating to the current fiscal status of corporations witlifli the EIM. Some key 
inatters are discussed below. 
1. Is 'allocation' of taxing juiisdiction subjected to the Freedoms? 
Following the ruling in M&S, a question that comes to the fore is to what extent the 
Gill Nl-orig hiating rule on 'allocation' of taxinor power remains valid. As shown, the 
ECJ, hi principle, disallowed cross-border loss relief However, fil a 1ý1-fitecl nun-lber 
of circutiistances, it made consideration of such losses obligatory by the state of the Cý 
subsidiary's residence. In broad tenirs, where the use of losses by the subsidiary is 
not possible anymore, the parent's state of residence should allow those to be 
34 
1 bld para 55. 
considered. This is so, irrespective of the absence of jurisdiction to tax tile revenues 
out of which the losses arose. 
Despite its narrow scope of application, the outcome of M&S has been to place 
allocation' of taxing power under the scrutiny of EC Law. This is ground-breaking, 
in the sense that the 'allocation' of tax jurisdiction has so far been Linderstood to fall 
with-in the exclusive con-1petence of the Member States. 135 It is true that this Giffi- 
established rule, was long expected not to survive the challenges placed by cases 
with more elaborate facts. Thus, the distinction between 'exerclse' and 'allocation' 
became increasingly more difficult to identify. 136 
In light of the narrow constructiortof the rule in M&S, Gill), still appears to set the' 
principle. Yet, it is also a fact that this rule has now been SLII. -)jected to exceptions. 
M&S is one exception and the rulings in outbound dividend distributions' 37 probably 
create a second. Further, tNs override, albeit limited in scope, 114gliliglits ail effort to 
bmig, think-ing)- on equal treatmeDt at the level of the Community. That is, the 
symmetry of the system should be perceived within a cross-border (EC) fi-ainework. 
I 'Coherence' and the "Balanced Allocation of Taxing Power" 
Both the a'hove concepts constitute justification grounds whicli are coininonly used 
iii direct tax cases. Of all justificatory arguments, the above are probably the most 
debated ones. Coherence, despite having beeD tackled in Bachniaiiii, a case decided 
as early as 1992, seems to incorporate a notion under constaiit eVOIUtioll . 
13 8 The 
'balaticed allocation qf taxing povver' is a recent term. It was first used iii M&S and, 
135 0411Y para 30. 
136 
... although 
direct aryalionfidIs ivilhin their competence, Mell'Iber Staies Inust iione the 
exercise that cornpetence consistently ivith Con-imunity law... '. There is no point in listing the specific 
cases which quote this statement, as it appears in, more or less, Lhe ma. ) . ority of'direct tax judgm-ients 
issued by the ECJ- 
137 
/k CTIV GLO, Denkavit France. 
13S esp, see Manninen and Case C-150104 
Commission of the European Commmwie. ý v Kingdom (? f 
Dentnark 120071 ECR 1-00000 (hereina er Conunission v Denmark). . 
ft 
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ever since, reappeared iii ON, AA and Reýve Zewralfi. naiiz. Effi)rts have beeii made m 
the post-M&S tax literature 139 to clarify the nature of the concept and place it with,,, 
the tests of equal treatment. What is more, it has beeii argued that there is an 
i-titerrelatiori between the. above two grounds for just ificat io n. The analysis that 
follows is aii attenipt to shed light onto the matters raised above. Ajiy special 
significance for corporate cases will also be identified as such. 
Coherence 
The concept involves a direct link between a tax rule whicli creates a disadvantage in 
breach of EC Law and a compensatory advantage. 14( ' Following Bachinamil-1], the 
only direct tax case upheld by the Court on coherence (-'rounds, the ECJ elaborated 
on the concept in a number of cases. 142This resulted in a rnucli stricter definition. 
More specifically, the Court ruled that both the infringing provision and the 
compensatory advantage should involve the same taxpayer and the, same tax. 143 That 
rendered the chances Of Success of a coherence defence minimal. Within sLicli a 
framework, especially cases which acconu-nodated economic double taxation did not 
have a chance of meeting , _,, 
the requiren-ients of the cofierence tests. Economic double 
taxation, by definition, involves a scheme of two taxpayers. 
Manninen 144 brought forth a significant chmige. The test was relaxed to allow that 
the disadvantage and compensatory advantage do not occur in the same person. This 
13" R-Tmer (2007) 44; Vc-: mistendael (2007) 416, 
140 J Engliscb, 'Fiscal Cohesion in the Taxation of Cross-Border Dividends' (Pt 2) [20041 European 
Taxation 355,356 (hereinaj? cr Englisch (2004)). 
141 Bachmann paras 23-27. 
142 jilielock-. v; Case C-484/93 Svetisson and Giistai, sson v Miiiislre du Logemew ei de ITIrbanisme 
1-1995] ECR 1-3955, Case C-107/94 Asscher v Stawssecretaris vaii Financlý)i [1996] ECR 1-3089 
(hereinafter Asscher); Melallgesell, whaft: Case C-136/00 RD Daimer [2002] ECR 1-018147 
(hercinqfler Danner). 
141 Enalisch (2004) 356. 
C_ 14-1 Mannineii paras 40 cl secj. 
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new version of the test is also present in the Advocate Generals' Opinions, in M&S 
145 '7 and 0), AA as well as in the judgment in Rewe Zentralfi . ". 
In light of these new developments, cases of econon-& double taxation, such as 
Verkooýjen, could possibly be reconsidered. The aim should be to identify to what 
extent the Manninen approach to coherence could have led to a different ruling 
today. To sustain arguments on coherence, the crucial feature is to establish the so- 
catled Wirect link' between a discri-minatory/restrictive tax provision and a 
compensatory rule. In Verkooiien, relief fi-om corporation tax, levied at the 
distributing conipany level, was given through an exemption at the level of the 
dividends' recipieiit. Considering thtis, a valid justificatioii based mi colierence, 
within an EC context, would require knowledge of the payer's fiscal situation. For 
instance, exen-1ptiOn may be refused iii the origin state if no or low (below a certall, 
minimuin) corporatimi tax is payable 'by the distributing company. 
However, the facts in Verkooýjen show that the direct fillk would be difficult to 
establish due to the nature of the relief rUles. Nan-iely, the exemption amount 
allowable to the dividend recipient was a fixed 0 Ile, 146 which implies that it was not 
determirted in proportion to the corporation tax dLle at SOL11'Ce. In Manninen, by 
contrast, where the amount of tax credit was fixed as a ratio of the arriouut of 
dividends received annually, ' 47 the direct link could be easier to SLISWIII. 
hi M&S, coherence did not appear in the judgment. Yet, it was extensively djSCUSsed 
in the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General. The Mamunen rule was, ill 
principle, followed. Analogy to Manninen did not only involve the presence of a 
second person in the, coherence test,;. It was also significant for initiating the practice 
of examinii-tg the fiscal situatioii across border to explore treatment in the other 
14S ii) paras 71-77-, 0), Ail (A. G. 's Opinion) para 34, Reive Zcniraýfinan- panis M&S (A. G. 's OpilliOn - 
60-6 t. 
146 Ve Iýkooýjejj I-),, TLI 10. 
147 malmiliell par', 8. 
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Men-iber State involved. 148 The Advocate General used the term 'equal trearment ', '49 
which gave rise to criticism by the literature, as the content of tile concept was 
regarded as vague. This is possibly a reason why the Court did not retain the 
Advocate General's analysis on coherence hi the judgment. Still though, it is of 
hiterest to look at this construction. 
With-iii the fi-ame of coherence, 'equal treatnient' refers to an advantageous tax rule 
iii the host state (i. e. state of the loss-i-naking subsidiary). In M&S, that should allow 
the subsidiary to make use of its losses there and as a result, the state of the parent 
company may retain its di scriiiiiii atory/re strict ive regime. Thinking of the economic 
rationale behind 'equal treatinent, it all seems to be directed towards achieving 
neutrality of tax treati-nent in intra-EC transactions. The aim is that bu,,,, Iiie,, "s 
decisions should be distorted to the least extent possible. 
All Midications given by the Advocate Generallso about 'equal trearment' relate to 
the provision of a loss carry-forward facility in the host state and the possibility to 
transfer losses to a third party. However, loss carry-forwards incorporate many 
problematic features whicli may often reacli the point of cancelling the meaililig of 
the term. 'equhyalent'. For instance, most state,, -,, operate son-ie form of loss carry- 
forward. The availability of an uiilij-iiited til-fle span to carry forward would lead to a 
sigrifficant cash-flow disadvai-itage, since loss relief relies on the idea of an instant 
benefit. 151 
All the more so, assunUng that a loss carry-forward is available in the host state, 
disparities in tax base and rates place lin-ýits to neutrality. In such a context, 
equivalent treatment n-iay only be perceived by reference to the Freedoms. That 
con-1plicates the situation, as equivalence of treatment in dealing with the 
148 ibid para 54. 
141) M&S (A. G. 's Opinion) para 76. 
1,50 M&S (A. G. 's Opuiion) para 82. 
1,51 GTK Meussen, 'Cross-Border Loss Relief in the Europem Union followina the Advocate 
General's Opinion In the Mcirks & Spencer Case' [2005] Europeari Taxation 282,284 (heremafter 
Meussen (2005b))'. Mw-tiii 66. 
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subsidiaries' losses should be determined through the rules of one Member State (i. e. 
the parent company's state). 
Balanced Allocation of Taxing Powers 
The ECJ in M&S did not follow the Opinion of the Advocate General. Instead, it 
took a new approach to justification which, as explained earlier, involved a joint 
consideration of three justificatory arguments. Two years after M&S, it was 
coiffirmed in Rewe Zentralfinan. - that the 'balanced allocation qf* taxing pmvers' 
cannot stand individually. 1-53 Instead, it should be considered in conjunction with 
other grounds for justification. 
The meaning of a 'balanced allocation qf taxing powers' is not entirely clear. Part of 
the literature' 54 actually draws a con-elation between t1iis concept ajid coherence, 
implying that both tern-is have a comn-lon point of reference. N comiection witli 
M&S, it has also been suggested that coherence was in the miild of the Court wbell 
discussing the 'balanced allocation *. 1 55 
Quotes fi-on-i M&S and Revve Zentralfinan., delineate the concept in a way which 
brings it close to 'allocation' as established in Gilly long ago. More specifically, the Z7 - 
judoment iii M&S reads: 
... 
in tax matters profits and losses are two sides of the same 
coiii and must be treated symmetrically ill the same tax 
system 41 order to protect a balanced allocatioii of the power 
to impose taxes between the different Member States 
concerned. 156 
... the preservation of the allocation of the power 
to impose 
taxes between Member States might make it necessary to 
15) Lang- (2005) 98. 
1-53 Reive lcntraýfinanz para 41. 
1-54 Isenbaerl 13. 
Lang ('2006) 424. 
1 -56 M& S pam-11 43. 
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apply to the econounic activities of companies established in 
one of those States only the tax rules of that State in respect of 
both profits and losses. 157 
Further, the scope of the concept is delineated in Rewe Zentralfinati. 
... an argument based on the balanced alk)cation of the power 
to impose taxes betweeD the Member States cannot in itself 
justify a Member State systematically refusing to grant a tax 
advantage to a resident parent company, on the ground that 
that company has developed a cross-border econon-k activity 
which does not have the immediate result of generating- tax 
revetwes for that State. 158 
The situation is not, thougli, as straightforward. Thus, if the 'balanced allocation of 
taxing power' merely replicated the rule in Gilýy, the scheme would fall outside the 
scope of the Freedon-i-s. Therefore, there would be no requiren-lent to ulitiate a test oil 
equal treatment. That is because the higher tax burden borne by the claullailt would 
be a result of the disparities (absence of lial-i-noi-iisation) in the Menlher States' tax 
systems. Yet, the 'balanced allocation' has been used as a ground to justify, ill 
conjunction witli other arguments, aii already established restriction. The difference 
is significant. Namely, the 'balanced allocation', as a justificatoi-y (yroui-id, is subject 
to the Freedon-Ls and becomes part of the tests of equal treatment. 
It is obvious that, where 'allocation' of taxiiig power feature, ", as a ground for 
justification, the legal matter does i-iot concern disparities among Member States. In 
cases such as M&S, there is a finding of EC Treaty infringen-lent in the form of 
discrimination or restriction, beijig the outcome of exercise Of SUCli allocated power. 
The balance of allocated power seenis to be threatened where the system of intra-EC 
activity suffers some asyi-niiietry. '--)9 That should non-nall, y take the shape of 
unrelieved losses, unrelieved withholdii-. ig taxes charged on dividend distributions, 
and so on. Asymmetry is the result of taxing the sanie revenues twice or not at all. 4-ý 
1-57 
ibid para 45. 
1-58 Rci. ve lciitraýfinanz para 43. 
15') Fumer (2007) 44. 
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Equally, losses and other deductible arnounts may also be considered twice or not at 
all. 
In the context of the. state-by-state tests for compliance with the Freedon. -Ls, it is often 
necessary to exan-iine the tax regin. -ie across the Ivi-der-, that Is, in another Member 
State. The aim is to ensure that tax is imposed once and relief is also made available 
once in any of the two Mernber States. Consideration is at Con-ii-nunity level. What is 
more, fiscal costs are not aii issue, as neutrality under the EC Treaty does not 
guarantee an equal tax burden. Where symi-netry is absent, the scheme is in breach of 
the Freedoms and the only way to rectify this situation is through interveiling ill the 
Member States' tax bases. Namely, i-n that particular instance, one of the two bases 
will broaden whereas the other will equally decrease. 
Commentary 
In a fi-arnework of facts sin-iilar to M&S, both concepts (i. e. 'coherence' and 
'balanced allocation) have the objective of making losses deductible once. This P-1 
what symmetry require,, -, -, otherwise, the, outcorne may be elther a dOUble-dip ot- the 
losses remain unrelieved. Neutrality of legal tream-lent drives tile thinking behind 
n-iost of the ECJ's judgeii-tents in the field of the EfM. It concerns tile creation of 
such conditions within the internal ii-larket that carrying on con-miercial activity is 
not discouraged if cornpared to sirnilar don-lestic transactions. In this respect, it could 
perhaps be noted that a loss recapture system could possibly serve the objective of 
neutrality/symmetry. It would, namely, allow cross-boi-der transfers, of losses and 
then guarantee neutrality through the recapture. Yet, loss recapture was not referred 
to in the judgmei-it. 
It is apparent that a go-roup taxation scheme of consolidation provides 
for the 
opportunity to set off intra-group losses azg*nst profits. FUrther, SijjCe tj-ýS is meant 
to be a structure functioning separately from national tax systeiw,,, It should feature 
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no risk of double-dip or of leaving the losses unrelieved. Special provisions should 
however be made for loss recapture. Since losses are considered at the level of the 
consolidated group tax base, arrangements should be made if those are recaptured 
once a loss-n-iaking group entity becomes profitable. 
111. The Treatment of Permanent Establishments by the Host 
State 
Oue of the key issues in the taxation of MNEs within the EIM is the tax treatment 
accorded to PEs in the state of their location. 160 Witt-fin a group taxation scheme of 
EC-wide scope, consolidation and apportionment place PEs and Head Offices oil an 
equal footing. Further, instances of disci-iii-tliiatioii/i-esti-ictioii arc not likely to Occur 
internally as COJIM-1-1011 rules are applicable across the group. PEs become significant 
where their Head Offices are resident outside the territorial contours of the group. 
However, those sets of facts exclusively Involve entities resident in third COLIlItIleS, 
and this takes them out of the ambit of the EC. 
The starting line in this, field is Aiwir Fiscal. The ECJ required that branches of 
coii-ipai-iies resident in another Mei-nber State should be accorded equal treatment to 
resident subsidiaries. The naaiii, argui, -nent has been that tax charges were imposed to 
the above two fori-yis of secondary e stab] ishme nt without distinction. Si. milar rulings 
were given in the line of cases whicli followed the path of Ailvir Fisml: 
Commerz-1)(ink 161 , RBS 
162 and S(iint Gob(iin- Coiisiderijig that the same tax rules were 
160 For a cletalled exan-unation of the implicatic)ns associated with awardbig residence or simply 
prantuig entitlement to the DTC benefits, ýee-. HE Kostense, 'The Saim-Gobam case and the I- 
applicatioli oftax treaties. Evolution or revolution'. 1' (2000) 9 Ec Tax Review 220 et seq. 
161 Case C-330/91 Rv IRC, ex parte Commerz-fiank AG [19931 ECR 1-4017 (licreille! fter 
Commer 
. 7balik). 162 Case C-311/97 Ro 
, 
yal Bank of Scodmid plc v E1111-ilko Dimosio (Greek State) 11999] ECR 1-265 1 
(herelnqfter RBS). 
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applicable, comparability Of SitUation was found to exist between domestic 
conipanies and EC-resident foreign companies with local PEs. 
Saint Gobain is a step ftirther in the Avoir Fiscal line of cases. 163 It brouglit the 
application of 'national. treatment' in the host state up to the level of DTC 
entitlement. The case examines the situation froin the perspective of the host state 
(i. e. the state of the PE's location). It raises the issue of a PE's equal treatment at the 
level of DTCs. More specifically, the question is whether EC Law requires that a PE 
should be entitled to the benefits of DTCs concluded by the state of its location. 
rawing from Avoir Fiscal, it should be a prerequisite for the above that a PE's tax 
base is computed pursuant to the same rules as those applicable to resident 
companies. The question of DTC entitlen-ient arose fi-oin the fact that DTCs, in their 
status as international. agreements, are part of the legal order of the state of the PE's 
location. Therefore, it would be inconsistent with 'iiational treatment' to deprive PEs 
of the advantages arising from the law of that state. 
This cannot, however, lead to a straightforward conclusion. 
One concern was whether a PE's entitlement to DTC benefits ". 110L11d be coupled 
with tax residence in the host state. On this point, the ECJ did not z(--Yýo ally 
further 
than concluding that PEs of non-resident coinpanies should be granted DTC 
advantages 'on the same conditions as those ývhich (tj)j)1, v to resident comj)anies'. 164 
It follows that the Court did not determine which DTC should be applied In the 
given triangular context. Nor did it enter into a discussion about how the treaty 
benefits would be conferred on a non-resident (i. e. the PE). 
A second issue involved whether the benefit entitlenient presupposes that the PE is 
subject to worldwide taxation in the host state. In Saint Gobain, the PE was taxable 
163 R Offermanns and C Romano, 'Treaty Benefits for Permanent Establishments: TheSamt-Gobam 
Case' [20001 European Taxation 180,187 (hereinqfter Offermanns and Romano). 
"" Saint Gobam para 58. 
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in Gerinany on foreign dividend income attributed to it, which was Linderstood to 
equal an unlimited tax liability. 
Both the above questions have as yet not been given a definite answer. 
A third con-iplexity related to the legitimacy of extending DTCs to third parties (i. e. 
non-signatory parties). 165 Under public hiternational law, 'treaties may neither 
impose obligations on, nor create rights for, third states'166, eXCept if tlIe third party 
gives its comsent to the above. The consent, where it concenis entitlen-ient to rights, 
may be presumed, unless the Treaty in question provides otherwise. Coll siderin g that 
a PE's entitleinent to the host state's Treaty benefits makes sense because that DTC 
is more beneficial, a case of presunied assent could potentially be arguable. 
Saint Gobain starts off from a simple affirination. That is, to the extent that PEs and 
resident companies are subject to the san-le fiscal rules, they shoLild also be entitled 
to the same benefits. Thus, this would create a neutral setting as regards the choice 
of legal form for (secondary) establisimient. It is, however, doubtfttl whether EC 
Law places any sLicli requiren-lent. On the other hand, awardinQ a PE with i-esidence 
sI tatus appears a distant prospect and this is, by no mean,;, a necessity in achieving 
EC Law coinpatibility. 
It follows fi-oin the above that Saint Gobain does not provide a definitive solution to 
the issue of PE eutitlement to DTCs. This is partly due to the peculiarities attached 
165 see also: Offermaims and Romano 184 & 187-, in the author's opinion, Salia Goball, is not a case 
dealina with MFN. which was anyway rejected in 'D'. This case may have iiivoIvtd an exteiislon ofa 
DTC to a third party. However, the set of facts in Saint (., obaui does not fit thu conditions for 
applying MFN. Thus MFN is about allowing entitlement to the most favourable provisions conceded 
by the taxing state, in a specific issue, through its DTCs. In Saint Gobaln, the aim was not to give the 
PE the most favourable tax treatment available under DTCs concluded by Germmy m comiection 
with receipts of l'oreign dividends. The claina primarily required equivalent Lreatmeiit to that of 
German-resideiit companies. MFN within the EC was, in any case, rejected in 'I)'. However, the 
Court in 'I)' Aso turned down the proposition of'sil-MlariLy to Saint Gobain. It was cxplicitly pointed 
out that. the two cases involved a different comparison. ["aV1,, (2, d 166 A Cassese. haermitional edn Oxford University Press, 2005) 170-17 1. 
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to the facts of the case, which do not allow conclusions to) be drawn. Progress in the 
area should therefore be expected through ftiture litigatiom. 
IV. Intra-Group Asset Transfers 
Asset transfers arnong associated companies can be distinguished into two groups: 
(i) those falling within the s-cope of the EC Merger Directive 107; they qualify for a 
deferral of tax on the gain accruing to the transferor; and (u) those considered by the 
Court for compliance with EC Law on the basis of the ftindamental. freedoms. The 
first category (i. e. Leltr-Bloein 168, Sevic Systems 169), linked to the interpretation and 
application of the EC Merger Directive, is examiried as part of Chapter 2 on positive 
integration. 
The leading authority ill the second category (where the EC Merger Divective is 
excluded) is X and Y. This is a case on group taxation. The ECJ found a Swedish 
rule which excluded fi-om tax deferral transfers of shares at undei-value to he iii 
breach of the Freedom of Establishment. The transfers were made by a Swedish 
legal person to ali associated Swedish limited compai-ly, while the latter was lield by 
a foreign parent. This was a case of illegal restrictioii in wh-ich the traiisferor wits 
deprived of a cash advantage because the parent of the transferee was situated iii 
another Member State. 170 The restriction consisted of a linfitation to the right to 
invest in foreign-hel. d conipardes. Arguinents of tax evasion were put forward to 
justify the non-deferral. Thesemainly focused on the association aniong the group 
167 Council Directive (EEC) 90/434 of 223 July 1990 on the cormi-ion system of taxation applicable to 
mergers, divisions, traiisfer of assets and exchanges of shares conceming companies of dilftrent L, I- I- 
Member States [ 19901 OJ L225 (herein-qfter EC Merger Directive). 
168 Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloetn v bispecteur der Belastitigdietisil-Otideniciiiingeii Amsterdam 2 [19971 
ECR 1-04161 (hercinqftcr Leur-Bloem). 
169 Case C-4.11/03 SII-VIC S, illstems Akfiengesellseliqft ), Ainisgericht Neuvvied [20051 ECR 1-10805 
(hereinqfter Sevic 
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elltities which were parties to the transaction. However, the ECJ, in line with its 
settled jurisprudence, interpreted anti-abuse provisions strictly. It was held that 'tax 
evasion or tax. fralid cannot he iqferred generally... 171 and that the provision in 
issue was 'not specýfically designed to exclude from a tax advantage purely artýficial 
arrangements'. 172 
DeBaeck 173' which followed, was not a corporate case, Here, the transteror was an 
individual. The facts generated legal issues in the nature of X and Y' 74 , since an 
association between the transferor and the transferee was, again, of relevance. 
Cotilpared to X and Y, DeBaeck dealt with a much n-lore straightforward restriction: 
the transfer of shares to a foreign company'led to a charge to capital gain,, tax 
whereas a similar transfer to doniestic: conipanies did not. 
It follows that, where the EC Merger Directive is not of application, intra-group 
asset transfers are treated by the ECJ under equal terms to those of all other cases 
decided on the basis of the Freedoms. Further, the arguments for justification do not 
present features peculiar to asset transfers. Rather, they abide by the mainstream rule 
of tion-discriiiiiiiatioiiliioii-resti-ictioii tests discussed under Part A of this chapter. 
Intra-group asset transfers are eliminated when they take place within a group 
taxation scheme of consolidated base. It follows that equal treatn-ient is unlikely to 
be breached in this context. However, disci-iii-ý-natioii/resti-ictioti should becoine 
relevant where a group tenninates or an asset leaves the group, whicli implies that 
capital gains n-iay need to be recaptured. 
"0 X and Y para 3 S. 
171 
ibid para 62. 
172 
ibid para 6 1. 
173 Case C-268/03 Claude De Baeck v Belgische Smat [20041 ECR 1-05961 (heremalier T)eBa(-, ck). 
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Conclusion 
In devising an EC-wide group taxation system, the jurisprudence of the ECJ is a 
field of necessary background knowledge. It thus protects the legislator from makingy 
choices which may later be struck down by the Court as illegitimate. The non- 
discriiiiination/iion-i-estiictioii tests feature a structure based, in niany cases, on a 
coi-i-1parison between domestic and equivalent cross-border facts. This 'bilateral' 
thinking is structured on a preiidse which, is ffindamentally different from tile 
rationale behind coi-yiprehensive approaches. Considering this, the case law of the 
ECJ is meant to act more Lis a safeguard rather than as a source of inspiratim in 
connection with positive integration initiatives. 
In addition, the jurisprudence often acts as guidance to the legislator. It identifies 
specific national features which infringe the Treaty. Those may theii be tackled at C7 
EC-level through projects in the field of positive integration. Keepilig track of 
developii-ients in. the case law is therefore essential to a thorotigh Linderstanding of 
legislative iiittiatives. For instance, m the aftermath of M&S, there seems to be son-ie 
acti. on in the w-ea of cross-border IOSSC S. 175 The same applies to exit taxes 
177 178 
following de L(iste. yrie and N 
The ECJs jurisprudence intervenes to rectify a Treaty infringement. Oil the other 
hand, an EC-wide group taxation system reaches for the broader objectives which 
permeate the EC Treaty as a whole. The latter are in principle non-enforceable but 
contribute decisively to the process of market integration. A discussion of those 
objectives will follow in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
174 
ibid para 24. 
175 Conunission (EC), 'Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations' (Comn-iunication) COM 
(2006) 824 final, 19 December 2006 (hereinqfier COM('2006)824), 
176 COMIIIISSIoll (EC), 'Exit Taxation wid the Need for Coordinatioii of Member States' Tax Policits' 
(Conunun Ication) COM (2006) 825 final, 19 December 2006 (hereillqfler COM(2006)8-')5). 
177 Case C-9/02 Hughes de L(isi(ýyrie du Saillant v Miiiisiýrc ele IT-cmionde, des Finance. ý et de 
VIneluvric [2004] ECR 1-02409 (hereinafter de Lasteyl-le). 
178 Case C-470/04 Nv h'ispecteur ) an de Belasiingdlen, w Oosilkatitoor Alinclo [2006] ECR 1-07409 
(hercinqfler N).. 
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POSITIVE INTEGRATION RELEVANT TO 
GROUPS 
Introduction 
Through the. lens of the objectives central to the EIM, this chapter exal-nines the 
legislative activity of the European Comniunity-in the field of corporate taxation. 
The focus will be on corporate groups. In any case, the vast majority of corporate tax 
issues at European level involve arrangements between associated companies and, 
therefore, have a direct impact oDgroups. The analysis will covei- both legislative 
initiatives which never came into ftuition as well as the law currently in force and 
plans for future development. 
Most positive integration initiatives have so far been received Nvith SLUSPICiffll, if not tý 
hostility, by the Member States, whicli exl-)lains the pooi- record of lquislative acts. 
The current Histitution-al. structure of the EIM in taxation involves a low deoree of 
integration if con-1pared to state entities of a federal StrUCtUre. PILIS, in the area of 
direct taxes, hi particular, strong intergoverni-fiental featUres dominate the applicable 
regime. The competence to legislate direct taxes primarily rests with the Member 
States. The EC Treaty does not explicitly confer any power on the Coinliunity in 
relation to direct taxation. Neither does it set any harnionisation objectives in this 
field. All legislative action so far taken has found legal ground in TEC art 94. The Z7 
rule provides, on the prerequisite of ui-iaDij-YiitY, for laying down rules ain-ling at the 
approximation of laws, affecting the establishi-iient or functioning of the comi-rion 
market. 
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Part A: Unsuccessful Integration Efforts up to the 
early 1990s 
The idea of harmoiiising corporate taxation across the EIM is not a developi-new of 
the 1990s or the early 21" century. Instead, it appears as early as iii the policy 
documents of the 1960s. In the Segre Conu-nittee Repo rt179' published iii 1966, it is 
expressly i-nemimied that the fiscal systems in Europe should not obstruct the 
creation of conditions similar to those of an internal market. The report fLirther 
stressed the iinportance of location neutrality and of neutrality in the form of 
secondary mvestmeiit. 180 Additionally, son-ie of the most cutting-edge issues, 
currently under discussion, had been identified by the Segre Coininittee as areas for 
action. Just by Uidicatiou, the Report included proposals for the replacenielit of 
existinLy bilateral DTCs by a multilateral treaty concluded ammig the Member States. 
Issue',; such as the exteiision ()f tax credits to no ii-re side iit shareholders, latei- foLmd 
to be in breach of the EC Treaty'81, were also within the areas of recommeilded 
action. Surprisinoly eiiough, the approximation of corporate tax bases also feautrecl 
as an item for urgem action in the Comn-tission progranune for harmoiiisatioji of 
direct taxes. '82 This was published in the aftermath of the work of the Segre 
Con-muttee. 
Bui-lding on the developi-nem of the 1960s, the following years saw legislative 
initiatives in the form of Conunission Reports and Proposals for Council Directives. 
179 Commission (EEC), -Le D6velopment d'un MarcM Europ6en des Cap'taux' (Report of the Group 
of Experts), 1966. 
"' For more detlails, stfe- A Easson, 'Harmonisation of Direct Taxation in the, European Community 
From Neumark to Ruding' (1992) 40 Canadian Tax Jounial 600,604 (hereinaJier Easson). 
181 By indication, the key ECJ Judgements in this area are- Baar. 5, llerkooýjen, 
Len. -I., Manninen. 
182 Easson al. 605. 
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Some dealt specifically with corlx)rate taxes in the EIM but all failed to reacli 
frUitIOn until the early 1990S. 
183 As taxation has always lain at the heart of state 
sovereignty, harmonisation of direct taxes proved to be a project too premature to 
materialise in the 1970s and 1980s. Even where pl, ol-. )osal. s only took the shape of 
specifically targeted measures, sucli as the Parent-Subsidiary and EC Merger 
Directives, significant delays occurred. 'Fhe above Directives were only adopted in L- 
1990 fol-lowing their initial proposal in 1969. Son-le of the unsuccessfully prol-x)sed 
measures are worth mentioniiig, as they are relevant to group taxation. 'Fhey could 
possibly prove useful in assessing currently pending initiatives in the same field. 
Orte key topic of debate is whether the approximatimi of corporate tax rates should 
be an-iong the EIM objectives. The position taken in the Commission Proposal 1975 
has been in favour of approximation in a range betweeii 45 and 55 percent. 1 ý)4 The 
saii-ie policy choice has been confirmed in the subsequent documents up to the 
Rudhig Report' 85 in 1992, whicli incorporated a suggestimi foi- a bandwidtli of 30 to 
40 percent. Ever since, corporate tax harmonisation initiatives have focused on the 
prospect of a harmonised tax base COLIpled with a system of profit allocation to 
eligible Member States. ThLe system allows national tax rates to continue applying. 8() 
In a short note published in early 2005'8', Onno RUding took a stance in faVOL11- Of 
tax rate approxin-lation. He iiisisted on that necessity, for the purpose Of tackling 
183 Commission (EEC), 'Proposal for a Directive on the H, -Ti-nonisation of 
Systems of Company 
Taxation and of, Withholding T. ix(--s on Dividends', I Auoust 1975 and Bullctin of the European 
Communities, supplen-tent 10/75 (liereinafter Commissim Proposal 1975), Commission (EC), 'Scope 
for Conver gence of Tax Systeims in the Con-irriunity' (Report) COM (80) 139 final, 27 March 1980 
(hereinqVier Commission Report 1980). Jdem 'Proposal for a Council Directive on the Harnionisation 
of the Laws of the Member States reh'iting to Tax Arrangements for the Carry-Over of Losses of' 
Undertakings' COM (84) 404 final (hereinqfter Proposed Directive 1984). idem 'Proposal for a 
Council Directive Concernýig Arrangements for Taking into Account by Enterprises of the Losses of 4 C- 1.1 
their Permanent Establishments and Subsidiaries Situated in Other Member States' COM (90) 59-S 
ftnal, 28 November 1990 Uiereinqfter Proposed Losses Directive). 
184 Coninussion Proposal 1975, Bulletin of the European Commun 1 ties, supplement 10/75 at 9 and 19. 
185The Ruding Report. 
"' Con-mussion (EQ, 'Towards an Internal Market without Tax Obstacles' (Con-ii-nunication) COM 
(2001) 582 final, 23 October '2001,16 (Iiereinqfter COM(2001)58-)). Commission (EQ, Vompanv 
Taxation in the Internal Market' (Commission Staff Working Paper) SEC (2001) 1681,233 Octobtr 
2001,380 (hrreinafter Staff'Paper). 
187 HO Ruding, 'T'lic Past and the Future of EU Corporate Tax' (editorial) ('2005) 14 EC Tax Rc\, ic%v L- 
I 
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cases of distortion and discrimination within the EIM. His proposal is for a rate span 
between 20 and '30 percent (or 3_15 percent) which, to his understanding, call also 
retain a level of competition an-long Men-iber States. It is true that tax rate diversity 
n-lay contribute to enhancing tax competition. within the EIM but is also associated 
with disadvantages. It risks defeating the objective of inter-jurisdictional equity, as it 
distorts the choice of place of investment. It should be noted that the effect is 
expected to be a lot ii-iore intense in. a context of source-base taxation, which is often 
the applicable system within integrated markets. 
Another issue which the Commission, sought to settle as early as 1975 concerned the 
extension to all shareholders of relief available against tax liability i. 11 the state of 
residence. The proposed provisions gave entitlen-ient to a partial i-n-iputation credit, 
which was to -be granted at the expense of the state of source. 
'" More specifically, 
the dividend recipient would be entitled to deduct the credit ainount fi-oin its final tax 
liability at the state of residence. The imputatloii credit would be coinputed as a 
percentage of the corporation tax paid at source. That would be deteniiiiied by tile 
state of residence within a range of 45 to 55 percent. '90 Tile sum of the imputation 
credit was then to be recuperated fi-oin the state Of Source, which was to beal- tile 
respective cost. Consequently, the credit cost Obliterated the advaiitaoe of the 
withholding tax (levied by the state Of Source Lll')Oii distribution). The puri-)ose Of this 
con-1pensatory payment was to alleviate the erosiou of tile tax share of tile state of 
residence. Such a scherae clearly departs fi-om the principles of inter-i urisdictio 11al 
equity'91 which promote source-base taxation withiii markets of a high degree of 
integration. What is more, the mechanism involved a great deal of administrative 
impracticality. The Rudhig Report, in dealing with distributions, stayed fin-n to the 
188 Easson 607. 
`9 Commission Proposal 1975 12 &21. 
190 ibid 10- 11 & 20. 
'191 PB Musgrave, 'hit erjuri sdiction al Coordination of Taxes on Capital Income' in S Cnossen (ed), 
Tax Coordinatiot) in the European Commitniry (Kluwer, 1987) 197,202 et seq. (hereniqlier 
Musgrave (1987)),, idem 'Fiscal Coordination and Competition in an International Settlnza' In L Eden 
(ed), Retrospecli"cS of' PlIbliC Finance (Duke University Press, 1991) 276,294-296 (hereInaper 
Musarave ('1991))i idem 'Inter-jurisdictional equity in compariv taxation. principles and applications 
to the European Union' in S Cnossen (ed), T(Lving Capital Income M the TDiropean Union (Oxford 
University Press, 1995) 46,53-54 (heremqfter Musgrave (1995)). 
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imputation credit bUt seern,,; to have abandoned this compensatory aspect of the 
Co"I'llission Proposal 1975. 
The Co"I'llission Proposal 1975, which. took steps to tackle the issues set out atx. )N, c 
for the first ti-me, was badly received by the parliament and was fiiially withdrawn in 
1990. 
Aii effort to lay dowii a systeni of cross-border loss relief In the context of groups of 
companies was made by virtue of the Proposed Losses Directive in 1990. Despite 
the support given to this Proposal by the Ruding Report two years later, the atterrTt 
to reach agreement by the Member States was unsuccessful. That led the 
Commission to withdraw it for further consideratimi in 1999. The Proposed Losses 
Directive put forward a solution of cash flow advantage, as it provided for a loss 
recapture inechanism. The sclietne involved a recaptLire of losses once the subsidiary 
became profitable or, at the latest, by the end of the fifth year following 
consideration of a loss an-iount. 19.2 It is further clarified that the taxable income of 
each subsidiary ,, hall be con-1puted in accordance witli the rules of the Men-iber State 
of its tax residence. 193 Finally, the law makes specific reference to states that 
maintain an alternative loss relief metliod, such as consolidation, and allows tliem to 
retain it. 
194 
The proposed system, designed as a cash flow advantage, auns at preventing the 
same losses from being surrendered more thaii once Cdouble-dip'). This is all 
objective wNch may be circumvented, unless appropriate domestic anti-abLise rules 
are put in place. Potential problems lie in the imeractioii betweeii the Directive rules 
and existing domestic systems of group relief. For instance, a risk could surface if 
domestic law,. such as the UK system, allowed horizontal loss relief (i. e. losses of a 
subsidiary to be set off against the profits of a sister subsidiary). In such an event, 
192 Proposed Losses Directive rts 9& 10. 
IQI ibid art 9(2). 
FW ibid art. 12. 
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the PAM isions of the Directive did not preclude that the loss be sw-reiidered twjce. '9ý' 
If this Proposal had coine into truitioji, it could probably have prevented case,,,, and 
notably M&S, fi-om reaching the Court. 
The Proposed U)sses Directive specifically targeted at solving loss relief problems 
within groups rather than addressing a wider spectrun. -i of issues. A comprehensive 
scheme would instead extend to areas such as transfer pricing, thin capitalisation, tax 
deferrals in cross-border intra-group transfers. 196 The recuperation of losses also 
witnessed a systei-ri which essentially abided by the surviving inter-governmental 
character of the EIM.. Each sovereign state strived for the integrity of its tax base. By 
contrast, a supra-national approach would possibly deprive the surrendering 
subsidiary fi'0111 using the losses in the future rather than arrange, a recapture. 
The issue of intra-EC tosses' tax treatment was reconsidered by the Comillis'sloll ill a 
Communication of December 2006.197 Three alternatives for loss relief in cross- 
border situations were proposed: 
(i) A D(, i finitii., e Loss Tmnyfer ('intra-group loss tranýfel-') which involves a 
permanent transfer of losses (or profits). There is no recapture when the SUrrendering 
company makes a profit. It is also me. n. tioned that some clearing system may need to 
be devised, for the purpose of compensating the loss-absorbing Member State, 
(ii) Tempor(v-v Loss Tran, ýfel- ('de(ltt(-tionll-eilitegi-atioli method'): this is a inethod 
providi-ngy a cash-flow advantage. The loss is recaptured by the surrendering Z-- 
company once it becomes profitable. 
(iii) Curl-ent Taxation of Subsidiary's results (', ývstem ofconsolidated pipfits')-, this 
is system of bring-ing together, at the level of the parent company, all profits and 
losses of a group's members. A deduction of the tax paid by each of the gn-mip 
subsidiaries in their states of residence should be inade available to the parent. Here, 
loss relief is an in-in-iediate outcome of consoliclation. 
Easson 625. 
196 s Thiý ; all Ipproach taken by the Con -rýssioii Staft'Paper of 2001, which, al art I'mIll , Pcl: lfic, 'IIY 
targeted measures. also puts forward compreheiisive solutions. 
197 COM(2006)824. 
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Part B: Successful Legislative Initiatives 
Positive integration in the field of corporate taxatioii has beeii Iiii-lited iii scope and 
could be divided into two phases: (i) the group of initiatives which materiallsed ill 
1990 (i. e. P-S Directive, EC Merger Directive and Arbitratioil Convention) and (ii) 
the so-called Tax Package, adopted on 3d June 2003, part of the content of w1lich 
(i. e. Interest & Royalties Directive'" and the Code of Conduct) has a strolig 
relevance to MNEs. 
A brief overview of positive integration is given below. Analysis is kept short, as 
this work does not aim at entering into a compreliensive analysis of secondary 
Comi-n-unitY law in the field of tax. Son-ie basic infonnation is set as a ]: )ack(-']-()Lliid to 
the core part of the thesis, which looks into the prospect of devising a group týlvltlon 
scheine for MNEs applicable across the EIM. 
(i) Parent- Subsidiary Directive 
Provision is made for the abolition of withholdino- taxes on dividend disti-ibutioms at Zý 
source and for the prevention of double taxatim through relief (i. e. underl ing credit y 
or exen-iption) at the level of the parent con-ipany. The Directive was recently, 
99 
an-iended to extend its ambit to a wider list of companies, which also Includes the 
European Company (SE). 200 Part of the amendment has also been to provide for a 
S non system of taxation 19' Council Directive (EC) 2003/49 of 3 Julie 2003 on Lt conin I applicable to 
interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States [20031 
OJ L 157 (1 &R Direct i ve), 
ctive on I kinuary 2004) [20041 01 Council Directive (EC) 2003/12 of 22 December 2003 (et'le - 
L007/0041-0044. 
2" Council Regulatl0f, (EC) -1157/2001 of 
8 October 2001 on the Statute for a Europeaii Conipaiiý- 
(SE) [200 1] OJ L294/0001-0021 (hereinafter SE Regulation), I- 
f) 
gradual reductimi dowii to 10 percent in 2009 of the holding requiremelit for 
applicatimi of the P-S Directive. Emitlemew has also beell granted to PEs and to 
cases of i-ndirect holdings (provided that tax has been paid by at least one of the 
subsidiaries in the chain). 
Some coii-lplexity arose in relation. to the required ininimum holding period . 
20 1 The 
902 ECJ ruled on the issue in Denkai, ir and drew a distinction between: (a) the 2-year 
holding require ment, for the purpose of being granted a definitive entitlement to the 
privileges of the Directive and (b) the requirement that a full 2-year holdiýng Period 
, -should have been completed at the time that the respective return for the dividend 
distributiorL is filed with the Authorities or the distribution takes place. Nan-iely, the 
2-year holdbig period iiwans that, if the parent con-1pany disposes of its holding 
before the required time span elapses, dividend distributions are taxable. That ], "., 
they no longer qualify for the benefit of the P-S Directive. This does not, however, 
imply that distributions taking place in the meantin-ie cannot seek entitlement to the 
Directive. I 
The ECJ has interpreted the concept of 'withholding tax' in Athinalki20,, ' . 
The facts 
concerned a Greek Subsidiary company whicli distributed profit to its Netlierlands, 
parent. The relevant all-10LIlItS had been subjected to corporation tax at source witli 
exhaustion of ftirther liability pursuant to the relevant provisions of Greek inconle 
tax. However, the specific category of iiicon: ie where exhaustion OCCUrS tl-tl*()Llgll 
taxation at source is subject to aii additional tax burden due upon distribution or 
capitalisation. This is typically still classified as 'corporation tax' under Greek law. 
The Court, stayingy firm to its principle of substance over for-ni 204 , rejected the 
reasoning that the challenged tax liability qualified as corporation tax. Instead, it was 
conviiiced that it actually functioned as a withholding tax. This was found to he so, 
'201 P-S Directive art. 3(2). 
202 jC ItC,,, ýCs )II C-283/94, C-291/94 and C 292/94 Denkailli Iwernational BV a. o. v BuIldesallif flir 
Fhianzen [19961 ECR 1-5063 (herrinqfterDoikavii). 
203 Case C-2294/99 Athinaiki Zvthol-, )oiia AE v Elleniko Dimos"O [2001] ECR 1-06797 (hero'nafter 
Alhinaiki), see also. I Stavropoulos, 'ECJ: Greek Income Tax Provision is a Withholding "'vithin the 
Meamrig, ofthe Parent-Subsidiary Directive' [20022] European Taxation 94 et secl. 
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despite the fact that the respective amoums were to be borne by the distributing 
corripany . 
205 An argLI111el. 1t featuring in the ruling is that the arising tax liability could 
not be offset through the use of negative incoi-ne fi-om previous tax years. With 
certai-i-ity, this was at odds with the pruiciples allowing a loss carry-forward. )06 It was 
thus understood to bighlight the distinction of that particular charge from corporate 
taxes. Consideririg that the distribution in issue fell within the scope of the P-S 
Directive, the arising tax liability was found to be prohibited. 
A fh-ial remark in coiuiection with- the P-S Directive concerns the compatibility of 
Article 4(2) with the Freedom of Establishn-lent. The provision allows Member 
States to retaiii national recyii-nes of non-deductibility of 1-iolding charges at the level 
of die parent company. The ECJ refrained from considering precisely the 
compatibility issue hi Bos(. d, fin-fiting itself to the. statement that the option of Article 
4(2) may be 'exercised onl-)., in conipliance with thefund(imental proi,, Isions (#'tlie 
Trewv 
. 
'07 
(ii) EC Merger Directive 
Ttie Directive allows the deferral of tax on the gain arising fi-om cross-border 
corporate restructurings. Those may be carried out in the form of niergers, divisions, 
transfers of assets in exchange for securities or schen-les of 'exchange of shares'. ")' It 
is beyond the scope of t4is work- to give details of how each of the above 
restructuring tech-niques can be accomplished. It should be clarified, though, that the 
tax deferral is only a cash advantage meant to last until a later disposal of the assets. 
In a recent amendment209, the ambit of the Directive was extended to cover 'split- 
offs'210 in exchange for shares in the receiving company. 
N4AMinaiki para 27. 
205 G Rolle, 'Is Corporate Income Tax a Withholding Tax'-' Some Cormients on the Adimaiki 
Zj, thopoiia Case' (200-33) 12 EC TaxReview 36,39. 
266 Athinaiki para-29- 
207 Bosal parn 26. 
208 EC Mer , ger 
Directive art 
20c) Comicil Directive (EC) 2005/19 of 17 February 22005 [20051 OJ L058/0019-0027. 
210 njis involves traiist, ers of assets that constitute a distinct branch of activity. 
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Despite having been in force since 1992, the EC Merger Directive has been used by 
the Men-iber States- to a very lin-ifted extent - if at all. This is so, becaLISe the 
corporate law framework for implenienting the Directive is inissing in a number of 
countries. Headway is expected to occur through the corporate basis for 
restructurings given by the SE Regulation. Again, however, further coordinated 
action is required. The SE Regulation only provides for mergers of public limited 
liability con-ipanies of different Men-iber States. An additional condition is that the 
merger should lead to an SE. In that context, it should be noted that, in Sevic 
System-S211' the Court found the German corporate law on mergers in breach of the 
Freedom of EstablisluxieDt. Illegitimacy originated in the unavailability of corporate 
provisions allowing cross-border iýiiergers. 
The scope of the anti-abuse provision of the EC Merger Directive 212 has been 
interpreted in Leur-Bloem. The Court gave a strict literal interpretation of the anti- 
abuse clause. It ruled that, if the operation was not carried out for 'valid commercial 
reasons', there is a presumption of tax evasion or avoidance. There is no common 
view in the literature about whether the presumption is reftitable. -)13 hideed, it was 
also suggested that a general 111le auto iiiat ical ly excluding certain categories of 
operations froin- the scope of the Directive goes further than necessary. It is therefore 
disproportionate to the objects it pursues and so in breach of EC Law. 
(iii) EU Arbitration Convention 214and Soft Law on Transfer Pricing 
Transfer pricing disputes are part of an MNE's everyday life. They involve 
excessive conipliance obligations and have proved considerably th-ne-consun-Mig. In 
211 ýee also. A Rainer, 'ECJ Hear Case on Cross-Border Mer-ers' (EC Tax Scene) (2005) 33 Intertax 
405. 
21 2EC Merger Directive art II (1)(a). 
-)13 
L- 
F Hoenjet, 'The Leur-Bloem judgment: the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the 
interpretation of the anti-abuse clause in the Merger Directive' (1997) 6 EC Tax Review 206,214. 
214 Convention (EEC) 90/436 of 23 July 1990 on the elimination of' double taxation in connection 
with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises - Final Act - Joint Declarations - Unilateral 
Declarations [ 1990] OJ L225 (hereinqfter EU Arbitration Convention). 
76 
these circun-istances, an EU Arbitration Convention was proposed, for the purpo)se of 
acting as a dispute settlement n-lechanisn-i. The aiii-1 was to provide for an EC-wjde 
framework for the. elimination of double taxation in transfer pricing disputes. 
Despite the initial plan to give it the f6mi of a Directive, the instrument was finally 
enacted as a n-iult i lateral international agreernem. This takes its 
interpretation/application out of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Unlike the Mutual 
Agreement procedure in the context of DTCs, the EU Arbitration Convention 
provides for rnandatory arbitration if Mutual Agreement is not reached. The 
application of the Convention, however, encountered difficulties, since there has 
been uncertaiýnty as regards the precise starting point of the various deadlines being 
part of the procedure. Practical problen-is also arose in connection with the 
Suspension of tax collection for as long as the dispute reSOILItioll lasts. What is ii-iore, 
serious delays were imurred in bringing into force a Protocot"5 granting, the 
Convention autoi-iiatic extensions of 5-years each. Following an initial 5-year period 
of application, the Protocol, although signed WithOLIt delays, was only ratified by the 
15 Member States at the end of 2004. It was then given retroactive effect referring 
back to Is' January 2000. 
III RIM 20022, the European Commission Set Up a body under the nalne of the TU 
Joint Transfer Pricing ForunY to deal with transfer pricing ISSLICS III the EU. The 
objective has mainly been to tackle transter pricing matters tl1I-OLI. (-Y1I Soft law Z7 
iDstruments. The Forum consists of experts from all national administrations as well 
as of bLisilless representatives. Its work prograninie, was initially set for two years 
with the principal afin to work towards a Code of Conduct for the implementation of 
the EU ArbitratioD Convention. Indeed, the Joint Trwisfer PrIcIlig) Forum is still ýi 
operatlon after its mandate was extended twice by the Con-iiiiission (i. e. 2004 and 
2006). 
)) ' Protocol to the EU Arbitration Convention of' 25 May 1999 ameiiding the Convelitiý)II ol-23 July 
1990 11990] OJ C202. 
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The work of the Forum is guided by the problems identified and objectives set in the 
Staff Paper. 2" Overall, the approach taken is to use the OECD Transfer Pricino- 
Guidelines 7 as the starting point for EC hiitiative S. 218 In light of this, the Forum has 
ii'minly worked on three areas since it was first convened in October 2002. As part of 
its first task, it explored ways of rendering the Arbitration Convention more 
effective. This led to a Code of Conduct adopted by the Council in December 
2004 
.2 
'9 A second Code of Conduct on transfer pricing docurnentation for associated 
companies exists since July 2006 . 
220 Again, the idea originates in the Staff Paper. ' 
The Code targets at reducing coi, npliance cornplexities relevant to the collection of 
transfer pricing docun-ientatiori in intra-EC trading among associated companies. 
Smile rules are thus laid down to standardise docun-lentation that MNEs are liable to 
s-ubmit to the tax authorities of EC Mei-yi-her States. 
Fin-ally, the most recent development is a Communication of February 2007"-"' 
deal-iiig with Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) at European level. The 
underlying rationale has been. to ofter a solution which prevent,, costly and time- 
consun-iing transfer pricing disputes. Priority is therefore given to an ex ante. rather 
thwi an ex post, method of tackling double taxation. There is provision for unilateral 
as well as bilateral and multilateral. APA programmes. The proposal is for a centrally zn 
216 axation in the For problems related to Transfer Pricing, see Commis,; ion (EQ, 'Company T. 
Internal Market' (Corrimission Staff Working Paper) SEC (2001) 1681,2_33 October 2001,255 
(herem(ifier Staff Paper), for remedial meas ures, see ' 344. 
17 OECD (ed), Tran. ýIrr Pricing Guidelines . 
16r Muffiliallonal h1acrI)rises and Tax Adinnjisiranotrs 
(OECD, Paris 200 1) (heremqfter Transfer Pricing Guidelines). 
218 Staff Paper 346. 
219 Co I_1m. SS. ( I M (EC), 'On the Work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the Field of'Business 
Taxation from October 2002 to December 2003 and on a Proposal for a Code of Conduct for the 
Effective Implementation of [lie Arbitration Convention' (Corraiiunication) COM (2004) 297 final, 
23 Aph 12004 (hercinafter COM(2004)297); Code of Conduct (EQ of 28 July 2006 for the effeak, 'e 
implementation of the Convention on the elirriniation of double taxation in Connection with the 
adj . ustnient of profits of associated enterprises [2006] OJ C176/02 L 220 Comii-nssion (EQ, -The work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum on transfer pricing t7 
documentation for associated enterprises in the EU' (Communication) COM (2005) 543 final, 7 
November 2005, Council Resolution (EQ of 27 June 2006 on a code of conduct on tmnsfer pncing Z_ 
documentation for associated enterprises in theEuropean Union ['2006] OJC176/01. 
221 Staff Paper 348. 
2)2 Commission (EC). 'The work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the field of dispute 
avoidance and resolution procedures and on Guidelines for Advance 
Pricing Ag-rcernents within the 
2007) 71 final, 26 February 22007 (hereinqfter 
COM(-')007)7 I). ELY (Comjjjujjjcýjtion) COM (2' 
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coordinated scherne. Further, a regulatory fi-amework for negotiation aniongy the 
competent tax authorities is set out. Detailed reference Is also 111ade to the 
responsibilities of the taxpayer applying for an APA, especially the tasks attached to 
initlatiiig the procedure. 
(iv) Interest and Royalties Directive 
This is recently enacted law which requires that no withholding tax is levied at 
Source upon interest/royalty pay. mei-its n-iade to companies or PEs of companies of 
the same group. This is in line with the core objective of elimination of double 
taxatiort i-n the EIM. The. holdiiig requireuient for application of the Directive is 25 
percent. The Directive was amended on I" May 223 2004 to allow for transitiolial 
regimes i-n favour of some of the new Men-lber State S. 224 Three of the 'Ad states' 
(Greece, Portugal and Spain) have also been granted transitional periods. Those 
regimes may concern both interest and royalties (Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Portugal) or be limited to royalty payments (Czech Rel-mblic, Slovakia and 
Spain). The withholdino- tax rates may go up to 10 percent for an initial period of 4 
to 6 years and then, should be reduced to 5 percent for the ren-laining, part of the 
transitional time. FUrtlier, the Men-lber State of the recipient company oi- PE PS, LIIICICI- 
the obligation to give relief for the withholding tax charged under the transitional 
regime. ? ') -5 Finally, a ProposaI2 26 for an-lendment of the I&R Directive is currently 
pending. The objective has been to ensure that the privileges of the Directive are 
only n-iade available to recipients which bear taxes at residence. Exen-ipt 
companies/PEs do not qualify for the privilege of the Directive. The Proposal also 
extends the list of eligible con-ipanies to add the SE and the European Cooperative 
Society (SCE). 
223 1&R Directive art 3(b). 
224 Council Directive (EQ 2004/76 of 29 April 2004 amending Directive 2003/49/EC as re,,, (-., trds the 
of certain Member States to apply transitional periods [2004] OJ L157/0106-011-1 1)o, ssl., l 1 
(hereinafter Directive (EQ 2004/76). 
225 1&R Directive art. 6(2), as amended by Directive (EQ 2004/76. 
2'26 Cofnll -11 ssi 01, (EQ, 'Proposal for a Council Directive amending DirectivC 
2003/49/EC on a 
colyull(),, systelli of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made 
between , issociated 
companies ot'different Member 
States' COM (2003) 841,30 December 2003. 
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Part C: Future Developments 
The turn of the century saw a re-emergence of the plan to harmomse corporate 
taxation at the European level. The process was triggered by the extensive Staff 
Paper on company taxation, issued by the European Com-ftission in 2001. Ever 
since, progress in the area is regularly reported in a series of Comn-fission 
Conmiunicatio IIS. 227 A Report stating the position of the European Parliament was Z7ý 
228 
also publislied in 2006. 
'Me Staff Paper identified the areas ill which the lack of harn-ionisation ill direct 
taxes created obstacles to the functioning of the EIM. It also dISCLIssed remedial 
ineasures classified in two categories: (i) 'targeted' measures and (ii) Z: ý 
'comprehensive' ineasures. The foriner involves tacklitig the identified obstacles 
one-by-one (Ii. e. cross-border loss relief, cross-border inti-a-(-, I-OLlp asset transfers, 
distribution cf dividends, transfer pricing and thill capital isation). The 
compreliensive ineaSUres propose foUr fttlly-fledged LD-OLIP taxation systenis. Those 
may either be alteniatives or apply each to a different type of entity (at the sarne 
time). They are meant to allow highly hitegrated businesses to benefit fi-orn 
harnionised direct taxation scheines in the EIM. 
227 idem 'Tax Policy in the Eurc)pean Unic)ii. priorities for the years ahead' (CommunicatWil) COM 
(2001) 260 final, 23 May 2001 (hercluafter COM(2001)260)- COM(2001)582. COM(2003)726, 
Commission (EC), 'fniplementing the Community Lisbon Progran-u-iie-1 proguress to date und next 
steps towards a Comn"ion Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)' (Communicatic)n) COM 
(2006) 157 final, 5 April 2006 (hereinafter COM(-)006)157). idern 'Implementing the Community 
Progran-tme 1-()r improved growth and employment and the enhanced competitiveness ot'EU business. 
further pro. gess during 2006 and next steps towards a proposal on the Cornmon Consolidated Z- 
Cc)rpc)rate Tax Basc (CCCTB)' (Conin-itinicatic)n) COM (2007) 22133 final, 2) May 2007 (hcreinqfter 
COM(2007)223). 
2 'Taxation ol'Undertakinus in the Eurc)pean Union- i Common Co-)nsNidated ` European Parliament, t, 
Tax Base' (Report) FINAL A6-0386/2005. I December 2005 (hereiriaftcr The Bersani Rel)()rt). 
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The European Con-1111ission ljosted a series of consultation sessions with interest 
groups as well as a number of conferences oii EC company taxation. The aim has 
been to consider identified problen-is and potential remedies. In particular, tile 
discussion largely involved the feasibility of bringing any of the proposed 
comprehensive solutions to materialisation. 
The outcome was a decision to promote two of the proposed models: the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) for MNEs and Hoine State Taxation 
(HST) for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). , '9 In principle, both systems are 
envisaged to apply on mi optional basis and involve a consolidation of the group 
results. The outcoi-ne is then to be coupled with apportion. n-ient Of the, (vi-oup, tax base 
to the eligible states. In contrast, a centrally administered EU Corpoi-ation Incoine 
230 Tax (EUCIT) , wholly or partially attributable to the reveintes of a Community 
Authority, appeared a rather ta-dikely prospect. It was thus f0Und that the anIOU11t Of 
harmonisation in direct taxation was still small. As a result, the Member States 
retamed an exclusive right, to impose direct taxes. -- Havi-my been one of the Staff -I" 
Paper's proposed alternatives, EUCIT was put aside for future coil siderat io n. It was 
tIlOUg1lt to go Much further than what Could match the stage of market integration in 
the EC at the tiine. 
Under- both the CCCTB and FIST, the use of al)portionment for deternifflilig tax 
liability in each Member State provides a solution to complexities inherent in 
transfer pricing. The Staff Paper contanis a discLission of the difficulties attached to 
computing the value of transactions pursuant to anii's length separate accounWig. 
) 3-1 
229 Staff Paper 373-376; JM Mintz, 'Company Taxation and the Internal Market - European Company 
Tax Reform: Prospects for the Future' (2002) CESIfo Forum 3 (herelitafter Mintz (2002)), JM 
Weiner, 'EU Commission Study on Company Taxation and the hiternal Market Considers 
Comprehensive Company Tax Reform' (200 1) 24 Tax Notes hiternational 511. 
230 Staff Paper 37T. for more details on EUCIT, see: M Gammie, 'Corporate Taxation in Europe - 
Pýjtj-js to a Solution' 120011 British Tax Review 233 (herehiqlier Gami-rile (200 1)). 
)31 W Hellerstein and CE McLure, ýLost in Translation- Contextual Considerations in E\ ýtluating thr- C_ 
Relevance ofUS Experience for the European Commission's Company Taxation Proposals' [20041 
Bulletin ofinternational Fiscal Documentation 86,88 (hereinqlier Hellerstein and McLure). 
232 A detailed analysis of the formula and its advantages as well as ofthe challenges pktccýýI by arrn'ý, 
length pricing within integrated markets is provided in chapter 9 of this thesis. 
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Indeed, drawing con-iparable prices within closely integrated businesses features as 
one of the key drawbacks of pricing on a transaction basis. This problein caii be 
dealt with through the profit allocation mechanisn-1 (i. e. apportimimeilt). What is 
more, coi-isolidatioi-i allows losses incurred by the group con-ipanies to be 
automatically offset and intra-group dividend paynients to be disregarded. 
In the informal ECOFIN meeting of September 2004, agreement was reached for the 
creation of a Comn-ýission Working Group for the CCCTB. The Group had its first 
meeting on 23'-dNovember 2004. Its work can be followed througli the relevant web- Z-- 
pages 233 on the website of the Directorate General for Taxation and the Custorns 
Union. Apart from the documents which specifically report on the agenda and the 
conclusions of the Working GroUP234, progress has also been reported in the series of 
Community Conmitmications published since 2004.235To conclude, accordirig to the 
time-schedule, a proposal for a Directive should. be expected in 2008. 
Questions arise on the tests for group memberslup: bolding percentage and unitary 
business. Iii addition, the geograpNcal contours of the groLip bring forward the 
concept of 'water's edge. This is likely to create conTlexity in the operatimi of the 
DTC networks both ainong, the Member States and vis-a-vis tbird COLIMI-ICS. Aiiother 
area of complexity involves agreeing on a single tax base, especially IiI tile absence 
of a federal pattern to function as a startbig point alomy"ide the US Principle . 
236 
Finally, the factors which determine the allocation of apportioned profit should be 
defined and weiglied iii such a way that they do not risk being malliptilated by tax 
avoidance schemes. 
233 See: DG Taxation and the Custort-Ls Union (ed), 'Comm(--)n Tax Bas'e' 
<h ttp: //ec. europa. eu/týix, 'ttioll-custonis/ttxatic)ii/co. i-iip,, tii y-tax/comi-non-tax-baschn de x-en. 11 ti-n> 
accessed 17 May 2007. 
234 See esp. Commission (EQ, 'Progress to date and future plans 1'(-)r the CCCTB' (Workin,, C, 
Document) CCCTB\WP\020\doe, 15 November 2005 (hereinafler Progrtss Report CCCTB Nov 
2005); idem ýProgress to date and future plans for the CCCýB' (Working Document) 
'fj CCCTB\NVP\046\doc,. 220 
November 2006 (hereirta ter Progress Report CCCTB N(. )N, 2006). all 
documents ", ill be considered in detail, where relevant, in later chapters oftbis thest, "'. 
23-S COM(2006)157, COM(2007)223. 
236Hellel., , nd McLure 91 et seq. ý'teijj 11 
I. _) 
Devising a group taxation system of COlisolidation, meant to apply across the EC. 
highlights, among others, the isSLIeS, briefly stated above. The core part of this thesis 
is dedicated to exan-iining the content and applicability of those concepts in light of 
the EIM principles and objectives. 
DERIVING EXAMPLES FROM CORPORATE TAX 
SYSTEMS AT SUB-FEDERAL LEVEL: CANADA, 
SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 
Introduction 
The EC is an integrated market 1D several fields. 237 In direct taxes, though, it is Z7 
highly fragmented still consisting of twenty seven systems; that is, as mally Lis the I. -- - 
Member States. Group taxation schemes, where present in the EC, operate at 
national level in principle. )"' There has never been a central mechanism for 
allocatim(y EC-wide revenues to the eli(yible Member States. It is therefore ObVIOLIS 
that experience in gl'()Lll') taxation at sub-iiational level is poor in the EC. Considerilig 
this, useful input can be derived throUgh eXplOl'ing structures of sub-national 
corporate taxes iýn certain federal-type i-narket S. 239 This cliapter coutains surveys of 
-137 There are areas of economic ýtclivity in which conui-ion policies have alruady been estaHislied 
within the EIM. These include Customs, Competition and Anti-Trust, Agriculture ajid Fisheries. 
23S The group taxation systems operated by the EC Member States do not accommodate cross-border 
aspects with the exception of' Deli n-iark, Italy and partly, Austria and France. More details oil this are 
provided in Chapter 6 ofthis thesis. 
23 a, the US and Switzerland-, RS Avi-Yonah, 'Tax Pollcv 9 Appendices to Ruding Report on Cana& 
Forum - The Implications of Federal Tax Systems 
I-or European Tax Harmonisation' (1991) 45-27 
Tax Notes International (page numt)ering not available on Lexis-Nexis) (hereinafter Avl-Yonclli Z7 
(199 1)). M Daly and J Weiner, 'Corporate Tax Harmonisation and Competition in Federal Countries, 
Some Lessons I-or the European Community? ' (1993) 46 National Tax Journal 441-461 (hereinafter 
Daly & Weiner). JM Weiner, 'Using the Experience in the US States to Evaluate Issues in 
Implementing Formula Apportionment at the Iliternational Level' Paper 83 (, Office ofTax Analysis - 
US Department of Treasury, April 1999) (heremqfier Weiner (1999)), idern 'Formulary 
Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States aild 
Canada' Working Paper No 8 (Taxation Papers, European Conu-nission, 2005) (hcrefflqfter Weinei- 
(2005)). 
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the basic features of the tax systen-is of Canada, Switzerland and the US. It is a 
gerteral approach, which amis at showi-ng the evolution of key structural elements Ul 
sub-federal direct taxation over the centuries. So, the analysis below will not eng"age 
in a discussion of specific elen-ients of the systerns reviewed. Precise references with 
a relevance to group taxation will be made in later chapters. 
240 
Cý 
The choice has been made for the above three countries because, arnoiig tederal-type 
states, those are probably the only ones to levy corporation tax at sub-national level. 
The Canadian system presents features of a high degree of coordination/ulliforillity 
-and lies the closest to the end occupied by regulation. Switzerland used to be nearby 
the other end (i. e. 'tax con-tpetition') before the Tax Harl-flonisatioll Law (THL) 
entered into force . 
241 It has now adopted a hani-ioifised tax base at cantonal level, 
which has brought the system closer to regulation. Finally, inost elen-ients of the US 
system are favourable to tax competition. 
Part A: Canada 
1. An. Overview 
The Canadian constitutional frainework 242 in fiscal matters is an interesthig bleiid of Zý 
decentrallsed structures coupled with uniform rules applying across the country. 
240 group tax That is, namely, Chapter 6 on the entitlement to group membership, Chapter 7 on thc tc, 
base, Chapter 8 on the territorial scope of the group and Chapter 9 on the Formulary Apportionment. 
24 1 Federal Tax Act of 14 December 1990 on the Han-nonisation of' Direct Taxes of Cantons and 
con, u1junities (in force since I January 1993). 
242 RM Bird and DJS Brean, 'The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income and the Unitary Taxation 
Debate' [Nov/Dec 1986] Canadian Tax Journal 1377 et seq. (hereinqfter Bird and Breanyl M 
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Corporation taxes are part of this system and, since the Confederation was created 
(1867), they have been shaped to fit the various historical developil-lents. The 
discussion. below on Canadian fiscal federalism will prinwily shed light on the 
evolution of corporate taxation. 
The federal governii-lent and the provinces hold concurrent jurisdiction to levy direct 
taxes. The fact that the provinces enjoy' a taxing entitlement is a feature of 
decentralisation which highlights the federal. identity of the systein This aspect is 
further reinforced by the provinces' freedoni to determine corporate tax rates 
independently of the federal government. On the other hand, agreej. -nent has been Z-7 
reactied on a un-iform tax base and profit allocation ineclianism. For the provinces, 
the adoption of the above uniforn-i rules is part of tl)e deal of entering into Tax 
Collection Agreements (TCAs) with the federal Uovernment. Namely, that is an 
obligation which they undertake in exchange for the tasks borne by the federal 
governinent in the context of a TCA. As part of that process, the federal government 
commits to collect and administer taxes imposed under provincial or territorial 
legislation. The province or territory is then paid its share of the taxes collected. 243 
These fundamental featUres allow a general commem oii the Canadian tax system. 
Unifori-nity creates a fi-aniework of fiscal neutrality iii mvestinem decisioii across the 
country. In addition, an amount of coinpetition is retained amojig the provinces 
mainly through rates' variation. This plays a crucial part m preventing distortion of 
Cuerrier, ne Ila rnion isa tion of Federal Tax Legislation booklet 7 (Canada Dept of JustIce, Ottawa 
2001). M Daly, 'Tax Coordination and Competition in Canada- Some Lessons for the European 
Conu-nunity' Annex 9A in Commission of the Europeui Coi-nniunities (ed), Report of the Coninuttec 
qf In. dcj)cn&, nI Experts on COnipany T(Lvation (Office ! 'or Official PublIcations of the European 
Communi lies, Luxembourg 1992) 383 et seq. (hereiw#ier Daly). also see generally: RM Bird (ed), 
mnensions qf Canadian Federalisni in Fim-inchig Canadian Federation No 41, icinc Fiscal [ (Fi i ai cý Z71 
Canadian Federation, Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto 1980); AK Eaton, Evsays iti 7axation 
Canadian Tax Paper No 44 (Canadian Tax Papers, Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto t966)-, JF 
Graham, Inlergovernfitental Fiscal Relationships: Fiscal A(ýjttso-nent Ma Federal Coulary Cmadi,, 111 
Tax Paper No 40 (Canadian Tax Papers, Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto 1964). P Leslie, RH 
Neumann and R Robinson, 'Mmaging Canadlm Fiscal FeclerallsnY IT] JP Meekison, H Telford and H Z-1 
Lazar (eds), Reconsidefing the Invitutions (? f Canadian F(Iderallsin (Institute of Intergovernmental 
Relations, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Montreal '1002). 
243 Canadian Revenue Agency (ed), 'Corporate Tax Administration for Ontario - Question,,, & 4- 
Answers' <www. crt-, irc. gc. ci/wliatsiie,,, v/ltems/ctao-cli-e. Iiiiiil> accessed 26 April2007. 
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cOnipetition between richer and poorer provinces. Thus, given the uniformity of tax 
base and formula, a coordination of rates would inevitably render richer provinces 
asyrnmetrically more appealing, as con-ipared to poorer ones. So, disparate tax rates 
enhance healthy tax competition. Finally, 'equalisation payment, "5144 are also n-iade 
by the federal govern-ii'ient to support the provinces with hi-nited revenue raising 
capacities. It follows, therefore, that the Canadian fiscal system is sufficiently 
uniform to successfully tackle market inefficiencies arising from the interaction of 
disparate rules. 
Due to the features set out above, the current Canadian tax system cwi he, for the 
EIM, a path worth considering. In light of this, it is useful to go through sorne key 
structural points and also run through the fiscal history wNch marked its evolLition 
hito what it is today. KnQwledge of the historical process is always a useful tool ill 
assessing, - how/if aspects of the Canadian system can fit imo the framework of the 
EIM. 
11. Fiscal Federalism. in Corporation Tax 
CoM)ratioii tax is levied at both federal and pro vMcial/territorial level. The 
provinces and territories hold their owii taxing rights. M principle, they ellact tax 
rules individually but the, adniii. iistration and tax collectioii is ruii by the federal 
goven-mient, with the exception of Alberta, Ontario and Quýbec. These three 
provfllces have opted out of conceding the corl-wate tax adnifflistration and 
collectioji to the federal. goveriu-nent. It should be noted, though, that Ontario Z7 
244 They consist of'rei-nittances which, in practice, have existed since the Confederation in one form or 
another. The modern - explicit - systern was introduced in 1957. Further, the 
Constitution Act of 
1,982 refers to the principle of equalisation as a federal responsibility. Since 1967, the 
formula for 
calculation of' [lie equalisation amounts has been based on a natimial airrage stamlard, which is 
taken 1. () reflect a province's iay , 
capacily. See: RW Boadway and PAR Hobson, lnleiýý, ovrrmncnfal 
Fiscal Relanotis III Canada Canadian Tax Paper No 96 (Canadian Tax Papers, Canadian Tax 
ay and Hobson). Foundation, Toronto 1993-3) 40 et seq. (herein. qfter BoadWL 
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typically entered the Single Adn-ýinistration of Corporate Tax following sigynature of C, - 
a Mell-iorwidum of Agreement on 6"' October 2006. Sijigle corporate tax instalments 
24S will begin In 2008 for tax years ending on or after I" J anuary 2009 . 
The so-called 'abateiTient' ')461 fixed at 10 percent of corporate taxable income, sets 
out the context Of interrelation between the federal government, On the one hand, 
and provinces and territories, on the other. It involves a reduction by the federal 
governii ient of personal and corporate incon-ie taxes to make room for provincial and 
terrItorial taxes. That was a developn-lent of 1961 when the. Tax Rental 
Arrangements were replaced by the Federal - Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act. 
To cornply with the new tax framework, the provinces and territories introduced 
their own personal and corporate income taxes (PIT and CIT). ')47 Under the currently 
applicable regirne, the taxes charged by the provinces either offset the 'abateineiit' 
or 4i-ipose an even higher tax burden. 
Canada does not operate a group taxation system. There is, therefore, no 
consolidation or loss relief sclien-le. Arguments 1-tighlighting risks of tax abuse wciv 
put forward against the possibility of trartsferring inter-provInce losses. 24' Taxation 
is at company level only. Uniform rules apply to defining the tax base ]n tile 
provinces and territories w4ich have transferred the administration. and collection of 
taxes to the federal governi-nent. hi practice, tittle divergence. fi-om the mainstream 
249 
rule can be identified in the schenies so far in force in Alberta and Ontario . 
Further, if a coinpany is liable to tax in niore than Olle PJ-OVfIICe 01* teITItOI'y, the tax 
base is coupled with a uniform formula for the allocation of revenues to the eligible 
jurisdictions. The formula replaced a systei-ii of separate accounts in 1962. It iý, 
24 For this development, see: Canadian Revenue Aggency (ed), <http: //w\vw. cra- Z- 
, trc. ge. c,, i/whatsiiew/iteiiis/etac)-e. litn-ý> and <bttp: //www. cra-circ-gc. ca/whitsiiew/iteiiis/ctýio-qýi- 
e. htn-g> accessed 26 April 2007. 
246 fl. 11s is also referred to by the term 'tax points'. For a definition of concepts, sccý Centre 
for 
Constitutional Studies (ed), <www. law. ualt)erta. ca/ceii[res/ecs/keywords. phl)"kevword=63>, tcccý,. ý, cLI 
26 April 2007. 
247 lbid. 
24' Bird and Brean 1411. 
244) J Harvey Perry, 'Taxation in Canada' Cmadic-m Tax Paper No 89 (Canadjan Tax Paj)crs, 5''' ek-111 
Caiiadian Tax Fowidallon, 1990) 168-169 (herenIqfWFHarvvy Perry ( 1990)). 
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usefL'l to note that these common rules partly offset the disadvantage caused by the 
absence Of gl'OLIP taxation. This is achleved through preventing tax base wverlap and 
double taxation. 
As the provinces retain entitlement to deterniine the tax rates and have sovereignty 
over their revetmes, the systern ren-mins decentralised to a considerable degree. ) Cý 
The basic tax rate at federal. level is 38 percent and drops to 28 percent following the 
'abateinent'. Further, the net, tax rate, is 12 percent for corporations granted with 
Small Business Deduction. All other corpoi-atioi-is are subject to corporate tax at 21 
percent. Each of the provinces and territories with a Tax Collection Agreen-ient 
accoryin-iodates two rates: a lower and a I-11gher one. The fornier applies to incon-le 
either eligible for the Sn-iall Business Deduction or within limits set by each 
province or territory. In that category, the lowest rate is hosted by New Brunswick, 
fixed at 1.5 percent, whereas 5 percent is the highest, charged by NewfoLindland and 117) 
Labrador together with Nova Scotia. The higher rate, being the default rule, ranges 
between 11.5 percent iii the Northern Territories to 16 percent in Prince Edward 
Island and Nova Scotia. 
Imer-corporate dividend payinems made M Canada are tax-fi-ce. No withholdmLl tax 
is imposed at source and exen-iptioii applies at resideme. Furtlier, foreign-source 
income is not taxed by the provinces. The uuiforni formula allportiomileut is 
employed to distinguish between foreigii and domestic revenues of a corporate 
entity. This allows double taxation to be limited to the foreigni state and federal 
governmem relations. hi any case, DTCs are usually in place ii] that context and 
provide relief. Imenially, the tiiiiforn-1 formula minimises the possibility of having 
the same iiicome taxed by n-lore thaii one province. Then, dirough abstaining fi-oill 
taxing foreigii income, provinces/territories rule out the lik-eliliood of overlap 
between tax bases operated by provinces and states of source. 
ala provided in this paragraph concerns rates in effect on I" kuwary 2007 wid is 
limited to 2'--'o 'n iedC 
provinces and territories with a Corporate Tax Collection Agreement with 
the federal government. 
ncluded. -17he Information is made This means that l'i"tires for Alberta, Ontario and Qu6bec are not 1 
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Ill. A Brief Historical Survey 
The allocation of taxing erititlement betweeii the federal governn-lerit and the 
provinces is a reflection of Canada's colonial past as well as of major historical 
events of the Twentieth Century. 
According to the British North America Act (BNA Act) of 1867' which founded 
the Confederation of Canada, the national government was granted unrestricted 
powers to levy taxes. In contrast, the provinces' jurisdiction was fin-lited to direct 
taxation. In that context, federal powers could be delegated to the proviiiccs' to be 
used for a purpose within the provincial competence. 'S' Prior to that, hTiport duties 
were the main , source of revenue for the provinces. Those were, however, conceded 
to the federal goverimient under the BNA Act, which left the provinces with direct 
taxes, being very unpopular at the tinie. It is true that the i-ange of direct taxes which 
the provinces could impose was quite broad, coinprismg, property taxes, death dLitics 
and incon-ie taxes. -)-ý -1 On the other hand, the iniposition of direct taxes iiivolved 
considerable political cost, due to their unpoptilarity. The outcorne of this situation 
was that the Federal Authorities had to rein-iburse the provinces for the debts an,, eii, 
- 254 due to the, loss of revenues, through subsidies. 
available online by the Canadian Revenue Agency. It can be accessed at: <w,, \'%ý. cm- 
arc. cc. ca/tax/business/topic, -, /c()i-porition s/n-ieiiu-e. htm] > accessed 26 April 2007. 
25 1 It should be noted that the BNA Act was succeeded by the Constitution Act in 1982. One oftlie 
most significant changes introduced has been the transfer of forn-ial control over the Constitution Z71 
from Britain to Canada. The incorporation of provisi0iis for coiistitutiOnal ainendment into the Act of 
1982 (Sections 37-49) is a major reflection of this. The BNA Act, unlike most constitution, -,. 
contained no amending formula, which n-ieant that changes had to be enacted by Acts of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom. Diose, acts were known as the Britisli North America Acts. E\, Cr 
since in force, the Constitution Act has been revised ten tiiiics, to accommodate minor amendments. 
25 2 Harvey Perry (1990) 150. 
2-53 GV La Forest, 'T'he Allocation of Taxing Power under the Caiiadian Constitution' Canadiaii Tax 4- 
Paper No 65 (Canadian Tax Papers, 2 nd edn Canadian Tax Foundation, 1981) 33 (hereniafter Lt 
Forest). 
254 bi d IS. 
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It is evident fi-orn the above that, as early as the foundation of the Canadian 
Confederation, there has been a strong presence Of central goverju-nent. The 
provinces were dependent on the federal state at the time, manily due to having beeii 
deprived Of indirect taxation which was their primary source Of revenue. It was clear 
that, in the first lialf-century of the Dominion, imposition of direct taxes could not 
generate self-sufficiency. 
The gradual shift towards direct taxation had a definite impact on the evolution of 
Canadian fiscal federalism. The first step in that process was the impositioii of direct 
taxes by the provinces. By 1896, corporation taxes, successimi duties and personal 
1, V IIU , 
255 income taxation an III The -iounted to 10 percent of total pi-ov cial ee es. 
provinces had no choice but resorting to levying direct taxation since the federal 
subsidies soon proved inadequate to meet their bLidgetary needs. That was especially 
so when the provinces engaged into developi-nent iiifi-astructure works. In the 
aftemiath of these initial developments, the central authority was further enhanced 
duriiig World War 1. More specifically, the federal go-overmnent imposed a fonn of Z7 
corporation tax (i. e. War Profit Act) for the first time in 1916.1ý6 Shortly after this, a 
question was brought before the Privy Council about whether the Parliament, M 
iinposing taxes at federal level, exceeded its constitutionally conferred powers. The 
tI inding of the CoUl t257 confinned the existence of concun-ent jurisdiction (i. e. federal 
governinent and provinces) over direct taxation. In the decades that followed, the 
federal govem-mem gradually strengthened its emitlement to impose direct taxes. 
The above developments added considerably to the aspect of ui-iifori-nity in the 
Canadian corporate tax system. TI-tis also allowed the federal government to provide 
sohitions iii the course of the 1930s' depression. It coped successfully with 
alleviatin. (. 1- through re- distribution., tl-ie problems arising frorn. divergence irý ltý 
revenues among the provmces. 
255 
ibid 220. 256 
ibid 223, - 
Hýjj-vey Peri-Y (1990) 18. 
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Another Major precedent in Canada's fiscal federalism is connected with the 
renunciation by the provinces of their rights to collect personal and corl-mration 
taxes. 15 8 That had been a developmertt during World War 11 which led tile provinces 
to confer the competence to levy personal and colporate income tax oil the federal 
government. '" It was done in retuni for co'nipensation. Those 'Tax Rental 
Agreements' of the war period paved the way to atteinpts made by the central 
goveninient to maintain coDtro] over direct taxes after the War. The provinces, 
however, objected to such a prospect, whicli forced the govenunent to work out a 
compromise proposal in 1947. According to that, the provinces would 'rent' t1len, 
taxes to the, central government in return for a payinent. In addition to that, they 
would be allowed to levy corporation tax. at 5 percent to be collected by the federal 
govemment. All provinces, with the exception of Ontario and Quebec, became 
inembers to those agreements, known as the 'Tax Rental Agreements'. That system 
lasted until 1962 but new agreeinents had to be signed every five ycars. Tlie 
a2ree. ment of 1952 achieved a wider consensus, as it was also signed by -011tario. 4. -- ý7 
The Dominion goverimmit proposed w-i additional formula favourhig it. -""" 
The agreen-lent of 1957 triggered the i-ntroductloii of eqLialisation paymems, which 
strongly reflects the integration objectives of Canadiaii fiscal federalism. It broLight 
forth a change in the ii-lethod of calculating the compensation. This was now fixed Lis 
a percentage of the revenues collected from the rented taxes. Alternatively, the 
provinces could levy their own taxes at rates detern-dried by the federal governmerit. 
A rebate would theii be allowed against federal tax liability. However, under the 
pressure of the poorer provinces, being disadvantaged under the new regime, the 
261 federal government reacted by offering equalisation payments. 
257 Caron v Ihe King 11924-1 AC 999 which confirmed Batik qf'Toronio i? Lambe (1887) 
12 AC 575. 
2-58 La Forest-" 5, 
259 il)jd 25-27, J Harvey Perry A Fiscal Ilistory (? f' Canada: the post-ivar years 
(Canaclian Tax 
Foundation, Toronto 1989) 3833 (hereinofter Harvey Perry (1989)). 
260 La Forest 26; Harvey Perry (1989) 384. 
261 La Forest 27, Harvey Perry (1989) 383: the equalisation payment was fixed '... 10 brilig I/Ir per 
capila yield (? f the three ta_ve-ý inmNed 
(i. e. Persotial and Corporaic Income Tay and Lsiaw Ptuý,, ý) 
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In 1962, Tax Rental Agreen-ients were replaced by the Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Arrangements Act. By virtue of that, the federal government conceded part of its 
taxing entitlement to the pro vinces/territories through an abaten-ient amounting to 9 L_ t7 
percent of corporate pr ofitS. 262 In addition, it offered fi-ee collection of the provinces 
income taxes. This concession was provided on condition that the provinces and 
territories enacted rules, identical to the federal oiie,,,,, for the purpose of deterniming, 
the tax base and the profit allocatiort mechani S1,11.263 Ontario, Quebec and Alberta 264 
made use of an opt-out. Wit1i the exception of the recent Memorandum of 
Agreemew signed by Ontario with the federal goveriu-nei-it, they still levy and collect 
corporate taxes independently. 
265 
The fran-tework of 1962 outlines the, current balance of powers between the central 
governinent and the provinces iii Canada. The provinces and territories levy 
corporation tax and deternline the applicable rates freely. At the sarne time, the 
central government nianaged to retain a dominant position in determiflingy the details 
of the scheme. TI-nis, the province,; and territories were still under the obligatioii to 
comply with the federal rule,, on the tax base, rate structure and formula for profit 
allocation, In that wav, Canadian fiscal federalism mairitamed a shmificam deuree of 
Unif 1.11-ty. 
266]Even 
the three so far iion-participathig provinces, in practice, did not 
f I., IýICOIStr, UCtion. 
207 diverge highly froni the federal rules on the tax base and 01 ILI 
In the years that followed, the provinces achieved an increase in the share which 
they were given by the federal governn-lent through 'abatement'. For the peniod 
between 1967 and 197 1, the abatement aniounted to 10 corporate income tax points. 
up to the level of the average per capila yield In the two vi,, ealthiesi provinces, then Ontario and 
Que'bec'. 
262 La Forest 34. - Another one I)ercent was given to the Provinces by amendment in 1967. 
263 ibid 31. 
2' In the case of Alberta, there has been an initial participation in the I-Cderal-based arrangement and 
subsequen t wi thdrawal in 198 1. 
26-S Harvey Perry ( 1990) 167. 
266 Boadwayand Hobson 40. 
267 Harvey Perry (1990, ) 168-169. 
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In 1972) wid 1977, the federal government conceded additional tax points to the 
provinces in the field of personal incoine tax. -"" The corporation tax remaiiied stable 
at an abatement of 10 percent. The abowe could be a challenge to the dominant 
position of the federal government. Again, however, the centrally-led uniformity of 
specific rules witnesses that the federal authorities stilt set the rules iji a number of 
key issues. 
IV. Commentary 
This historical survey of corporate taxation in Canada denionstrates that the CLU'rent 
situation is the outcome of a long process. The creation of one powerful authority 
which would preserve lijiks wit h inetropolitan Britain seems to have been the maiii 
reason for establishing the ConfederatioD iii 1867 . 
269 At the same tiine, the 
provinces, which used to be separate colonies, preserved their integrity. This is 
reflected in their jurisdiction to impose taxes and tfieir discretionary power to set tax 
rates. Overall, the systein contaiiis the least of distortimi if compared to those of the 
USA or Switzerland. 
It has been suggested that certain features of the Caiiadiaii corporate tax system (i. e. 
uniform base and apportionment and free deterniiiiatioii of rates) could contribute to 
creating an efficient group taxation structui-e for the EIM. It is certain that, if the 
EIM is to opt for the path. Of regulation, as it seems to have been doing so-far, the 
Canadian systeii-i represent,, malmost ideal prospect. It should be expected, though, 
that steps will be difficult to accomplish, given the absence of a centrally placed 
authority in the EC. The histolical developinew relevant to taxes in the EC is 
marked by a dominance of the national states and is therefore highly fragmented. By 
contrast, Canada featured, mainly for reasons linked to its colonial past, a dyiiamic 
26 1, Boadway and Hobson 39. 
269 
ibid 4-, La Forest I S. 
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central authority which managed to successftilly claim taxingy powers. All additional 
demonstration of the central authority's power is that most of the provinces and 
territories were convinced to align their systeins. 
In the absence of a setting favourable to a centralised approach, efforts to achieve 
some degree of uniforn-ýity in the EC sl-tould possibly start from the lower-tier (i. e. 
the Member States, which, by analogy to Canada, correspond to the provinces and 
territories). No centrally-iinposed taxation is in the mid-terin schedule of the EC, 
wh-ich implies that the possibility of creating a central taxing aUtllOrity 1, S OUt Of 
question. Therefore, both the historical past and the existiýlgy structure of the EC 
confirm the need to design a tailor-made European system. 
Part B: Switzerland 
1. An Overview 
Switzerland 270 is organi. sed as a Confederation wliicli coinprises twenty six (26) 
cwitons. In alk)catinc, taxjurisdiction an ioiVg the different levels of overmilent, the Z: ) 9 
starting Ime is that, by default, taxing power is held by the cantons: 'they exercise all 
powers which are not assigned to the, federal power'. ý71 By implication, federal 
competence to tax exists to the extent that the Federal ConstitLition expressly confers 
270 1 Althaus-Houriet, 'Law ofTaxation' in F. Dessemontet and T. Ansay (eds), Introducilon jo 
La iv (3 rd edn Klukver Law Intemational, the Hague 2004) P Lochcr. Einflihning In das 
I. ilt(, rkaitiotiale, ýt(, iiet-r(ýcht (2nd edn Stýimpffi Verlag AG, Beni 1-7 et seq. 
II. is corresponds to Federal Const tut on ()I- 27 1 Fedtfral Constitution of IS April 1999 arts 3& 128- th' 
idesslawsrechi -) edi) May 1874 art 41 ler(5). See also 
U ffifelin and W Haller, Biff ( th 
Schulthess, Zurich 2001) 313. 
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specific taxing rights on the Confederation. '2 Stich constitutional authority may 
only be granted directly by the people and a niaJority of the cantons and is subject to 
renewal by the, 11.273 The last vote in connection with direct taxes and VAT was held 
in '2004. -174 Federal jurisdiction rnay be either exclusive or concurrent with cantonal 
jurisdiction. 275 In the field of dh-ect taxation, in particular, the Coi-ifederatioii shares 
the taxing power with the cantons and municipalities. Municipalities impose taxes in 
the form of surcharges on cantonal tax and are granted competence through zn 
delegation by the cantons. 
-)-17 , The tax system of the Swiss Confederation has a past of extensive disparity. ' In 
corporation tax, each- of the cantons used to operate its own tax base and forn-1-ula for 
apportioning)- its tax share up until the end of the 20t" Century. It was Only when the 
THL' -77 can-ie into effect on I"' January 1.993 278 that an WDOUnt Of UnifOrMity was 
achieved. '71) The current regime involves common rules in definino, the tax base 
which, however, do not extend to tax scales, rates, deductimis and allowances. 
272 R Lenz, 'The Sharing, ofthe Taxing- Power between the Feduril State, the 26 Caiaoiis and their 
Municipalitics' in Rassegna Tributari(a: Dottrina - Giurispruderiza - Pnissi Adn-linistrativa (E. T. I. 
edii, Roma 1987) 204 (hereinqfier Lenz), C May, The TM-Svstenu adapied hv die I, edcral Lax 
A(bnHil, ýiralioti (Beni 1970) 5 (hereinqIier Hi gy (1970)). 
27 3 H-R Mcrz, 'The Swiss Taxation Systei, ii- Federalism in Action' Position Riper on hitti-national 
Tax Coiripetition (Federal Dept. of Finance, Bern 2007). 
274 Ibid. 
27S Leri z 204. 
ý76 D Carey, K Gordon and P Thalmann, 'Tax RefOrn-i in Switzerland' in OECD (ed), Working 
Papers vol 7 No 60 (OECD Working Papers, OECD, Paris 1999) 12 (hercintilier Carey et alj, M 
Reich, 'Gedanken zur Umsetzuria des SLeuei-li,. -iriiioiiislerUilasgesetzcs' 62 Archlý fOr Schweizerisches C, L- 
Abgaberecht (Gei-er AG, Beni 1994) 10; P Thalmwin, 'Tax Coordination and Con-Tetition in 
Switzerland' Anntx 9B in Commission of the European Communities (ed), Repori qf the Conliniace 
(? f Independent kvperls on CornImny TiLvalloti (Office for Official Publications Of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg 1992) 397 (herelnqfter Thalmann). 
277 Bundes, gesetz Uber die Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern der Kantone und Genieiiiden (StHG), 
14 December 1990. Federal Constitution of 18 April 1999 art 129: this is art 4--Icluincluies of the 
Federal Constitution of 2 May 1874 (as amended by the Referendum ol'12 June 1977). 
27ý 
'nil's date for tntry into force was fixed by the Swiss government on 3 June 1991. 279The 
, lltollý ca were given in 8-year period of transition to bring their tax reginies in conformitv with 
the Tax Harn-lonisation Law. The deadline was set on 31 December 2000. In this regard, an issue was 
whether, in the course of the transitional period, the cantons could still adopt laws conflicting with the 
Tax Harnionisation Law. The inatter attracted controversial answers. See. X Oberson, Droltftýcal 
slvis, w (2"d edn Helbing & Lichterthahn, Basel 2002)) 18 (hercinqfter Oberson). 
2'0 B Dafflon, 'Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland. a sLirvev of constitutional issues, budget 
-jualisation' 
Working Paper Nr 278 17-18 (University ofFr bour-, Fribourg 1999) spon S tNf and e( I11-IIII re, 
(hercinqftcr Dafflon). 
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Neither does the harmonisation effort tOLICII UPOII the rules for allocation of a 
company's taxable profits to the eligible cantons. Therefore, each canton calculzitc, " 
its share pursuant to its own rules. 
Another important aspect of the Swiss tax systen-1 is the CODtnbution of the Federal 
Tribunal to con-ibating inter-cmtonal double taxation. Despite the existence of a 
constitutional clause which lays down a prohibition of niter-cwitonal double 
taxatioii2s', this matter has not beeil tackled by law so far. Yet, the Federal Tribunal 
has sought to alleviate the occurrences of double taxatiort by setting out, through itS 
jurisprudence, rules that deal with tax base overlap. 
The evol. uti(-)ii ()f the Swiss tax system froin a long-sustained fi-aginented structure to 
a more harmonised regime is of interest to any EC positive integration ýiitlativc. The 
same is true for the jurisprudence of the Federal Tribunal in solvhig double taxation 
Issues. There are points of similarity but also crucial discrepancies between the 
Swiss Confederation and the EC. All this is useful to consider in view of the EC 
group taxation harinonisation project. t: N 
11. Fiscal Federalism in Corporate Tax 
The Federal Constitution was amended, by referendum held on 12"' June 19772", to 
place a more explicit obligation on to the Corifederation to harnionise federal, Z_- 
cantonal and municipal taxes. The Bill on the Hartnonisation of Direct Taxes of the 
'81 Federal Constitution of 18 April 1999 art 127(3) (Federal Constitution of 2 May 1874 art 46(-)))- 
the prohibition of' the avoiclaiice of inter-cantonal double taxation is governed bv the cisc law of the Z7 
Federal Tribunal since the Swiss Parliament never adopted statutory law ii) this reo(ýnird. 
2S, 2 MR Juii, -,, lin 
harmomm'cricii Siciterrechi 
(Hell-mig & Lichtenhahil, Base] '2004) 86, W Ritschard, Commission dc coordmanoii pour L- fiscule (Government Printer, Berne 1973) 3 et seq. VNii-itionisall'on I 
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Cantons and Municipalities reached the Swiss Parliament in 1983. '1ý3 It was, 
however, successfully passed by both Chambers, together with a Bill oii Federal 
Direct Tax Law, only on 14t" December 1990. Followiiig expiry of the period Z7 
provided for request of a referendum, the goven-mierit fixed Is' January 1993 as the 
date for entry into force of the THL. The cantons undertook to aqjust their regimes it, 
in line with THL by -3)Is' December 2000. 
-)X4 
The THIL takes the forin of a framework law ('legislation de principe' or 'loi-cadre', 
'Grundsatzgesetz') which is addressed to the cantonal legislator and not to the 
citizen S. 285 11, Ii gjIt Of tl, iS, it gives detailed guidelines but still leaves the cantons 
with a certain scope of discretion in defining the tax base. Harmonisation covers the 
tax subject, tax object, time of assessment, tax procedure and criiii-ilial aspects of tax 
law. Yet, the tax scale, rates, credits and allowances have not been included ill the 
harii, ionised iteMS286 wid rerriain highly differentiated . 
287 It fbIlows that the THL in 
Switzerland retains a significant degree of tax competition, in inter-cantonal 
relations, mamly being the result of diversity in tax rates. This is all the more so, 
considerii-ig that equalisation transfers remain small in scale. 
As mentioned earlier, the Swiss CoustItUtiOll incorporates a prohibition ()f dmihle 
taxation in an inter-cantonal context. ," No laws have yet been enacted to implement 
the respective provisioD of the Swiss ConstitutiOn. Sonie approximation has, though, 
beeD achieved through the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, wl-tich has 
283 pj te Boekh(-)rst, 'Tax Rel'ormat. Firial Stage: Law of'14 December 1990 oii the Federal Direct Ttx I & Law of' 14 December 1990 on the Harmonisation of the Direct Taxation of Cmtons aiid 
Municipalities' [ 199 1] Europeari Taxation 215 (hereinafter te Boekl-iorst). 
284 Carey et al. 12, Dafflon 17-18. 
28, Oberson 17-18; J-M Rivier, 'La relation entre le droit f6d6ral et le droit cmtonal en matiýre 
d. 'imp0ts directs: harmonisatjoii et unil'ormlsation' in ProblMm! s acmels dii dronfim, al - AVIallgrs ell 
I'liotmem- du Prqf Raoul Oberson (Helbiii ig 
& Lichtenhatin, Wile 1995) 157, t63 (heremqfter Rivier). 
286 P Locher, 'Fimuizordriungy des Bundes' in D ThUrer, J-F Aubert and JP MUller (cLls), I 
Vetfi7, ýsungsrechi der Sclma, ill)rolt cmislinmontlel suisse (Schulthess, ZUrich 2001) 1213-1214 
(hercinafter Locher). 
287 An addi'tional element is that mosl ol'the Cantons (similarto the Federal Govemment) hi'storicully 
levied corporation tLIX Lit proo-ressive rates fixed on the basis of* the company's return on equity. -MiS r, - 
is still maintained extensively. 
2, ý 8 The prohibition of' the Fedeml Constitution is fin-lited to tax liability arismg within an mter- 
cantonal context. it does not thus extend tointernational double taxation. 
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laid down principles to tackle double taxation. "9 Over the years, these precedents of 
the Federal Court filled the gap created by the lack of legislation. " This body Of 
principles Of jurisprudential origin is often referred to as the 'case Imil, of inter- 
cantonal tax law'. 291 It should be noted that, in terms of 1-tierarchy, it is placed at the 
sarne rank as federal law, which means that it overrides cantonal rules in the event of 
conflict. 29') Finally, since I "t January 2001, the THL prevails over the jurisprudential 
293 rules on double taxation where there is a contradiction . 
The Federal Tribunal has given the following definition of double taxation: 'there is 
a case ofdouble taxatimi wheii the same person is subject to tax 
-v 
the tax Imi, of 
tvvo c(nitons, lbr the same (taxable) item aml M the same assessm-etit period .2 
()-' To 
the end of tackling double taxation, the court forined conflict rules. The aill-I has 
been to detern-iine the le0al aild factual connections which allow a caiitoii to briii(y ail 
individual under its tax jLirisdiction. '9 S hi interpreting the provisiort of the Federal 
Cojistitutimi on the prohibition of double taxation, the court came up with a general 
construction. That is, a taxpayer should not bear higher taxes ill a certaiii calitoll 
because the taxpayer is not exclusively taxable iii that cammi but, instead, also hears 
CIS '196 Ille(, it- I tax liability eWjlere. ý - il lacy therefore arises when the taxpayer, sLil-)ject to 
tax in inore thaii one cai. itoii, sLiffers ail overall higher tax burdeil thall if tax liability 
were incurre in one canton on. y. 
297 
A critical matter, especially iii exploriiig the Swiss tax system as a useful tool for tile 
EC, is that it does not contain specific provisions applicable to groups. There is, 
289 atiomil Tax C, 'ji-vard 
Law School Internt See generally. BA Boczek, 'Taxation in Swilzerland' in HL 
Program (ed), World I'm, Serie. ý (World Tax Series, Commerce Clearing House, 1976) 165 et scq.. I LI Hi gy ( 1970) 5&9. C, 290 For landmark cases, see: BGer 23 April 1875 1 BGE 54. BGer 6 July 1916 42-1 BGE t30, BGer 
')'> May 1926 52-1 BGE 238, BGer 25 November 1927 53-1 BGE 450; BGer 28 November 1962 88-1 
BGE 240. 
291 Oberson 393. 
292 ibid 394. E Blumenstein and P Locher, Systein des Schiwiz, rrisclu, n Siciierrechts (6ý' edii 
Schulthess, ZOrich 2002) 93 (Iiercitiqfter Blumenstein aiid Locher). 
)')3 Oberson 394. 
BGE 1,51 ff., for more details, see: Blumeiistein and Locher 93. 
Ibid. 
296 IbI& 
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namely, no availability of tax base consolidation, loss transfer or profit contribution - 
not even at the federal level. As a result, Switzerland can. iiot provide ail EC-wide 
system of group taxation with iuput as regards the entitlement to group inembership z: I 
or the methods for tax base integration. Yet, it can still be of relevance in coluiection 
with the apportiom-nent of cross-border revenues to eligible jurisdictions. 
111. A Brief Historical Survey 
Switzerland 298 acc ortuno dates the least centralised and most disparate systen-i ot 
corporate taxation among states organised iii the form of a federation. 299 Thus, it has 
consistently favoured tax competition arnong the cantons. Having always been a 
Confederation, Switzerland iiiaiiitaýis a looser fOrM Of Ullity arnong its constituent 
parts. That could make it a source of useful example for the'EC. A brief historical 
survey could assist in this regard, through highlighting analogies and pohits of 4n z-n - 
diverg-ence. 
Switzerland becan-le. a Confederation of Cantons in 1848 . 
3')() Before that, it was a 
Confederation of States until the end of the 18"' centttry. Further, that period was 
followed by an unsuccessful atten-ipt to be united L111der the name of 'Helvetic 
Republic' (1798). It was initially given a Federal Constitution, which was later 
revised totally to become the Constitution of 2"" May 1874. The Swiss Constitution 
contains two key clauses fil COD-IleCtiOll with taxation: (i) Article 129 (ex-Article 421) 
297 
ibid 93-94. 
29"S See generally: Carey et al.; Lenz 201-203-, H Oechslin, Die Ennt, lckhmg drs Bundessicuers - 
VMCIIIN 
der Schweiz. ý, on 1848 bis 1966 (Einsiedeln Etzel-Druck AG, 1967), Thalmai-In, Tederal, Cantonal 
md Commumal Taxes-. An Outlilit oil the Swiss System of Taxation' III T(Luillon In Siviizerland 
(Federal Tax Administratim Documentary Service, Berne 2003) 6. 
'299 Carey et al, 5-6. 
300 Higy (1970) 
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011 Setting the principles for harinonisation of, among others, direct taxes, . 301 and (ii) 
Article 127(3) (ex-Article 46(2)) on the prohibition of dOUble taxation in inter- 
cantonal transaction S. 302 
In coiifori-nity with international practice, the cantons primarily derived their 
revenues from indirect taxes prior to foundation of tile Swiss Confederation ý] 1848. 
However, they were driven to switch to direct taxation as early as the rnld- 19"' 
century. That move was a necessity then, as the Federal Constitution allocated 
customs duties to the exclusive cortipetence of the Confederation. 303 Considering 
that indirect taxation constituted the n-lain source of revei-lue at the time, the cantons 
were left with inadequate resources. TI-fis rule still stands today: customs duties and 
stai-iip tax, together with tobacco and beer tax, taxes on petroleUm and natural gas, 
are the main taxes under the exclusive taxing jurisdiction of the Confederation . 
304 
As said, revenues froni direct taxes were given to the Cantons by the Constitution. 
The Confederation. was, therefore, precluded from imposing income taxes. In the 
second half of the 19"' century, direct taxes levied by the cantom--, in principle, took 
the foriii of an annual net wealth tax. Then, it was at the turn of the centui-y that a 
gradual shift towards incon-ie taxes at cantonal level started to materialise. 
In the meannine, the Confederation also engaged ýito chargino mcon-ie tax in the 
wake of World War 1.305 Authorisation was based on a temporary constitutional 
an-iendment, Much wasnever given permanent status. In the years that followed, the 
301 V The Coqfeticration. shall establish principles on the hannom, zation. of' dirrct taxes of the 
CoriftWerailon, the Cantons and the Mumcipatilies; it shall take into account thc clJoris qf' the 
ze their ia ves. C. 'antons to harnimil 
2 The harmoni. -Plion shall concern tax liability, tax object, taxation period, and procedural and 
critnin. a. 1 1mv oii favation. 11annonizalion shall not cover tax scale. ý, t(Ly rate. ý, atid tax-rxcmpt 
arnounts. 
3 Vic Coiýfederaooti nm 
*v 
issite regulations agains! arrangements granting mq'uslýfied tav 
advantage' (art. 129 (ex-art 42) of [lie Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confedtration ol' IS April 
1999 as oii 15 October 2002). 
302 '[wercanional double ItLyalion Is prohibiied. The Cotýfederation shall take the nrce. ý, ýar, v 
measures' (art 127(3) (ex-art 46(2)) of the Federal Constitution). 
103 Len z 20 1, 
304 ibid 204-205, Hi ( gy (1970) 6. 
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Confederation vested itself with 'erner ency powers' to charge incoine taxes during 9 tý 
World War I and 11 as well as over the economic depressio 11.306 However, to date, 
the Confederation has not been given pernianent entitlement to i-inpose income and 
general turnover tax. 307 Jurisdiction is li. n-lited i-n time and is renewed by referenclum. 
Over the 19"' and until the late 20"' century, despite sorne, initiatives taken '308 110 
direct tax harmonisation project can-le hito fi-uition. Therefore, Swiss direct taxation 
was marked by the simultaneous application of a variety of disparate cantonal 
systeins. Further, Federal Income Tax, known as 'War Tax, was added in 1915.309 
The outcome was market distortion and extensive double taxation. In parallel, 
fl-iough, there was a significant degree of inter-cantonal tax competition which 
allowed the system to remain functional and balanced. 
In fight of this, the constitutional revision of 1977 opened the way to initiatives 
which led to the THL by placing ari explicit obligatimi oii to the Confederation. 
Details on this have beeu provided earlier in t4is section oji Switzerland. 
IV. Commentary 
The post-THL system of direct taxes in Switzerland suffers less distortion flian the 
previous regimeý It is apparent that the existence of a harmomsed tax base reduce, 
the frequency of double, taxation. Differential tax rates may cause some distortion of 
investrnent decision and ii-ripair neutrality. Yet, this disadvantage is offset by the fact 
that they create tax con-ipetitIOD in. the market and do not cause double taxation. On 
305 Lenz 2022. 
306 
ibid'-)02-203, 
307 
ibid 203. 
308 see generally F Cagianut, 'Art 42quinquies' in J-F Aubert and others (eds), Konip-jelitar 71ir I, - - Z-1 Bundesveýfassillo, ' SClivi., eu. crischen Eidnossenscliali voin 29. Mai 1874 (Helbing, & Lichtenhalm 
Verl(a 2 et seq. (hereinqfier Cagianut), 
_g 
AG, Basel 1996) 
309 Leiiz 202. 
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the other hand, double taxation is still part of the system, mainly due to 
discrepancies, among the cantons' profit allocation mechani sins. Those have 
rei-nained outside the rules on liarinonisation. It should be mentioned, though, that 
the Federal Tribuna1310 has produced jurisprudence afined at conibat4ig double 
taxation caused by overlap over inter-cantonal profit allocation. This is based on the 
principle of prohibition of inter-carttonal double taxation. 
Switzerland is a system which, prior to the THL, resenibled the current structures of 
the, EU in direct taxation. More specifically, the lower-tier of government appears 
more significant than the centre, since the power to levy taxes rests by default \vltli 
the cantons. Further, the contribution of the Federal Court to creating an integi-ated 
market has been remarkable and resonates with the ECJ. The Court has notably 
produced an entire body of judge-made law fl-wough interpreting a clause of the 
Federal Constitution on the abolition of double taxation. These analogies render the 
Swiss system of ýiterest to the EC. Thus, it could possibly be claimed that how the 
Swiss structures have evolved Could be close to a future image of the EC. 
Indeed, it should be stressed that tl-te two systems also incorporate fLuidamemal 
differences. The absence of federal-level EC govemaiice iii fiscal inattei-s is the most 
crucial among the poims of divergence. Further, the 'equal treatmeiit' jurisprudeilce 
of the ECJ has started to pave its owti path and shares only a few commoil feaftll'eS 
with the Swiss Federal Court's case law on the abolitioii of double taxation. 
Some comparisons could be drawn between Switzerland and the EC. Yet, the 
situation in the EIM appears more discouraging when it comes to the prospects foi- 
hari-nonisation. Apart from TEC art 293 encouraghig the abolition of double 
taxation, there is no other provision hi the Treaties placing an explicit obligation for 
310 Avi-Yonah (1991)* [ ... ] 'Fhe Federal Tribunal also established some rules governing 
the allocation 
of the tax base. Under these principles, property and incon-ie are generally taxable lmscd on the 
don-ucile ofthe beneficial owner, which in the case of i corporation can be its place of creation or its 
place of effective management (, so that a corporation can be taxed in two Cantons, but not more than 
two, on a don-ilciliary basis). Real estate is taxable based on situs. In addition, other Cantons can tax 
the property and Income of a corporation that has a permanent establishment in the Canton. 
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harmonisation in direct taxation. Further, even TEC art 293 is addressed to the 
Men-iber States and not to a central authority. It should be remembered that, ]n 
Switzerland, tile, initiative on hari-rionisation was only taken when the constitution 
was revised to place an obligation on to the Confederation itself. In the EC, there is 
i-io central authority with a competence to levy direct taxes. Rather, tax is imposed 
by the Member States. Considering that the States have persistently shown 
reluctance about entering ijito negotiations on tax matters, harmonisation projects 
are not likely to reacli fruition any time soon. 
Part C: The United States of America 
1. An Overview 
The -ýJS SyStel. T, 311 Of SUb-national taxeS312 cannot be regarded as a centralised one. 
Yet, neitlier is it decentralised to the extent that the Swiss SyStell-I Used to be before 
311 Avi-Yonah (1991), Bird and Brean; Daly & Weiner-, JM Weiner, 'Tax Coordination and 
Competition in the United States of America' Annex 9C in Con-u-nission of the Eurol)ean 
Communities (ed), Report qf the Committee qfhidependew L'Jyperls oti Couipany Taxtuion (Office for 
Mer Official Publications of the European Conurtuni ties, Luxenit-x)urgy 1992) 417 (herelnqfter Wei 
(1992))-, Weiner (2005). 
312 The term 'sub-national taxes' is used here ýn connection with taxes imposed at the level of US 
States. It should be noted that, in the systems of ýi number ot'US Statesl one may also come icross the 
term 'Franchise Tax'. This originates in the 1)roperty tax that States were allowed to impose oil Z7 
property loccIted within a State. Given the I)rohibition by 11-ic Con-inierce Clause to tax inter-state 
commerce, Franchise Taxes, being construed is a I)roperty tax on values derived from business 
al taxes labelled as inc n income, were treated as constitutional. By contrast, SUbSt, 111tially identicL C0 le 
charges would hivc fallen within the ambit of the prohi bition. For more details, see SL Gordon, -Thc 
United States of America' in IFA (ed), Ta-yalioti Lýsiw. ý in a P-ederal State and Ecoriontic (; rmilmigs 
ivith Conctirreiil T(Lxing Authorities vol 21a (Kluwv-r La, 
'x hittriiational, the Hague 1996) 3,8 
(hereinqfIer Gordon). 
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the THL caine into force. Further, the tax base, the rates and the mechallisill for 
profit allocation do not enjoy uniformity across the federation. 
As regards the tax base and FA, the range of disparities remains relatively limited 
because the differentials of each State often have the federal tax base as a common 
startii-ig point. In addition, there is a type of forimila which is widely acknowledged 
as% the standard one. It is quoted as the 'Massachusetts Forrnula' and comprises three 
equally-weighted factors (Ii. e. property, payroll, sales). Individual States in the US 
normally rnake adjustments to the 'Massachusetts Formula', for the purpose of 
adapting it to their priorities. 
In tax rates, the adverse effects of tax competition and of mcolne stfiffing, are 
considerably alleviated through integrating lower-tier and federal-level taxes. To Zn 
give full relief, integration ShOL11d take the form of a full credit provided at federal 
level against lower-tier taxes. 3 13 
State tax liability is computed in a number of US Stateý,, PUI-SLIWIt to tile ý-TRMP 
taxation concept referred to as 'unitary taxation' or 'combined reporting'. More 
specifically, the tax base, which becomes subject to apportionment, accomn-iodates 
the taxable profits of an entire unity of bIlSilICSS. SLICII L1111ty usually comprises tile 
results (or part of the results) of niore than one emity. That is because the criteria for 
qualification as a unitary business function ii-idependently of legal forin Details on 
this will be giveii in Chapter 6, which explores possible tests of if 11titlement to group 
meinbership. 
The US sYstem of sub-natioDal taxes reflects a market which seeks to achieve 
unification through fi-ee-trade. -flie objective of a unified market in the US does not 
pass through harmonisation ah-ning at neutrality. 314 Instead, integration has been L-1 
expected to advance in the field of taxes through the far-reaching interpretatum 
313 Musgrlve (1987) 217-2 19. 
"' Gordon 4. 
105 
give', by the US Supreme Court to two federal constitutional clauses: the Commerce 
and Due Process Clauses. The two concepts will be discussed briefly below as part 
of the historical review which follows. 
11. A Brief Historical Survey 
The US CollStitUtioll 315 provides for clual sovereignty between the federal 
government and the stateS. 316 The starting line is that the former is only given 
Iii-nited rights ellUmerated in the ConStitLItiOII whereas the states are In principle 
assigned powers by default. TNs is stated in the Tenth COII. StitUtlOnal Amendment 
I 
(1791), which reads: 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited b)! it to the States, are resert, ed to the States 
respectivelY, or to the people . ý'17 11, t1le field of taxes, the divisimi of competeiice 
follows the above general rule. The tramers of the Coiistitutloji were thought to have 
afforded individual citizens more protection through this separation of 
Col-rlpete 318 
Regarding- federal taxes, Article 1, Section 8, Clause I Of the CO]ISMU6011 VeStS the 
Congress with the power: '... to lay and collect taxes, duties, iml)osts and excise. s- 
Yet, this power reniaiiied significantly curtailed until the Sixteenth 
Constitutional Amendmellt319 was passed m 1913. The federal government was 
namely precluded from charging income tax on individuals . 
320 That was the outcome 
315 atifted in 1789. Tbe US Constitution was signed on 17 Septerriber 1787 and was rL 
316 Read generally: TA Kaye, 'Tax DiscriMination: A Comparative Aiialysts of US and EU 
Approaches' (2005) 7 Florida Tax Review 47,54-56. 
317 For a full version ofthe US Constitution: <Iittl-): //www. l, iw. coi-iiell. edu/coiistitution/index. htl-i-d> 
31 8 TA Kaye, 'Congressional Lirnitations on State Tax Sovereignty' (1998) 35 Harvard Journal on 
Legislation 149,150. 
311) , p-le (-ollgress shall have povver to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever sourcr 
derive(l, iviihoui apportionment among the several state, ý, and vothow regard to any ceiistis or 
emaneran . on'(Arnendment XVI (1913)). 320 
.ý 
S-joIj(, Trocey, Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911), also see. HE Abrams and RL Doemberg, 
International, the Hague 1999) at I. I. o 'Im Tavation (Kluwer Law t, 
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of the interpretation given by the US Supreme C(-)Lirt321 to) the foll()wing 
Wilstitutional clause: 'all duties, imposts and excises shall be unýftmn throughout 
the Unite(l States 
. 
32 2 The Sixteenth Ainendment brouglit fortli a change to this 
situation and ever since, the Congress has legislated personal income tax. In 
contrast, the Supreine Court had acknowledged the right of the federal goverimient 
to in-ipose corporation taxes prior to the Sixteenth Amendment. Those were found to 
be indirect taxes, in-iplying that they were not required to be subjected to 'uniform 
apportiom-nent'. 
The US States' competence to levy tax faces restrictions by two fundamental 
constitutional principles: the Commerce CIaLIse and Due Process. Both concepts are 
broadly COI]StrLied in the COIIStItLItIOn and do not contain any explicit refereiicc to 
taxation. However, the jurisprudence of the US Supreme COLIrt developed all 
extensive tax-specific mterpretatioii of the two clauses over the years. It thus devised 
tests that fix the balance of power iii levying taxes within a federal framework. The 
aini is to protect interstate conmierce frorn n-iultiple and discrimniatory taxation. 
The discussion below of the Con-in-lerce and Due Process Clauses will be limited to a 
brief historical survey and a -review of the fundamental principles. The ann is, to 
provide a background which will allow a better Understwiding of US Lyroup taxation 
at SLib-federal level (i. e. con-lbined reporti-ng, ). 
(i) The Commerce Clause 
323 
321 Pollack i, Fariners'Loan & l-'rust Co., 158 U. S, 601 (18951). 
A22 Article 1, Section 8, Clause I of- the U. S. Constitution. 
323 Read generally on the Commerce Clause in taxation: TBR Christenson 11, 'Cuno v 
Dain-ýIei-Chrysler- A Normative Chatige in the Application of' the Dormant Commerce Clausc as 
Applied to State Taxation' (2006) 3211 Ohio Northern University Law Review 23; W Hellerstein, 
'State Income Taxation of' Multijunsdictional Corporation,,,. Part 11. Reflections on ASARCO and 
Woolworth' (1982) 81 Michigan Law Review 1.57 (here'iia er W Hellerstein (1982)), dem T, 
Internal Consistency" Foolish": Reflections on in Emerging Con-mierce Clause Restraint on State 
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The, Con-imerce Clause is enunciated in the US Constitution throug"li a shoi, 
statement: 
[The Congress shall have power] ... to regulate cominerce 
with foreign nations, and. arnong the several states, and with 
the Indian tribe S. 3-)4 
This is a very broad construction wliicli has served as a legal basis for a huge amount 
of jurisprudence in a period of over two hundred years. Indeed, the Commerce 
Clause has evolved into one of the key US constitutional principles. Over time, 
various attempts were made to defiiie the concept and divei-se tests were put forward 
by the US Supreine Court. 325 
In the field of taxes, the Commerce Clause has matrIly featUred iD jUl'iSI-Mlidence in 
the fon-ri of a proliibition of either interstate conmierce ('among the several states') 
or foreign commerce ('with, ft)reign nations'). Further, state taxation is aD area of 
strong presence of the commonly referred to 'dormant' Commerce Clause. 326 That is 
aJ udici ally- created concept w1iich iinposes a prohibition oil tile US States to regulate 
interstate commerce. The constitutional language does not contain any such explicit 
wording. Neither is there evidence fi-om the Philadelphia Conventions debates that a 
negative aspect of the Constitution was in the Framers' intention. 327 Rather, the 
provision in, principle reads as an affirmative grant of power to the Congress whilst it 
stays silent about the rights and obligations of the states. 
Taxation' ('1988) 87 Michigan Law Review L38; iderný MJ NlcfntýTe and RD Pornp, 'Commerce L, - Clause Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines' (1995) 51 Tax Law Review 47. 
324 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U. S. Constitution. 
325 For a comprehensive survey ol'the tests which marked the history of the Commerce Clause, see BI 
Bittker, Regulafion (? f Interstate and F'oreign COn-tinerce (Aspen Law & Business, Neý, v York 1999) 
(hereinafter Bittker). 
326 ibid 8-31, KL Moore, 'State and Local Taxation of Interstate and Foreign Corni-rierce: the Second 
Best Solution' (1996) 42 Wayne Law Review 1425,1437-1438 (hereltialier Mcx-)re). 
327 Bittker 6-4. 
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It was in 1824 that the Supreme Court released its first judgment on the Con-in-lerce 
Clause written by Chief Justice Marshal 1.3 2' The facts of the case dealt with the 
hiterstate fi-eedon-i of navigation. In delineating the scope of the Conu-nerce Clause, 
Marshall's conclusion clarifies that this is not limited conin-iodities (as one of the 
litigants claimed): 'Commerce, undoubtedly, is tr(#fic, but it is something inore: it i. s 
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse bet"ýeen nations, and parts of 
nations, in all its branches... . 
329 This staten-ient confirn-ied that the contours of the 
Conmierce Clause were not limited to goods but also extended to services. 
The first state tax statute reached the Supreme Court to be tested for compliance 
with the Commerce Clause in- 1,829 . 
330 The facts involved the 'dormant' Foreign 
Coim-nerce Clause and dealt with a state licence tax M-1posed on importers and 
wholesalers of foreigi-L ýYoods. The court ruled that the hi-iport-Export as well as the 
Foreign. Commerce Clauses were violated. hi 1873, this jLidgixiem was followed by a 
case in the field of the 'doi-i-iiant' interstate Co. mmerce Clause. 33 1 The tax III issue 
was compared to a CUStOms duty and was invalidated by the Court. 332 
Since the Commerce Clause was first applied by the US Supreme Court, the Iiiie 
which di stincy ui sties in-state fron-i interstate commerce has often been re-drawn. III zn 
the aftermath of Gibbons, w4icti took a restrictive approacli to the states' right to 
regulate commerce, the Justices of the US Suprenie Court held opposing views on 4-7n 
scope of the Cominerce Clause. Justice JOhIISOII, COIICUIT111CY with tile 1-najority, 
developed an interpretation which viewed the power granted to the Congress as 
exclusive: '... the grant, of this pmver carries ivith it the vihole mlýject, leaving 
nothingftv the state to act upon I- -333 Aii opposite view which pointed to concurrent 
juri, sdiction was set forth by Chief Justice Taney: '... the mere grant of poiver to the 
328 Gibbons v Qgden 22 U. S. (9 Wieat. ) 1 (1824) (heremalier Gibbons). for a con-unentary on the 
implications of this 'udgment, see Bittker 1-8 - 1-16. 1j 
329 Gibbons 189-190. 
330 Broivri, 25 U. S. (12) Wheat. ) 419 (1829), 
331 U. S. ( 15 Wall. ) 232 (1872). Staic Preight 7'tLv. 82' 
332 FP Schoettle, 'Commerce Clause Challenges to State Taxes' (1991) 75 Minnesota Law Revk: ý\ Z- 
907,921. 
313 Bittker 6-9 & 6-10. 
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general government cannot [be properly construedl to be an (Avolute prohibition to 
the (-, ývercise of'any power over the saine sidýject by the State. s .. 
ý-ý4 Coole 
- 1,111,5 came a, ', 
a compron-fise between the atx)ve contrasting positions and introduced the distinction 
between 'national' and 'local' . 
336 Thus, the US States were precluded fi-om 
con-imerce regulation to the extent that the issues 'are in their nature national, or 
adinit only of' a uni orm sý, stem-, or plan q' regulation'. States are then fi-ee to 
regulate on matters 'best provided. f6r, not by one sYstem ... 
Nit by (is many as the 
,3 ý7 legislative discretion of the several States . 
In Sivith v Alaban,. C, ý38 ill 1888, the Court initiated a different test based on the 
distfiiction between 'direct' and 'indirect' ýnpact on con-unei-ce. That allowed a 
wider scope for regulation- to the states. In 1938, the 'Multiple Taxation Doctrine' 
can-ie to the fore but was short-lived . 
339 It was soon i-eplaced by a revival of the 
direct/indirect distinction which. beca. ine again relevant when ýl jUdgement was 
'40 issued on Freeman v Hewit-, .A prohibition was placed on 'mi-v state taxation 
1. mposed directlY on an interstate transaction', ii-respective of that being fairly 
apportioned and non-cliscriminatory. 
This test wtdcli put form over SUbStanCC341 was OVOILimed in Complete 'A UtO 
34-) 
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1977. It was this case that launched what evolved into the so-called 'four-prong test' 
of the 'dorinant' Conunerce Clause' A Michigan corporation cliallenged the 
constitutionality of a Mississippi gross receipts tax ý\,, lilcli it had to bear for the 
'phOlege qj'... doing business' in Mississippi. The test is structured as a set of foul- 
claims w 4ich should be raised and proved by the taxpayer to successfully challenge 
334 
Jbid 6-12 & 6-13. 
335 Cooky v Board of'Wardens, 53 U. S. (12 How. ) 299 (1851). 336 Bill ker 6- 1 S. 
337 Ibid. 
33, x 
ý5[111t/j v Alabama 124 U. S. 482 (1888). 
339 W6tcrn Liv(, Stock v Bureau qfRevetme 303 U. S. 250 (1938): Bittker 8-22: Moore 1439. 
340 Frecinan v Ileivit 3229 U. S. 249 (1946). 
34 1 Bittker 8-34. 
342 Complete Inc v Brady', 430 U. S. 274 (1977) (hercinqlier Complete Auto). 
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the comstitut, 343 ionality of a state tax law. - It follows therefore that state taxes are in 
principle legiti I imate unless the taxpayer proves that the clause is infringed. This 
makes the Cominerce Clause a positive test, which can partly be in contrast to the 
EC state of affairs. Thus, if a domestic tax law is challenged before tile ECJ in tile 
context of infi-ingement proceedings, the Men-iber State should provide evidence of 
its legitimacy. That is the opposite starting point to the Commerce Clause. 
For state taxes to be in compliance with the Cou-imerce Clause, t1ley, "'hould: 
(a) tax activities witli a substantial nexus to the taxinu state. 
(b) be fairly apportioned, 
(c) not discriminate agahist ii. iterstate conunerce; and 
(d) be fairly related to services provided by the state ( 'speakin(g vOth one mice'). 
The test has attracted sorne criticisni for being uncleai- in certam respects. 
The, nexus requirement appears identicat to the test attached to the Due Process 
ClaUSe. 344 It 345 has been subi. nitted ' that the Court may have wished to respond to 
both clauses but the taxpayer's pleadings lacked reference to Due Process. This view 
of Q i/I 
11, tlljý does not however appear to calTy a lot of credit M the aftermath 11, 
case, the Court noted that 'the Due Process an(l Commerce Clauses, it'hile vinilar, 
, . 1'47 ilnl)ose distinct limits on the taxing poivers (ýf the States . It was namely held that 
the requisite degree of nexus differs under each of the two clauses. More 
specifically, the Coninierce Clause was found not to have significantly eý,, ()Ived after 
,f 
343 The Judgment i-eads. no clami is made that. the activity Is not siff icientlv, connected to the 
State to. invify, a i. a. y, or thal the tax is not. /airly related to benýfits provided the taxpqVer, or that the 
t(Ly discrimmairs against interstate comi-nerce, or that ihe tax i. ý not Pirly appom . oned 
(Complete Atito 287). 
344 The Due l"i-Oces, ', Clause will be discussed under the next title (Part C, Section 11, Title pi)). 
34ý ' Bittker 8-36. 
346 QUIII Corporation v North Dakota 504 U. S. 298 (1992) (hereinafter Qmll). read al,,, () Moore 144-17 
et seq. 
347 QW11 305. 
III 
Bellas HeS, 'V. 
ý48' which presupposed, as a minimum, some physical ýi-state presence. 
M contrast, Due Process appears to have moved on. It now suffices that the seller 
purposefully directs its connnercial activity to the residents of the state (the 
'minmium contacts' criterion). 
'149 
Another noteworthy aspect of the four-prong test is that it does not rule out nitiltiple 
350 
taxation. This became a requirement later under the Foreign Con-mlerce Clause. It 
will be shown in later chapters of this thesis that, to tackle multiple taxation, the tax 
base of each combined groLip should be, con-1puted under uniform rules. In addition, 
the States should share the same fori'm1a in apportioning the group revenue,,. 
In discussing multiple taxatIoDand its relatiort to the Commerce Clause, the concept 
of fair apportion-ii-ient is of some relevance. 351 It is nan-iely doubtful what objective 
fair apportioraxient is set to pursue. Followiiig Containel, 352 , 
decided only montlis 
after Conq)lete Auto, fair apportionment was liaked to 'imemal' and 'extertial 
consistency'. Thus, these concepts were considered by the US Supreme Court ill 
connection with apportionmem formulae in general. It should be noted, though, that 
no Ihik was explicitly drawn to the fairness' of apportionn-mit. To be Diternally 
consistent, 'theftvinitla mitst be sucli that, ij'applied b), everv Jurisdiction, it nvilld 
result in no inore than all oftlie unitary business incolne being taxed'. " Extermil 
consistency was revised in Goldberg v SýveW 54 to be construed as follows: 
whether the State has taxed only that portion (fftlie revenuesfironi Hit, interstote 
348Naflonal Bella. 5 Hess, hic. v? Illinois 386 U. S. 754 (1967) (heremqftcr Bellas Hes. v), MT Fatalt, 
'Federalism and State Business Activity Tax Nexus, Re\lisiting Public Law 86-272' (2002) 21 
Virginia Tax Review 435,469 et seq. (her(-. 4nafter Fattale). 
349 Quill at 306-308, Swain brings forth the view that a 'substantial nexus' under the Commerce 
Clause is close to 'nunimum con, tacts' under the Due Process. Further, he points that Quill does not 
hold. that the Commerce Clause threshold is lower or higher than the Due Process threshold. See: JA 
Swain, 'State fncome Tax Jurisdiction. A Jurisprudential and Policy Persptctiveý (2003) 45 William 
and Mary Law Review 319,372-373 (her(-,, h, iqfier Swain). 
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-so Bitiker 8-36 - 8-37. 3-51 Moore 1450-145 1. 
3-52 COnlainer Corp. qJ'Ar)-terica v Fraiichise Ta--v Board 463 U. & 159 (1983) (hereinafier Cowal . llcr). 
3-53 Container 169. 
354 (, Oldb, ý -ýei 488 U. S. 252 (1989). f er, 
I I-) 
activity vvhich reasonably reflects the in-state component of' the activitY being 
taxed ,. . 
3.55 
Considering that no reimiciatimi of multiple taxatioii is contained in the Commerce 
Clause, it has, beeii sought to give fall- apportiomnent such a dimensiom Yet, 
arguments can be raised against this view. One I-)olllt is that the Court felt the need to 
add, as part of the Foreign Commerce Clause 356' a separate prong on the risk of 
multiple taxation . 
357 Further, in Container, the Court found the outcome of tile 
apportiomnent to be fair, regardless of the existence of multiple taxation. " 8 So, 11o 
safe conclusions can be drawn. 
Discrin-imation, despite having first been invoked as early as in 1869, has not been 
elaborated on through jurisprudence to have, its scope precisely delineated . 
359 11, 
cases, its construction appears to reflect discrimination under the EC Treaty. It is 
thus a bilateral test which does not aim at U14011111ty in a multi, state context. Each 
state shall treat in-state taxpayers and out-of-state taxpayers sinfflarly . 
3"0 Finally, in 
A ýMC0361' the Court created more ambiguity when it tested the existence of 
discrimij-iation against '. internal consistency' tests. 
Two years after Complete Auto, the initial four-part test was SLIP]-) le ilie nted by two 
additional prongs. This second versimi was created by the US Supreme Court ill 
Japan Line for application to facts of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Ill that comext, 
the followilig should be exan-ýiied: 362 
(a) the risk of multiple taxation; aDd 
(b) the impairil-ient of federal uniformity (or of the so-called 'one voice'). 
355 
ibid 26 1. 
356 Japan Line Ltd v Coutity, of Los Angeles 441 U. S. 434 (1979) (herelliqfter Japall briv). 
3-57 MC)Ore 1450-1451. 
3-58 
ibid 1452. 
359 
ibid 1457. 
360 lbidý 
36 1 Arinco Inc v Hardesty 467 U. S. 638 (1984). 
362 Japan Line 45 1. 
ll-, Il 
Regarding., point (a), it should be noted that the Court denounced an absolute 
prohibition of multiple taxation. That was interpreted as, in practice, taking a 
111ý1i'Tiuill of multiple taxation as allowable. 363 
(ii) The Due Process Clause 
The Due Process Clause 364 becanie part of the US Constitution by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Aniendinent, which reads: 
... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law 365 
The principle echoed by Due Process could possibly be traced as far back as the 
Magna Charta in 1215. It was then that Kincy John made certain concessions to- the I- 
Dio-lisli noblen. -leii, of which one was that lie would not deprive thej. -n of life, liberty 
or pi 166 1,11 1344, the term 'due -operty, except according to the 'law of the land'. I 
process' featured for the first time when KmL, Edward III was forced by the 
Parliainent to accept a statute that would restrict I-fis excessive power. 307 
A ueneral comment on the Due Process Clause in the framework of direct taxes is 
that it takes the form of a ban on extraterritorial taxation. The scope of this rule is 
specified through tests hitroduced by jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court. One 
generally-construed test consists of the question whether a tax has been levied 
without going tlu-ough the due process of law. If the answer is in the affirmative, the 
363 Cowainer 189. 
3"' Read generally: DM Hudson -, md DC Tunier, Intemational md Interstate Approaches to Taxing Z- Business hicome' 0984) 6 Northwestern Journal of Int'l Law & Business 562,584-588-, HO Huntcr, 
'Federalism and State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises' (1983) 32 Emorv Law Journal 89; Swain 
330 et seq. 
165 Amendment XIV (1868). 
366 JM Gora, Dim, Process of Lent, (National Textbook Company in colij . unction with the American 
Civil Liberties Unioll, 1977) xi (hereinqfter Gora). 
367 Gora 1-2. 
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taxpayer is then found to have Suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of 
property. 368 III Moorman 369 
, the Court set out a two-part test for Due Process: 
(a) There should be a minimal connection (or IeXUS)370 between the taxable activity 
. 
37 and the taxing state, I and Z__ 
(b) The incon-le attributed for tax purposes should be rationallýy related to values 
connected with the taxing state. 372 
Finally, as regards the requisite nexus for taxation, it has been discussed earlier 
under the Cominerce Clause that., followiiig Quill, physical presence is no more one 
of the tests. 
111. Commentary 
It is risky to draw aiialogies between market integratiou iii the US and the processes 
applying in the EC. -Hie US approach is marked by the conStitLIti0iial principles of 
the Con-imerce and Due Process Clauses. Those feature a vei-y broad statutory 
constrUCtIon and differ fundan-lentally from the tests of 'equal tream-mit'. The US 
concepts were given tax-related content mainly tlll'OLI, ýjh the jUrIsprudeiice of the 
Supreme Court. This is probably the only common elemem they share with the 
principles of iioii-discriiiiinatioii/iioii-resti-ictioii in the EC. It is obvious that the US 
constitutional clauses put forward an understanding of market integration wl-tich 
368 S Goldstein, 'Resident Taxpayers: Internal Consistency, Due Process and State hicome Taxation' 
( 1991) 91 Col umbia Law Review 119,128 (herej*ntýier Goldstein), 
369 Moorin(in Vý. Co. v B&r, 437 U. S. 267,273 (1978) (Iiereinqfler Mooriii(m). 
37001, the concel-)L of nexus and its interrelation to the Commerce Clause, read generally Fatale. 
371 Apart I-rom Moor-man, see also Bellas Hess 756, a similar test was set forth in Miller Bros i! 
Maryland, 347 U. S. 340,344-345 (1954): '-sonie defitwe link, some mininium connection, betvi,, eell 
additional dimension of [the taxing state] and the person, property or transaction ii seeks to ta-A-'. An L 
Due Process is proposed in Wisconsin iý J. C. Peimr-y Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940). Namely, state t. ixLition 
, should actually 
be a return for the use of public services by the taxpayer. This seerns to reflect the 
rationale behind the nexus theory. 
372 Th.,: on resonates accord ng to wh ch the tax is condliti with the test set out in Ilium Tank in 1919, LII 
should fairly reflect the taxpayer's activities in the stateý I-Inion Tank Line v Wright, 249 U, S. 275 
(1919). 
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strikes the EC as unfamiliar. Still though, this different approach is worth 
considering ahead Of embarking on devising a group taxation scheme. of EC-, A/Ide 
scope. This is because the US provides the only existi-ng case Of gl'OLIP taxation at 
sub-federal level. 
It has been explained that the aiin to tackle j-nultiple taxation is absent from the four- 
prong test applying to the interstate aspect of the Con-unerce Clause. Still though, the 
chances of tax base overlap are reduced through the exclusiou of interstate 
commerce proceeds from the states' tax base. This outcome is further supported 
through the nexus requirement of Due Process. On the other hand, double taxatioii iii 
the EC is tolerated by the ECJ to the extent that it does not iiiffinge the treedoills. 
This is surprisingly so, despite the existence of TEC art 293 placing all exl-)Ilcit 
obligatiort on to the Member States to abolish double taxation. The provisioil is, 
though, not enforceable before the Court due to its lack of direct effect. 
Another element of n-iarket integration iii the US is the non-discrimination clause 
contained in the Cou-m-lerce Clause's test. However, that has by Do means led to 
jurisprudence of a similar significance to that of the ECJ in the field. More 
specifically, the concept appears to incorporate a con-1parison of in-state with out-of- 
state situations. Yet, in this broad construction, the prohibition looks almost all- 
inclusive, as it lacks comparability tests and justifications akin to those produced by 
the ECJ. The fact that the US Supreme Court has not focused on refining the noll- 
discritiii-nation prorig may also indicate that this is not meant to be the decisive test. 
The mechanisms w1iich contribute to market i-ntegration in the US, being inherent in 
the Federal Constitution, do not find an equivalent in the EC. In the tax field, they 
have been developed to fit the Deeds of 'unitary taxation'. The term will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of this theSiS. 373 Briefly, it uses business unity as a 
test for entitlement to group men-ibership. This is a concept un-known in Europe. 
373 Chapter 6, Part A, Section Ill. 
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Despite divergence and lack of familiarity with concepts, the US experience In sub- 
federal corporate taxes is invaluable for the EC. The US notably conStALIteS tile Only 
ijiternational precedent in applying group taxation (i. e. 'combined reporting') at a 
sub-federal tier. This is a fact which, irrespective of the possibility to draw analogies 
to the EC, renders the elements of US combined reporting essential knowledge for 
EC policy-n-laking. 
Concipsion 
European initiatives may derive iýnsplration from existing systems of sub-Dational 
taxes only up to a certain extent . 
374 The difference between the Intra-EC situation 
and any of the above countries is significant. This is obvious in both the degree of Z7, 
integration and arnount of sovereignty conceded to the central administration. 
Divergence is primarily caused b the fact that the EC does not hold ally decision- y 
making power in regard to direct taxes. Ratfier, this lies witli the Member States Z-- 
instead. 
It has been shown that, despite divergence at sub-tederal level, the existence of a 
strong federal state is critical. In Canada, the involvement of central govemn-lent had 
a decisive impact on gradually structuring a relatively uniform system. Thus, the 
Constitution provides for a general jurisdictiorl to tax at federal level and this in 
principle stretches to cover all taxes. The US systei-yi of sub-federal corporate 
taxatioii benefits froin using the federal tax base and the 'Massachusetts' formula as 
starting points. A commori feature betweeii the US and the EC relates to the 
374 See generally: RM Bird, 'A Comparative Perspective on Federal Finance' in KG Banting, DM 
Brown and TJ Courchene (eds), Die T'imire qf I-Jscal Tedertilism (chapter 9) (School of Policy 
Studies Queen's University Kingston, Ontario 1994) 293,308 et seq. (heremafter Bird). 
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ýactivist' role of the US Supren-ie Court and the ECJ in interpreting tile Federal 
Constitution and the EC Treaty respectively. Since, however, the two constitutional 
traditions are so different, there js not n-mch for the EIM to derive a useful exan-1ple 
ft-om. In Switzerland, it has always been the cantons that, by default, held the tax- 
in-iposing power. Direct taxation at federat level was just an additional system to the 
already existing cantonal ones. The Federal Court played a significant part in 
preventing double taxation. However, iýnefficiencles persisted. It is noteworthy that, 
in the absence of action by the Confederation, the cantons proved incapable of 
leading the way towards direct tax harn-ionisatioD over the 20"' century. This is all 
additional indication of flie importmice of federal-level governance in accomplishing 
integration. 
lis 
4. POLICY APPROACHES TO CORPORATION 
TAXES IN CLOSELY INTEGRATED MARKETS 
Introduction 
Tax initiatives at European level have always beeii guided by the principles of 
European integration, as those have kept evolving iii the context of the EIM ovei- the 
years. TI-te first two chapters of the thesis gave aii outline of the background oI] 
negative and positive integration in the area of corporate taxes. The focus has beeii 
ori aspects that ii: iipact strongly on the taxation of groups. N this fourtli cliapter, aii 
attempt will be made to place the EC initiative oti corporate taxatioil witIIIII a 
broader scope of priýnclples that permeate business taxatimi iii mtegrated markets and 
notably the EIM. 
The word which could possibly suniniarise the long-term fiscal vision for the EIM is 
ýefficiency'. This is aimed to ii-iaterialise withiýi a fi-an-lework of what is referred to 
as ýcompetitive neutrality . 
375 Over the half century Of existence of the EC, various 
attempt S376 have been inade to legislate the way to rnarket efficiency in the field of 
corporate taxes. The process indicates that efficiency in tile Elm is broadly 
envisaged as the Outcome of harmonisation (or coordination) of the disparate 
national systenis. From a tax perspective, heavy compliailce burdens, lack of 
transparency, elements distorting conji-nercial decisions, double taxation are m 
375 See gellerally, WF Fox, MN Murray and L Luna, 'How Should a Subnational Corporate b1come I Tax on Multistate Businesses Be Structured' (2005) 58 National Tax Journal 139-159 (hereinafter 
Fox and Murray). 
""' C01111-nission Proposal 1975-, Commission Report 1980; Proposed Directive 1984-, Proposed Losses 
Dircctivc. 
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pruiciple incompatible with efficiency. On the contrary, achievement of a certaill 
ail-iount of fiscal neutrality across a market appears to be the most declslve `teP 
towards an efficient setting. 
Internationally, there are divergent approaches to the above. The opposing theories 
accoi-yin-iodate the views of the, 'free marketers', on. the one hand, and the 
(regulators', on the other. 
The discussion that follows will seek to clarify where the current EC policy plaiis 
stand on the spectrum between regulation and tax competitioil. Further, it will also 
explore possible paths to efficiency through the exan-linatimi of certain features of 
the EIM that guide hari-noiiisation. Finally, analysis will be carried out of the 
objectives to wl-iich the EIM should conform as well as of the instrumems to be used 
for coordiiiationtliarii-ioiiisatioii.. 
Part A: The Debate over Policies for Corporate 
Taxes in Integrated Markets: An Outline of Views 
There are two mah-i policy approaches to tackling fiscal inefficiencies within Illulti- 
jurisdictional markets: regulation and tax competition. The proponents of regulatloll 
seek, through legislative n-leasures, to alleviate the adverse consequences caused by 
the interactioii of disparate laws. Such consequences normally involve, market 
distortion, being the result of double taxation, increased costs or disadvantageous 
treatii-ient of cross-border situations. On the other liand, the 'free- n-iarketers' insist 
that the market itself contains inherent forces to move, into sonie approxii-nation and 
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tackle distorting eleme ItS. 377 In multi-jurisdictional markets, the second theory Is the 
least restrictive of state sovereignty. Th-is is a key reason why, despite its 
inefficiencies, it has gained sorrie support internationally. 
The regulators target at rectifying, througli comi-non regulation, features whicli cause 
market inefficiencies. TI-itts, a harinonised system of corporate, taxation could 
simplify tax con-ipliance obligations for businesses active in more thail one 
jurisdiction within an integrated market. Iii principle, conunon rules should elimiflate 
fiscal obstacles to transactions or dealings within a market. In its extreme version, 
sucli a system should involve a uniform tax base and rates aci-oss the market, wNcli 
creates a fiscally neutral environinent without tax competition. 
However, a complete elimination of tax competition among the constitLIellt parts of 
an integrated market Could have adverse effects. It would thus grant the fillancially 
most powerful jurisdictions with a definite comparative advantage over the snialler 
markets. This is especially so, to the extent that there is no provision for cross-N)rder 
consolidation. 378Further, in a context of detailed market reL"LIlation, achievement of 
perfect neutrality may not always bring a positive effect. If the common rule,, are 
CO le 171) rigid or extre'l-i-lely 111p _X- , they are likely to foster an inefficient market. More 
specifically, they would create a negative impact on con-ipetitiveness, which is in 
380 
contrast to the target set in Lisbon in the year 2000 . 
The free- marketers' position does not appear entirely clear in the literature. A paii 
makes reference to tax competition as an alternative to regulation, which also leads 
377 RS Avi-Yonah (199 1) (page numherin - not available on Lexis-Nexi. s). 
378 JAM Klaver and JM Timmermans, 'EU Taxation: policy competition or policy coordination"' 
(1999) 8 EC Tax Review 187 (heremqficr Klaver and Timmermans). 
379 AJ Cockfield, 'Tax Integuration under NAFTA: Resolving the Conflict between Econom c -, md 1ý II 
Sovereignty Interests' (1998) 34 Stanford Jounial Intemational Law 39,48 UiereinqfterCockfield). 
380 11, Mar -i Council in Lisbon placed the following mandate. "The Union lia. ý 
- cli 
2000, the Europeai I1 11" 
toda. y. v, i tisr1l'a tiei+, strategic (ý,, oaljor the iie-vt 
decade: to beconic the most competitwe and 
knowled 
, qc-based econonty 
in Ihe vtorld, capable ol'sustainable economic groi-vth 1+4111 Illore alid 
jobs and greater social cohesion' - Lisbon European Council 2' and 24 March '1000, better 1 -1 - 
Presidency Conclusions, para 5. 
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to harn-ionisation (or, at least, appromination) but through a different pat 11.3'ý 1 
Another view takes disharmony and inefficiencies as inherent - though not 
necessarily harmful - i-n tax coinpetition practices. 
Tax con-ipetitioii may lead to an approximatiori of rates, which could also involve 
fixing rates at a lower level. than if agreed on through legislation. Apart from that, Z7 
however, the tax base is very difficult to allow for approxin-iation without regulation. L- 
hi this respect, the effort to attract investment may probably bring son-ie 'similarity 
of CollCeptS, 382 in the definition of the tax base. Still though, distortim would persist, 
as similarity is not enough to obliterate tax base overlaps and disparities. In tern-L-, of 
end-result, if the envisaged objective is to attain neutrality, this does not seem to be 
tackled effectively. Nan-iely, atteauating disparities does not guarantee a fully neutral 
investment decision. 
The opposing approach admits that, in a non-regulated market, advantage call be 
gained from 'economic benefits derived fi-om Imaintahiing] tax dit . 1-entials . 
3ý3 
Such a systen-i is certainly n-iore flexible than a coordinated structure applying across 
a larger area. Further, neither does it appear necessarily irreconcilable with the 
vision of an integrated market. An example is the USA market which clearly favours 
de-regulation and tax competitIon. In contrast, higher transaction costs, being, an 
outcon-ie of the absence of regulation or divergence, create a setting likely to impede 
cross-border trade. 
Part B: Corporate Fiscal Policies in the EIM 
3, ý 1 Avi-Yonah (1991) (page numbering not avallable on Lexis-Nexis). 
Cockfield 61, 
3S 1 ibid 48. 
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1. Is Rec)-ulation. Necessary for Corporate Tax Coordination in 4: ) 
the EfM? 
There are no provision-s in the EC Treaty that accon-imodate a specific requireilleilt 
for corporate tax coordiiiatioil/hariiic)nisation., TEC art 293 384 addresses a task to the 
Member States to enter into n-egotiation-s for the purpose of securhig the abolition of 
double taxatiom However, the provision does not place any precise obligation oil to 
the Member States to reach the specified aiji-1. No direct effect is produced, meanhig 
that there is no ei. ititleme. nt to an action before the ECJ for non-iniplen-ientation. It 
follows that the Treaty does not expressly envisage that direct taxation- should 
ultimately take the, form of a Unified fi-arnework across the EfM- 
Giveii the absence of a power-conterring provisimi in direct taxes, legislative 
i-neasures in principle contain a reference to the EC Treaty as a whole and TEC art 
94 
. 
38 ý' The latter incorporates a generally construed claUse '-fi)1- the approximatimi 
qf/mi's', regulations or administrative provisions ofthe Member States as directlY 
qffi-Tr the establishment or ffinctioning qf the common market'. It follows that 
meaSLires of approximation are welcoine, though not required. -"" Indeed, a reference 
to the broad objectives of the single market does not fulfil the requireinews for direct 
effect. Therefore, the Member States do not intringe the EC Treaty if they i-einain 
iiiactive iii direct taxation. Thus, to conform to the EC Treaty, it normally suffices 
that national tax systems comply with the discri-iiiiiiatioii/i-estrictioii ndes of the 
"-' 'Member States shall, so. /ar as is necessaty, enter into negoti . ati . on. ý ivith each other A+, ith a Orw to 
setwrhigft)r the bewfii qf their nationals: [ ......... 
- the abolition qftlouble taxation iv*hm the Commimil ' N., 
'(TEC Lirt 293). 
3"5 For instance, see the Preambles to the P-S and I&R Directives. For aii out] Hie of the successful 
legisLitive in the field of direct taxittion, see ettrfier in this thesis Chapter2, P, -trt B. 
3,, 6 , '1he council shall, acting unatilmously on a proposalfton't. the Comml. ýslmi wid qfier collmilting 
the [, uropean Parliament and the Ecoiionm .c antl Social Comn-twee, i. ý. wte directhws for the 
app roýy 1-11 jai 1'0/1 (? f such laivs, regulations or adminisiratn, e proO. woii. ý of the Member States ti. ý 
direcil af -6oning (? I'Ihe comnion market'(TEC Lin 94). Jýct the establishment orfinu 
3 12) 
Fundamental Freedo IIIS. 387 This points, however, to a totally separate process from 
coo rdi nat io n/harn-ioni sat io n. 
The initiative of the European Comi-nission for aii EC-wide approach to group 
taxation clearly evidences a policy choice favourintg-Y regulation, rather than 
competition. The envisaged framework goes far beyond the Treaty requirements for 
eliminating fiscal impediments to, and discrimination against, free movement. 388 
Meanwhile, the absence of an enforceable task for regulation could allow the view 
that the EC could have opted for an approach favourable to competition. 
Setting the creation of an efficient market as the Ultimate objective, the question 
boils down to the following: should attainment of that objective necessarily require 
elimillation of disparities in the Men-iber States' tax systen-is? 
The answer to such. a question is not straightforward. Since there is no leLl'al 
oblig,, ation to move iýn either direction, any choice is primarily a policy decision. As 
said, the docui-nentation produced by the Europeaii Commission in the field of 
company taxation puts forward initiatives for harmomsation of national systems. 
It appears that a certain amount of uniformity is iiecessary to achieve market 
efficiency. This can be identified, even in countries such as Switzerland and the US 
where priority has clearly been given to tax competitiom'"() L- 
In the case of Switzerland, the introduction of the Tax Harnionisatioii Law (THL) 
lias brought a I-x)licy change into the system. Uniforinity through regulation now 
0 
occupies an ýnportwit area (i. e. tax base definition) in the tax systern of the 
Confederation. This does not, however, imply that competition is no more part of the 
"' For a detailed discussion of the terms 'discTimination' and 'restriction' and of the tests on equal 
treatment, see earlier in this thesis Chapter 1, Part A, Section 11. 
3 's ation in the Internal Market' (Commission Staff Working Paper) " Con-m-nission (EC). 'Company TaXL 
SEC (2001) 1681,23 October 2001,370 el seq, (hereinafter SWITPLIper). 
389 See Chapter 3, Parts B and C respectively. 
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SySte 111.39') As explained in the section on Switzerland, the rates, allowances and a 
number of other items reinain under the con-ipetence of the cantons. 
The US lias developed a concept of market integration whicli does not pass through 
regulation. In effect, double taxation is tolerated in that ConteXt. 391 Yet, there are 
certain features in the US tax system allowing some approxiniation of laws at sub- 
federal level. As corporation tax is charged at two levels in the country, the federal 
tax base essentially constitutes a starting point in the formation, of the US States' tax 
bases. Therefore, a degree of uniforn-lity is achieved by the sole existence of a 
federal-level liability to tax: ', 92 The situation is similar as regards the mechanism for 
profit allocation used by each US State, for the purpose of computing its sliare ill a 
corporatioWs (or unitary group's) tax base. It is the '. Massachusetts Forn-mla' '393 to 
which rnost US States i-i-iake adjustn-lents to fix their individual formulae. In addition, 
the objective of market integration ill the US iS I')LU'SI-ted tlll*()Llgll the jUl'iSPI'Lidence of 
3 94 the Supreine Court on the Cormierce. and Due Process Clau, 
None of the above pararneters is relevant to the EIM. This is primarily due to the 
absence of taxing *urisdiction at EC level. That is, m devising a gl-()LIP taxation 
system f- Europe, Men-ibei oi States' sovei-eignty should i-emain intact. -"'ý' Indeed, the 
fact that cross-border mtra-EC transactions are L,, -tlll (govenled by DTCs is I 
den-ionstrative of a strongly ii-itergovernmental fi-amework. So far Lis foreseeable, 17 Z 
Men-iber States Would not concede their exclusive competence to impose and collect 
taxes to any authority at EC level . 
3"" Apart from a policy of regulation, there is no 
390 Locher 1213-1214. 
391 CF. McLure Jr and JM Weiner, 'Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula 
Apportionment of Comp, -My 
Income' in S Cnossen (ed), TaA-ing (, 'apltal Income in the European 
Union (Oxford UnIversity Press, Oxford 2000) 243 et seq. (hereinafter McLure & Weuier). 
392 Musgc-, rave (1987) 217-219. 
393 For details on the 'Massachusetts Formula', see. Chapter 9, Part B, Section 1. 
394 For a comprehensive discussion ofthe concepts, see. Chapter 3, Part C, Section It. 
3')-' Hellerstein wid McLure 88-, CE McLure Jr, 'Tax Harmonisation, Fiscal Federalism and Re. --ional 
Economic Integ--ration- International Experience and Lessons for Brazil' (20011) -)-1 
Tax Notes 
International 2862 el secl. 
306 T-h ': , 1,5 1, also ill finc with the principle of sub'sidiarity. See genemlly- M G6rard, 'Neutralities and 
Non-Neutralities ill International Corporate Taxation: Ail Evaluation ol'Possjhle and Recent Moves'. 
(2002) 48 ifo Studien 533.549 (herelliafter G6rard Ofo Studieii))-, Klaver and Timmermans 185. 
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other mechanism in the EC to ensure a certahi an-lount of unity. T'he ECJ is bound by 
the bilateral nature of the iioii-discriii-iiiiatioii/iioii-resti-ictioii tests which may only 
have an in-ipact of limited scope on the systein It follows that regulation inevitably 
appears the most prornisingy path to an efficient market. 
A further question could probably involve the extent to wliicfi regulation should 
apply. Nainely, this boils down to which aspects of a tax systeni should be 
harmonised and which left to the Member States' decision. There will be elaK)ration 
f lloW. 397 on this hi the substantive chapters that 0 Regulation at EC-level is expected 
to cover the elements of the tax base and the FA. In contrast, the rates will remaiii 
with. in the responsibility of the Member States. Finally, certaiii administrative 
practices will most probably require uniform treatment, as they are crucial ill 
enhancing market efficiency. 
11. Principles for an Efficient Setting for Groups of Companies 
in the EIM 
1. The Objectives 
When it coi-yies to corporatimi tax harmordsatimi initiatives, the ii-iandate adopted by 
the European Council of March 2000, held in Lisbon, is the starting pohit: 
The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the 
ne xt decade: to becoine the most competitive and dynarnic 
know ledge- based econoiny in the world, capable of 
197 That is: Chapter 5 on the administration of the system; Chapter 6 on the rules for group definition. 
Chapter 7 on the methods for coniputing the group tax base; Chapter 8 on the territorial scope ol'the 
group, wid Chapter 9 on [. he niechanisni for apportioiiing the group base to the ell. gible states. 
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sustainable economic growth with inore and better jobs and 
greatersocial coliesio 11.398 
The inandate provides an in-iportant guldeline for reference iii designing a group 
taxation system for the EIM. There is thus an emphasis oil ill-1proving ecoiloinic 
welfare in the Comn-itmity 399, which is an objective dating back to the Treaty of 
Rome. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the European Cotm-nission has taken. legislative initiatives 
in the field of. coinpany taxatioi,. i. The aim has beeD to create a framework allowing 
the efficient allocation of resources within the market . 
40" The ineaninty of this, 
according to the Staff Paper of 2001, is that fiscal e1en-lents which currently distort 
econornic activity and investment within the ElM should be eliminated . 
40 1 Distortion 
usually impacts on the decision about the type of investment, its locatioll and 
financing. In contrast, where resources are efficiently allocated, mvesm-ient decision 
11.4 2 is not tax-drive 0') Rather, it shmild be based on other factors, such as economic 
infrastructure., availability of qualified work, short and medliull'i-terIll Outlook in 
403 
different markets and countries, accessibility of markets, and so on . 
in the Staff Papei . 404, inarket efficiency is treated as beingy a concept almost Identical 
to (fiscal) neutrality. hideed, the analysis contained under the title 'efficiency' is one 
of 'neutrality'. Possibly, 4simplicityý, ýcertaiiity' and 'trw. 1 spare nc y', analysed 
separately in the Staff Paper 405, could also be treated as contributim-T, alongside 
IIeUtrality, to an efficient setting. In ten, iis of substwice, all the above concepts 
represent features whiclishould appear in a con-m-lon regulatory fi-aniework applying 
to MNEs in the EIM. 
31)8 Presidency Conclusions, Ushon Europem Council of 23 wid 24 March '1000., para 5. 
391) Staff Paper 15. 
400 Ibid. 
401 
ibid 15-16. 
402 Stall-'Paper (executive summary) 2. 
403 
ibid 3. 
404 Staff Paper 26-27. 
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The Current Structurt, (? f the EIM 
In the area of direct taxation, the EIM appears significantly fi-agnielited. With the 
exception of few specific items where Community legislatloll has created common 
rules, 406 the market consists of as many tax systems as the number of Member 
States. It follows that, in EC Law, the approach to direct taxation is, in principle, 
inter-governri-iental and the, Freedon-ts are its focus. The extensive jurisprudence of 
the ECJ in direct taxation is based on interpreting 'equal treatment' in a context of 
discrimination or restriction. 407 This is a bilateral test wNch does not enhance 
uniformity within the EIM. Neill-ter can neutrality be achieved M such a context. Tile 
process does not go beyond the requiren-lent for coii-ipliance with the EC Treaty. 408 
Challenges Presented by Closeýv Integrated Multi-Jurisdictional 
Markets 
Efficiency iii a closely integrated market primanly presupposes a legA fi-an-iework 
wl-Lich can accommodate increased capital mobili ty. 409 Further, complexity is 
inherent in multi-jurisdictional strUCtUl-eS ill tlIC field of direct taxation. This is due to 
the fact that the taxing power is exercised by more than one Prisdiction within the 
same market. Such a market is usually organised in a federal-type structure. 
Where activity remains strictly local, it does not go any ftirther than the contours of a 
specific sLtb-national ui. iit. In those cases, tax treatmem is, ill principle, 
straicy lit forw ard. Namely, corporation tax Would be charo-ed according to the federal Zý Zý' Z17 
405 
ibid 28. 406 
see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
407 For details on the structure ofthose tests, see Chapter 1, Part A of this thesis. 
40' T O'Shea, "TI-ie ECJ, the 'D' case, double tax converitions and most-favoured iiakons' 
comparability and reciprocity' (2005) 14 EC Tax Review 190,199-200 (heremqfter O'Shea (2005)), 
Marie Lln(ýfoi-s- 
409 Musizi-ave (1987) 197-198. 
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and relevant local rule,;. However, activity wliicli does not extend beyond a suh- 
federal Ullit constitutes a rare occurrence in closely integrated markets. Indeed, 
economic action is norinally carriedon across the market's COFIStitUellt units due to 
increased mobility of capital. Thus, the market should be economically inteurated 
g enougli to be treated as one single area. 
Activities that involve crossing sub-national jurisdictional borders could typically be 
tackled through the established principles of source and residence. That is the 
curi, ent regune in the, EIM. There is, though, a series of reasons why it is not 
satisfactory to deal with such facts through traditional international tax concepts. 410 
The maiii argument relates to the objectives pursued by an integrated market. 
Priority is thus given to eliminating impediments to the mobility of capital amongy 
the constitLient units. The ain-1 is to acIiieve fiscal neutrality of investinent decisions. 
ýffie focus is, therefore, not on protecting the tax base of each COJIStI. tUeIIt L1111t fron-I 
erosion but rather the tax revenues of the intemal market as a whole. As a result, the 
prýicipal am-1 is not to allow defence of the ijitegrity of Individual tax bases. This is, 
however, what the concepts of source and residence mainly alm at. In contrast, sLib- 
federal tax rules should depart fi-om the above inter-governmental practice to best 
serve increased capital mobility and business integration. 
So urce/re side nce structures, within 1-tighly integrated markets, could be vulnerable to 
tax avoidance schemes deployed through incon-ie shiftijig, and foi-Lim shoppiýng 
These practices are considerably facilitated iii such markets, as compared to the 
international marketplace. That is because associated coinpames often treat highly 
integrated markets as one shiggle unit and becoi. ne active tlirouLllh huge liumbers of 
imer-company transactions. The result is increased mobility of the factors of 
production which facilitates the ii-ianipulation of systen-is operating under traditional 
international tax principles. For instance, if the residence test is a typical one (e. g. 
place of incorporation), successful tax planidii(T will easily shift mcome. towards the 
lowei-tax sub-federal. units. In contrast, the abuse risk is reduced if the tax base is 
410 sec oenerally Mtisýzrave (t987). L- -I 
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allocated on the basis of 'factors' which function independently of both SOL11-ce and 
residence. The mechanism for profit allocation is termed FormUlary Apportionment 
(FA). Its effectiveness largely depends on how the factors are designed to cope with 
inanipulation risks. 411 
Charging coip)i-ation tax solely on a source basic412 is a method that one often s 
comes across in computii-ig tax at sub-tederal/sub-national level. This is a feature of 
Capital Import Neutrality (CIN), wl-fich means that the overall tax burden is always 
equivalent to liability in the jurisdiction of source. No tax should be charged at the 
hoii-le state jurisdiction. Sucli a fiscal structure can contribute some simplicity to a 
i-ilarket of increased capital n-lobility. It is thus widely tlioLight to be n-lore effective 
than the traditional source/i-esidei-ice taxation where fiscal liability arises twice. Still 
though, to make sure that double taxation is ehniiiLiated, there is one additional 
requirement. That is, the rules of the sLib-federal systems should not clasli in 
detem-anin. gy the source of income. 413 
A system of source/re side nce taxation may also be designed to give full relief by 
credit at resideiice, which creates Capital Export Neutrality (CEN'). This Would 
render the decision to invest across the border a IleUtral option for the taxpayer, as 
coinpared to staying within the jurisdictioii of the state of residence. In such a case, 
though, significant admi-nistrative and implementation impracticalities are likely to 
arise. Namely, to the end of elin-iinating double taxation, a full ln-iputation credit 
should be gi-wited at residence for the tax paid at source. That is, however, a system 
which is hard to operate. Tax paid at source would be at the expense of the tax share 
allocated to the sub-federal unit of residence. Such a situation could spur oil severe 
competition of tax rates and bases among the units, of a federal structure. hi support 
of the above concerns, it inay be useful to recall that the Comj-rdssion Proposal 
41 1 For detailed analysis on FA, see Chapter 9 of this thesis, (a short reference is made later in this 
chapter under. 2. 'flie Instruments. 
412 PB Musgrave, 'Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base' essay no 6 in CE McLure Jr 
(ed), The Slale Corj)oralloii Incorne Tax: Asites in Worldivide Unitar. v CombMation (Hoo\ýtr 
Institution Press Stanford University, Stwiford 1984) 228,232-233 (hercinafter Mus, - avc (1984))ý gr 
idem (1987)200, idem(1991) 292-293. 
1 -10 ) 
1975 414 envisaged a coinpensatory payment by the jurisdiction of ýource towards 
residence. The purpose was to partially alleviate the erosion of the tax share of 
residence. The mechanism involved, though, great administrative coinplexity. It 
further reinains doubtful whether it could achieve equity in the division of tax shares 
(i. e. 'interJurisdictional equity' ). 415 
Irrespective of the systeni applying internally, the traditional source/residence 
concept should be retained to regulate relations in an international setting. 
Traditional international tax concepts are functional witl-fin a network of bilateral 
relations amoi-ig sovereign- states in the context of which there is no integration 
objective. Therefore, so urce/re side nce taxation should still be applicable to 
con-iputfi. ig tax liability at federat level . 
416 This concerns transaction,,, With third 
countries and the application of DTCs. In the EIM, DTCs are concluded exclusively 
by the Member States and there is no tax i-imposed at EC level. In light of this, 
commercial activity between Member States and thtird countries should be taxed 
pursuant to source/residence rules. 
Neutrali(v"" as the Key Concept 1. ii Integrated Markets 
With-in a multi-jurisdictional market, fiSCal 11eUtrality, ill its 4AI)SOILIte Vel'SiOll, should 
. 
418 1 yroup normally involve applying a uniform tax base and rate Iii additiou, if ag 
taxation system is in place, a L111601`111 formula for profit apportioument should be 
devised. It follows that such a structure cancels tax competition among the 
constituent units (i. e. the Member States M an EC context). 
413 
idem (1987) 284-285. 414 Conimssion Proposal . 1975 art 
8(2). 
415 Musgrave (1987) 202 et seq., idem (199 1)-294-296, idern (1995) 53-54. 
416 Musgave (1995) 66, idern (1991) 296-297. 
-117 RA Musgrave and PB Musgrave, 'Iffler-nation Equity' in RM Bird and JG Head (eds), Alo(leoi 
hsca/ bsucs: Essavs in Honour of GIFIS Shqup (University of' Toronto Prcss, 1972) 6-3) (Mus(-, rave 
(1972)) .- idem 
(1987); idem (1995), Stall'Paper 26-27-, Staft'paper (executivc surnmary) 3. 
This is a situation, in principle, fi-ee of any fiscal distortion. However, that does not 
necessarily imply that investment deci a regulated landscape remains in such 
neutral. Rather, in the absence of tax competition, a con-iparative advantage would 
be created in faVOUr of wealthier econo S. mi e, 41 9 That Is because any opportunity of 
attracting capital through tax-frieiidly St1-UCtLII-eS would become minimal. Therefore, 
complete fiscal neutrality may give ri,,,, e to iion-fiscal features which actually impact 
on investment decisions. 
In light of the above, federal-type states charging corporation taxes at stib-federal 
level (i. e. Canada, Switzerland and the U-S) have introduced provision,, to strike a 
balance between neutrality and conipetition. In the US, a fi-ee-market approacli is 
reflected in the, disparities of the forn-lula factors and diverse version,,,, of tax base 
applied by each US State. This is, however, offset through the imegratimi 
mechanism between lower-tier md federal taxes. Iii the celitralised Caiiadiaii system, 
whicli ties closer to regulation, competitimi is brought in by means of allowing fi-ee 
determination of tax rates. Further, iii Switzerland, the Federal Tribunal has souglit 
-to reduce distortioii caused by disparities m cantonal tax bases (prior to THL), rates 
and formulae factors. This was done by layi-lig dowii general pi-inciples ill 
interpreting the constitutional principle of prollibitimi of double taxation. 
As said, the EIM, at its current state of developinent, is still far fi-on-i being a fiscally 
neutral market. Further, since the market accomii-io dates disparate systems, there is 
tax competition but its beneficial effect is ofteii impeded due to distortions. 
Neutrality underlies the European Commission's poficy docuinents. It is thus one of 
the key principles to which the proposed 'coi-yiprehensive schemes' should conforni. 
'Mose delineate the future directions for coordinatioii of corporation taxes irý Europe. 
As said, a neutral schen-le is marked by the absence of any fiscal element which may 
41 S G6rard (Ifo Studien) 550; M G6rard, ýInterjurisdictjonal Compmy Taxation in Europe, the 
German Reform and the new EU Suggested Direction' CESjfO Workang Paper No 636(l) (CESil-o t t- 
Work in a Papers, CESifo, MWiich 2002) 19(/icr(, i'ii(! fi(, rG6rard(CESil'oWc)rkiii,, Paper)). 
419 Klaver and Timmermans 187. 
132 
distort business decisions. That non-nally presupposes an accomplished 111teLration 
process, having reached the objective of a 'single market'. It implies that legn slat i ve 
measures have been enacted to regulate all aspects of corporate taxation at EC level. 
The outcome should be to create one single EC-wide regiii-le for corporate taxation. 
2. The instruments 
a) Formulary Apportionment (FA) 
420 
FA is a key feature which corni-nonly applies, instead of arm's lengtil separate 
accounting, to sub-federal structures for the allocatimi of profit. It is widely believed 
that switching hom transaction- based separate accomithicy to an approximation of L_ 
profit reached t1irough apportionment is justifiable on the following gromids. (i) to Cý 
reduce costs relating to compliance with transfer pricing rules and (ii) to provide a 
fi-amework for taxation which fits the integrated business structure,, that MNE,, 
organise then-iselves in.. Therefore, the CO]Itl'll-)LItiOll of FA to fleUtIlIlIty and 
efficiency primarily focuses on two areas: 
(i') Combating hicoine shiffing practices towards lower-tax jurisdictions. Under FA 
scheines, the share taxable in each. sub-tecleral jurisdiction is deterniiiied by the 
weight carried by each forn-mla. factor in that junsdiction. By in-1plication, the priciiig 
of individual transactions is no niore an iridicator. That means transfer pricing 
provisions appear redundant, as there is no more incentive to engage irt income 
sh-ifting practices. 
(ii) Drawing comparables and identifyhig value-added arising fi-om ecommies of 
scale and scope may be extrei-nely difficult in intra-group transactions. hi cases of a 
4-11 high degree of business integration within the internal market finding the so 
caUed Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUp)412 may prove extremely difficult. 
Especially when it con-ies to global MNEs, it often happens that there are brands 
exclusively produced within a single large group. That makes identification of price 
con-iparables a rather tough exercise . 
423 Moreover, the so-called 'Synercri Sill' '424 
attached to economies of scale and scope, may render a transactio n- based 
computation of profit inaccurate .4 
`5ThIs is because the 
I(-YIroup companies contribute 
to each other's profitability. This share of value among the group entities cannot be 
depicted by separate accounting. Consequently, a traditional source/resideiice 
approach would probably not reflect this econon-iic reality. In addition, identifying" 
the location of source and residence may prove a cornplicated process within a 
highly integrated business. 
As said, source-base taxation Could be a better alternative to so urce/re side nce 
schemes wheii it con-les to calculate sub-iiational taxes. That is because it comributes 
more effectively to market neutrality. It is, though, tile FA, instead of source 
taxation, that most federally- structured countries (i. e. the US, Canada, Switzerland) 
have adopted, for the purpose of subjectfiig companies to tax at sub-national level. 
There are soine reasons for this policy choice. More specifically, Source taxation 
may prevent double taxation, provided that there is no tax base overlap an-iong the 
SUb-federal Linits. It cannot, however, provide effective solutions to the difficulties of 
correctly identifying the, location of source and specifyliwy profit attributable to that. 
This is especially true in the case of highly integrated MNEs where there are shared 
420 Detailed discussion on FA is contamed in Chapter 9. 
42 ' For a discussion on incTeased capital mobilitv and its implications in highly intego-Tated markets, 
see earlier in this chapter Part B, Section 11, Title 1. 422 Transfer Pricing Guidelines 11-2. 
423 
, 
Musgo-, rave (1984) 236. 
424 CE McLure Jr, 'Defining a Unitary Business. An Economist',; View' in CE McLure Jr (ed), Ilic 
State Corpe)ralion Income Tax: [ý-mes iti Worldivide Unitary Coinbinallon (Ho)over Institution Press 
Stanf6rd University, Stanford 1984) 89,95 et secl. (heremafter McLure (1984)). 
425 'fl-ils ,, especially so, where income comes in substantial part through the exploitation of immigible 
property Mi McIntyre, "llie Use of Combined Reporting by Nation Slýilc,; ' (2004) -335 
Tax Note, 
International 9 17 (hemnafter Mcbityre (2004)). 
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values among the various locations,. As a result, attacl-m-lent to a precise sub-federal 
unit is often not obvious. This problem is tackled through the FA, which ftinctions 
independently of the traditional principles Of SOUrce/residence. Namely, the formula 
factors 420 (Under the classic 'Massachusetts' model: property, payroll and sales) 
employ more precise allocation criteria than the geograpliical location Of income. 
That makes FA more appropriate than 'source' to fit into new commercial structure,,,. 
FA does iiot alone ensure aclueven-lent of fiscal neutrality427 and market efficiency 
through elimmathig tax obstacles. That would require operation of a uniforin 
formula across the market. In countries where FA is currently operated, such as the 
US and Switzerland, eacli State or Cwiton is most likely to devise its own version of 
the formu. 1a. Thus, income of a specific company (or, in the US, a unitary busiriess) 
is apportioned to each sub-federal unit pursuant to each State's/Canton's own 
rUle S. 
42 " That inevitably creates distortions in profit allocation, as it causes double 
taxation due to overlap in the revenues incorporated into tile tax base. It follows that 
only a uni-form formula would be in line with the objective for neutrality set by the 
EIM. 
b) Tax Base and Rates 
If perfect location neutrality is the target, it is then clear that both tax base and rates 
across a multi-jurisdictional market should -he uni fo I- 111 . 
421) 011 the, other hand, if each 
of the sub-federal units applies a different tax base or rate, some distortion of 
business decision is likely to come into the picture. That will, DI principle, concern 
the location (i. e. sub-federal uitit) of investment. Still though, a setting of perfect itr 
426 ating profit pursuant to the factors i. s, in Fox and Murray, McLure holds the view that alloc. 
practice, equal to ch,,:. iroing tax on each of the formula factors. ý71 C- 427 Gýrard (ifo Sludien) 550, 
4 28 See Chapter 3, Part B, Section IV on Switzerlaiid md Part C, Sectioil I& IV. 
429 Musgrave (1987) 198-199. 
135 
4 
-, 
0 tiscal neutrality may still not be the best policy choice for the Member States. 
This is because the system may be rigid and difficult to administer or suffer non-tax 
distortions. 
There are systems, such as the US, wl-&h accommodate significant disparities both 
in tax base wid the methods for profit allocation. To eliminate adverse effects, there 
is provision for integration between lower- and federal-tier corporation tax rates. In 
an EU context, the potential settin 1.431 ,g 
looks the exact opposite. As explained earlie ,' 
combating distortion in the EIM places a requirement for harmonisation through 
regulation. A group taxation systein allowing Member States to apply differential tax 
bases and/or variable FAs for profit allocation would clearly depart fi-()ill the above 
ob . ective. Yet, tax rate differences, apart fi-on-1 some degree of market distortimi 
likely to impair location neutrality, do not cause double taxation. Neither do they put 
an additional burden on to compliance costs. Finally, differential rates do not, in 
principle, risk failing the test of iioii-disci-i-ii-iiiiatioii/iioii-i-estriction before the 
ECJ. 432 
The policy documents issued by the Europeali iDstitutions in relation to compauy 
taxation after 200043, mark a change of approach to the determination of i-atcs. T11c 
question arising is whether the policy Choices ()f the new Millennium C()llstitute all 
ideological shift towards the 'fi-ee-marketers' theory, which favours tax compention. 
In the 1970s, the attempts for coordinatioii/liai-i-noiii. sation of corpoi-ation tax systems 
430 In the context of the EU, there is always in additional element to this. It the Member States' 
sovereignty, which ends up deterri-itning policy decisions very often. In light ofthis. it is unlikely that 
a coordination process which alms at a high degree of neutrality, through a uniformity of hasus and 
rates, is not faced with severe resistance on the part of the Member Statcs. The compromise likely to 
be struck does not nori-nally involve a doginatically perfect solution. It is instead a deal which lies 
alms at analysing policies solely on the somewhere on the spectrum between the two ends. TI-ils thesis L 
basis of technical principles. 'nie examination (A' the impact that Member States' individual interests 
ma have on decision-making directions falls Outside the scope of this \\, -(-)rk. y Z7 
43 1 For more details, see earlier in this chapter Part B, Section 1. 
432 This is so to the extent that no difference in rates applies between foreign and domestic situations 
within each Member State; for the iioii-disci-imlii, -ttiý)ii/iioii-resti-ictic)ii tests, see 
Chapter 1, Part A, 
Section 11. 
4ý3 COM(2001)260*, COM(2001)58-2. Staff Paper, COM(2003)726-. COM(2006)157. The Bersani 
Report, COM(2007. )223. 
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in the EIM passed througli tax rate approximation . 
434 The same approacli was, 
retained in the Rudiiig Report of 1992. Approximatimi was envisaged by means of 
setting a maxii-nufn and a mininium rate . 
435 On the contrary, proposals for tax'rates 
issued after 2000 provide that those are freely fixed by the Member States. 
To answer the question, one should consider that the Comintmity legislative 
initiatives up to the Staff Paper of 2001 have always aimed at tackling inefficiencies 
of the EIM iii specific matters. Therefore, the approximation of tax rates was not a 
proposal n1eant to apply in addition to a scheme of tax base uniformity. Tile shift 
from the approach of tax rate to base uniformity seems to have been linked - at least, 
iii timing - to the so-called 'comprehensive remedial measures. Nainely, this was 
the first thne that the Con-nnission communicated the broad li-nes of a system of 
corporate tax, rather than aspects that rectify specifically identified complexities. By 
the time that the prospect of tax base uniformity cwne into the picture, the 
deterinination of tax rates was left to the Member States' discretion. Over the years, 
the evolution of policy choices seenis to have involved a decision oil whether to 
regulate the tax base or the rates. However, the final position has never been olle ()f 
complete uniforn-iity. It seeins that a certain arnount of tax competition has always 
been appreciated - either through the fi-eedom to decide on the clements' of tile tax 
base or the rates. 
c) The External Network qf DTCs 
The Member States, in principle, maintain the conTeteme to deal with third states m 
fiscal relations. Briefly, the, general rule oii external conipeterice is that it rests with 
the Men-lber States, unless explicitly or iji-iplicitly conferred oil the Con-u-numty by 
the Treaties. The vast majority of cases fall within the so-called 'InThed 
cotyipeteiice', of which the scope has been delineated through ECJ case law. 
434 Conimissim Proposal 1975. 
435For infOrmation about the Ruding Report, see Chapter "), Part A. 
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More specifically, the existence of internal common rUles Is an adequate ground for 
claiming that external competence in the Specific ISSUe has been conceded to the EC 
('paralleli S11-1I ). 436 The same rule renders Con-imunity competence exclusive In the 
fields it covers. Further, where internal legislation is missing, external Con-ununity 
coii-tpetence should still exist 'insofar (is the participation qfthe CommunitY in the 
international agreement is ... necessaryfbi- the attainment ofone of the oh' jectives qf 
the Community 
437 (priiiciple of 'complei-yientarity'). In this case, however, 
S. 
4- ConuyiunitY cou. 1peterice is concurrent with that of Member State This usually 
leads to the conclusion- of mxed agreements. 
There are areas, such as dividend distributions, interest and royalty payi-nems, 
savings taxation, in which the EC has legislated. 439 hi light of the above, it could 
possibly be argued that, in those fields, co. inpemice has dejacto passed to the EC. 
Were such a conclusioil to gain approval, the European Commission would have to 
be invited to negotiate, alongside the Member States, certaiji provisions of their 
DTCs. 
Conclusion 
416 Case 22-70 Commission qfthe European Cornmitin . ti . es v Council qfihe Eiiropean Conununiars 
11971 j ECR 00263 (ERTA) (hea., inafter L-RTA). 
437 Opifilon 1/76 delivered pursuant to Article 228(l) EEC Treaty. - 'Draft Agreement cstablishhig a 
ELiropeafi laving-up fund for inland waterway vessels' [ 1977] ECR 00741, para 4 (hereina er Laving- 
Up Fund). 
43' This conclusion arises from (he stricter interpretation of exclusive competence adopted in the 
f0flowing two Opinions issued in the 1990s- Opinion 2/91 delivered pursuaiit to Article 228(1) 
second subpara EEC Treaty. - 'Convention N' 170 of the International Lalx)ur Organization 
coiicernin- safety in the use ol'cheinicals at work' [1993] ECR 1-01061 (hereawfler ILO Ophuom-, 
OpItiloti 1/94 delivered pursuant to Article '2228(6) EC Treaty. - 'Competence of the CotTu-nunity to 
conclude international agreements conceming services and the protection of intellectual property' 
[ 1994] ECR 1-052267 (hereinqffer WTO Opinion). 
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There are key parameters, peculiar to the EIM, which place a reqUIreMent for tallor- 
made Stl-LtCtLtl*e. ',,. Overall, any proposed European scheme for group taxation should 
be created to meet the principles of the acquis communaittaire. 440 
It has beeii showii that a comprehensive corporatimi tax system at ELiropem level 
should serve the EIM policy objectives for neutrality and efficlericy. The alm should 
be to devise a scheme which can best contribute to a balanced presence of tax 
competition and of neutrality. 441 
To this end, a uniform tax base should be applicable across the group, whereas the 
tax rates can. be left to the Member States for deterniination. The tax rate divel'Uence 
may render investment decisions non-ne-utral but this drawback is otfset by the 
advaiitages of tax coi-iipetition. In any case, perfect fiscal neutrality does ]lot 
i-iormally create a neutral frmilework for invesm-lent, as it allows otlier (non-tax) 
differences to surface. It is also crucial that the forn-iula for profit allocation within 
each group tv uniform. This should comprise both the factors for apportionment and 
the weight allocated to them. Thereby, tax base overlap will he deterred, w1licl] 
should result in elimillating double taxation within the group. 
EC group taxation should also be in compliance with the Ti-caties. Thu", the system 4n 
gements to allow applying internally should be coupled with. International tax an-an 
flow s to and. fi-om third countries. This need arises primarily becaLPSC of the absence 
of federal-level taxation in the EIM. 
In the following chapters, it will be explored whether (and how) the objectives 
diSCLIssed above can materialise within the current framework of the EIM. 
439 For more details, see Chapter 2, Part B. 
4,40 It refers to the entire body of EU Law which is produced this fai-, It is divided iii chapters 
iiegotiated between accession states mid the EU. For the negotiations with Croatii and Turkcy, the 
(--oninutria-waire consists of 35 chapters. 
441 For a brief outline of the ideolqgical debate, see earlier in [his chapter Part A. 
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5. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 
Introduction 
A group taxation system for the EIM is aii experiment without precedent 
imernationally. Ideas and experiences can be derived fi-oin systenis applying to 
federal-type state entities but still, the sovereignty of EC Meinber States inarks a 
difference in the EIM. 44-1 UniqLie challenges arise in connection with both the aims to 
be pursued and the administration of the system. That is the result of all oftell 
contradictory coexistence of single market integratiorl targets and Member States' 
competence in direct taxes. 
In the analysis that follows, reference is on. 1y made to c1d. ministrative featLII'eS Of 
certain US States that apply combined reportin kv. 44 .3 The systems of Canada and 
Switzerland cannot provide an example for the EC, as they do not accommodate 
group taxation structures. Rather, FA is applied to eacli individual corripany. 
HavUig analysed the policy pruiciples which permeate ýitegration objectives in tile 
EIM, the broad lines of how a. group, taxation system could be adiyiýiistered will be 
discussed here. The idea is thus to look at the administrative issues before moving 
on to exploring the individual structural elements of the EC-wide group. That is 
-'42 See aenerally, Commission (EQ, 'Adn-flnistrative and legal tramework/cluestionnaire' (Working 
DOCL1111ent) CCCTB\VvT\030\d(. )c, 2 Marcli 2006 (hereinalier WG Doe I on Adi-nin Issues, ), dem 
'Points for Discussion on "Adn-flnistrative and Legal Fraine-work"' (Workmu Document) L'. L, 
CCCTB\WP\036\doc, 19 May 22006 (hereinqfter WG Doc'2 on Admin 
Issues). 
443 It. should be noted that the cited features of systems of certai. n US States are inevitably small in 
number. The reason has been that information on the issues researched has only spi-sely been 
available. Tberefore, this is, by no means, meant to be a comprehensive survey. Yet, it can still 
an idea of the applicablestructures. 
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because knowledge of what can be workable in practice is expected to act a,,,,, 
guidance for any decision on the substance of each precise element. 
'Me administration-related issues to be exan-lined below have beeii organised in four 
parts: corripliance, enforcen-ient, dispute resolution and re-assessi-neiit of tax liability. 
Part A: Compliance 
The analysis that follows will focus oii tax compliance obligations which present 
particular features in a group taxatioii context. The areas identified in that regard 
iýnvolve group registration, detern-iination of tax periods and retuni filing. 
1. Registration 
An EC-wide group taxation system is expected to accommodate companies wl-ticil, 
in most cases, have already registered with the national authorities. It is, therefore, in 
sucli a context that a scheme for registration of the group should fit. An option could 
be to allow the group to register for tax puilx), ses only once. That would naturally be 
in the state of the parent company's residence. Going through the group registration 
formalities in each Member State, host to at least one company eligible for gro p 
participation, would prove a non-pragi-natic approach . 
444 Sucli a practice would be 
444 It should be clarified that any scheme for groups should not eliminate the requirement for separate 
tax registration of each individual group entity. The main reason is that, when it comes to commercial 
establishment, certain administrative formalities in individual Member States cannot be avoided. 
There , -Te thus regulatory requirements which, on top ol' tax registration, should be complied with. In 
VAT, the 'one-stop-shop' facility for re(y stration makes more sense, as there s no other formality 01' 1-1 11- 
a regulatory nature. It is currently in fOrce in the field of e-con-uiierce and saves third-country 
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costly and time-consuming indeed. It would defeat the purpose of market efficiency. 
Below, there is discussion of certain critical features dealing with group registration 
which, in the author's view, should appear in an. EC-wide group taxation system. 
Notýfication oj'Group Registration to Participating Member States 
Such a system of registratiou should be coupled with a mechanisni of automatic 
i011445 446 notificat to the tax authorities of all Member States concerned. Notably, a 
systern of automatic exchange of informatioii would provide a useful tool. A detailed 
discussion on this matter will. be carried out later in this chapter under Part B (i. e. 
Etiforceinent). 
The Member State of a group's registratioii should be m charge of checking whether 
the rules for (group) ii-lemberst-up have beeii con-iplied with. It could also be ail 
option to allow the Member States whicli host group subsidiaries to raise objections 
to the group's compositim if they consider that the rules are breached. This would 
be in line with Member States' sovereignty in direct taxes. Depending oil the 
ch-cuinstances, that could also increase the chances of appl-ovat of ail EC group 
taxatioii systei-yi. 
If the Member States are giveu the possibility to raise objections to group 
membership, they S11OL11d be allowed a reasonable amount of tiýine to exaivýine the 
situatio 11.447 For such a meclianism to function properly, it is expected that each 
suppliers of e-services from the obligation to obtain VAT numbers in each Member State they trade. t7 I 
There is also discussion of the possibility to extend the 'one-stop-shopý facility to cross-border 
services taxed, for VAT purposes, at the place of the recipient's establishment. 
4-45 Notification will follow registration of the group. So, the procedure will not take the shape of a C- 
notification for approval similar to [lie procedure of Merger Control in EC Competition Law. I- 446 11' EC garoup taxation 
has been implemented as part of an enhanced cooperation scheme, then 
notification will be limited to die participatiiig Mei-iit-*--r States. 
447 The possibility of Member States to raise objections originates in a coninion feature of I 
Adniinistrative Law. Taxpayers with a legitimate interest ýTe often given the right to object to 
Administrative Acts. Pie objection may take the form ofeither in appeal at the administrative lc\, Cl 
or an action before the court. For an example within the context of the EC, see TEC ýYt 2330 subpara 
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Member State should make available resources within its tax administration - 
possibly, through creating a special department. A grOLIP'S registration would only 
be treated as final upon expu, y, without objection, of the specifically defined period 
of tin-ie. Approval of a groups n-ien. -ibership by all Men-lber States concerned would 
then be deen-ied to have been obtained. Should disagreement en-ierge arnong the 
Member States, it would be solved through a dispute settlement system. This 
prospect is discussed later in this chapter under Part C (i. e. Dispute Resolution). 
Titne. fOr Registration 
A brief consideration of registration formalities applicable to national group taxation 
systems gives evidence of exteusive disparities. 
The French rules on Regi'me d'integrationfiscale-4-"' require that group election must 
be done before the first day of the accounting period to which consolidation shall 
apply. Further, an official agreement should be enclosed in the election declaration. 
The regulatory fi-ainework in Gerinany 449 appears ji-iore flexible than the French one, 
in terms of the dates by which registration formalities S1101-Ild be completed. More 
specifically, it involves conclusion of a Profit and Loss Transfer Agreement 
(Geý, t,, Iiiii(ilýti, ihi-ling, ýiýet-trag) between the parent company and each of the 
4- natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, in. witive proceeding, ý ... agamst a 
(kci. 0mi iihich, although in the jorm of a regulation or a decision, addre. ý. wd to another person, is of 
dirrct and indi. Yidual concern to the ormer'. 
-4-4ý This is a system of profit consolidation on which more detail is provided later in this thesis as part 
of1he ownership tests for entitlement to group men-ibership (Chapter 6, Part A, Section 1) and of the 
rules Oil IIIX baISe integn-ItIon (Chapter 7, Part A, Section I)-. J Richard, 'Comparison between UK and 
French Taxation of Groups of Companies' ('2003) 34 Intertax '20,28-29 (1wreltiafter Richard)-, JA 
Borrat and A Bassiýre, ýReport on Group Taxation in France' in IFA (ed), Cahirrs dc drolt. fiscal 
haernanotial vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 271,275-276 (herelflafter 
Borrat and Bassiýre. in IFA Cahiers). 
441) P Eckl, 'Business Taxation: Heavy Tax Increase Imposed by the Tax Privilqge Reduction Act' 
[20031 European Taxation 91,93 (here inqft( ,r EckI (-)003b))-, OT 'German Fiscal 
UnM,, 2003' (2004) 3. ) Interhax 2,5 (heremal? cr Gral'Kerssenbrock). 
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subsidiaries makilig part of the Organschaft. 450 Following that, the A-Lrueillellt 
should be recorded m the Commercial Register. Until the Tax Privilege Reductioll 
Act took effect (i. e. prior to the 2003) assessn-mit period), the system used to allow a 
higher arnount of flexibitity in complying with regulatory requirements. Namely, the 
Agreen-ient could be recorded oi-i the Con-miercial Register evei-i irt the year 
f0flowing that of initial application of the Organschqft's rules. The regline which 
, replaced those rules set forth a stricter timelhie. Thus, the group registratioi-i stiall 
now be completed by the end of the fiscal year iii which the Agreement became 
applicable. 
At the other end of the spectrum the UK LITOLIP or consortium relief involves a quite 
flexible structure. 45 ' No obligation is placed to register as a group entity at any time 
hi advance. Namely, group or consortium inenibersNp is gained when the claim for 
loss transfer is filed, which can be withiji a two-year period. Still though, both 
entities taking part in loss relief should, be found to have satisfied the -(']-()LIP 
membership tests over the entire accounting year in issue. In light of the above, it Z7 
should probably be noted that the UK scheme is, to a large extent, all outcome of the 
Country's group taxation system. Siýnce th-is involves no consolidation and the 
entities retain their integrity, the UK group relief does not give rise to significant t_ - 
additional administrative forn-ialities. That gives it space for flexibility. 
In California's 'water's edge, the option is given to become a groLip mei-nber Z-- - 
subsequently. The taxpayer is deei. iied to have elected and sliall be bound by the 
election for the ren-laining terni of the contract . 
45 -) Another possibility is forced 
election, whicli may occur by reason of a tax audit. 45-) If the Franchise Tax Board 
450 nI Is is the term al'ter which (lie German group taxation system is named. For details on the 
Organschqft, see later in this thesis Chapter 6, Part A, Section 1. 
45 1 For more details on the UK group relief*, see later in this thesis Chapter 6, Part A, Scchoii 1, 
Richard 3"; Y Rupal, 'Report on Group Taxation in the United Kingdom' in IFA (ed), Caliirrs de 
i fiscal vol 89b (Cthiers de droit fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 68-5 et seq. dro 't II 
(herciiiqfter Rupal in IFA Cahlers). 
452 Calit'ornia Franchise Týtx Board (ed), 'Water's-Edge Election and Contract' (Intemal Procedw-cs- 
Manual, September 2001) - Section 3.1 Point i 
<httl): //www. t'tb. cýi. gov/, ýiboutFTB/m,,. tnu, ils/audit/w, iter/cli3. pdt'> accessed 16 June -1007. Z- 453 Ibid. 
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find,,, that a non-electing taxpayer is actually a n-lember of the group, the taxpayer 
qualifies for a deemed election. 
W considering possible solutions for the EC, an idea could be that elections are, iii 
principle, registered at the beginning of the taxable period . 
454 That could probably be 
withiji the first mmith. Such aii arraugen-ient should allow enough time fol- a 
procedure of dispute settlenieDt, if activated, to have been coix1pleted before the 
-annual ta-N liability becomes due. Further, a inechanisni should be put iii place to 
confinn, on an annual basis, the groups' compositimi and record chaiiges in it. 
Equally, it should furnish the Member States with the opportunity to pronounce their 
objections. Thus, parent compaiiies (in EC groups) shall bear al-i ()bligatioll to 
coiffirn-i their group's n-iembership to the conipetem authorities of their state ()f 
residence. That should be done at the beginning of each tax period. A mie-momh 
deadline shotild suffice for that. 4ýý Member States will then be notified of changes, 
so that they can be in a position to file their objections early enoLigh iii the tax year. 
The Tenn qf the Group 
Another issue on which a decision should be reached relates to the grOUP'S life span 
and changes in entitleinent to group tnembership occurring in the rneantime. In 
making a choice, consideration should be taken of tax avoidance risks but As(), of 
the Lisbon Strategy objectives to make the EC 'the most competith,, e knmi., Iedge- 
bcised in(irk-et'. These two factors for policy decisioD are often in conflict, as 
measures scheduled to tackle tax avoidance may be found to discourage collpetItIol, 
454 Even though, in national group taxation systems, the point of reference M this regard is the 
acc, ounting year and not the tax year, it is the Litter that should be used in the context of the EC. This 
is because the critical even[ here is to allow enough time for possible Member States' disagreements 
on group composition to have been settled before tax liability becomes due. Further, since the groul) 
tax hase will not be linked to financial accounts, the accounting year is, typically, not critical. hi 
practice, however, considering that financial accounts are used as a primary source ofinfori-nation I'or 
tax accounts, some coordination between accounting and tax years should be worked out. 
4-55 Confirniation is also part of the French inicgran . on fiscale, which requires the parent conipany to 
submit a list of the Companies to be group niernhers in the following accountingperiod. C, I 
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in the EIM. In the analysis that follows, it will be shown how this clash SUrfaces in 
deterniining the tel-111 of tile gi-oup. 
A look into the situation of national group taxation systems reflects a situation of Z7 
disparity. 
Li Geriuaiiy, an Organschqft is regi, 456 stered for a minimum term of five years. 
Earlier teri-iiination 'ftw no serious reason' treats the group as not having existed at 
all . 
457 Sales, spiii-offs and restructurings are mentioned as serious reasons for 
tenTii-nation. 
A n-ýinnnuni term of five years is the rule in France as well. There is. llowever, 
provision for changes in the group, which should he reported annually by the parent 
company on a list submitted to the tax authorities. The changes are valid for tile 
following accounting year. 4 s8 Further, at the end of the accounting period, it is 
possible to take out companies initially declared. However, no new entities cail be 
added. 
It follows froin the systenrs applying to both Germany and France that group 
niernbership is locked at the begUilning of the tax year. If clianges III (YrOUp Zý 
entitlement occur in the meantime, the earliest that the new coinpanies can gam 
group entitlen-lent in France is the next accounting year. 
In the UK, by contrast, partly due to the lack of consolidation features in its group 
taxation regune, 459 the systern operates with flexibility. There iS thUs an annual 
456 HM Eckstein, 'Report on Group T1.1xCition in Germany' in IFA (ed), Cahlers tie droli jiscal 
internwoonal vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 2293,303 (hercinqfier Eckstein 
in IFA CAlers), D Endres, 'The Concept ofGroup Taxation: A Global Overview' (2003), 31 Intertax 
349,350 (hereinqfter Endres), Eckl 93-, Graf' Kerssen brock 12. 
457 Eckstein in IFA Cahiers 304-305, Graf Kerssci-ibrock. 12. 4-38 Richard 29. 
4-59For an explanation of the distinction hetween [lie (often contrasting) terms used to descrlbu tax 
base integration methods, see Chapter 7, Part A, Section 1. 
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OPtioll without wiY obfigation for a prior registration or disclosure of group 
460 
me A el "'. 
In California, the filing requirement is for seven years (oi- eighty four consecutive 
n-imiths) for incon-le years beginning on or after I"' January 1994. Further, there Is 
provision for a facility of automatic renewal as wel] as for a notice of iloil-reliewal. 
Ternunation of an election prior to the contract's expiry is, in principle, possible 
with permission by the Franchise Tax. Board . 
461 Otherwise, for elections beguji mi or 
after I't January 1994, the only way to avoid the permission is that the taxpayer be 
acquired by an unaffiliated larger entity which has not elected. 
One proposal for wi EC group taxation systern could be to 'lock' the group for a 
defined period of thi-le once it is registered. This would imply that no 'new entries' 
or 'exits' would be allowed. As shown earlier, such provisions are not a ]-are 
occurrence. They instead constitute con-m-ion practice for a number of states. Within 
a group, such an approach contributes to legal certaintY. Further, it reduces tax 
avoidance risks, as no easy advantage can be taken of artificial chamyes ill holdillas 
just for the purpose of gaining the benefits of group taxýition- Oil the other hand, it 
features a certain amount of rigidity, which does not contribute to effectively 
pursuina the Lisbon objectives for cortipetitiveness. 
The above rule appears to be an important elemeM of group taxation systen-Is wIlIch 
do not accoi-i-miodate allocation of the group tax base by FA. This is a structure 
typical of the national systems operated by the majority of Me]-fiber States. 4" ) 
Consolidation/pooling would probably be unworkable unless aH participatimy 
entities were registered during the same period and for the sai-ne an-lount of tUne. 403 
For i-nstance, a pool comprises revenues of entities which have been part of the 
460 Endres 350. 
461 Cahlornia Franchise Tax Board (ed)., 'Water's-Edge Election alld Contract' (biternal Procedures 
Mal I ual, September 2001) Section 3.2) Point B 
<hltl): //www. ftb, c, i. gov/aboutFTB/m,, itiuals/audit/wLit, er/ch3, pdf'> accessed 16 June 2007. Cý 461 See Chapter 6, Part A, Section 1. 
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group for a full accounting year as well as of an entity which became a group 
member in the previous three ii-ionths. In such a case, the parent company's results 
would end Lip distorted. It would thus be risky, if not Impossible, to compute, out of 
a 4new entry's' individual tax liability, the amount of tax corresponding to the three 
months. This would be necessary, though, as that amount is credited against the 
parent con-ipany's tax liability upon consolidation/pooling 
Another option could be to have the groups registered at the end of each tax period. 
In that way, only coinpanles which remahied i-n the group for the entire past 
accountfi. ig year would be eligible for membersl-tip. However, fi-om an adnifiiistrative 
point of view, leaving registration for the year eDd could prove a drawback in 
manacyint, an EC-wide systeni. Notifyingy the Member States for approval of the 
group's con-iposition so late i-ii the year would not allow enotio-11 tinle for resolvhIg 
disputes before tax becomes due. This could indeed lead to compromising legal 
certainty. Namely, the group ixienibers' tax liability Would iiievitably remain subject 
to amendment Insofar as no defiriitive decision on the group's coinposition has been 
reached. 
In the aLitlior's, view, the adoption of FA in allocating the group tax base to the 
eligible Member States could possibly offer a wider range of ()I-)tl()Ils. 
Apportmninent allows a company whicli participates i-n a grotip for a shorter period 
than the entire accounting year to be allocated its proper share of the tax base. 
Namely, complexities inheretit in separate accounting, such as that Of COMI)LIMIg the 
credit, are no more present here. It still seems, though, that there is some room for 
tax avoidance through artificial changes in holdhigs. To the end of tacklhig this, 
Member States could agree to lay down minimun-1 holding periods Of the entities 
participating in a gl. OUP. 464 More specifically, instead of 'locking' the entire group 
for a number of years, it could be provided that the mimmun-i holding period is 
463 ar. For instance, und r a con-irrion tax ycL It is not necessarily required that group companies share L 
Organschqft, tax periods do not need to coincide in terms of dates. 
464The condition for holding over a n-iii-iii-num peri (ýd is an anti-avoidance clause contained in the P-S L, 
Directive art 4(2) and I-lie I&R Directive art. 1(10). 
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considered at the level of each group member. Thus, 'new entries' and 'exits' would 
be allowed, insofar as the respective group member has remal ined in the (:,, i-()up for at 
least five years. The minimum life of a group will therefore be set oil an entity basis 
and not for the entire group. That should allow some flexibility. 
11. Taxable Periods 
The tax year occupies different dates in the systeni of each EC Member State. In 
light of this, the question is whether the Member States should decide that one single Cý 
fiscal period should apply to al] members within a , Iii(-, Ie group. 
It cwi be derived fi-om comparative data on accounting periods that national policies 
appear divergent. 
syste Among a list of twelve states with o-i-oul-) taxation -I- 11s, 
465 only two states (i. e. 
Australia and the Netlierlands) operatinc, full consolidation schemes require a 
common business yeai- for tlieir gi-oup entities. Rlrtlier, the san-ie applies to the US 
system which, despite carrying the name 'consolidated tax group III practice 
functions as pooliDg. An additional con-iment is that, among, the systems j-cviewed, 
1101le Of those Without consolidation/pooling features (i. e. UK and Sweden) places all 
obligatioii for uniform accounting years. Further, differential approaches can be 
Identified among Organschqft states, with Germany allowing differences whereas 
Luxembourg not. Finally, a requirement for con-m-ion bush-tess year also applies to a 4-7 
number of states with pooling systems such as Demnark, France and Spaill. 
In the US States' systems of combined reporting, there seems to be a default rule of 
common taxable year. However, an-migenients are also put 11-1 place to allow 
flexibility for inembers of the combined group which apply a different accounting 
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period. In TexaS, 466 the prij-ylary point of reference is the taxable year of tile federal 
consolidated group. More specifically, if two or more members of a group file a 
consolidated retL11-11, the coi. -nbined group's accounting period is that of the federal 
group. Otherwise, the common taxable year is that of the principal Texas entity. 
Furtl-ier, guidelines are given to make arrangements in comection with group 
inembers with a different accounting period. Similar ru-les govern tile systein irý 
Illinois. 407 There is thus a starting line, making the taxable year of the designated 
agent the rule for the combined group. Then, this is coupled with a set of guidelines 
on how to deal with group inernbers which accommodate schernes that diverge from 
the general norin 
In principle, intemational practiceWitDesses a fi-agmented approach. Still though, a 
nuinber of conclusions can be drawn fi-om the above. It seems that tile I-Liles of tax 
retum filing are of some relevance to a OI-OLLP member's taxable year. Z-- 
More specifically, it is certain that, where a group taxation system involves a liýnited Zý 
degree of integration, there is no requIrement for a cOllullOll accounting period. That 
is, nan-lely, the case in the UK scheme of -loss relief' and the Swedish 'profit 
contribUtiOll'. 40- 8 FLITtlier, another clear set of facts exists where the parent company 
files a sinule tax return on behalf of thC eIAt1re k-IFOLIP (i. e. Australia. the Netherlands 
and the USA, ). 469 In those cases, the gyroup men-ibers seeni to always have a coininon 
taxable period. 
The situation in the rest of cases does not seem to create a conu-non norm on taxable 
periods. 
465 See comparative table in: Endres 350-35 L 
466 Window on State Government, 'Instructions Ior Completing Form 05-161 Texas Francb, se Tax Z- 
Information Report' (Ii-istructions) <Iit[l)-//,, N! ww. window. state. tx. us/taxin fo/I ranch i se/05- 
158 
- instruction s/05- 
16 1 
_combo_elim. 
lit ml > accessed t6 June 2007. 
467 Illinois Department of Revenue, 'Revenue/ hicorne Tax/ Con-ibined Returns' (Regulation) 
<httl): //www. reven ue .s tate. 11. us/Le gal 
fn formati on /rt us/Part 100/ 100-52 30. pdf> accessed 16 June 
1007. 
468Endres 350-351. 
461) Ibid. 
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A first point is that a distinction can be drawn between systems of a fundamemally 
different structure. In most of the national systerns, the subsidiaries settle their tax 
liability individually and then have their results pooled at the level of the parent 
con-ipany. A credit is provided for tax already paid . 
47" The approach takeii is mixed, 
even though the n-iajority of countries seem to have favoured the policy option of a 
coininon taxable year. 
On the other hand, 'combined reporting', operated by the US States, incorporates a 
fundamentally different structure. It may also consist of filiiig separate tax return,,; 
but the taxable base of eacli entity is not deterniined individually. Rather, the 
group's combined tax base is allocated to the iiienibers by FA. This creates a niore 
integrated scherne than pooli-tig. The, exaii-il-)Ies of TexaS47 1 and 11] 11 Io i S4 71 
derrionstrate a degree of flexibility. More specifically, room is given for departure 
fron-i the default rule of a common tax year. Again, however, arraiigeinems are made 
to allow the departing entities to fit into the group I , -, taxable period. This is 
frequently done by apportioning ai. i emity's yearly result,,,. The outcome i,,,, that 
shares from two consecutive accounting periods are tak-eii account of for the group 
tax base. 
It appears that, in a systeii-i which allocates the tax base through a formula, a single 
taxable period across the group is a definite contribution to efficiency. However, this 
should not rule out the possibility of allowing son-ie flexibility. In principle, though, tý 
to the extent that an EC group taxation scheme operates FA to determine each 
entity's liability, accounting years should be fixed to coincide . 
47, Otherwise, 
470 Se .e generally IFA Cahiers' General Report 2004. 
471 Window on State Government, 'Instructions for Completing Form 05-161 Texas Franchise Tax t, 
Infon-nation Report' (Instructions) <http: //www. window. slýte. tx. us/taxinfo/franchise/05- 
158 
- instructions/05-16 
1-cornbo-elim. hti-i-fl> accessed 16 June'2007. 
472 Illinois Department (if Revenue, 'Revenue/ Income Tax/ Combined Returns' (Regulation) 
<h revenue. state. 11. us/Le. gal In formation/regs/Part t 00/ 100-52130. pdf> iccessed t6 June 
2007. 
473 In connection with the CCCTB, the Member States havc taken a position in favour of a 
harmonised solution, see WG Doc 2 on Adn-iin Issues 5. 
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S19111ficant coordination problems would surface. For example, the deadlines for 
notifying registration, proposed under Section I above, would probably lose their 
justification in the absence of a uniform tax year. 
Ill. Tax Return Filings 4: > 
Prior to discussing possible structures of tax return filing in an EC group taxation 
systern, some comparative data is provided below. 
Fully consolidated systems, such as those of Australia and the Netherlands, provide 
for one single filing made by the parent company. 474 The US -federal group taxation 
system also operates througli one si-ugle returri wliicli is filed by the parent company 
on behalf of all group members. By contrast, eacli group entity is called upon to filt 
its own return in tax systems classified as pooling. Those may range from 
Organschqft (i. e. GermanY475) to SClien-ies of tax base corisolidation with elimination 
of inter-coinpany profits (i. e. France and Spai 11470 1 
). At a first stage, eacli group 
n-iember con-1putes its own tax base, on which it pays tax. The individual tax bases 
are then pooled at the parent coinpany's level, wliicli allow's losses to be set off 
agains. t profits. 
repol in 
477 When it comes to US States' business taxation, the concept of combined I 
enters ii. ito the picture. No consolidation is involved. Namely, each group member 
files its own tax return with the group's coi-iibiiied report appended. However, here, Z7 
the amount of tax due by each group entity is not determined prior to combinatimi, 
474 Endres 350-351. 
475 Ibid-, Eckstein in IFA Cahlers at 304-305. 
476 Endres 350-35 1. 
477 McIntyre (2004) 919. GT Sparagna, 'Report on Group Taxation n tile United States' in IFA (ed), 
Cahlrr. ý (/(, droil. liscal intetvational vol 89b (CaWers de droit fiscal micn-iational, IFA, 2004) 711, 
715-716 (hereinqfter SpTama in IFA Cahlers). 
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as it happens wit], tile Organschqft. Instead, tax is payable by each group member oil 
the deten-nined share of combined income allocated t1rough FA. 
This practice is also confim-led by individual US States' data. Iii New York, 478 tile 
group n-lust file a cortipleted con-ibined report. In addition, eacli coiTx)i-ation must 
con-ipute and show the tax which would have been due for payment if tile entity filed 
on a separate basis. Texas operates a scheme in whicli the principal Texas entity is 
responsible for reportii-ig on behalf of the con-lbined group. 479 It files a con-lbined 
report together with all reports and schedules required by the comptroller. 
The options available to aii EC group taxation system iii connectiol, witil tax returil 
fiting are basically two. Filing inay take place at the level of the parent group 
conipany or, alternatively, the taxpayer cau file a separate tax ret-uni with each 
ehuible Member State. In principle, the ahove two paths roughly coilicide with the Z7 
alternatives put forward by the Working Group ori the CCCTB project. 480 
The first policy choice would most probably allow the taxpayer to deal with only 
one tax administration . 
41 ' The amounts of tax collected would then be passed (wer to 
the eliLTible Member States. SLich facititation may not, however, make *a significant 
differeiice fi-om the ,, econd option. Gmsidenng, that each Membei- State retains its 
own taxing jUrisdictimi, separate tax returns would need to be filed for each group 
entity in any case. So, the prospect of a single tax return SCeIIIS tO be OUt ()f qLle', 6011. 
47' New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, 'Suminary of Tax Provi,, -,, Ioiis in SFY 2007- 
08 Budget' (April 2007) 6 
<http: //www. tax. st. ate. iiy. us/pdt-`/stats/sunil)i-ovisions/suniiii, try-ot'_2007_08_týix-provisioiis. pdf> 
accessed 16 Jurie 2007. 
479 Window on State Governi-nent, 'histructioi-is for Coinpleting Form 05-161 Tcxi,; Fraiichise Tax 
Information Report' (Instructions) <laitp. //k-vAN,, w. wiiidow.,,, ttte. tx. us/taxiiiI'ý)/frAncliIse/05- 
158 
- instructions/05-16 
1-combo-elim. htmI> accessed 16 June 2007. 
480 
WG Doc 2 on Adn-din Issues 4-5. 
481 Th Sa( je-Ct ý-sljop, I is , )I " 01 type of system. Such a scheme is in 
force in the field of e-scrvices in 
VAT. It off-ers third-country operators the opportunity to register and accourit for VAT with the 
1110- authorit es of only one Member State. See: Council D rective (EC) 2002/38 ot'7 May 2002 amendi 
temporarily Directive 77/3881EEC as regards the value added tax arrangements applicabIc to radio L- C, 
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Further, the Men-iber States may not be willing to concede their administrative 
control over the group entities which fall within tlieir taxing emitlement. It is certain 
that any such move would risk underi-nining their effectiveness in the course of a 
future audit. Still thou(ji, despite its grave effect on Member States' sovereignty in 
direct taxes, this may not be of much practical significance. It will thus be discussed 
latei . 482 that the competence to audit the group may inevitably need to be conferred 
on the parent company. Fhially, irrespective of the scheine endorsed, it is necessary 
that the national tax authorities be in a position to keep full record of their entities' 
financial and tax accounts. This is crucial when .a subsidiary leaves the Z(: -)Toup. 
-"' 
It fotlows that a schei-ne, of tax retum filing akin to 'one-s'top- shop', despite its 
drawbacks, could be a workable solution in the EC. It does not, thougli, appear a 
necessity. The decision is, most likely to be reached based oil practical 
considerations. One example is how much of their sovereigi. lty the Meniber States 
will consent to concede. 
Separate returns would normally need to be filed m comiectioil with the part of 
group incon-ie which is not apportioned. It will 'he discussed in Chapter 8 that 
business incon-ie derived ftoiii tliird Countries may not be included m the EC (, roLip ': ý: 7 
tax base. In such case, it will instead be allocated by attribLitioii to the belleficiary 
entities. The sarne is likely to apply to dividends of a third-country SOL1rCe. 4S'-1 
Therefore, those iten-Ls of incon-ie should be declared separately. 
485, -ry that they are arranged as fixed As regards dates for filing it will be necessa 
dates, especially if no agreenient is reached on a common tax year for the group. 
and television broadcasnii- services and certain electronically supplied services 120021 OJ L128 1ý - (hereinafter E-Commerce VAT Direct. ive). 
482) See later in this chapt. er Part B, Section Ifl. 
483 For two exaniples which demonstrate the problems arising from a subsidiary's departure, so: ý IFA 
Cahiers' General Report 2004 52 (2.5.1) & 55 (3.2.1). 
484 See Chapter 8, Part. B, Section III, Title 2. 
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Part B: Enforcement 
1. Exchange of Information 
A group taxation system extending across the border of a single jurisdiction should 
accommodate a sophisticated i-iiechanisin, for the exchai-ige of information. In such a 
context, cross-border iriformatioii is not required solely for the purpose of deterring 
tax avoidance schen-ies. That has primarily been the focws under International Tax 
Law. Iii the case of an EC group taxation system, extensive exchange ftilfils more 
vital functions. It is a prereqUiSite for the system's viability and day-to-day 
operation. 
More specifically, the exchange of information appears to be art indispensable 
element of the system in the following cases: 480 
(i) The authorities of the. parent con-ipany's state shall annually release i4ormation 
on group n-ien-ibership to all participating Member States, so that objections can be 
raised. 
(ii) The authorities of the parent company's state shall notify the outcoille of the 
apportionment to the Member States eligible for a share iii the group tax base. If a 
systen-i of single tax return is opted for, the approved allocation should be notified to 
the Member States. Further, a mechanism should be devised to allow the amounts of 
tax collected to be passed over to the entitled jurisdictions. On the other hand, if the 
taxpayer deals with each administration separately, the mechanisn-is for notification 
need not be very sophisticated. 
485 WG Doc 
-1 on 
Admin Is,,,, ue,, -, 4. 
15 5 
(IiI) To complete a tax audit, national authorities will need to get hold of data 
retained by another Member State. Assistance from local tax 111spectors or expert, " 
may additionally be required. This should be a frequent occurrence in the COLIrse Of 
487 
audit'S. 
Legal instruinents, are available, worldwide, for the excliange of hiformation 
between states in the field of taxation. European states are parties to a Imniber of 
the, 11.488 The agreeinents differ as regards the range of taxes they cover and the 
. -FOrms which they allow the exchange of i4ormation to take. It is beyond tile scope 
of this thesis to pursue a detailed examination of international (and regional) 
agreeineilts/coilveiitioiis/pacts for the exchange ()f information. Features Could be 
derived from those experiences for the. purpose of creating an EC oroup taxation 
system A thorough study, though, should be the item of a separate researcli topic. 
The present work will only attempt to Set Out the broad lilies of an exchange of 
information scheme focused on the needs of an EC group taxation system. 
In considering exchange of information within such Li frainework, a starting point 
should be the Exchange of Inforination. DirectD,, e of 1977. The Directive covers 
taxes on income and capital and could serve as a basis on which exchange of 
inforination within EC-wide groups Could be built. The Directive, as amended in 
2004, contains provisions on exchange by requeSt489 as well as automat iC490 and 
spontaneottS491 exchange and siniultaneOLIS Colltl . 01S. 
492 
486 WG Doc 2 on Admin Issues 6. 
497 For more details, see later in this Part Lit Section 111. 
488 A list of instrument,; for the exchange of information, relt,, ýaiit to the European region, call be C found below- (1) tax treaties which normally include an exchange of information article based on art 
26 OECD Model-, (it) bilateral agreements on mutual assistance. the OECD Model Aggreement oil 
Exch,, inge of Inforn-iation on Tax Matters is expected to be used as guidance in bilateral liegotiatiOlls. 
(ill) Council of Europe/OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters of 25 January 1988 (Ili force, I April 1.995) (Strashourg, Council of Europe, 1989 - convention 
no. 127). Ov) Nordic Pact Multilateral Convention on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of 7 
December 1989 (in force, 9 May 1991); (v) Exchange of Information Directive. For more details and 
some comparative approach to the above, see P GyOngyi Wgh, 'Towards a Better Exchai-i-C of 
Information' 120021 European Taxation 394 et seq.; scc also generally FA Garcfa Prats, 'Exchange of 
Information under Article 26 of the UN Model Tax Convention' [1999] Bulletin of International 
Fiscal Documentation 541-548. 
4S9 Exchange ofInformation Directive art 2(l). Z- 
156 
The cases listed under points (i) and ii) above Should become subject to an 
automatic exchange of inforination, as the need to conimunicate facts arises on a 
regular basis (i. e. annually). To this end, the Member States could probably make 
use of tI)e wording of art 3 of the Exchange of Information Directive. Tile provision 
does not contain any listing. Instead, it allows decision to be i-nade by the Member 
States under the 'consultation procedure', which is also regulated by the 
Direct iVe. 
. 
493 
As regards tax audits (i. e. item listed under (iii) above), the concepts of exclialil. ), e by 
request as well as of spontaneous exch-ange and siii-niltaneoLis coiltrols are crucial. 
Pius, tl-iose should be developed into fully-fledged niechanisins intended to establish 
a nfinimuni cominon level of disclosure. Nainely, Iii(--, I-Lly integrated MNEs cannot be : _-I 
audited, where information made available to the tax authorities does not go beyond 
each sim ity. 
494 
gle ent This is all the niore so where a gn-oup iý, subject to a set of 
con-immi rules for corporation tax purposes. 
The questimi coming next concern.,. s the degree of disclosure of data. Namely, iii a 
dispute oii the outcome of allocatioii betweeii the parent cmnpailyýs state and a 
subsidiary's state, should the latter be entitled to have access to Mformatioii oii other 
group subsidiarie S.? 495. If not, how will it be in a positioii to challeiige the allocatioii 
performed by the parent state (which holds the relevant Mformation)" Full disclosure 
, should be taken as a given reality at the level of the parem con-1pany's state. That 
state will get hold of the, entire group Is results for the purpose of computing the tax 
base and allocating it. Considering this, claims are likely to be put forward for 
extending the right to access to information to Member States liosting subsidiaries. 
490 
ibid art 3. 491 
1 hid art 4. 492 
ibid art 81). 491 
ibid art 9. 
494 Vertical integration and econon-nies of scale and scope do not allow an accurate result to 
achieved it, eacil group entity is considered separately: McLure ( 1984) 95-, Musg-rave ( 1984) 236. 
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The implications of an EC group taxation system in the field of exchange of 
hiformation seem far-reaching indeed. They brhig forth an impressive restriction on 
SoVe eig state 'I 11ty. 
496 Still though, common rules on disclosure appear to be a 
necessity. Otherwise, the system will most probably fail. the test III practice. The 
question is whether the Member States will be willing to take steps in that direction. 
11. Rulings 
No particular challenges are raised by the existence of divergent iiational systems for 
rulings insofar as those deal with issues of a domestic scope. So, questions on the 
elements of a group subsidiary's tax. base can be referred to the domestic tax 
authorities without creating complexities. 
A set of common rules across the. group would be necessary when the questions 
referred affect the tax base entitlement of other states that host LN-OLIP men-ibens. Foi- 
histance, if a taxpayer, being a group subsidiary, applies fOr a 111111w tOuChilig UpOn 
group definitioli, consolidation or apportionmei-it, this cannot be tackled locally. It is 
a grOUP-related ii-latter which should necessarily be dealt witti centrally. A rulin', g, on 
any such issue could probably be given by the parent company's state. Namely, this 
is encumbered with the task of detenni-iiing group entitlement and with carrying out 
consolidation and tax base allocation. It is obvious that any such ruling creates 
effects for all jurisdictioi-is hivolved in the specific group. 
Rulings systems may be structured either as binding or non-biiiding. Irrespective of 
this, a ruling by the parent company's state on group composition, consolidation or 
allocatimi should be n-lutually recognised across the group. Otherwise, the system 4n 
495 WG Doc I on Adnun Issues 2-3. 
496 See the Introduction to this diesis for an explanation of the conflict between stale sovereignty and 
market integration objectives. 
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Would be entirely deprived of efficiency. Notably, if the rulingns scheme is agreed 
upon as binding, all Member States attached to the group should collipiv with the 
decision delivered. It is apparent that a harmonised system of rulings would 
constitute an optimal SO]UtiO11.497 However, this is not expected to be an easily 
negotiable objective'498 as, it would bring the Men-iber States before a further 
restriction of their sovereignty. In light of this, mutual recognition could represent a 
ni-id-terni solution. It is true that it could potentially compron-lise the syste]Ws 
uniformity. Still though, taking account of the current state of harmonisation in 
direct taxes within the EIM, no better prospect appears to have a chance of 
materialishig in the near future. 
On the path towards common I-Ldes, a stw-ting point could be the Comn-ussIO11 
Con-miunication of 2007 491) (mving guidelines for Advance Pricil - -eemews i-(, Ap 
(APAs). Among other facilities, the proposed framework provides for the 
negotiation of bilateral and multilateral pricing agreements betweell tax 
administrations. If considered in connection with an EC group taxation system, these 
agreements would need to be extensively amended. The main reason is that, m most 
cases, the allocation of the group tax base is expected to be carried out by forlmila. 
That places potential tax base overlap on a different basis. TIILI, '-,, d1ffC1-e]1CC, '-, ]n the 
pricing of transactions are no more the reason for disagreement. Therefore, deals in 
the context of an EC groLip will have to be brokered based on other criteria - 
possibly, criteria i-nherent in apportionment. 
111. Tax Audits 
497 For analysis on usefulness of a harinotilsed (, -idvance tax rulings system 
for Europe, s'cc: C 
Romano, Advance TaV Rulings wid Principles (? f Lmv: TOivards a European L(ix Rulings SA's /(, /I I. ) 
Doctoral Series vol 4 (Doctoral Series, hitemational Bureau of Fiscal Documentatioii, Amsterdam 
2002) 417 et seq. (hereinafter Romano). 
498 For a proposal of the basic dements for a European tax rulings system, see: Romano 463 et seq. I 
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The responsibility to carry out tax audits is naturally held by the authority wl-fich is 
competent to levy the relevant taxes. Given that the Member State, ", In principle 
enjoy an exclusive power in direct taxation, tax audits in that field should typically 
be conducted at national level. Apai-t froin the two Directives on Mutual 
Assistance, 500 there is no other piece of EC legislation touchim-Y, directly oi- 
indirectly, upon audits. Thus, in the absence Of COI-IUIIOII ]-Liles, the starting ]ine 
should be that each Member State shall have con-ipetence to audit the group's 
entities liable to tax In its jurisdiction. These tax audits refer to determining a single 
entity's taxable revenue. That is, nan-iely, the tax base wl-fich is added to the results 
of the i-est of the group, for the purpose of creating the overall base. 
However, a substantial difference in circtinistances occurs if grotips extend beyond 
national borders across the EC and common rules are applicable witlifil a Cyl-OLIP. 
Treatment then depends on how the group taxatioii scheme is sti-Lictured. Foi- 
instance, the system of the US States does not involve a centrally performed 
computation of the group tax base followed by apportioiiiiieilt to the eligible 
jurisdictions. Iii contrast, each US State carries out its owii coinpLitatioi-is 
individually, for the purpose of arriving at its tax share in the group. 
An EC group taxation system may typically be admiiiistei-ed by eitlier a central 
authority at European level or -by the Membei- State of the i-el-)ol-tilig entity. 
The latter is in principle the parent con-ipany. Considering the lack of direct tax 
jurisdiction of the EC, it seems iii line witli subsidiarity to assigii the computatioii of 
the group tax base and its allocati0ii to the parent entity. Roughly, this is also tile 
policy choice promoted by the European institutions. so' Should a sclierne of 
499 COM(2007)7 1. 
500 Council Directive (EEC) 76/308 of 15 March t976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims 
resultni-Ig from operations forming part of the systeni of financing the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund, and of agricultural levies and customs duties and in respect of value added tax 
[1976] OJ L73 (herehiqfier Mutual Assistance Directive)-, Council Directive (EQ 2001/44 of 15 June 
2001 amending Directive 76/308/EEC on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims resulting froni 
operations forn-iing part of the systeni of' financing the European A. gricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, and of agricultural levies and customs duties and in respect of value added tax and 
certain excise duties [2001] OJ L 17-S (hcreinqfter Tax Recovery Directive). 
501 S[af[Paper 373 et seq.; Bersani Report 11, 
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consolidation/poolilIg. 502 be applicable, the group tax base and its allocation to the 
eligible Member States should be worked out by the parent eiitity. 5('-' No 
discrimination issues are likely to arise from this practice since the parent entity will 
be applyhig con-inion rules across the group. 
It follows that, irt such a context, audits should naturally be tackled at the level of the 
parent emity. In this regard, it should also be clarified whether parallel audits will be 
allowed. Typically, each Member State is entitled to audit the group entities subject 
to its tax jurisdiction. Considering this, care should be takeil to prevent chaotic 
situations fi-om occurring. Thus, auditing one group emity is likely to lead to tax re- 
assessments and to revisions of accounts with an impact on the entire group. 
')04 The 
outcome is therefore a situation of legal uncertainty, which is difficult to operate in 
practice. On the other hand, deprivilig the Member States of their auditing 
entitlement appears a serious restriction oil sovereignty. Given their so far sceptical 
approach to tax integration initiatives, the Member States Would not be willing to 
waive their audit powers. What is more, that would confer a clear advantage oil the 
largest economies in the EC, which usually host parent group companies. 
The above discussion allows the CO]ICILISion that a system. of auditing each 
( 27 1'( )U I) 
z::, 
member separately would be unworkable. Despite any difficulties in decision- 
iiiaking, due to Member States' reluctance, it seems that operating audits at the level 
of the parent conripan-y is the only option-505 
502 For a detailed discussion of the concepts of 'consolidation' and 'pooling'. see Chapter 6, Part B, 
Section 1. 
. 503 It is a separate issue whether a ýoiie-stop-shop' structure is operated to allow the filing of tax 
returns and the settlement of tax liability through dealing with one single tax administration. -17he 
matter here exclusively concerns how the computation of the ()-Toup tax base and the apportionment to 
eligible Jurisdictions should be audited. It is irrelevant which authority processcs the torm. 1litles Of I- 
collectlon. 
504 See later in this chapter Part D. 
50-5 This is not a necessity in US combined reportitig because each State computes its taxible share 
independently of all other States eligible for laxing parts of' the same unitan, group. Iii contrast, all 11 Z- - EC-wide group taxation system will involve one group-level allocation of the tax base. Hence, =y C, - 
chaiicre in a state's entitlement will require a re-assessment oftaxable shares across the ,, roup. ý7 
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E,,,, eii this practice is, however, bound to give rise to complexity, as it will require 
extensive coordination among the Member States' tax authorities. The first step is to 
delineate, the scope of competence assigned to the tax aLitliorities of the Member 
State which carries out the audit. In this regard, a crucial issue of state sovereiglity 
will have to be resolved. Indeed, a tax audit carried out by a foreign authority is all 
intervention in the taxing state's fiscal jurisdiction. Thus, as, part of the audit 
procedure, the parent company's state will inevitably have to review the tax 
accounts of each group member. That is certain to lead to re-assessments of tax 
liability. 
Apart from the sovereignty issues, there also are practical aspects M the above 
proposed scben-ie. Nan-lely, audits normally involve a i-e%, ],, -, Ioii of the financial 
accounts and tax results of the group entities. That is very likely to create difficulty 
for the tax inspectors in the state of the parent coi-yipany. It is true that the individual 
subsidiaries' tax bases which produce the group base may be con1puted pursuant to 
common rules. However, financial reporting nonns will remain disparate aniong the 
Meniber States. 506 It seems, therefore, very possible that oii(YoUig, assistance will be 
required frorn domestic accountants ii-i tackling the results of gi-oup subsidiaries. A 
sophisticated system of exchaii(ie of information, poss. 1bly coupled with scheines of 
ongoing cooperation an-ioiig national tax authorities, appears a iiecessity. The 
prospect of a more active presence of the. Member States in which (Troup subsidiaries 
are liable to corporation tax rnay also be explored. For instaiice, they could be giveii 
the right to participate in the audit procedure - probably through sending a tax 
iiispector. 
This section does not include a discussion of how to deal with disputes possibly 
generated in- the context of an audit. Detailed analysis on dispute resolution follows 
under Part C below. 
-S()() There is an exception here in connection with EU-Iisted compaiiies, ts they are required to report 
using Intematimal Financial Reporting Staiidards (fFRS). L- C-1 
64, 12 
Part C: Dispute Resolution 
An EC-wide group taxation system is a un-ique experin-IeDt without a precedent, 
beii-ig a blend of intergovernmental and n-iarket hitegration features. 5 () 7 Con-sidering L- 
that the Mej-i-iber States in principle retain full sovereignty in direct taxes, a tailor- 
made solutioii should be devised to preserve that. This is necessary indeed, since a 
dispute hi one state has an iii-imediate in-ipact on the taxing entitlement of all other Z71 
states eligible for part of the sanie group's tax base. 
A crucial element would be to give the states which host group subsidiaries certain 
rights in deterraining their tax sliare. ý"" Part of this would be to devise a scheme for 
the settlement of disputes between Member States. The set of EC Treaty provisions 
on the, jurisdiction of the ECJ does not supply an adequate legal basis in that regard. 
frideed, in disputes between Men-il-)er States, arbitratimi or, possibly, a panel facility 
could provide positive results faster than a Court procedLlre. 'ý(" Most disputes are 
expected to concern either the share of the group tax base allocated to each eligible Z7 
Men-lber State or the entitlen-ient to (Yroup membership. The former will in principle 
surface in the process of an audit or an objection. to a tax assessment by the taxpayer. 
507 For a discussion of the principles relevant to this interaction, sct Chapter 4, Part B. 
508 'nils strikes a balance between the absolute sovereignty of veto and decislon-making by qualified 
ma I oritV votina (QMV). In certain international organisations of intercyovernmental structure, 
decision is made by consent. Examples here are the WTO and the UN Gencral Assembly. 
'09 This is also the frarnework through which the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding operates. 
Since it has been designed to solve disputes between sovereigoii its structure could be of some 
relevance to the EC initiatives. See generally: F Ortino and E-U Petersmann (eds), Ae WTO Dispiae 
Settlettlenj Sysicin 199.5-2003 (Kluwer Law International, the Ha 4 gue 
2004). 
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1. Unique Features in the EIM 
A dispute settlement instrun-ient for an EC-wide group taxation system should reflect 
the special features attached to such a system. Those mainly originate in the nature 
of the EIM, which should respect state sovereignty in direct taxation, but also 
promote its objectives of n-iarket hitegration. 510 It follows that the Member States 
should be grwited standin-g, for the purpose of safeguardhig their prerogatives. As 
example can-not directly be drawn, from existing international practice, any scheme 
to be devised should be tailor-made to fit the structures and aims peculiar to the EC. 
As said, disagreement is likely to arise in two mam areas of an EC-\N,, i(-Ie (Troup 
taxation scheme. 
(i) The Definition of a Group (i. e. inembei-ship entitlement and ten-Itonal scope) 
S"I For purposes of administrative simplicity, ý -wovision should be rnade that gr()ups 
become registered in the state of the parent company's tax residence. "2 Registi'ation 
.,, hall then. be notified to the Tax Authorities of the group subsidiaries' states. III SLICII 
a context, standing, shouto-I In principle he acknowledged to: 
(i) the Member States, insofar as a state considers that an entity (-Ies) i-esident in Its 
territory should (or should not) have been incoiporated in the LTI-OLIP-, and 
(ii) the group, represented by the parent conipany, may challenge the decision on its 
Composition. 
(ii) The Computation of each Member State's Share 
Dividing the tax base by FA requires the creation of a i-Tiechanism for the purpose of 
allocating inconie to the eligible Men-iber States. In an EC-wide scheme, con-mion 
"' See the Introduction to his thesis. 
511 Staff Paper 2S. 
5 12 It should be clarified that this proposal is lin-iited to entity registration wid is nol meant to 
bt a 
ck)mprehensive -onc-,.,, t()p-shop' scheme. 
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rule,,,, for allocation of the tax base should apply - at least - within each singile 
(YrOUp- In such a context, disagreements among, the Member States, entitled Zý to tax 
part of the group base, are inevitable. TMs is because the allocation of taxable profit 
is carried out, for the entire group, by the state of the parent entity's residence. As a 
result, states have to collect tax on the basis of a computation performed by another 
jurisdiction. 
The question is whether the Member States will be giveii the possibility to raise 
objections to the taxable share assigned to thern. It would be a significant limitation 
of their sovereignty not to be aflowed to communicate their disag-reernent. 
Consequently, a standing to challenge the allocation of the gyroup tax base should be 
given to: 
514 
(i) the Member States; and 
(il) the group, represented by the parent company. 
These two categories of standing will be discussed below. 
11. Disputes between Member States 
Reasons of administrative simplicity and effectiveness require that disputes between 
the Member States be treated ti-wough a special settlenlent procedure. The aim 
should be to allow a solution to be reached within a short time. That often means 
outside the ordinary court procedure. Thus, a long judicial process would create 
considerable complexity. For instance, addressing tax assessments to (Yroup 
513 See Chapter 7, Part B, Section 1. 
'ý14 flle -ionstrates the dual nature of the mechanisni for standing recognised under the scheme den 
allocatM(y the tax base within the group. On the one hand, the taxpayer should be given standing to 
challenge the assessment. The group is here in the position of taxpayer. 'Mis ls the aspect of the 
system which highlights iiitegrahon and ainis at creating a fully-fledged scheme. On the other hand, 
the standing granted to the Member States accomi-nodates an intergovernmental climensioii \vIllch 
points to state sovereignty. 
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mervibers, whilst disagreement is still pendiiig on the apportionment, would foster 
legal uncertainty. Still though, the ECJ, as an institutional framework, should not be 
rejected, since it is always possible to set up a fast-track process within its anibit. 
Alternative procedures of dispute resolution, such as direct negotiation or arbitration, 
do not guarantee a quick coinpletion either - unless appropriate rules are in place., 
(a) Common Rules. fbr Legal Certainty . 516 
1 
A certain practice should be established to secure a deerned consent by the Member 
States to the definition of a group or the altocation of the tax base. To in-iplernew 
such a system, a deadline for Member States' complaims should be set by a future 
EC Directive on group taxation. Once the deadline expires, provided no complailit 
has been filed, the act which- determines the inembers of a certain group oi- allocates 
the profit will be deetned final. Such a scheme would allow Member States' 
sovereignty in direct taxation to survive. Thus, they would be granted a substantial 
right to oppose the result of acts performed by one state for the entire group. At the 
same time. the sclieme would fulfil the reqLilreineiit for leL)al certainty, since the 
taxpayer group Would be given a clear and final picture of its tax liability. 
If the Member States are deprived of the ri(Yht to cliallenc-Ye decisions of the parent 
cornpaiiy's state, the system will be faced with insurmountable complexities. For 
instance, a severe restriction of state sovereignty would occur if the Member State, ", Z: ý 
were under the obligation to collect an-lounts of tax they probably disagreed with. 
Further, taxpayers assessed to corporation tax would be Uely to endure a situation 
515 For exan-iple, see the MAP and the Arbitration Convention which both have failed to solve 
disputes in, short time: OECD (ed), ftnproOng the Resolution of T(LY Treal), - lhspule'ý (OECD, Par],. ", 
Feb 2007) (hereinqficr OECD Report for Revised MAP), Convention (EEC) 90/436 ol'23 July 1990 
on. the elimination of double taxation in c(--minection with the adjusti-nent of profits of associated 
enterpriscs - Final Act - Joint Declaration,, - Unilateral Declarations 
[19901 OJ 1-22215 (hercirtqfter 
Arbitration Convention). 
-51.6 oil 
-11 Adin'nisiratii, e leo-al certainty as a general principle of EU Law, see penerallN -P Craig 1,1 
. 
fI Lait, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 607-654 (herema er Craig). 
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of legal uncertainty created by the possibility ()f a new tax assessinent! "' Mol-e 
specifically, supposing that the Men-iber States were given standing to brilig all 
action against their allocated share following tax c6liection, the decision could 
potentially increase their taxable share. 'Hiis would result in the taxpayer bearing e. v 
post a supplen-ientary tax liability. Such treatment of a taxpayer is clearly a failure to 
observe the pri. n. ciple of legal certainty. 518 No grounds for estoppel are in issue 
here. 519 
(b) Resolution qfDisputes through Ordinary Court Procedure 
The EC Treaty provisions on the Jurisdictiou of the ECJ allow for infi-illuenlei-it 
proceedings to be initiated between Member States (TEC art,,, 227,228). 111 this 
context, there is a Commission engagei-iieut in the pre-judicial process. 'ý')O It includes 
subn-ýssioii of 'observations' by the Member States involved as well as the issuance 
of a 'rmsoned opinion' by the Coi-funission. The process cail obviously end Lip beincy 
rather long. Further, since the initiatiOn of infriiigen-mit proceedings depend,,,, oii the 
discretion of the Conin-iission, there can-not be any legal certainty that actioii will 
actually be taken at the end. 
In addition to the above, it seems that an important drawback Of Using TEC art 227 
is also the political 11]_Wi11511 which it witnesses. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the provision has so far beeD the legal basis for mfi-ingement proceedings in a very 
limited number of cases. FLa-ther, hi most instames, the Member State wl-ýich 
C0111111ISS1011,221 brought the action had support from either the. or other Member 
523 States. 
517 Romano 332. 
518 1bId. 
511) 
ibid 325-326. 
520TEC art 227 subparas 2&3. 
521 P Craig and-G De BIJrca, Ell Laiv: TeAil Cascs, and Mawrials (3 TC1 edn Oxford University Press, 
2003) 428-429 (heremafter Craigy & De Bdrca). 
-522 C, 'Ise 141/78 Fr(mcc v UK [ 1979] ECR 2923. 
52 3 Case C-388/95 Belgium v Spain [20001 ECR 1-3 P) 1. 
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It follows that: 
(i) It is very doubtful whether TEC art 227 can provide a legal basis, so that disputes 
between Mernber States can be brought before the ECJ; 
(ii) A flexible structure in the form of a committee or panel should normally allow 
faster and i-nore effective problem-solving. It has to be supported by an appropriate 
set of Rules of Procedure, which could still operate in the context of the ECJ. 524 
(iii) Dispute settlement between the Member States could take the form of. either a 
-5 special procedure widiiii the ECJ, possibly acting as an arbitration Court, ' or a 
conuiiittee/panel staffed with Conu-iiission officials and natIoDal experts. 
(c) Settlement (#'Disputes through Negotiation and Arbitration 
The principal aim, as to the settlement of disputes between Member States, should 
be to create an effective system allowing deals to be reached within months. 
Ordinary judicial procedure at the usual. ECJ pace would generate considerable 
complexity. This would therefore be an inappropriate path for resolving disputes 
ainong the Mei-riber States. Further, considerin. L) that state sovereignty in direct 
taxation should be retained '52() a stage of negotiation 
between tax aUtIlOnties, ain-ling 
at n-lutual wn-eenient, appears a workable option. 
Ne(yotiation targeting at reaching mutual agreement is not an uiikiiown process to tý 
Member States' administrations. Article 2-5 of the OECD Model Double Taxation 
Convention (DTC)5217 provides for negotiation, aimiug at inutual agreement, between 
tax administrations, where there are claims of incorrect application of the respective 
524 TEC arts 220 subpara 2& '225A set out the ftarnework for the establishment ot'judicial panels. 
The European Civil Service Tribunal which took up its tasks in 2005 was Founded under the sarne 
ii Ilie above legal basis provided by the EC Treaty could possibly be used in creating a provisions. Z_ L_ 
panel to accommodate group taxation disputes between Mernt. 'er States. 
525 The m-bitration clause of TEC art 239 could provide a legal framework to this, 
5 26 Stal'I'Paper 371-372 (Title 12,22). 
527 See P Baker, Doiible Tax Cornrennons: A Manital on the OL_CD Model Tax Com, rialm oil hicome 
and Capital (loose-lea! ) (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005). 
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DTC. The OECD Model may give some Useful ideas oii the generalities of how to 
schedule a scheme for negotiation in the context of disputes o1i EC group taxation. 
However, the procedure attached to it suffers fundamental defects. In particular, its 
effectiveness is seriously undermined by the fact that the process may last for 
years. 5ý' On the contrary, this work sets fortli, as a priority, that Member State 
disagreements should be solved under fast procedures. That is vital to a smooth 
operation of the EC group taxation system. In addition, the Mutual Agreement under 
the OECD Model DTC contains no guarantee that a solution will finally be worked 
out. 529 This is also a critical deficiency of the systern, 530 WIIICII is furtlier intensified 
since, unless provided by domestic law, states are under no obligation to suspend tax 
liabi lity. 531 
The Arbitration Convention illustrates the fii. -iportance of giving safegUards that 
direct negotiation will finally lead to settlenient . 
53 2 The Convention is so far binding 
upon fifteen (the 'old') Member States. It thus provides that an advisory commission 
sliall undertake to deliver its opinion if two years of negotiation L, () by in 
5" OECD Model DTC art. 25(l)- '[ ... I 7he case must 
be presewed itvhiii ihrrc 
, 
ý, rar. ýJroni ihejir. ýi 
i 'fi( 'on o ih(, actim rc. mIt'ng )i h-Lvation... '. See a],, (-) the OECD Commenlar\, . 1005 art, 25 xlrýl iotý,, -ali II 
17. 
521) OECD Model DTC art 25(3)- . ......... 
dýf 7hey niay also misith logetherft)r the elimilialioti qfdouble taxatioli in casc. ý 
not proi, idedjor in ihe Conveimoii', OECD Model DTC art 25(4). '1he conipetem authohhe, ý ......... 
may communicate it, ith each other See ilso the OECD Commentary 2005 art 25 para 26- 
,[... / but asftir as reaching nutiual agreement through the procedure is coticerned, dic compeieul 
authorities are under a dut ). Inerel , 
v, to use their best endea), ours and not to achiei! e a remili[ ... /'and 
para 45. It must, hoi iv i ý(-r, be a(hnitted that this pro0slon i. ý not vC1 entirely sati. ýJactorýjrom I/Ir 
fa, ypayer's i? ieivj)oini. 77ils /. ý because the competent awhorities are required only to seek a. wluiloll 
and are not obliged iofind oiie / ... 
J'. 
530 Evidence to these defects is the updated version of art 25 of the OECD Model DTC, which -has 
been added a paragraph 5 to provide for the opportunity '... to submit the resolution of a particular 
issue ii. lnch is pi-twenting agreement in the case' to an arbitration process with 
binding el , ftct. A 
condition is that the competent authorities have been unable to reach agreement on the issue for two 
years since the case ýN/as presented. It is stressed that 'resolution cominues to be reached through a 
minual agreement procedure'. For more details, see: OECD Report for Revised MAP para 46 of 
-'D Model (neiv) art 2 5(5). Prol, 7osed Commientol-N) on the OL-( 
-53 1 An effort is made at OECD level to improve this situation for the benefit of' the taxpayer. Scc 
OECD Report for Revised N/1AP paras 31.4-31.6 of Proj)osed Commewary on flic r('V7Ned OECD 
Model art 25. 
-532 Arbitration Convention arts 6,7 &II In conjunction with art 12, see also earlier in this thesis 
Ch, apter 2, Part, B, Title (Iii). 
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unfruitful-ness. 533 The advisory commission is under the obligation to act within six 
months. Further, the parties are given another -six months to renegotiate a 
settle nw, tit . _ý35 If there is no positive outconle, the coiTmission's opinion gains 
binding status vis-a-vis the parties in di SpUte . 
536 In an EC group taxation fi-amework, 
the Arbitration Convention could not apply, since its scope is limited to tackling 
double taxation (in transfer pricing disputes). Apart froin that, extending its aj-ylbit to 
cover group taxation does not appear an appropriate policy option. The Convention's 
provisions do not meet the requirement for a fast-track procedure. More specifically, 
the matter could remain pending over a period of roughly six years in one of the best 
, case- scenario s. 
537 If a Court procedure has already been activated, a further delay 
occurs, since the two-year term for negotiation shall be launched only after judgment 
of the final court of appeal has been issued. 
In the context of EC group taxation, it could be considered to ý)Ive the Member 
States a period to negotiate solutions directly. That should not exceed six inoutils. 
Such an approach would act as a strong indication that state sovereignty in direct tax 
matters is retained and enhanced. It would further allow legal certainty, as tax 
assessments will not be left in a pending (Don-final) status for lon(ý. The same ý7 
applies to replacing direct negotiation by an alternative i-necliallisn-1 (possibly, 
arbitration) after the six-inonth period lapses. The aim should be to put forward a 
solution wid-tin the following half-a-year at the latest. The decision should be 
binding on the parties, except if they have already reached agreen-lent on a different 
basis. 
A question relevant to the above involves the, composition and function of a possible 
arbitration body or panel. The ECJ appears to be a suitable institution to 
acconnnodate arbitration. However, in such a case, special procedural rules should 
-533 ibid art 7 para I- 
-S34 ibid art II para I 
-535 ibid art 12 para I 
-536 ibid art 122 para 2. 
-537 Arbitration Convention w-t. 7 para I subpara I the case should not have been sub,,, jtted to tbý 
judiciary. 
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be enacted, so that the cases referred can be resolved within six inonths. As already 
mentioned, submitting the disputes to the Court's ordinary procedure would 
seriously compromise effectiveness. 
The EC Treaty contains a possibly suitable legal basis on the jurisdiction of the 
CO , urt. 538 This is TEC art 239, which reads as follows: 'The Court Qf Justice shall 
havejurisdiction in any dispute between Member States which relates to the subject 
matter of this Treaty, ýf the dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement 
between the parties'. 
The specific article has not extensively been interpreted by the literature. 5" 
Competence under this article may naturally derive fi-orn international agreen-lents 
among, the Member States. A clause conferring jul-isdictioii on the ECJ is also a 
requirement. The agreement should have been concluded on the basis of an EC 
Treaty provision. An exai-yiple has been the Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Eqforcement ot'Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters concluded under TEC 
art 293) fourth indent. In addition, the Austria-Gen-nany DTC guarantees that each 
case giving rise to a Mutual Agreeii-lent Procedure is either resolved thereby or 
submitted to the ECJ . 
540 It is doubtful, though, whether DTC clauses Would enhance 
efficiency -under these circun-istances. Initiatives at bilateral. level should be welcon-le 
but coordinated action is also necessary if it is to devise a comprehensive regulatory 
fi-amework. 
538 M Zijger, Arbilralion under Tav Treaties: Improving 1, egal Proteciion in Internalional Tax Laiv 
Doctoral Series vol 5 (Doctoral Series, International Bureau of* Fiscal Docurnentation, Amsterdam 
2001) 118 (hereinafter Zijger). 
539 No reference to TEC art 239 is made in any of the 
following leading textbooks in EC 
Constitutional Law: A Arnull, The European Union and if, s Court of Justice (2"d edii Oxt'(-)rd 
University Press, 2006)1 G De Wirca and JHH Weller (eds), Iliv European Court of Justice (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2001), Craig; L Neville Brown and T Kennedy, The Court o Just'ce of'the LI 
fI 
European Col-n. munities (5"' edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000). For a short reference, see Craig & 
De B6rca 96. 
fficulties or (Ioubts ansing as to the interpretafimi or application of dilS 540 4h'i the evelit that aiiy dif 
Convennon caii not be resolved by the competent altilionties by inutual agreenient ......... Ivillim a 
peri . oet qf three yearsftorn the (late qf connnew-ement of the proceedings ......... the 
States shall be 
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To the end of adjudicating urider TEC all 239, the ECJ should be LTiven jurisdiction 
by virtue of a special agreei-nent binding on the parties. 11, te case of EC group 11 Z7 
taxation, the relevant Directives and Regulations will be suppleniented by an 
agreement aniongy the participant Member States. Further, the prerequisite of TEC 
art 239 that the dispute should relate to the subject-niatter of the EC Treaty will also 
be fulfilled. Th-us', direct tax ri-leasures are enacted under TEC art 94. Ali amendment 
should also be made to the Colurt's Statute and the Rules of Procedure to add a faster 
process in dealing with Meiiiber States' disputes in group taxation. The scheine 
Could possibly take the forrii of panels. That could however prove more complicated 
than expected, as it would require that the Statute of the ECJ be amended. The 
procedure is laid down in a Protocol annexed to the. EC Treaty and ai-midnient 
requires a unanimous Council vote. 541 
TEC art 239 could offer a suitable legal basis for SUbMiSS1011 of group taxation 
matters to a fast-track procedure within the institutional framework of the ECJ. The 
amomit of required resources will depeiid on the numbers of cases to be referred, 
which should be left to be deterinined in practice. 
111. Disputes between Taxpayers and Tax Authorities 
A primary question is whether each group entity is treated as a single taxpayer or, 
alternatively, only the group as a whole is entitled to bring judicial actions. This is a 
inatter of policy choice which additionally has an in-ipact on audits. Thus, in the 
event that the group is treated as one single taxpayer, then audits are most likely to 
be allowed only to the parent company's state. 
objjý,, auon to submii Me case to arbiiration as defined by Ariiclc 239 ofilic 
EC Convention 
vviih fh(, Court of Me European (, ontinunitie, ý'(Austria-Geriiiýiliy DTC art -15(5)). 
ZýIger 114-115. 
-541 TEC art. 24-5. 
17-1 
The, implications of such a decision appear significant. 011 the one hand, placing the 
group, as a whole, in the position of taxpayer is a bold jj-iove. 'ý4) It thus PTeSUPPOSeS 
that the subsidiaries' states waive a significant degree of their tax sovereignty. This 
is because they will have to rely ali-nost entirely on the parent compallyls state as 
regards their taxing entitlement. One often cornes across sucli sclien-les in grmlp 
taxation systems which involve filing of a single tax return. 543 However, the above 
mainly concern,, group entities resident within one single jurisdiction, whicl) implies 
that the challeDge of reconciling sovereign states is absent. 
Allowing appeals by each group entity to be brought before the domestic courts 
under the respective national. rules would relieve fi-om impasses- connected with 
soverei, pity. Still tl. l(-)Llgll., that would give rise to fi-esh concerns. Namely, thei-e 
would be a clear risk of adininistrative chaos, as adjLIStIIIeD. tS to past tax assessments 
would clefinitety be required. 
The situation would become unworkable with certanity. So, despite soverejunty Z7 
restrictions, it seems that dispute settlement should take a centralised form. In huylit 
of this, there seems to be no other path but authorising the parent group company to 
deal with As national tax authorities on belialf of the entire k-II-0Ul-). 544 A fi-ainework of 
adininistrative rules at EC-level would be required to regulate tf-fis. 
Establishing Jurisdiction of National Courts 
The taxpayers' judicial protection does not seem to put forward challenges which 
require. special treatment. In. principle, appeals will be 'brought before the national 
542 This is so If one considers that, in most national group taxation schemes, the cntities retain their 
integrity. See also later in the thesis at Chapter 7, Part A, Section 1. 
543 See- Endres 350-351 - Australia, the Netherlands and the USA, earlier in this chapter Part A, 
Section Ill. 
-544 In any case, it Js the tax authorities of the parent entity7s state that undertake to compute the group 
tax base and apportion it to I-lie eligible group members. 
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courts of the parent company's state. The ECJ could have an involvement pursuant 
to its existii-ig jurisdiction. 545 
The judicial procedure would n-orn-ially be linked to the type of legal instruments 
used at EC level to enact legislation in the field. Namely, within an EC group 
taxation schei-i-ie, it is expected that the harmonised/coordinated regime will be laid 
down by Directive. This should be coupled with a number of Regulations, intended 
to tackle specific issues relevant to i-mplementation. That includes giving detailed 
information on apportioni-iieiit, setting forth audit rules, arran-ging formalities 
attached to the exchange of information, etc. 
Appeals for judicial review 546 will be directed against acts of the domestic tax 
authorities, issued in implementation of EC legislation. According to the Treaties, 
Directives ShOUld be transposed into doinestic law withiri the deadline mentioned in 
their text. If the deadline elapses in the absence of transposition, a Directive may still 
develop direct effect under specific conditions. 547 Should those conditions be 
established, the Directive may directly be hivoked before a dol. nestic court. Further, 
Regulations becoine al. 1101natically part of national legal orders and de\'clop a full 
direct effect as well as supremacy. This implies that they can, as such, be challenued 
before the courts. Considering the above, a conin-lon type of appeal is acyamst 
don-iestic administrative acts issued on the basis of national legislation which 
in-1plements EC Directives. More specifically, the ground forjudicial review n-lay 
involve an allet-yed flaw of: (i) an (often individually-addressed) administratn,, e 
decision or (ii) the domestic legislation implementýig EC law (on the basis of which 
the decision is issued). 
A Taxpayer's Standing to Appeal Directly to t1i. e ECJ 
,4 -ý TEC arts 230 and 232 (legal review), 2234 
(preliminctry ruling) and 288 (non-contnictual EC 
liability) could be of relevance here. 
. 546 TEC arts 230 and'2132. 
547 For details, see. Craig & de B6rca 204 et secl. 
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It is a Imig-establislied ft"Ictiork of the Court to interpret EC Law and examine tile 
co4ormity of national rules to it. Therefore, no ameridmelit to its j Lirisdictimi is 
required, for the purpose of carrying out these tasks. The beateii patIl to follow, for 
the purpose of reaching the ECJ, will be to have a prelimirtary rulirig, referred by the 
national court. 548 That would, most possibly, conceril the mterpretatimi and 
implementation of the provisions of a Directive/Regulatiom 
Further, it appears that taxpayer entities are given fiii-ýited scope to directly bring an 
appeal for judicial review before the ECJ. The provision 549 reads that standing to 
appeal to the ECJ is, in pruiciple, granted to individual taxpayers, where a Decision is 
addressed to them. It may also be that a Decisim-i is in the form of a Reg-Ulatioil or 
that it is addressed to another person. Yet, it should then be 'qf'direct and indh. -idiial 
concerti' to the taxpayer con-ipany hi isstte. 550 
Given the case law of the ECJ in interpreting an 'individual ... concern',: 
) 1 
taxpayers assessed to corporation tax do not sustain 1-figh chances in bemu successful 
before the COLIFt. More specifically, the so-called Plaum. ann test, still valid iii the 
majority of cases, finds that persons are hidividually concerned: 'ifthat decisimi 
qffýcts them by reason of'certain attributes ii'hich are pecullar to them or by reasoll 
qf circuni. stances in which theý- are difterentiated firom. all other persotis'. 
Considering that law at EC level is iiorn-ially of a general natUre, the chances are that 
taxpayers fail the Plaw-nann test. It follows that the prospect for direct action by a 
taxpayer against an EU institutimi is small - if not minimal. 
-548 TEC Ift 2234, 
-54q TEC art 230 subpara 4. 550 Ibid. 
5,1 Crai - 331 et seq. - Craig & de BCirca 482-5 1 S. I- II 
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Part D: Re-Assessment of Tax Liability 
It is an inevitable outcome of the structure of an EC-wide group taxation systen-i 
that, once a members tax liability is re-assessed, all members should be subjected to 
re-assessii-lent. This is because each group unember is allocated a share of the group 
tax base. If, for any reason, a member's tax assessment has to be an-iended ev post, 
tl-ds iiiniiediately implies that the entire groupýs 'pie' will have to be re-allocated. 
A re-assessment of tax liability may be required iii any of the following cases: 
(i) As a result of a tax audit, the aniount of tax due by a group entity is usually 
suýject to re- assess i nent. This is so, where the entity's revellue ('before 
consolidatioli. ) has to be re-adjusted to coinply with the audit conclusions. That leads 
to a re-allocation of the (. -Yroup, base, 
(ii) A dispute between Member States wt-fich involved the coinputation of the group 
tax base or the outcome of the apportionment is settled and leads to a re-allocation of 
the taxable shares; 
(Ili. ) A i. -iational court of the parent entity's state issues decision oil a taxpayer's 
appeal against wi act of tax assessn-lent by the domestic tax authorities. 
It is an obvious conclusion that any EC group taxation systern would be bound to 
face, ailIlLially, nunierous instances leading to a re-assessment of tax liability. An 
obligation to re-calculate the taxable shares each time that a re-adjustment were 
approved would render the system L111WOrkable. In fact, that would suffice to defeat 
53 the fundai-nental objective of effectiveiiess. ' A possible solution to this could be 
that tl-ie, parent company's state takes account of all re-adjusti-nents at the, end of each 
tax year. Pie balance (i. e. difference from what was assessed in the year under re- 
assessment) would be added to, or deducted fi-oin, the current year's share. Such a 
-5-52 Case 25/62 Plauniann & Co v Commission [ 19633 1 ECR 95 (hereinqfter Platylialill). 
5'53 Stall'Paper 27. 
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process could hopefully allow the system to operate at some speed and at a hmer 
administrative cost. 
Conclusion 
The above discussion of how an EC group taxation '-', YSteIII COUld be administered 
demonstrates that an entire new structure would need to be put in place. 
In principle, compliance and enforcement, to the exceptioti of audits, do not seem to 
bri-ng forth difficulties which cannot be dealt with. Iti contrast, the audits and dispute 
resolution require that the Member States concede a sigilificalit share of their 
sovereigmy to the state of the reporting entity. This is, 'by itself, a sti-mig indication, 
if not proof, that a unartimous voteý54 is not a foreseeable prospect Lmder the current 
circumstances. Indeed, if one considers that n-lost parent group emities will be based 
iii the wealtliiei- Meinber States, one can predict aii cmerglug hostility from the small 
countries. If agreeinent is ever close to be reached, the small states will most 
probably ask for compensation as part of the deal. 
Tliere are critical elen-lerits of substance wli*cli inake EC group taxatioii sclieines a -I 
rviid- to long-term prospect. Yet, a good number of those problems seem possible to zn zn 
tackle iii soine way. The adi-riinistratioii of the system, though, gives rise to 
unprecedented challenges. The Mernber States could only have a chance to solve the 
upcoming problems if they possessed a strong will. However, this seems to be 
absent - at least to the general impressiom 
TEC 94. 
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6., ENTITLEMENT TO MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
GROUP 
Introduction 
Determining the criteria for entitlement to participate in a group is a key qLtusti0ii to 
be addressed in connection with an EC-wide group taxatimi systern. Over the years, 
different experiences of states have, created traditions of different approaclies to the 
matter. 
fn taxation, the policy decision lics betweeii the following two structures: 0) 
schemes defining a grOLIP 011 the basis of holding percentage, which inay, in cases, 
be coupled With SLIpplementary tests-, aud (n) a systern f0CLISjIILI Oll the L111ity Of 
business activity (i. e. unitary taxation). The former roughly reflects UTI-OLIP taxation 
tradition in Europe whereas the latter originates M the US and flOLIIAShed in sub- 
national taxes. 
Group taxation systems applicable across Europe have so far been limited to a 
domestic context. They namely display no cross-border dimension, with the 
155 557 5 5ý 
exception of Demiark, ') Italy"') and partly, Austria- and France. -A key feature 
555 C Amby, 'Report on Group Taxation in Denmark' in IFA (ed), Cahicrý de droti ji. ýcal 
I. nle"wfional vol 89b (Cahiers de drolt fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 233,244 et secl. (hercinqfier 
Amby in MA Cahiers). 
S-)6 F Nobill and MA Lanza, 'Synthesis of Italian Tax Reform' (2004) 32-1 Intertax 564,565 
(hereinafter Nobili & Lmza. ). 
557 Austria does not alipul the treatment ol'non-resident group subsidiaries with thl, it of're,,, )Idciit group 
mernber,;, in which a scheme ol pooling is in force. It onlyallows foreign subsidiaries' 1(), ý,, ts (wid not 
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of thwe schemes is that they are based, almost exclusively, oil ownership 
requirements (i. e. shareholding) a"10119 the group entities. It is only few countries 
(i. e. the UK, Germany, Austria and Italy) which incorporate in their laws certain 
conditions of substance, such as management control and economic nexus. 
On the other hand, under unitary taxation, taxable items are exclusively detennined 
by reference to considerations of integrity of the business activity. The scheme is 
largely an outcon-ie of reqUirements set by the US Constialtion and, notably, the 
Con-u-nerce and Due Process Clauses. s`9 It evolved over the nineteeiith and twentieth 
centuries in parallel to the economies of the US States. 
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to reach a conclusion oil the appropriate 
features of a group taxation systen-i intended to include entities fron-i across the EIM. 
To this end, analysis will be carried out on existing options, classified, for 
simplicity, into four cate(Tories. It should be noted that the options extend beyond 
taxation, as management control is widely employed in Company Law. Thus, the 
following approaches will be discussed in connection witli entitlement to group 
inembership: (i) liolding percentage; 00 control over management; (iii) uiiity of 
business activities, and (iv) VAT grouping. Part of the effort will consist of 
examining conTlexitles likely to enierge under eacli of the above sclien-les in the 
context of the EIM. Finally, whatever Solution is promoted, it is necessary that it 
remains compatible with incoine allocation fl-ii-ough FA. 
A 
prolits) to be considered. See- I Brandstactter and others, Investment m Atistria (KPMG. 
2_004) 39 et seq. (Ijereinqffer KPMG 
Austria (2004)). 
allows cross-border consolidation and applies to a small number of French coll, sol. i(M 
multinationals, it is awarded throu-1-i administrative decision at n-flinisterial. level. 
The Commerce and Due Process Clauses are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Part C, Section 11. 
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Part A: Systems of Entitlement to Group 
Membership 
560 In the IFA Cahiers' General Report -1004, which dealt with group taxation, a 
corporate group was given the followmg definition: 'a groill) qf bilsine. ss 
organisations connected through common control by iva. N, qf shareholding andlor 
other fiti. micial and m(mageri(d relationshij)s'. The definitimi is broad. It thus, 
comprises rules which deterniine membership oj-. t the sole basis of shareholding as 
well as tests setting forth other fiiiaimal or n-lanagerial relationships additionally or 
exclusively. The definition may, therefore, acco nu i-io, date both shareholding as well 
as control over decision making, as criteria for membership. Z7 
1. Holding Percentage Z-- 
(a) The Rule 
The deteri-ii-ination of group membersliip on the basis of holding percentage points to 
a straightforward rule. This is because the decision only involves consideration of 
objective criteria (i. e. percentage of participation, in share capital. ). It is possibly for 
this reason that most national group taxation systems eii-lploy shareholdiýng as their 
primary criterion for membership. Thus, provided that the requirement foi- a specific 
holding percentage is not coupled witli any supplementary criterion of a subjective 
nature, it cwi lead to an immediate conclusion, on entitlement. It should, thowuh, be 
noted that an approach based on a liolding percentage does not test group unity 
for 
560 IFA Calijers' Geiieral Report-2004 -11. 
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substance. Namely, the system does not accommodate elemems that place 
requirements for substantive link,, among group members. That does not ofteii allow 
the group to retain an adequate degree of unity. Substantive elen-lents iii defining a 
group may consist of a requirement for sonie integrity of business activity or for 
centrally-oriented decision making 
(b) National Systems in Europe 
The i-fiajority of EC Me. n-iber States 
561 have opted for group taxation systerns created, 
ahnost exclusively, on the, basis of ownership in the sense of shareholding 
62 
percentage. ' In i-nost cases, this test is not supplemented by any condition of 
substance. Holding percentages in force range between 50 percent (i. e. Germany, 
Austria and Italy) to full ownership (i. e. Danish Joint Taxation provides for 100 
percent), with a good number of systems having set their requirements at roughly 90 
percent and over. 563 
As said, the above rule,, --, apply, with sn-lall differentiations, to most states. Yet, iii an 
effort to offset some of the negative aspects mlierent in shareliolding, Italy, tý 
Germany, Austria and the UK have arranged that their rules are coLlpled witli son-le 
additimial requirenients. 
56 1 The following EC Member States i-naintain group taxation systems- Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland. 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdorn. The data was derived from Commission 
(EC), 'Annex to the Communication on the Tax Treatnient of Lossts In Cross-Border SItuatlons' 
(Conin-iission Staff Working Document) SEC (2006) 1690,19 December 2006 (hereinqfter Annex to 
COM(2006)824). 
562 The data used is derived from a comparative studý, r held, on behalf of IFA, in 2004 for the purpose 
of preparin a volume 89b of Cahlers de droit fiscal internailonal. 'Ilie study involved fifteen out of 
then twenty five EC Member States: Austria, Bellgiun-L the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxenibourc_, -, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. In addition, two EFTA States were considered: Norway (also party to the EEA 
Agreeniew) and Switzerland. Research done for this diesis' purposes has also covered 
fundamental 
updates in the systems of the above listed states. 
_563 Aniong the countries included in the 2004 IFA study, the following- fall within this category: 
Deimiark, Finland, France, Luxemb(-_)urg, the NetherLinds, Norway (EEA State), Portugal, Sweden. 
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In the Italian group taxation systeni, enacted in 2004, non-voting shares are ignored 
in calculating holding percentage,, -,,. 
This limits decision oii quallficatIon for group 
mernbership to those shareholdings which involve participatiori iii decisimi making 
through voting at the General Meeting. 564 What is more, a supplementary conditimi 
is set, according to which, in additiori to a majority shareholding, group members 
565 should also hold rights to dividends exceeding 50 percent . 
hi Gerniany and Austria, the Organschaft has always involved a considerable 
aniount of additional substantive prerequisites which were found to have rendered 
the system difficult to operate. Since 2003, the legal framework of the Gen-nan 
Organschqft lias been simplified. 566 There is, naniely, iio more a need to coiisider 
whether there is financial or organisational integration amono cet-tam entities, foi- the 
purpose of qualifying for an Organschqft. This requirernelit used to give rise to 
significant co-n-Tlexity, as it involved an arnount of subjective tliijiking and 
therefore, did not provide an adequate degree of legal certaility.. "" Holding the 
majority of votinc, rights in. the group subsidiaries is currently the only condition 
applying lit addition to shareholding. Pus adds aii elemerit of substaiice to the 
system, as it allows a consideratioli of control over the group subsidianes' decision 
niaking, without depriving the structure of legal certainty. 
Austria proceeded with inore ground-breaking ii-wasures. It replaced the Organschqft 
with a new systeni which has been in force since t't January 2005. It III I-viliciple 
allows the pooling of group profit,, -, and losses. 568 As regards entitlement to group 
participation, except for the 50 percent shareholding, there is also a requirement for 
control over manageineilt, which ineans the i-najority of voting rights should be held 
by the parent entity. 
Nobih & Lanza 564,565. 
565 
ibid 565. 566 Gral'Kerssenbrock 4. 
567 
ibid, Eckstein in IFA Cahiers 301. 
"68 KPMG Austria (2004) 39-40. 
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Group men-lbership tests in the UK appear a lot n-lore elaborate. Again, the startmL, 
line is a requirement for 75 percent holding in issued 'ordinary share capital". Apart 
fi-on-i that, a number of additional tests apply. Those are ineam to ensure that there is 
I. ne, nl-)el. s. 569 a substantial economic nexus among group More specifically. the 
parent entity, referred to as the 'equity holder' '570 should hold a right to 75 percem 
of the profit available for distribution as well as an equal right to distributable assets 
oil a notional wil-iding up. 57 1 Further, the so-called 'stability test' suggests that tile 
parent e. iitity should be in a position to dernonstrate that decision making at the level 
572 of the subsidiary is in line with its wishes. There is no requirement for a inimmum 
of voting rights in the subsidiary. In addition, anti-avoidance rules have beell devised 
to prevent i-nailipulation of the above tests. 573 
It should. also be inentioned that, in son-le systems, shareholding appears to hc a valid 
test in areas other than taxation. In French Con-1pany law, the clefimflon of terms 
5 'subsidiary' (filiale ), 74 and 4pai-ticipatioii' (participation )575 is based on 
shareholding. More specifically, qualificatim. t as a subsidiary requires that the 
majority of capital is held by the parent. As re(, --, ards participation, it places a test of 1, 
holding rangli-ig between 10 and 50 percent of the subsidiary's share capital. t-- 
(c) Commentary 
If group menabership is detern-ý-ued solely on the basis of shareholding, no guarantee 
for strong links an-long gl'OLIP Members can be given. Shareholdi. n. g can be an easily Z-- 
applicable test, as it leaves Do room for discretioD to the tax authorities. The fact, 
569 IFA Cahiers' General Report 2004 38, Rupal Ill fFA Cabiers 689. 
570 1 bid: '... all shareholders other than fixed rafe preference shareholders and leliders Oio. w lowo 
are not normal corninercial loans'. 
571 [bid. 
-572 ibid 692. 
-, 73 
ibid 690-692. 
-574 Code commercial art 233-1 in JP Valuet and A Lienhard, Code des Soci('Vs ei dr. ý man--Ws 
financiers (Dalloz, Paris 2005) 797 (heremafter Code des Soci6t6s). 
575 
ibid 803: Code commercial art L. 233-2. 
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though, that it does not place any requirement for the existence of economic ties 
an-iong group members could give rise to manipulation in cases. More specifically, 
entities i-nay artificially be incorporated ý-ito, or excluded from, a certain group. Iii 
the event of incorporation, they may subsequently be removed fi-om the group as 
soon as this can be i-ilade possible by the rules on registration. 
A reasoii for artificial incorporation may be to make use of the rules on group 
taxation, for the purpose of relieving losses. Conversely, a certain entity may be 
removed from. the group, through a disposal of shares, whilst it is aii fiitegyral part of 
the business. This is usually done for income shifting purposes. Further, exit fi-oin 
the group may be accompanied by a transfer of residence. 5"' CFC provisions and 
other anti-avoidance measures could possibly contribute to diSCOUraging sLicli 
attempt S. 577 
In an EC context, a pure ownersNp test does not, in principle, appear as the optimal 
solution to meet the challenges involved. Namely, to the extent that entities under 
common ownership are accommodated within the same group, without actually 
being components of the same business, economic reality is distorted. 
578 Mt),. e 
specifically, if revenues froin businezsses with different profit margiiis were pooled 
together and then, apportioned, the outcome would not reflect the gyroup's ecoimmic 
79 
situation. ' Unless there is a unitary elei-iiew, the. formula factors will not be 
weighted in accordance with their contribution to a specific busine, "'s activity. 
580 
576 Case 8 1/87 Rv HAI Treasury, (. ýv parle Daill., Mail & General Thist Plc 119881 ECR 5483. 
577 Any meclsures taken should be given a shape that does not risk to be found in breach of 
discrin-ýn,, ition/restrictl(, )n. For the concept of 'wholly artificial arrangementsý, see Case C-196/04 
CadbivývSchvveppes p1c and Cadbury SchivepIms Overseas Ltd v ('11? [20061 ECR 1-07995 paras 5 1, 
55,57,61,63 & 69. 
578 RW Genetelli, 'Apportionment Factor Issuesý 617 Practicing Law Institute/ Tax (Tax Law and I 
Estate Phumma Course Handbook Series, Practising Law Institute, 2004) 7,24 (hercinafter 
Genetelli). 
571) Bird and Brean 1392-, McIntyre (, --1004) 
938-940, McLure (1984) 96-98, Musgrýi\c (1987) 197 et 
seq. (read generally). 
, 80 The proposal of this thesis for the EIM is set out later in this chapter at Part 
B. 
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Further, a theoretic principle-oriented explanation could be that t1le FA is meant to 
provide solutions in allocating taxable illcome where, due - to high economic 
integration, synergies and ecoi. -tornies of scale and scope5" are involved in tile 
systen-L Considering this, a link based solely on holding percentage does not 
presuppose so integrated an activity as to create synergies. In that sense, an 
ownership test alorte does not justify the use of FA as a replacement of arin's, length 
separate accounting. 
11. Control 
(a) Introduction 
Control is not one of ttie primary tests employed worldwide in defining a (-, i-()up for 
corporation tax purposes. As shown in SectloD I above, it Is normally usck-l as a 
supplement to shareholding. Comrol is, however, the dominating test foi- ormtlý 
ate to discuss the elements entitlement in Company law. It has been thought appropri, 
of a control test as aD alternative for group membership, as it already has a presence 
in taxation. In particular, voting rights constitute one of the criteria, secondary to 
shareholding, applied by some EC Member States O. e. Gern-lany, Austria and the 
UK). Below, group entitleinent, in the field of Company law, will be discussed by 
reference to dree Member States: the UK, France and Germany. A choice was made 
of these jurisdictions, as their legal systems represent both the con-mion and civil law 47ý 
world. 
(b) The United Kingdom 
ýsl McLure (1984) 95 et seq., l Musgrave (1984) 
236-237 & 240. 
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hi UK Company Law, control over a subsidiary is tested by virtue of objecti\, e 
criteria. Thus, it is required to hold a majority of the voting rights in the 
shareholders' meethig. The san-ie applies to the right to appoint or remove members 
of the Board of Directors assigned with the n-iajority of voting rights at board 
nwetings. More specifically, Section 736 of Companies Act 1985 (as amended by 
Section 144 CA 1989) provides that any of the following cases inay qualify, for 
company law purposes, as a group of compaiiies: 
(i) the holding con-ipany holds a n-iajority of the voting rights iii the subsidiary, or 
(ii) the holding company is a member of the subsidiary and has the right to appoint 
or remove a majority of the members of the Subsidiary's Board of Directors; or 
(iii) the holding company is a nieniber of the subsidiary and controls alone. pursuant 
to an agreement with other shareholders or inembers of the latter, a majority of the 
voting rights in the subsidiary. ' 82 
bidirect holdings may also qualify for a group. 
The UK has adopted a n-iore extended definition of control in connection witIl the 
obtigation to draw consolidated group account,,, (i. e. Balance Sheet and Profit &, 
Loss Account). Those rules have beeii laid dowj) m implemematimi of the 7"' EEC 
83 f IloWi It4 tWO Ca', e, ",: 
Sý4 
Directive5 and extend the concept of control to the 01 
(i) 'nie parent corripany has a right to exei-clse a 'dominatit influence' over an 
undertaking (the subsidiary) by virtue of provisions laid down in the undertaking's 
Constitutimi (, AA-ticle,,, of Association) or in a "control contract", wWch ShOLIld be 
permitted by the Constitution, aiid 
592 PL Davies, Go-wer and Davies'principles qfmoderll Compall ' 
y, Imi, (7 th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2003) '209 (hereinqfter Gower and. Davies). S Griffin, Compan 'v 
laýi.,: FUndamewal 
Principles 0"' edn Pearson Lonemian Harlow, 2006) (hereimfler Griffin), read also for the regime 
before '1985- F Wooldridge. Groups (? f Companies: the Laiv and Pracilce hi Brimin, Fralice avid 
Germaiiý. T (histitute ofAdvanced Le-al Studies, London 1981) 17 et seq. (hereinafter 
Wooldridge). 
583 Council Directive (EEC) 83/349 of 13 June 1983 based on Article 54(3)(G) of the Treaty oil 
fter 7 Directive). Con sol 1 dated Accounts 11983] OJ L193 (hercina 
tb II 
For a general coverage of the cases in which group accounts shall be filed, stc 
Griffin. 
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(ii) The parent company has a 'participating interest, meaning a shareholding of 
minimuni 20 percent ij. -i the undertak-ijigs capital, wid actually exercises dominant 
iiifluence"") over it or there is unified nianagement of both undertakings. 
It was thought, however, that an extended definitimi of conti-ol, Such as that 
586 introduced by the 7'11 Directive iii the field of accounts, would create uncertainty if 
brought into con-ipany law. 587 As a result, it was decided that the scope of the two 
additional cases above should be linii. ted to the cousolidatioil of accounts and 
financial disclosure. 
Both these rules seem. to involve tests for control wl-fich are not as straiOlitforward as 
the ones laid down in company law. Giving binding guidelines to the subsidiary's 
directors, 588 in principle, seems a clear test. However, in practice, inany grey-area 
cases may come to the fore. In addition, a shareholding of 20 percent, irrespective of 
the fact that it is coupled with a test of dominance, appears a relatively low 
requirement. This is particularly so if con-ipared to the holding percentages that 
dominate national group taxation systems. 589 
It follows that the rationale differs between allowing the formation of a group III 
company law, on the one hand, and placmg an oblicration foi- consolidated accoLints, 
on the other. The former apparemly requires stronger finks aniong group 
participants. The reasoi. i possibly derives fron-i the assumption that decision making 
witfifiii a group often ahiis at promoting the groupýs overall interests. In that context, 
a decision could even be to the detriment of hidividual group subsidiaries if it is still 
beneficial to the group. 590 For instame, a parent entity may refuse to rescue a 
subsidiary which becomes insolvent, iii spite of the group's possession of adequate 
For the criteria which specify 'don-iiiiant inflixiace': schedule IOA para 4(3). 
5 86 It should be noted that delineation of 'control' is more exteiisive under the 7ý' Directive not only 
due to [he additional cases qualifying for a parent-subsidiary rclation but also 
because any 
undertaking (and not just companies) may be a subsidiary (s258(2) CA 19851). 
Gower and Davies 208. 
Ibid 207, 
581) Those range between 50 (Geriflany) wid 100 percent (Denmark). 
-590 Gower and Davies 202-203. 
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funds., S91 It is obvious that the above presumes very close ties amon-L, the lyrmip 
men-ibers. Otherwise, legal certainty and the companies' lin-fited liability would be 
seriously con-ipromised. 
(c) France 
In France, Company Law links control, ah-nost exclusively, to voting right.,,. ý' 9 
Howevet-, the deftuition of a group appears to distinguish among three sel)a]-ate 
concepts, of which control. is only one. Naii-iely, there is reference to a 'SUbsidiary' 
(filiale), ýparticipatioW (participation) and 'control' (contrOle): 9- As mentioned 
earlier under Section I on the shareholding percentage, the tests en-1ployed to define 
thefiliale and participation are exclusively attached to slial-ek)WIng. Contr6le is, 
though, treated under more substantive terms (i. e. voting rights). FLirtlier, the Frencli 
code commercial contains two separate sets of rules for company law and 
consolidated accounts)9ý respectively. lit both. cases, the underlying concept of the 
tests is the parent's 'coiitrol' over the subsidiary. 
Under Cornpany Law, 196 control exists under any of the following circ Lii nsw lice.,,,.: 
(i) The parent possesses, directly or indirectly, sticli a percentage of capital in the 
subsidiary that it is allowed to hold the tyiajority of voting right,, In the sliareliolders' 
meetings; or 
rights In the 
-it 
has the right to exercise a majority of the votin., (ii) The parei 
subsidiary pursuant to an agreement concluded with other n-lembers or shareholders 
and whicli is not contrary to the interests of the company; or 
591 ibid 203. 
JP LeGall and P Morel, Frent-h Conipanv laiv (Longmaii, London 1991) 241 
(herc, 'imlier LtGall 
and Morel)-, Code des Soci6t6s 804: Code conu-nercial art L. 233-3. 
593 Ibid. 
594 Ibid. 
595 ibid at822- Cocle commercial art L. 23-33-16. 
5% ibid 804- Code coinmerci a] art L. 233-3; LeGall and Morel 24 1. 
iss 
(iii) Through the voting rights it holds, the parent, in ftict, detennines decisions 
reached in the shareholders' iiieetiiigs at subsidiary level. 
In addition, control is deen-ied where the controlling company possesses 40 percent 
of voting rights in the subsidiary and. no other inember or shareholder holds, directly 
or indirectly, a higher percentage. 
In relation to consolidated accounts, an obligatioii to con-1ply with that formality 
arises if any of the following requirement S597 is fulfilled: 
(i) The parent company cowrols the subsidiary exchtsh,, eýy; this may involve (a) 
holding tl-te majority of vothic, ri lits; or (b) the power to appoint the majority of zn --1 19 
inembers in the subsidiary's irianagenient body for two consecutive fiscal years-, or 
(c) the right to exercise a Woinhiant hffliience' over the subsidiary under ail 
agreement or clause in its statute, provided that the parent is a shareholder; 
(ii) The parent company cowrols the subsidiary jointly with another cornpaiiy iii 
such a mainier that decision making is norinally the outcome of their mutual 
agreement, 
(iii) The parent company exercises a 'notable iqfluence' over the subsidiary, whicli, 
pursuant to the law, 59' is deemed if the fomier holds, directly or indirectly, at least 
20 percent of the voting rights In the latter. 
French provisions on 'control' are, in principle, based on objective tests. Those do 
not normally leave significant space at the authorities' discretion. Aiming at 
measuring influence oii decision making, the, tests primarily used are based on 
voting rights. It cw-i be noted that, similarly to the UK, a group is more broadly 
defined in connection with the publication of consolidated accounts than under 
Coi-npai-ty Law. Ttus common approach may not have been fortuitous, as it is likely 
to have been the outcome of implementing the 7hDirective. 
597 Code des Socl6t6s 822: cTt L -'33-16*, 
LeGall and Morel 247. 
s" Code des Soci6t6s 8'23: art L. 233-16 IV. 
189 
However, the regulatory framework is not in line with legal certaiiity at all times. 
More specifically, the domestic authorities are left witli a considerable an-lowit of 
di. scretion when called upoi-i to interpret such concepts, as 'infiact determiiiation' of 
decisions or 'dominant h1fluence'. It is clear that the application of sucli factual 
contingencies needs to be supported by substantial tests oil group unity. Considering 
fl-tis, the above concepts could potentially prove useful supple nients to rules that 
contain primarily technical tests. They could thus reduce the risk of compromising 
substance. 
(d) Germany 
The striking feature about groups iii Germaii conipaiiy law is the dismictimi drawii 
between optional groups ("1, 't-, rtrcigsk-ol-il-ei-tie'), created through a 'comrol contract' 
('Behei-r, ý(-huiigsi,, ertt-(ig'), and actuallde fticto clependeme ( faktische Kotv-eriie'). 
Further, there is a closer form of optional association, referred to as ýuitegration' 
(Tingliederung'), wliýich is only available to Gerinan public companies. It is beyond 
the scope of this work to go into detail in connection with each of these forms of 
group organisation. Rather, the focus will be on the criteria for entitleinent to 
membership and on their possible link to the amis WhiCh the (-11-OLIPS have been 
established to attain. 
An undertak-mg is 4dependent' if another undertaking is in a position to exercise, 
directly or -hidirectly, a dominating influence over the fonlier. 
599 The controlling 
undertakin should have the means of making another (undertakiii(y) comply witli its 9 
WiSlIeS. 6')() At least one of the two undertakings should be a public conTally 
('AktiengeseIIschqft') or a company limited by shares (Wommanditgeseliscliqft alff 
Aktien'. ). There is a series of criteria which may be found to fulfil the meanilig of 
599 Wooldridge 48. 
600 IN& 
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'dependence'. 601 In principle, though, the law treats the means as iiTe le vaiit. '-'ý' , More 
spec ific ally, 003 tile following could qualify for 'dependence': 
(i) The existence of organisational and judicial instruments suitable to allow the 
exercise of specific influence on the (dependent) undertakim, )-'s policy-, 
(ii) Pursuant to the (dependent) undertaking's statute or articles of association, 
n-fi-nority participations are granted with ii-lultiple votimy rights which guaramee tile 
majority of votes; 
(iii) The dominant undertaking influences the exercise of control and inspectimi 
rights by silent members and lenders. That is particularly so where these have all 
impact on the overall policy of the dependent undertakiiig and its business directiom 
According to Paragraph 1.8 AktG '604 w1iicli defines groups, it is presuined that a 
group is created between one or more dependent and one coiitrotlilhl Undertakmg. "')ý! 
Further, 'unified management' is mentioned as a key eleii-mit leading to the civatimi 
of a group, even in the absence of dependence 60"' Legislation provides')"' that the 
existence of 'unified maiiagen-lent' is deemed kvitliiii the context of optional gl-OLIPS. 
That is, nan-iely, where there is a 'control contract' or 'integration'. The 
-: 's provisions do not contain any definition of 'unified management'. Aktiengeser. - 
This is not a straightforward test, similar to those based on voting rights, which arc 
emptoyed under the UK and French systen-is. The concept of 'unified managen-ient' 
may take diverse f6mis. It could thus be any of the following: 608 
(i) regular instructions; 
(Ii) treating the managers of the dependent undertakings as executive orgalls 
entrusted with the implerneiitation of decision,, reached by the don-ýinant compaiiy, 
601 U Eisenhardt, Geseliscliqfisrechl (Beck, Milicheii 2002) 488 (heremqfter Eisenhardt). 
602 Wooldridge 48. 
6"The 
cases listed are mentioned in Eisenhardt 487-488. 
604 Aktiengesetz: (German) Stock Corporation Act-, also sec generally H Schneider and M 
Heidenhain, The Grennan, Stock Corporation Act (CH Beck/Kluwer Law International, Munich -1000). 
605 Eisenhardt 492. 
606 
ibid 493. 607 
Ak [G para IS. 60' 
The cases listed are mentioned in Eisenhardt 493. 
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(iii) guidelines on fundamental n-iatters relatin-gy to the dependent Undertaki ns 
policy and business directions as well as to the inspection of their compliance. 
Guidelines or advice do not need to necessarily take the forni of instructions, 
(iv) the persons in n-umagement do not need to be the same in both the dominant and 
dependent undertakings. 
In ýcoiitrol contracts' and 'integration', stronger ties are reqUired between 
controlling and dependent undertakings. 
More specifically, the instructions addressed to the dependent entities are binding- 
and the policies pursued may even be to their detriment. It may be that the 
controlling company will have to inden-mify the subsidiary for its annual losses""'I 
but still, the type of relation calls for a higher degree of unity. Therefore, except for 
'Lillified managernent', which is deemed to exist, the law also places supplementary 
requirements, for establisl-mient. Those additional pohits are objective in forn-1, so that 
they can provide legal certainty. 
In 'control contracts', a strict ownership-based test has been adopted. Namely, the 
conchision of a contract should be approved by 75 percent610 of the capital 
represented in the votes' cast at the shareholders' meeting of the dependent 
undertakiii-g. In addition to this vote requireinent, if it is to ci-eate the so-called 
integration', 611 the controllin company should also own a shareholdýig of Z__ 9 
10 mininium 95 percent in the dependent undertaking. Special provis' iis apply for 
compensatuig ii-ittiority shareliolders6'2under this schei-ne. 
It appears to be a rational policy decision to place stricter requiren-lents where a 
dependent entity relies on the controllin-g con-ipany's arrangements in connection 
with significant ecoDotiuc interests. However, the decision to switch to an ownership 
601) Gowermd Davies 204-, Wooldridge 6. 
610 Wooldridge 6. AktG para 293. tr 
Oil 
Wooldridge 7-8-, AktG pLwa 320. 
612 
AkI. G para 320b. 
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test, in cases of highly integrated groups, could possibly be challenged as all 
inappropriate route. Thus, if the policy objective is to achieve an increased aIII()LIIIt 
of unity among group members, shareholding may not always be the ideal solution. 
TI-As is because it is n-iore of a technical, rather than a substantive test. By contrast, 
an amount of substance could have been retained in the system if the existence of 
'unified management' had to be proved, iii, stead of beiDg deen-led. 
So, where there is the greatest degree of dependence under German Company Law, 
the groups are not pri-marily defined by reference to control. Instead, ownership 
seems to prevail. In ýcontrol contracts, the requirements appear eveii lower than the 
conditions set for participation in group relief under the UK group taxation system. 
This is all the n-iore so if one considers that a 'control contract' gives nse to more 
extensive intervention into the dependent entities than the UK intra-group transfers 
of losses in group taxation. 
111. Unitary Taxation 
(a) Introduction 
A totally different approach to group definition is taken by unitary taxation. It 
involves a number of concepts developed for the purpose of coil-Tuti"Ll corporation 
tax at sub-iiational level (i. e. State-level) in the US. Further, unitary taxation has so 
far inextricably been linked to tax base allocation through FA. tn this context, tile 
key underlying concept is the so-called 'unitary business', which rouglily points to 
unity of comniercial activity perfornied by the group as a whole. 
613 
613 
... the 
linchpin ol'apporfionall'i , 
v, iii the field (ý' slate incon-Ir javation is the unitarv-bu. sinc. ýs 
principle. ': W Hellerstein (1982) 158. 
19-"), 
Unitary taxation, even though far fi-om the structure of Member States' Lyi-oLip 
taxation systems, is worth discussing at a European level. Behig a system which 
presumes a high degree of market integration, it could contribute hiterestnig input to 
614 
the EC initiati Ve. 
The discussion below does not aim at giving a thorough analysis of unitary taxation., 
as any such atten-ipt would be beyond the scope of this thesis. The inteiitioii is to set 
out its key concepts and definitions, so that a discussioii can follow oil the suitability 
of a 'unitary business' definition for an EC group taxation system. 
(b) The History 
Unitary taxation is the outcome of the f6tlowing two parameters: (i) The Commerce 
Coll,, t-tUtio1161- and Due Process Clauses of the US ., I 
ý' allow a US State to tax only such 
income or value of firms as earned witlihi its t-x)rder; and (ii) In mid- 1800s, firn-is 
began to extend their activity across the frontier of single US States. In view of the 
al--)ove, the issue raised was how a firin would be taxed considenno these 
CO]IStitUtIonal constraints. More specifically, the US States are prohibited fi-mil 
taxiDLY income of a corporatioll Unless there is son-le n-itnimum connection hetween 
the specific anio-unt of income aDd the taxing State. III SLIch a context, ann's leiigth 
was found not to lead to the true value of a tax base, as firms developed iii 111tegrated 
structures. 616 The inajority of those cases concemed railroads and telegraph 
614 
Read generally Daly &- Weiner-, W Hellerstein mid CE McLure, 'Lost in Translation- Contextual 
Considerations in Evaluating, the Relevance of US Experience for the European Com-nission's Z7 
ft In Compmiýl Taxation Proposals' [2004] Bulletin 1-017 International Taxation 86 (1wrema er Hellcrste- 
& McLure)-, McLure & Weiner243 et seq.; J Mintzand JM Weiner, 'Exploring Fori-n-ula Allocation 
for the European Union' (2003) 10 International Tax and Public Finmice 695 (hereMafter Mintz & 
Weiner)-, Weiner (1992),, idem (1999); idem (2005). 
615 TIle two CO1ICe ts 616 . 
1) Lire discussed extensivelyin Ch,, tl-)ter 3, PclrtC, Section 11. 
GN Carlson and H Galper, -water's edge Versus Worldwide Unitary Combination' in CE McLure 
Jr (ed), The State Corporallon Income RLY: Issues in Worldivide Unitaýv Conibinalioll (Hoover 
, 
fter Carlsc Institution Press StanlOrd University, Califorrim 1984) 1,5 (hereina -)n & Galper)-, MJ 
-)etween Arm's- McIntyre, 'Contrastino, Methodologies: A Systematic Presentation of the Difference,, L 
Length/Source-Rule System and a Cotiibiiied-Rel)c)rting/Fc)riiiu]Lu-v-Apportic)iimeiit System' (1994) 
National Tax Association 2226 (hcreinqfter McIntyre (1994)). 
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busmesse s. 617 The true value could only be computed if they were considered as one 
single 'unit of assessment'. For instance, the value of railroads 618 mahily consisted 
of the fact that they connected the East and the, West. A ca]cLilatioil of taxable 
revenue on a source basis in certain loss-inaking States Would disregard the fact that 
this State gains value fi-om being part of the overall trip. Developl-neilt ill the area 
was carried forward by the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court which elaborated 
,6 on the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. The concept of '11exuS 19 emerged to 
allow the taxation of a share of the unitary revenues, even where no source could be 
established in the respective State. 
(c) Divergent Dýfinitions: Jurisprudence and Theory 
Unitary taxation contains both tecluiical and substantive tests. In addition to the 
requirement for control, a corporate group is defined by reference to sLibstwitive 
business criteria that broadly point to a unity of the business activity instead of the 
corporate structure it has been organised i 11.620 The key feature of the system is that it 
does not look at each entity separately. Neither does it distinguish between source- 
and residence-based rules, in order to determine the COr1tOUrS Of a L1111tary oroup. 
Instead, the ain-i is to bring together the parts of a corrmion bUshiess. This is done, Zý' 
regardless of the entity structures involved in the respective business 6-11 and of 
possible territorial borders which delineate jurisdiction to tax. This is why a unitary 
group is, by nature, not limited to a specific geographical scope. Yet, most unitary 
617 Advisory Conunission on Intergovernmental Relations, 'State Taxation of Multinational L, 
Corporations' (1983) '18 Tax Notes 995,999. 
618 KL Hou 
, ghton, 
'Unitary/Combined. Filing,, s. Old Concept, New Focus' (2004) 33 State Tax Notes 
457 (hereinqfter Houghton). 
619 Read generally: Fatale; Swain 372-373. 
620 Mj '1004) 35 Tax Notes Mclntvre, 'The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation States' 
International 917 et seq. (hereinafter McIntyre (2004)). 
621 WD Dexter, 'Attribution of a Multinational Corporation's Net Income: Tlie Position of Unitary 
States Reggarding) Combined Reporting' (1985) IS Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 311,3228 
(hereinafter Dexter). 
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US States have now conceded a 'water's edge 
622 
election under severe fiitemational 
pressure. 
623 
There is no globally accepted definition of what constitutes a unitary business. There 
is, thougli, an amount of consistency in the principles attached to it over the years. 
Further, there is no uniformity in the details of tests applied by the Courts and put 
forward by literature. 
After references by the US Supreme Court to the concept of a 'unit of assessment' in 
cases decided in. 1875 and 1884 respective ly, 624 it was only in 1942" that the Court 
first articulated a test for the so-called 'unitary enterprise'. The test was based on the 
concepts of '... u. nity of' use an(I management oj' a hisiness ivhich is scattere(I 
through seveml States... . 
626 Further, the Court ruled that factors, such as functional 
integration, centralisation of nianagen-ient and econon-iies of scale, arise fi-oln the 
627 business as a whole and there is no siýngle identifiable source. The contribution or 
dependeiicy test was put forward in Edison Stol. eS. 62" According to this, the 
requirements for a unitary business are fulfilled when the rule proves that '... the 
operation ofa portion ivithin the state contributes to, or is dependent upon, the 
operati . on vvithout the state... ,- 
629 
622 The conflict bolls down to whether the combined reports should incorporate the worldwide income 
N'the unitary enterprise or be limited to incorne earned in the US by foreign entities of the un itary 
group, the US-resident group member entities and US-located permanent establishments of the 
f0reign-resident group members. 
62 3 Specific reference to the events which led US States applying worldwide coinbinatioii to allow 
water's edge' election will be made in Chapter 8 (i. e. water's edge). 
624 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875)-, Muon Pacýfic Railivay Co. v Ryati 113 U. S. 5 16 
(1884); for more details, see Weissman 271. 
625 Aider Bros v McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 ('1942. ) (hereinafter Butler Bros)-, for more details, see 
Weissman 271. 
626 Aitler Bros 508. 
627 ibid 508-509. 
628 Edisoii Calijý)rnia, 5iores v McColgaii, 183 P. 2d 16 (Cal. 1947) (herehiqfier Ldison Stores). 
629 
ibid 21. 
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In 1980, the US Supi-eii-ie Court decided Mobil. 6.30 It found that the taxpayer did not 
submit adequate evidence to prove that the dividend payer companie's were ]lot part 
of the unitary business. Considering this, it was held that the State of Vermont was 
entitled to conclude that the dividends sourced Outside that State did not destroy the 
nex-Lis with in-state activities. In the same year, the Court ruled oil Exxon. 631 This is 
mother case of which the facts were found to fulfil the unitary business definition. 
Gasoline sold by Exxon in Wisconsin was purchased t1ii-ouggli all exclianoe 
arrangement with Pure Oil Company. That allowed a saving oil transportation costs. 
The Couil established a unitary link between Wisconsin sales and the business of 
exploration, production and refining. It pointed out that, unless Exxon were engagged 
into the above activities, it would not have been in a position to enter into the 
exchange arrangei-fient with Pure Oil.. It was thought that this SLIfficed to I-)ring 
Wisconsin reverrues into the pool of the unitary business. The unitary business was 
referred to as the Vin. chpin qf cipportionality ,. 03" 
In ASARC063", wid WoOIWOI. tll"634 the existence of a unitary tie was rejected where 
income from intangibles arose from passive investment. 635 A nwre contribution to 
the corporate Purpose was not found to suffice for sustaining the unitary link, as 
illcOlne ji-om whatever source ahva. vs is a business advantage... '. "' This 
argumem was developed further m Affied-Sigimil. 6" More specifically, a distinction 17, 
was drawii betweeii an operatiOnal and aii investment fmictioii of a capital 
transaction. A unitary business concept is sustainable only in the first case. Finally, 
630 Mobil 01/ corporation v Connnissioliel- (ff I'axes qf Vennont, 445 U. S. 425,100 S-Ct- 1223 (1980) 
(herelnqfter Mobil). 
631 it Wisconsin Departmem qf Revenue 447 U. S. 207,100 S. Ct. 109 (1980) (hereinqfter 
EV Vol 0, 
632 Mobil 438. 
631 A, 5, /IR(; O Im- v Idaho Slate 7av Commi, ssion 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982) 
634 'o it Ta iv Mexico 102 &CL 31 'IS (1982) 1'. W. Woolworth C -yalion and 
Reventic Department of Ne - 
(hereinafter Woolvvorth). 
635 For 'a comment on the two cases, see: JM Greene, 'ASARCO and Woolwoi-tll: 
Anomalous 
Anachronisms with Lirnited Precedential Value' 11983] IS Tax Notes 795. 
636 Woolivorth 363. 
637 Allicd-Signal hic v Director, Division qj'Taxation 504 U. S. 768 (1992). 
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Container CO, 1) 638 set forth a set of criteria for unity: functional integratimi. Z7 
substantial mutual interdependence and a flow of value. 
It follows that there is no unifori-n and precise definition of the elements which allow 
qualification of certain activities as a unitary business. Divergent views have been 
put forward in the literature. 
One of the tests marked as expansive 639 is that of California w4ich draws its origin 
from the railway ('unit rule') cases of the 19"' century. Ownership, operation and use 
are the three unities set forth to deterrniýne the existence of a unitary business. Those 
have been supplen-lented, through jurisprudence by the States' courts, ývitli 
dependency and contribution considerations. 
Further, according to another approach, the requirements to be met, so that a numher 
of affiliated coinpanies can be treated as a unitat group, roughly boil down to three yI -- 
criteria: conu-non coritrol, interdependence (in the form of shared expenses, 
economies of scale or scope and intra-group transactions) wid a substantial de(, yree of 
IIIVOIVe dealings between the entities 'd. 
640 
In the early 1980s, the definition of a unitary business gave -rise to debate betweell 
two scholars (i. e. Hellerstein and McLure) regarding the Utility of the so-called 
'Basic Operations Interdependence Test'. 641 In broad terrrLs, the test, proposed by 
Hetlerstein., involves flows of goods and services between controlled corporations. Z_71 
Only basic operations are included, which appears to comprise everything directly 
638 Container Corp qf Ain v, Fremcht. ýe Lax Bel 463 U. S. 159 (1983). 
639 JR Hellerstem, 'Allocation and Apportionment of Dividends and the Delineation if the Unitai-N! 
Business' [ 1982] 14 Tax Notes Today 155, t62 (hereinafte. r JR Hellerstein (1982)). 
640 McLure (1984) 107-, idern 'Operational Interdependence is not the Appropriate "Bright Line Test" 
of a Unitary Business - At least, Not Now' in Special Report The thiltar ,v 
I'm Comrovcr. ýv. - zkrilcIrs 
and Commentary. Chapter V. Defining the Unitary Blisiness [19861 86 Tax Notes Toidty 70,108 
(hercinafter McLure (I 986a)). 
641 For 'a detailed analysis of arguments and the series of articles, by the two scholars, which 
discussed the issue, see: Special Reports Ihe [Mitary T(L-v Conlrovers-v: Article. ý ond ConmiciaorY. 
Oialner V D(fining the Unitar. i., Misnicss [ 1986] 9 Tax Notes Today 153. 
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related to the business itself. Operations of support"' (such as accounting, legal, 
centralised advertising, etc) do not make part of the unitary enterprIse. 11, addition, 
an aniount of substalitiality is a reqUIrellIellt. Otherwise, iliterdepende lice does not 
suffice by itself. According to Hellerstem, a controfled entity should qualify as 
substantially interdependem if its revenues from inter-company transactions amount 
to 15-33 percent of its operating gross receipts frorn basic operations. 641 Criticism by 
McLure in this regard has mainly focused on the above theory's failure to address 
issues such as the role of managemellt. 044 Inevitably, since centratised management 
is not treated as an operation of interdependence, separate accounting is applicable. 
Such a situation fails to address a possible maximisation of profit due to the 
centralisation of i-i-ianagen-lent. Further, it would be likely to hynore factors which, 
over time, have been given significant wei(lht in deterininfii(l the existence ()f a 
unitary business. 645 For ii-istance, elements, such as coryinion officers and directors, 
centralised bookkeepi-iig or accounting functions and financial dealings, do not seem 
to qualify as ýbasic operations'. This is indeed so if one, considers that the hiclusion 
of the above factors into the unitary business appears to be critical under the current 
multidivisional structures of con-(domerates. Thus, hi such a context, each of the 
functions set out above is, ii. t principle, carried on ttirough a separate legal entity. 
'Fhe defimtion of a unitary business points to a SUbjective test. In light of this, it inay 
be worth conceding to the view fliat there is no point in seeking to construe one 
single test foý qualification. I. n this respect, Weissman' S646 position appew-s a correct 
approach. Acc-ordiii to this, it suffices to fulfil any one rule from a given list to 9 Zý 
qualify as a unitary business. These tests are mainly derived from key US Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in the field. The proposal con-iprises the four categories Zý 
642 t. nationals: Replacement of JR Hellersteiii ('1982) 166, idem 'Federal Income Taxation of Mul 1 
Separate Accounting with Forn-wlary Apportionment' [19931 5 Slates Tax Notes 407,417 
(hercinafierHellerstein (1993)). 
643 JR Hellerstein (1982) 166. 
644 McLure (1986a) 109. 
64ý WH Weissman, 'A Review of the Unitary Business Theory in Ligy-ht of the Nilure of the Firm 
Today' (22004) 33 State Tax Notes274-2275 (hereMafier WeissmLai). 
646 
ibid 2267 et seq. 
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, 
IOW: 1,47 (i) The TI be -iree Unities Test (unity of ownership, unity of operation, unity of 
use in the centralised executive force)-, (ii) Contri but ion/Depende ncy Test (the 
portion of business done within a State is dependent upon, or contributes to, the 
operations done Outside); (iii) Factors ()f Profitability Test (functional integration, 
centralised management, econoniies of scale), and (iv) Flow of Value (between or 
among various businesses). Weissman notes that the above tests reflect the Structure 
of business which arose in the 19'bceiitui-y. 
(d) Commentau 
The coi-icept of unitary business is intellectually challenging. Due to its substantive 
elements, it is by definition in a better position to fit into the otjectives of an internal 
market, compared to ownership and control tests. Oil the other hand, despite being, a 
suitable solution on a pohit of principle, a unitary definition can gTive rise to legal 
uncertainty and marty difficulties in practice . 
64' This is because, as shown earlier in 
this Secti0ii, there is no generally acknowledged rule, or even set of I-Liles, clarifying 
the criteria for group inclusion. Further, the fact that the crucial element is a specific 
business activity, rather than a legal entity, could generate unnecessary 
complicati-Mis. In particular, identifying the various 1-)USiIIeSS fields in which a single 
entity may be active is a far tron-i straightforward exercise. 
Unitary taxation 
649 
was created to fit the needs of the US market M its first steps 
towards integration. It then evolved m parallel to the US economy. It refers to 
situations of increased capital ii-iobility M 111ghly integrated markets where tax results 
of associated entities are marked by 'syiiergism'. As shown above, there is no single Z. -- 
generally acceptable test for identifying a unitary business. Still thouggli, despite 
finpleii-ientation difficulties, this is by nature a niore suitable patli than residence 
647 Ibid. 
64z, C0M (210 0 3) 7216 -12 6,41) Read gnerally: RD Pomp, 'Issues in the Desigii of Formulary Apportionmem in the 
Context of 
NAFTA' (1993-4) 49'Tax Law Review 795,801-805 (hercinqftcr Pomp). 
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worldwide taxes when it comes to charging corporation tax at sub-federal level. This 
statement is usually justified on the following two grounds: 
(1) Unitary taxation involves the use of substdntive tests which appear more 
appropriate than technical rules for tacklii-ig tax avoidance practices; OSO and 
(ii) The allocation of profit by FA, which is normally attached to unitary groups, 
allows dealing effectively with trartsfer pricing complexities. In addition, it nwets 
the needs of closely ii-itegrated markets. 
More specifically, in connection with point (i), the Use Of Substantive tests in 
delineating the group reduces the chances of nianipulating the system. Normally, 
any irtcome shifting to a sub-federal jurisdiction which applies tax at a lower rate 
.. should 
be accompanied by an actual move of con-ii-nercial activity. However, when it 
comes to multinational groups, their intricate corporate structures inay still allow 
income shifting without in parallel ii-ioving cominercial activity. An exan-1ple is to 
transfer loans and intellectual property rights to a sub-federal jurisdiction which 
applies a low tax rate. Indeed, intangibles can easily be moved around in the context 
of a multinational group. Still though, the above practice of tax avoidance could be 
deprived of a considerable amount of effectiveness if the group profit is allocated 
tlirou, gh FA. This is because the allocation factors tunction independently of wbere 
income is sourced . 
651 It therefore follows that unitary taxation (i. e. unitary business 
and FA) can contribute to preventing market distortion caused by income shifting, in 
highly integrated inarkets. 
Later in this chapter, under Part B, there is discussion of the suitability of a unitary 
group definition for the EIM. 
6_50 Mein tyre (2004) 9 IS. 
65 1 FA may however also produce distortions; in the event that the Forniula employs 
firm-specil'ic 
I, actors and different tax rates apply to each sub-federal unit, the overall tax burden of the unitary 
group may be decreased through factor-shifting: JM Weiner, Would Introducing 
Formula 
z: 1 
I 
Apportionment in the European Union Be a Dreani Corne True or the EU',; Worst Nightmare"' 
(2)002) 48 ilo Studien 519,525 (hereinqftcr Weiner (2002a)). 
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IV. Value-Added Tax Groupine" 
VAT legislation contains rules for grouping. Article 4(4) of the Sixth Directive 
enables Member States to treat closely bound persons as a single persoll. 653 This is 
only a discretionary clause; so, it is attached to no obligation. Fifteen Member 
StateS054 appear to have made use of the discretion given by the Sixth Directive and Cý 
have introduced VAT grouping. Further, the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Z7ý Z-n 
Luxemburg and Poland are also reported to be considering the possibility of layiiIg 
down rules. 655 
Given that over half of the Member States apply VAT grouping, the rules for 
entitlenient to group participation could be considered for an EC (Yroup taxation 
-cheme. The nature of the rules in VAT groupýig is determined by the SixtlI 
Directive itself in Article 4(4). Nan-iely, the precise national tests should in priuciple 
comply with the tripartite requireinent of financial, econoni-ic and organiZational 
links'. 
65" Read generally A Schenk and 0 Oldman, Value Added 'ItLV: A Coniparative Approach 
(Cambridge University Press, New York. 2007)-, BJM Term, Europeaii Indirect Tax La)v: Vil'Fand 
other indirect taxes (Boek-Werk Studio, the Netherlands 2003) 328. BJM Terra and PJ Wattel, 
111uropean I&Y Laiv 41' edn Kluwer Law International, the Ha. gue 2005) 408; A wui Doesum, H van 
Kesteren and G-J van Norden, 'The Internal Market and VAY imi-a-group transactions of branches, 
subsidiaries and VAT groups' (2007) 16 EC Tax Review 34. For details on VAT group treatment in 
the UK, see. R Wareham and A Dolton, Tolley's Value Added T(Lv 2006 (2 nd edn LexisNexis 
Butterworths, United Kingdom 2006) 580 et secl. 
653 'Sulýjecl to the consultations provided, for in Article 29, each MeniberState inay treat as a single 
taxable person. per, ýons established in the territoi-y of the country ivho, ýi: hde legallyindependent, are 
closel. v bound to one another by, financial, econonlic and orgatilZational links' (Council Directive 
(EEC) 77/388 of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of' the Member States relating to Z_ 
turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform 
basis of' asses smen L [1977] OJ L145) 
654 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Gernimy, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. Bel-I Lim passed the Bill to join only in 
November 2006 and the new law carne into force on I April 2007. 
655 Deloitte, 'Belgian VAT Grouping' Deloitte Belgium Tax Quarterly 
<htti): //www. deloitte. conVdtt/cda/doc/coiitent/BE TAX Belgian VAT Groul)lii-. pdf> accessed 
18 
July 2007. 
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The outcon-ie is a rule which incorporates features of both ownership and control 
test ý. 
656 More specifically, the condition of financial Integration poims to holdiiw; 
that is, namely, ownership. The rates applied by the Member States range fi-om 
beyond 50 percent of direct or indirect ownership in GermanY657 to 100 percent iii 
Denniark. ')5' The econoii& integration sets forth control coiisiderations. hi the 
Netberlands, the requirenient is that the entities should serve the sail-le type of 
client S. 659 Austria sets forth. a prerequisite for a reasonable interdependence in 
660 busines, s/operatimis between the parent company and the others. It also points out 
that economic integration may exist when the entities are active m the same field of 
business as well as when the parent deteri-nines the business policy of the group. 
Finally, beim, under the direction of the same group of persons fulfils the 
organisational criterion in the NetherlandS. 661 Iii that regard, the Germau system 
requires that the will of the domfi-iant eittity can be enforced. "" -' In Austria, 
orgartisatiOnal integration mealis that there sliould be a 1111111MLIM sliaring of 
1 
663 
resources (e. g. staff) between the dominant entity and the sLibsidiaries. 
The tests for entitleinent to VAT gi-oupnig do not sig"nificantly differ fi-0111 
o wnership- based national (Troup taxation systems. Further, the additional elements of 
econoinic and organisational integration resonate with coiitj-()l tests in Company 
Law . 
664 In addItIoll, SOMe of the tests proposed by the OECD Model in connection 
656 See gentrtlly: G Michie, 'General Report in Consumption Taxation and Financial Services' in 
MA (ed), Cahicr, ý de (11-oii fiscal Intemational vol 88b (Cahlers de drolt Fiscal 1ii[ernatIonal, IFA, 
2004)65. 
657 Reiss, 'Consumption Taxation and Financial Services in GermanNl' in IFA (ed), Cahiers de droil 
fiscal international vol 881) (Cahiers de drolt fiscal international, IFA , 
2004) 371 (hereinafier Re] ss). 
65S Hansen and Jorgensen, 'Consumption Taxation and Financial Services in Denmark' in IFA (ed), 
Cahierý tic droit. fiscal in. ternalional vol 88b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 292- 
293, 
659 van Hilten, 'Consurription Taxation and Financial Services in the Netherlands' m IFA (ed), 
Cahiers de droii jiscal International vol 88b (Cahiers de drolt fiscal international, IFA. 2004) 603 
(hereinafier van Hilten). 
660 Haunold, 'Consumption Taxation and Financial Services in Austria' in IFA (ed), Calnen de droil 
fiscal international vol 88b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, I-FA, 2004) 163-164. 
661 
van Hilten 603. 
662 Reiss 371. 
663 Haunold 164. 
664 See earlier in this chapter, Part A, Section 11, 
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with the agency PE are similar to those of organisational Integrity. 665 All this 
evidences that VAT grouping does not put forward any novel criteria for entitlement 
to group membership. In addition, there is divergence in the way that the Member 
States have implemented the statutory language (i. e. Article 4(4) of Sixth Directive) 
on financial, econoi-yuc and organisational ii-ttegration. Thus, the tests may share the 
san-le ends but are far fi-on-i being sii-yiilar. In light of this, VAT grouping could not in 
principle provide a self-standing solution. It could however constitute a source of 
ideas iii the context of the already identified areas of ownership or control. 
Part B: A Choice for the EIM 
Four existing systems, for group definition were discussed in Part A. The analysis 
that follows is n-want to identify tests for group definitiOn which best suit the EIM 
objectives. This is intended to be done through a comparison of features infierent in 
the four systen-is and through examining their coi. i-lpatibility with broader taxation zr 
objectives and EC Law. 
1. Interaction among Tests for Entitlement to Group 
Membership 
Ownership and control approaches present some. cotimion features which draw a 
sharp distinction froIll Unitary taxation. Similarity between the two systems maInly 
relates to both systei-iis' techi-ii, cal nature. Further, the use of straight fo rw ard and 
objective criteria in delineating groups does not allow discretion to the tax 
665 OECD Commentaryart. 5(5). 
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authorities, which ei-iliames legal certaility. 011 the other haiid, teclimcally-oriewed 
systei'nýs, such as the owiiership- and cowrol-based ones, do not -guarantee a 
ii-ýinitnum unity of the coii-iinercial activities hicorporated into a gyroup. A Lmitary 
business Occupies the other end of the SpeCtl - ul, 11.666 It ii-iay lack a generally 
applicable test, which inevitably creates wicertaiiity. Yet, unity of business activity 
is a prerequisite. 
Unitary taxation iii the US has largely been the outcome of tile States' efforts to Cý 
retaiii their tax base while also con-iplying with certaiii requiren-lents of tile US 
Constitution (i. e. the Conui-. ierce and Due Process Clauses). In the EC, tile 
interpretation giveii by the ECJ to the fundamental fi-eedoms has created tests for 
iioi. i-discriti-iiiiatioii/ii(--)ii-i-estricfion which point to a totally differetit perceptimi fi-on-i 
the US constitutional principle S. 
667 The systen-1 in the EIM clearly reflects its 
strongly intergovernmental structure. Here, the Member States SLIbjeCt their residents 
to worldwide taxation. So, there is no need to establish a nextis to guarantee then, 
taxing rights. The only restriction is set by jioii-discriiiiiiiatioi-t/iioii-resti-ictioii 
considerations, as formulated by the ECJ. This however involves tests (mainly of 
comparison) which follow a totally different patli from the prohibition of imer-state 
taxation laid down 0-trougli the Con-imerce ClaLISe. 
To reach decision on a test for entitleinent to group rnenibership, options should be 
tested by reference to the maii-. t problems intended to be solved . 
668 As explanied iii 
Chapter 4, the Freedoms do not place a requil-ement for a specific ChOiCe Of UrOUP 
taxation system. This is histead an initiative meant to build on -broader (legally non- 
enforceable) objectives of the EC Treaty. The following are key identified fields: 
. 
669 (i) To offset group profits and losses, 
To tackle transfer pricing fonnalities and, especially, the problems relating to the 
. 
670 
difficulty hi drawing price comparables , 
666 McLure (1984) 91-99. 
667 Cilapter 1, Part A, Section H, Title (ii). 
668 Staff Paper 223-305. 
669 ibid 242 et sekl. & 33333-344. 
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(iii) To bring taxation closer to econoii-& reality, whicli is marked by highly 
integrated inarket struct Lire s; that maiiily concerns addressing tax-related iSSUeS, 
which come to the fore as a result of market integratiom Namely, taking account of 
synergism and economies of scale and scope allows comideratimi of flows of value 
arnong parts of MNEs wliicli cannot be caught under an arm's length emity-by-entity 
671 approach . 
Allocation of the group tax base through FA is a prerequisite for ftilfiln-lent of both 
(ii) and (iii). Yet, item (iii) also requires a unitary definitim of group, so that the 
requirement for business unity can be fulfilled . 
672 In addition, the FA contributes to 
materialising (i), which can still be achieved in a Ii-amework of arm's length separate 
accounting. 
It can be concluded fron-i the above that the allocatimi of profit throLigh a FA is a 
necessary element which sliould supplement any tests for entitlement to group 
membership. The FA is also present as the method for profit allocatiori across the 
group in both the CCCTB 67 ý and HST prOpoSajS. 074 
0 
The loiVgr tradition of US state taxation clearly evidences the compatibility of unitary 
67- 
tests with FA. ý' The question coining iiext is to what extent a non-unitary oroup 
scheme can be reconcilable with FA. Namely, If L1111ty of bLtSilless activity is absent, 
is it still possible to operate the, FA? It all boils down to whether grOLIJ-),,, defined 
pursuwit to owDership or control tests can be subjected to FA. 
670 
ibid 255 et seq. & 344-357. 
671 MusgoTave (1987) 197-198. 
672 McLure (1984) 96-98. 
073 Commission (EQ, 'An overview of' the main issue,,, that emerged Lit the second meeting, of' the 
subgroup on group taxation' (Working Docunient) CCCTB\WP\048\dc)c, 23 
November 2006 
(lierem. aftei- WG Doc 3 on Group Taxation); idem 'An overview of the main issues that emerged 
during the discussion on the mechanism for sharing the CCCTB' (Working Document) 
CCCTB\WP\052\doc, 27 February2007. 
674 HST (Lodin and Garnri-k) 24. 
675 See earlier in this Chapter Lit Part A, Section 111, 
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hi principle, it cannot be excluded that FA be applied where participation is 
detern-iiiied on the basis of a technical test (i. e. holding percentage or control) rather 
than by reference to business unity. Thus, if the econon-iic reality were such that each 
entity car-ried on only one business, there would in, Mct be i-to need to distinguish 
between the two types of tests. However, separate consideration is required where 
one entity accommodates activities from n-iore than one business at-ea. In such a 
case, if a technical test is applied, distortion is bound to arise in allocating the tax 
base to the eligible group entities. 676 Nmnely, the weight of each factor for FA, 
measured at the entity level, means that reference is made to a factor's contribution 
to more than one business activity. Such a schen-ie does not provide any fraii-iework 
for a separate consideration of profitability M each business. Thus, factor's, takeil 
into account at entity level, are deen-led to carry equal weight m connection with all 
business activities perforn-ied by the, respective entity. 
The outcon-ie is that a technical test for group membership, If Coupled with FA, 
suffers distortiom The FA is understood to provide a solution of increased accuracy 
hi computing I-11coll-le, withill highly integrated businesses. Placing equal weight oil 
activities with different profit margins does not contribute to accuracy. In particular, 
, "Lich distortion gives a tax advantage to entities which con-ibine a significant part of 
high profitability and a small part of low-profit activity. This, is because the tax 
liability correspoi-iding to the higWy profitable part will he mitigated (acros,, the 
various businesses). 
11. A Rule for Defining Group Membership in the EIM tlý 
676 JS Brown, 'Formulary Taxation wid NAFFA' (1994) 49 Tax Law RevIew 759,762 (hermialier 
Brown), JR Hellerstein (19822) 164 & 167, 
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The documents produced by the Working Group on the CCCTB contain dis v., sion SCL, 
on a choice of test for entitlement to Lyroup membersIlip. 677 The Europewi 
Conumssion initiatly put forward legal and economic ownersNp as policy options 
open to the Member States for conuxientary and discussion. 678This is a discussion of 
broader relevance, as it concerns any EC-wide group taxation sclierne. Indeed, it is 
also a matter to deal with Linder HST . 
679 11, that introductory approach taken by the 
Coniii-iission, legal ownership touched upon shareholding. Further, the economic 
tests pointed to unitary taxation. No positiOn was taken in favour of any of the two at 
that stage, even thougli tests based on holding seen-ied to be treated as a primary 
choice. Business unity, on the other hand, created the Impression of being destined 
to rectify flawed aspects of shareholding. It COUld therefore be claimed that the 
Commission wished to encourage a sclienie wliicli conibiiied features of botll 
. 
680 Foltowin) - of a systerws - probably, to a different extent ga positioii iii favom 
technical test con-iprising) a single criterion (i. e. ownership or voting riglits), "' a 
further step was tak-en ii.. i the latest WG docun-lent! "2 It is nainely reported that 
general agreement was achieved on a systern for uroup i-nembersliip based on 
control. So the test should be one of voting rig jItS. 683 
In light of the above, the choice between a system based on technical featUres and I- 
one based on substantive feattires should be discussed. 
677 Comnl-,, S-on c (EQ, 'Issucs, related to group taxation' (Working Document') CCCTB\'VVP\03- \do ,5 
May 2006 (hereinqfier WG Doc I on Group Taxation), 1deni 'An over\, 'je\\, - ofthe main lssLitn" Lhat 
emerged at the first inteling, of the subgroup on group Lixation' (Working Docunient) 
CCCTB\WP\044\doc, 24 August 2006 (1wreinafter WG Doc 2 on Group Taxation), idti-11 WG Doc 
on Group Taxation, ideni 'An overview of the main issues that emerged at the third i-neeting ofthe 
sul)-roup on group taxation' (Working Document) CCCTB\W-P\053\doc, I March 2007 
(hereinalter 
t, Z7 
WG Doc 4 on Group Tax, -: -ition). 
678 WG Doc I on Group Taxation para 15 etseq. 
679 HST puts forward a proposal for a three-rule test which should be part of a 
HST ConvCimon: (i) a 
minimum ownership or control requirement is set as a condition for participation in the 
Home State 
group; (ii) membership ofonly one Home State group will be allowed, which implies that 
the lbove 
nýnlmum should I-w-- fixed at over 50 percent; and (iii) the parent entity's 
direct. or indirect holding in 
a subsidiary should fulfil the domestic (i. e. Home State) requirements 
for entitlement to group 
membership. For details, see HST (Lodin and Gan-irriie) 42-433- 
680 WG Doc. I on Group Taxation paras 15 & 27. 
681 WG Doc 3 on Group Taxation para 5. 
682 WG Doc 4 on Group Taxation. 
6S, 3 
ibid paras 13-14. 
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Unitary taxation, being a substantive test, can better fit the stnictures of all Intellial 
market. That may not prove ftinctional in practice thOLIgh. A reason. n-lay be that such 
a scheme points to concepts unknown to national group taxation sYstems applying 
across Europe. 
Further, the an-ioum of uncertainty involved iii detern-ýiniiig group memberstilp, due 
to the plethora of applicable tests, could give rise to large iiumbers of diSpLiteS 
among Me. ixiber States. This is indeed a likely prospect iii view of the framework for 
decision oii group membership. It is thus estimated that nunlerOUs disputes will 
con-ie to the fore due to the fact that no central authority at EC level Would fiold the 
con-ipetence to detenniiie group n-iembership. Neither is there the possibility of a 
scherne, similar to that of the US States, in which each Member State would 
detirteate the group pursuant to its owD rules. Rather, the position seen-is to be that 
the decision will be delivered by the state of the parent entity each time .641 11 Iffle 
with state sovereignty in direct taxatio. n, this thesis suggests that all otliei- eligible 
Member States should be vested with a right to object to the above decision on g 
685 n group deterimnatim) It is obvious that giving power to t ore than one body 
increases the chances of a clash. 
It follows fi-om the above discussio. n. that a technical systeii-i looks moi-e likely to 
attract the. Men-lber States' vote. That is apparei-it, having exaniffled the 
g- -Se 
0`, ý6 
implementation complexities to which unitary taxation may ive ri _. Membei 
States' faii-iiliarity with ownersl-iip/control tests could also play a part ill reacl-illig, a 
decision. 687 Further, it appears that certain drawbacks, such as Nrulnerability to tax 
abuse, can be tackled to a certain extent through the rules for FA and group 
registration. Z: 5 
I, in relatjoii to HST. HST 684 ha relation to the CCCTB, see generally WG Doc 2 o1i Adm n Issucs, 
(Lodin and Garrimie) 21 et secl. 
685 Chapter 5, Part A, Sectioii I and Part C, Section 11. 
686 See earlier in this chapter Part A, Section 111, Title (d), 
-)Og 
Considering this, the tests of legal ownership and control SlIOUld now be explored. 
A first issue for clarification is whether a system of control c(. )Lil. d contain sLibstantive 
- possibly, unitary - elements and also retain its technical structure. Indeed, control 
could possibly strike the proper balance between technical etenients and substance. 
Control is norn-lally specified through votUig rights, a power to appoint members of 
the Board of Directors and the exercise of unified management over the group 
entities. A degree of unity which shareholding tests alone are not in a position to 
ensure can be den-ioi-istrated here. However, this is a n-lanagement-related unity. As a 
result, it does not guarantee any unity of the busMess activity itself, 
Control tests, being pi-miarity used for coi-yipany law pLirposes, doiiot seern to he a 
test n-lore suitable than shareholding in the field of taxation. The reasoii is that the 
objectives to be safeguarded in taxes differ substantially fron-1 those (Tiveii priority m I 
company law. More specifically, providing security to lenders protectill(T minority 
08 
rights, ensuring that directors bear liability for their acts constitute key items m 
connection with which company law should provide solutioll, ". Colltrol over all 
entity's decisioii-making appears to I. -)e a prereqUiSite fOTpeI'fOJ'IlIIIl(-' these fmictioms. 
Oil the other hand, different aspects ma compaiiy's life bear weight wliei-i it comcs 
to taxation. In this respect, the decisive elenleilt is profit. Profit rout-Jily coijicides 
with the tax base. ')'9 Therefore, the systen-i aims at using tests whicli contribute to a 
fair allocation of tax base (i. e. taxable profit). Ownership, in the forin of 
shareholding, is naturally the decisive factor in deteniiii-mig entitlement to 4: ý' 
distributed profit. Further, supple mentary tests, such as rights to dividends or rights t7 
687 Eig ion systems ighteeii Member States operate group taxat . All schemes are structured on 
the basis 
of holding percentage and some of' them also contain features of-' control test,; - ýcc at 
Annex to 
COM(2006)824. 
688 See generally Gower and Davies-, Griffin. 
689 Commission (EQ, 'Taxable Income' (Working Document) CCCTB\WP\017\doc. 7 September 
2005 (herrinafter WG Doc on Taxable Income). 
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,,, 11,6 upon winding Lip, currently part of the UK systei 9') allow a more comprehensive 
structure. 
Therefore, if decision is reached for a technical criterion, there does not seem to he a 
reason for adoptiiig a more elaborate test thaii holdmg percentage. The latter could Z71 
also be coupled with supple n ie ntary tests, for the purpose of adding more substatice 
to the system and discouraging tax avoidance schemes. More specifically, the 
following features will have to be explored: 
(i) Determining Holding Percentage. for Group Membership 
One issue to be discussed is which rate the holding percentage should be fixed at. 
The rates appearing on the Parent-Subsidiary and Interest & Royalties Direct 
are most probably too low for a group taxation systen-i. Thus, the vast majority of 
sharelioldhigs m national group taxation systems range between 75 and 100 
62 
percent. 9" This constitutes a strong indication that rates should be fixed at levels 
higher than those of the above Directives. 
(ii) Supplementary Tests 
Group niembersliip tests fixed by reference to ownership (i. e. holding percentage, ) 
may provide a straightforward solution. These tests are practical to use at a fil-st 
stage of consideration. Still though, they should be supplen-lented by additional L- 
factors, so that tax avoidance risks, to which holding tests are prone, can be reduced. 
690 See earlier in this chapter Part A, Section 1, Title (b) on the UK system. 
6()] P-S Directive art 3(2); 1&R Directive art 3(b). 
692 For more details, see earlier in this chapter Part A, Section 1, Title (b). 
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Given the divensity in anti-avoidance tests applying at the national level across 
Europe, a Europem General Anti-Avoidance ClauSe693 would probably add to 
coinplexity. The Member States would be called upon to agree on an additional "et Zý 
of common rules. In light of th-is, it may be better to lay down specific anti- 
avoidance provisions intended to deal with identified areas of risk. 
A test would probably be required for the purpose of combating the artificial 
incorporation of business activities into a group. A system of ii-ionitoring i-nay be put 
in place to be perforn-ied by each subsidiary's Member State. In that context, 
transfers of business into group entities, ShortIY694 before or after their registration as 
members of the group, should be tested for their commercial purpose. Transfers to 
be identified as possibly suspicious should involve activities clearly unrelated to the 
group's ii-min business. It is also crucial that the business fields in which a group 
engages should denionstrate a degree of coherence . 
695 Otherwise the result of 
allocating the group tax base by FA will be significantly distorted and prone to 
manipulation. The taxpayer may bear the onus of providing adequate evidence that 
any new activity in the group has not been brought in with a view to avoid taxes. In 
this respect, son-ie conui-ion rules should be devised, giving the national authorities' 
guidelines on how to establish the existence of tax avoidance an-angements'. z: 1 
In cases of activities beijig closely tied to the inain group business, tax avoidance 
may consist of transfeui-no- branches of activity to elItItIeS OLItSIde the (-II-OUP. 
696 111 
47 - 
this regard, iiational CFC rules could possibly be a solution - at least, for the inid- 
temi. 
693 See generally: N Orow, Getieral Atitiv-1voidatice Miles: a Comparainv [tarmatiViial Anal. v! SIS ZI sh T, (Jordans, Bristol 2000 o dance' in Brit, ax Reporter vol I Pr'nc' e. ý o ). T Johnson, 'Tax Av 11 ipl 
Income T(ix (Wolters Kluwer (UK) Limited, 2004). 
694 Possibly, some indication of time could be given. That could, for in. slancc, be three months. 
However, this should not take the form of a binding rule-, instead, rooni should be left for 
consideration ofindividual facts by the tax authorities. 605 Weiner (1999) 76,77. 
606 
At ]east., this normally involves a genuine transfer of activity. In addition, the possibility of 
"'ettillL, 
Up a sepiArate subsidiary for the purpose of reducing the tax liability is not effective under a scheme of 
FA: McIntyre (2004) 918. Weiner (1999) para 32. 
Another area in which tax avoidance practices may flourish relates to transfers of 
holdings, aiming at artificially addiiig or removing entities from the gl'OLIP. 
The CCCTB working party has set forth the idea of an 'ovivershil) ai, eraging 
method . 
697 That is, the ownership of votýi. g rights is decided by reference to the 
state of affairs at the beginning and at closin(T of the tax period. A coumer-argument 
is that abusive behaviour could enter into arrangements to comply with the 
4averagi-ng rule' at the two specified points hi time while defying compliance over 
the remaining course. 
Those cases may be dealt with through placing a reqLiiren-ient for retaining lioldim-'s L_ Z7 - 
iii a group entity over a inininium period . 
698Nai-nely, PrOViSiOll Could be made 1`m- a 
inh-iiinuin holding of five years, which Should apply on an entity-by-entity basis'. 
Such a scheme could combat tax avoidance to a considerable extent. It would I-ender 
it difficult to manipulate group coinposition, through artificial 'entriesý anct -exits', 
as each entity should remain a group member for five years. Otherwise (i. e. ill the 
event of an early leave), the beneficial effects of group taxation sliou](A be revei-sed Z7 
ex timc. In support of the above, it may also be noted that discretion to laý. down a 
minin-lum holdhig period of two Linimen-Lipted years is given to the Member States ill 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 699 
It has been explained earlier that, in principle, this thesis is not meant to covej- the 
aspects of an EC group taxation scheme which relate to tax abuse. Tile above 
discussion, is only some preliminary thiiiking on issues specifically related to the 
entitlement to grOUP Men1bel-Ship. The ahii pi-hiiarily is to Wghlight that holding tests 
cwmot guarantee an efficient solution on their own. 
697 WG Doc 4 on Group Tavition para 15. 
698 Chapter 5, Part A, Section 1, Title Tenn of the Group. 
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Conclusion 
The analysis carried out in this chapter went through tile inain systems applying 
internationally in connection with group men-ibership detenninatimi. It seems that, 
despite its drawback-s, a test fixed by reference to holding percentage Is the optinial 
choice for the EIM. Thus, the concept of a unitary business, albeit ttleoretically 
appealing, does not appear compatible with the current s-tate of ilitegratioll ill the 
field of direct tax. Further, control, as deteri-nined through votiiia rights, serves better Z7 
certain ainis attached to Company Law. 
It has been noted that a schenie of shareholdhig contains -features prone to 
manipulatioi-i leadijig to tax avoidance. It is, however, true that the severity ()f their 
impact can be attenuated through adding supplementary tests. Ftirther examination, 
specifically oriented towards tackling tax abuse, is required to the end of arriving at L- Zý 
proposals. It is also obvious that these ii-iatters. can only be thoroughly explored after 
decision has beeii ftnalised on the n-min structural elei-iients of the schen-ic. 
In later chapters, there is examination of all other key elements of an EC-wide group 
taxation system. The conclusions reached here, will be considered In colijulictl()Il 
with the points set forth there. 
609 P-S Directi. vearl. 3(. 1). 
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7, THE GROUP TAx BASE 
Introduction 
A decision oil the structure of the group tax base in a system whicli aliplies across 
more thm one jurisdiction brings fortli a numbei- of coinplexitie. s. In the fi-ame"vork 
of the EIM, each Mei-i-iber State applies a fully-fledged corporation tax system whicli 
has been iii force for years. '00 As a result, there are significant disparities whicli 
cause incolierence. M light of this, a uumber of questions are raised: (i) Whicli 
methods of tax base integration Should feature ma specific model for gi-OLIP 
taxation .? 701 (ii) Should there be a harmonised base and rates or could a scheme 
remaiii functional in a landscape of diversity? and (Iii) Which element,, of income 
should be part of the group tax base'? 
TI-fis chapter will be divided in three parts (i. e. Part A, B wid C) corresi-)onding to Z7 
points (i) to (iii) above. 
In Part A, an atten-ipt will be made to clarify the concept,,, attached to tax base 
integration with a special focus on 'consolidatlon' and 'pooling. It will be shown 
that pooling is a broader ten-n than consolidation but, for the purposes of EC group 
taxation, the terms may be used interchangeably. In that context, the interrelation 
700 See Tables annexed to Commission (EQ, 'Company Taxation in the Internal 
Market' 
(Commission Staff Working Paper) SEC (200 1) 1681,23 October 200 1 (1wreinafter Staff Paper). 
701 The term 'tax equallsation' is used by B Winia 
I ii and has been defined as 'the levelling qf ihe tax 
burdeii vvith resj)ect to the o1waling prqfits and losses (? f iwo or more conipanies'. 
The author 
mentions that this term is meant to cover Lill diverse models for achieving the intended tax result. 
For 
more details: B Wiman, 'Eclualizing, the Income Tax Burden in a Group of Companics' (2000) 
28 
1 
, 
fI I hitertax 352 et seq. (hereina er Wiman (2000)). 
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between the group tax base and allocation systems, will be examined. Emphasis will 
be given to whether consolidation/pooling 
702 
SlIOLIld be treated as a prerequisite for 
FA. 
Harinonisation matters will be explored under Part B. The analysis will assess two 
separate procedural stages. That is namely the computation of each entity's tax base 
followed by creation of the entire group's tax base. In addition, the prospect of 
creating uniforn-lity will be discussed in the lig-11it of two optioiis: harmonisation of 
the tax base or of the rates. 
Finally, elements of the tax base, inherent in group taxation, will be discussed iii Part 
C. Two areas will be covered: intra-group and 10OLMd payinems. Iii tlils field, the 
examples relevant to sub-federal corporate taxatioii will have to be limited to the US. 
The reason is that the other two con-1parators (i. e. Canada and Switzerland) do not 
accommodate group taxation. As a result, the coiicept of a group tax base 
unknown in those systen-is. 
Part A: Models of Tax Base Integration 
The term 'consofidation' is used in the doCLIIIIellt's of the European institutions to 
describe the inethod for ca]CLI. lati-ng the tax base in the proposed group taxatioii 
schemeS. 703 In an EC context, consolidation involves an aggregation of grOLIP 
D-lembers' individual tax bases, calculated separately, according to coininon niles 
702 At this stacye, 1--x)tli terms are still used interchangeably, as, in the author's view, the mealiln(y which 
they have taken on different occasions has created an amount of confusion as to their content. 
Discussion will follow in Part A to delineate the concept of* consolidation and draw the distinction, if 
any, from pooling. Ill particular, a commentary will be included oil the use of the term -consolidation, 
in the context of the EC group Uav: ition proposals. 
703 Staff Paper 373, COM(2001)58-1 15; COM(2007)223 4. 
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applicable across the group. 704 However, the use of the concept 'consolidation' in 
hiteniatiODal tax literature seen-is to give rise to some ambiguity regarding its 
constituent eleinents. 
Tlie discussion below will focus on clarifyirýg the concepts of the main schernes 
applicable worldwide to group tax base computation. To this end, examples will be 
derived from group taxatioii systems applying to EC Men-iber States and 
internationally. In that context, an attenipt will be made to identify divergent 
approaches to the tenii 'comsolidation'. Li addition, the interaction between 
consolidation and FA is analysed as part of a separate section. A key matter'for 
discussion touches upon whetlier consolidation is a prereqUi. Site for FA. Related 
issues, sucli as the compatibility of consolidation with separate acc()Ulltill. ý, ', will also 
be explored. 
1. Clarification of Terms: consolidation, pooling, loss transfer, 
(profit) contribution 
The above terms point to the four main categories of group taxation w1lich one 
conies across in the national syste. nis of EC Member States. The primal-y feature of 
both 'loss relief' and ýprofit Contribution' is that ]Ieltllel- of thein involves the 
creation of a single group tax base. 705 hi that sense, they are, clearly distinguishable 
Concepts fi*OITI 'CODSOlidation' and poolbig'. in the case of loss relief, 
706 losses are- 
surrendered. from a loss- incurring group member to a profit- njak- Ing one. 
Group 
704'For the CCCTB, see WG Doc I on Group Taxation paras II- 14 11 tn 1, for 
HST, see HST (I-Win 
and Gai-nnile) 32. 70-5 11, , iother. -11-iisis done systems of loss relief, there is a transfer of losses from. one go-Toup . 1, tity to al I 
on a bilateral basis. Profit contribution operates on the same principle 
but consists of transfers of 
profit. 
706 National 11 -eliel' are. 
Cyprus, Ireland, 
group taxat on systems n 
Europe which accommodate loss i 
Latvia, Maltaand the United Kingdom. For details, see: WG Doc I on Group Taxation paras 
11-14 k 
29. 
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entities retain their individuality. Integration is limited to suri-endering or 
considering losses on an entity-by-entity ba,, -, i,,. 707 profit C011tribution schemes 70ý lay 
down sin-filar structures. They are aiined at nlitigating the tax liability of profitable 
group entities through transferrilIg parts of their tax base to loss-niaking affiliates. 
The distinction is n-lore difficult to draw between consolidation and pooling. In IX)tll 
cases, the end result is that a group tax base is created. The creation of a single group 
tax base, in all cases, allows profits and. losses of Individual. group members to be set 
off against one anotlier. '09 Otlier benefits, such as tax-free intra-group asset transfers 
are also con-mion occLirrences. It appears that the literature 710 makes use of the terin 
ýconsolidation' to describe schemes involving different degrees of integration. Still 
though, it can. be identified that consolidation acconin-iodates two broad categorles of 
group taxation systems. 
More specifically, there are few structures of 'very close integration in which the 
group is treated as a single unit/entity. Examples of such systen-ts, also referred to as 
'full consolidation', are Australia and the Netherlands. Under the Australian 
system, 714 assets, liabilities, actions and events related to the subsidiary are attributed 
", 
7 '2 a single fiscal incon-ie statement to the parent groLip company. Iii the Netherland, 
(i. e. one collective Balance Sheet) should be prepared for the group, aggregating 
assets and liabilities of the entities forn-ling the fiscal unity. Under botli the above 
schemes, intra-group transactions are always eliminated and one single tax return is 
707 Wiman (2000) 353, Endres 351, IFA Cbiers' General Report 2004 29-30. 
708 Profit contribution is the goup taxation scheme of the Scandinavian countries, in the EU, it is 
applicable in Finlandand Sweden. 709 
Stal ,f Paper 372. 
7 10 Endres 351, Wimlui (2000) 353-354, WG Doc I on Group Taxation para 14 ftn I 
711 P O'Donnell and K SI)ei-ice, 'Report on Group Taxation in Australia' in IFA (ed), CoWers tle 
dron 
fiscal intemational vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 121,126 (Iiewiiiqlicr 
O'Donnel and Spence in IFA Cablers). 
7' 2RJ De Vries, 'Report oii Group Taxation in the Netherlands' in IFA (ed), Calner. ý de droli fiIscol 
international vol 89b (Cahiers de drolt fiscal international, WA, 2004) 461,467 (hereltiqfier 
de Vrics 
in IFA Cahiers). 
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filed by the parent oil belialf of the entire group. Further, liability to pay taxes clearlY 
rests with the head company of the group exclusively. 713 
I scop IS714 fall-,, L The second category of group taxatimi systen Iv within the ,e Of 
4cmisolidatioii' is the n-lost popular among states. 715 This is also often referred to as 
4pooli-lig'. 716 In France, 717 ()Ile of the states in which such a scheme applies, fiabifitY 
to pay the tax on belialf of the entire group is exclusively bome by the parent. The 
legislation in force does not stipulate how the ai-nount of tax due should be allocated 
to the group men-ibers. This is detemined by contract signed by the group entities. 71 S 
Finally, intra-group transactions are efili-Linated only when it coines to fixed assets. A 
sin-tilar scheme is in force in Germany (Organsch(. 4i) . 
719 However, ties an-ioii(T the 
group members are looser, as intra-group transactions are retained. All the i-nore So, 
each group entity remains liable to pay the tax it has initially been assessed to. Under 
the Danish Joint Taxation, 720 the group is taxed to the consolidated 'joint taxable' 
incon-ie but all companies have a collective liability to the state for corporation tax. It 
should be noted that, albeit the existence of close inter-compaiiy ties, intra-L-IR)LIP 
transactions are still recmmised. In connection with return filing, the vast majority of 
systenis provide that each group entity is encumbered with carrying, out the 
72 formalities of its own tax return fililizgý. ' An exceptioii is the US regime, 
"" which is 
marked by the single consolidated return scherne. TI-Lis is submitted by the parent 
conipany for the entire group. As regards liability to tax, 110 UnifOrDlIty of treatinem C" 
can be identifi. ed. For instance, each- group subsidiary remaiiis liable to tax ill 
723 724 11, the -) ` Germany and collective liability is the case in Denmark US7 ý and 
713 ibid, O'Donnel and Spence in IFA Cahiers 126-127. 
714 Endres 351, Wimaii (2000) 353. 
715 fnformation is derived from the data presented in Endres 350-35 1. 
716 See tables in Endres 350-351 -, KPMG Austria (2004) 39. 717 Borrat and Bassiere in fFA Cahiers 277. 71S Ibid. 
7 19 Eckstein in IFA Cahiers 304-305. 720 
Amby in IFA Cal-ilers . 14 1. 721 Among the countries surveyed by Endres, each group entity files its own tax return in 
Austria, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Return filing is carried out hy 
the parent in Australia, the Nethcrlands and the USA. See Endres 350-35 1. 722 
Sparagon a in IFA Cali 1 er s 715 et secl. 723 Eckstein in IFA Cahiers 304-305. 
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Spah-t '726 consolidated members are jointly and severally liable for the group tax 
liability. By contrast, liability is limited to the parent in France, 72) 7 notwithstanding 
the fact that the sclieme is not one of full consolidation. 
Use of the term 'pooling' is often rnade in conjunction with 'consolidation'. More 
specifically, an attempt to defme 'pooliiig' is niade in the series of documents 
produced by the CCCTB Working Group. 28 Pursuant to this, pooling appears to be 
a broader concept than consolidation. Its meaimig thus focuses on the 'aggregation 
of individual tax results (ýf variotis gronj) nieni-bers'. 729 The eliminatioi-i of iiitra- 
group transactions is not critical. It may be part of the system but this is not 
730 It f ljoW,., obligatory. Yet, that is mentioned as a feature iiiherei-it in consolidatioi-i. 0 
that the treatment of intra-group transactions is set forth, in the CCCTB works, as 
the test which circun-iscribes the distinction between consolidation and poolirig. 
The above test (i. e. elimination of mtra-group transactions) as well as the 
understanding of pooling as a broader term is not entirely clear in Endres' 
comparative tables iii Intertax . 
73 ' Namely, the tcrm 'consolidation' appears to be m 
use as a generic concept, wh-ich is classified as 'group relief (UK). *group 
contribution' ('Sweden), 'pooling' (Geri-i-iany, France, Denn-iark, Spaiii, US, ALtstria, 
Luxen-ibourg) or 'full coiisolidation' (Australia, the Netherlands). FL11-ther, the 
elimination of intra-group transactions is not set forth as a test for distinction. 
Schemes of 'ful. 1 consolidation' in principle do not appear attached to the terti. -i 
pooling'. Yet, certain schernes allowiýng the elimination of intra-group transaction,,, 
(i. e. Spain, 732 USA 733 ) are categorised as pooliiig. That highlights son-le other 
724 Amby m TA Catilers 24 1. 725 Sparagna in IFA Cahiers 717. 
726 MA Grau Ruiz, 'Report on Group Taxation in Spain' in IFA (ed), Cahiers de droll ji, wal 
intemational vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal inteniational, IFA, 2004) 609,622 (hereitiqfter 
Grau 
Ruiz in IFA Cahiers). 727 Borrat and Bassiýre in IFA Cahiers 277. 728 WG Doc I on Group Taxation para 14 fm 2 729 Ibid. 
730 
Ibid. 
73 1 Endres 350-351. 
732 
ibid 350. 
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criterion for distinction. It does not look at the treatment of imi-a-group transactions. Zý 
According to Endres' classification, 734 this could possibly relate to all those features 
which lead 'ftilly coi-isolidated' groups to operate zis a si. 1-1gle unity. It is actually a 
situation closer to the 'original ii-leaning' of consolidation, being that of aggregating ltý 
fii-iancial statements. 
Combi-iied reporti ng735 i 11 US State taxation, despite being conceptually distinct from 
national group taxation systems, still allows certain comparisons to be drawn. It thus 
lies closer to pooling, as it involves no elimination of ijitra-group transactions. 
Further, each group ii-lember files its own tax I-etUrn and there is no alignment of 
individual tax base S. 736 
The discussion of the concepts above urges the conclusimi that any distinctimi 
between. 'consolidation' arid 'poolii-ig' appears to make more sense iii theory ratlier 
than in practice. The critical elen-lent is that both n-iethods build a group tax base. In 
addition, integration happens through addilig together the tax bases of individual 
group members rather than separate items of tax accounts. Apart from that, there are 
specific features which may bring the degree of imegratioll closer to tile coricept of a 
, single Unit,. 737 Alternatively, they may hold it at the level of a looser tie aillolw tile 
group members. 73 However, those variations do not point to critical disparities. it is 
only the possibility to eliminate tntra-L)Toup transactions which seems to mark a 
significant difference in approach. This is because, through such eliminatiori, the L- 
group tax base is not a mere aggregatioii of group men-ibers' individual tax result,, 
733 Ibid. 
734 
ibid 351. 
"5 BF Miller, 'Worldwide Unitary Comb1natlon: 'flie Callfornla Practice' in CE McLure Jr (ed), Die 
Stale Corporation Incoine Ta-v: Issues III Worldwide Unitary Combination (Hoover histitution Press 
Stanford University, Stanford 1984) 133,136 (liereinafter Miller): '... tlie combined report Is useel to 
determine the proper amount of bworne reporiable b. ý, each entit. y engaged In a single unitary 
business... '. 
736 For details on the comparison between 'Combined Report' and 'Consolidated 
Retum', seeý Miller 
136-137. 
737 For instance, alignment of the factual history ofa joining subsidiary with that of its parent ref1ccus 
a considerable dec-Tee of integration within the gn-oul). This is the case in Australia. 
See- O'Donnel 
and Spence in IFA Cahiers 126 & 129. 
myniore. Instead, the integrity of eacli separate mernbeCs tax base is brokem Tliis 
ýiterveiition brings the situatJoii a step closer to the migmal concept of 
conso lidation, being that of so-called 'con. solidatioii of financial accounts'. 739 
11. The Group Tax Base and Allocation Systems: the 
Interrelation 
(i) Cons olida tiomlPooling and FA 
A question is whether the allocation of profit by FA to eligible group n-lel-Tibers can 
only be carried out in the coi-itext of a conso lidated/poo led tax base. 
The FA presupposes the existence of a group tax base. By nature, this cannot be 
compatible with systems, stich as group relief or profit contribution, which function 
on wi entity-by-entity basis. Therefore, where entities retain their intetn-ity, there is 
in principle no room for allocation through apportion] Ile 11t. 
740 The FA may apply to 
each single eiitity separately where ai. i entity is liable to corporatiol-I taxes in more 
than one state. lit such. iiistances, the apportion i Yient refers to tax jurisdictions 
eligible for a share iii a specific entityýs tax base. ThLis, in Canada '741 
in 
Switzerland 742 ai-id those US States which do not apply Linitary con-lbilied reporting 
apportioi-n-nent takes place withiti the framework of a single entity. 
73S Systems which provide for individual tax liability of eacli group entity Lis well as separate return 
filing allow group members to retain their integrity and some degree of independence. 739 Z- Wiman 354. 
740 Some problems may be encountered in irnplemenung HST where the state of the parent cornpaný 
applies a group taxation system of loss relief' or profit contribution, as Iliost schemes 
do not involve 
the creation of a single group tax base. The document produced on HST clearly identifies that states 
without a domestic system allowing consolidation of profits and losses have 
little or no adw-witage in 
adopting HST. See HST (Lodin and Gamnlie) 32. 
741 
Bird and Brean 1411. 
742 R Duss and R Bird, 'Switzerland's "Tax Jungle"' (1979) 27 Canadian Tax 
Journal 46,58-59. 
It follows that, in the field of group taxation, the FA in principle requires that a 
single tax base becon-ies the basis for allocation of income to more thaii one entity or 
jurisdiction. The degree of integration of the single group base does not seem to 
have an ii-yTact on the FA. Namely, it is not as such likely to cause distortions. It will 
be discussed in Part B below that distortion may only be generated where disparate 
rules are applied in computing the group tax base. 743 Further, the factors used in the 
FA may also create a distorted result, which will be an item for analysis in chapter 9. 
Therefore, the rules on tax base integration do not affect the accuracy of the FA 
insofar as the end-result is a single group base. 
(ii) Cons ol idationlPooling and Separate Accounting 
Consolidation/pooling could be compatible with sepal-ate accounting in a lin-lited 
number of circumstances. For instance, many national group taxation systems in 
Europe and internationally operate under a combination of consoli(lation and 
separate acco Untl ng. 744 The structures, though, which those schernes normally take, 
do not flivolve a pure division of the group tax hasc. L_ 
In a don-lestic fi-amework, the groupýs liability to tax normally arises iii the navrie of 
i .- 
74S 
the parent company and a credit is given for tax already paid by tile subsidiai les. 
hi such a context, separate accounting does not, in pi-niciple, raise transfer pricing 
issues, shice all fiscal obligations arise withiýn a siii0e jurisdiction. Where a cross- 
border situation is in issue., 746 the process is as follows: foreign results are taxed at 
the domestic rate, as part of the group revenues, after liaviiig been converted to 
743 See later in this chapter at Part B, Section 11. 
744 IFA Cahlers' General Report 2004. 
745 [bid, 
746 11, Lbc EC, a cross-border aspect only . 1pplies to Austria, Denmark, Frame md 
Italy. 
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747 don-iestic tax results. A credit is then granted for tax paid abroad. This is 
apparently n-Ot a purely n-iulti-jurisdictional scheme. Indeed, it looks more like 
computing a single entity's tax liability rather than creating a gyroup base foi- 
allocation. Withm such a fraii-iework, transfer pricing concerils remain severe. 
It follows, therefore, that conso lidatioii/poo ling may only be compatible with 
separate accounting under the following scheme: the tax base of each group 
subsidiary is computed separately and integration only ilivolves the parent's tax 
liability against which a credit is given for tax paid by the subsidiaries. Where 
division of the group base is envisaged, separate accounting is incompatible with the 
structure. 
111. A Model of Tax Base Integration for the EIM I... 
Only a scheine involvino the creation of a single group tax base, in the form of 
consolidatiOn/pooling, COUld serve a nurnber of the obýjectives which the EC seek, ", to 
acconiplish. Otherwise, systems SLICh as group relief or profit contribution would 
provide a solution 'targeted' at dealijig with losses or reducilig taxable profits 
respectively. More specifically, a scheme of consolidation/pooling: 
f. 748 (i) allows intra-group loss relie , 
(ii) is a prerequisite for applying the FA, which appears to be the only histrument 
available for replacing ann's length separate accounting and so tackling transfer Z-- 
pricirýg fomialities; bi addition, the FA ineets the iieeds of closely integrated inarkets 
inore efficiently ; 749 
747 On Austria. MC Slefaner, 'Die Neue Gruppenbesteuerung In Osterrelch als KemstUck der 
Steuerreform' [2004_1 8 SWK 418 (hereinqfter Stefaner), on Den mark: Amby in IFA Cahiers 24 1. oii 
France: Borrat & Bassiýre in IFA Cahlers279 et seq.; on Italy Nobill & Lanza 566. 
748 Staff Paper 372. 
741) HST (Loclin and Gan-mue) 32: states without a domestic systemallowing consoliclation ofprotits 
and losses have little or no advantage in adopting HST-, Musg-Tave (1984) 236-2237: opportUllItICS 
for 
t 
prol-*iL shilling atid structural in lerrel alion ships. 
212) 4 
(iii) in conjunction with FA, cwi tackle certain tax avoidance practices at intra-gyroup 
level without a need to apply Thin Capitalisation or CFC ineasure s. 750 
It can be concluded from the previous analysis that an EC group taxation schen: ie 
places no requirement for a policy choice of precisely 'consolidation' or 
(. pooling'. 751 It should be sufficient to create a structure of single group tax base 
coupled with a mechanism for allocating the group tax base to all eligible Member 
States. The elimination of intra-group transactions need not be treated as an 
indispensable feature. More detailed discussion on this will follow under Part C 
below. Indeed, it should be a core element of the project that each group n-lember 
incurs a separate tax liability. 
The above should suffice to create an EC group taxation systenl of highly integurated 
structure in the nature of consofidatimi/poolim--y. At the same time, the scheme will 
allow significant sovereignty to the group inembers, wWc1i is in conformity witli tile 
T) 
principle -of subsidiarity. 
Part B: Harmonisation versus Diversity 
One fLindai-nental question is whether a system of g-roup taxation for the EC 
presupposes that coim-non rules apply to calculating the group tax base. Any possible 
answers draw on the debate between the proponents of tax competition, on the, one 
hand, and reaulation, on the. other. Earlier in the analysis, 
753 the opposing Views, 
expressed in this regard, were highlighted and put into the context of the objectives 
pursued by the EIM. Discussion in this part will specifically focus on the tax 
base. 
750 lbid, MclntýTe (1994) (numbering notavailable in the electronic version). Z7 751 See earlier in this chapter at Part A, Section I. 
752 TEC art 5 subpara 2. 
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Further, harmonisation or diversity is relevant at two distinct stages of the process 
leading to the group tax base: (i) the calculation of each group entity's (individual) 
tax base; and (ii) consolidation/pooling of the (Yroup members' taxable result,,, in the 
parent entity's state of residence. As the issues raised at both stages bear significant 
similarities, they will be considered below as part of the same title. Finally, it will be 
shown that a combination of harnionised tax base and diversity in rates can create an 
efficient market where tax con-1petition also has a presence. 
1. Computation of the Tax Base 
In principle, ulliform rules apply within a Li-oup to con-ipming each member's tax 
base. That refers to the stage prior to consolidation/pOoling of individual results. The 
nia ority of national systems of which the tests for entitlen-lent to memberslup ", ere 
described in chapter 6 do not accon-m-iodate any foreign element. They are nan-iely 
confined to one sii-igle jurisdiction, in whicli case applying, Linifori-ri rules aci-oss the 
group is a Datmal consequence. In Europe, it is only France (in the context of 
bent-fice consoli&-ý), Denn-iark, Austria Tý4 and Italy that provide for some form of 
cross-border group taxation. In those fmir states, the incorporation of foreign entities 
into the group requires conversion of flien, tax accounts to align witli the i-Liles 
applicable in the group's state. 75S 
r, 111ty is 1111jerent ui US unitary taxation. It is also interesting that a concept of uDifo 
That is a system perceived and applied on a totally different basis fron-i national 
753 See Chapter 4, Part A and Part B, Section 1. 
754 Austria does not align the treatment of non-resident group subsidiaries with that of rcsident group 
rnernbers, in which a scheme of pooling is in force. It only allows foreign subsidiaries' 
losses (and not 
C- Cý 
profits) to be considered. A condition is that foreign result, ý are converted into Austrian tax accounts. I 
In addition, those should then be recaptured once the foreign subsidiary makes a profit or 
luwves the 
cr , Iroup- 7 -5 5 For more details on France-. Borrat & Bassiýre in IFA Qdiiers 2283, on 
Denniark- Aniby in IFA 
Cahlers 240, on Italy. Nobili & Lanza 566, on Austria, Stefaner 418. KPMG 
Austria (2004) 39 et 
seq. & 62. 
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k'l'()LIJ) t, )XItIOII systerns anT overall, LIOCS nor present featurcs of' harmomsation. ' " Z-1 
)"lorc SpcCiFically, CýIch t's State applies it', ovvil tax law for tile purpose of 
-)IC v in a cornhined unitary týlx hase. o 11 It C"I "l )ut jjlý7 ,ttt 
its taNal shal I 
JOUCCSk the IVVenUCS Of UnItry entities resident in other US Twes need to he addul 
up to the conihined tax has'e. In dua conwxL the um wcowAs of tiuse enNes are 
"mmed Ri conq&y whir the tax rules of the State Carrynlýl Out tile CaICUlation. It 
s that cach US Statc's tax Share arises Out 01'a "I-OLIJ) tax hJsC CaICUlatCd Under 
mid'orin rulcs. 
lic w1cck, 1111""Ill Is cl, not centrLdi"o-1, III ilic s"'ll"ýc, tImt thc jilocLitioll of The t, ýx 
Ih)t C-11TIO-1 k) LI I 
I)% ( )I ICSII tc 1,01- Lill t: 11titt"", ()I, thc Collihmcd group. l6thcrý 
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Bringing the above discussion into an EIM context, the question P, whether uniforni 
rules should apply across the EC or, alternatively, each Member State should be fi-ee 
to abide by its own law. The latter could tal, -, e a fimn either sin-lilar to US combined 
reporting""' or FIST 761 
It is obvious that common rules should apply across each group to prevent tax base 
overlap. A system of EC-wide uniform treatment would apparently create a settiýng 
of efficiency. Further, neither would a scheme such as the HST give rise to 
distortio 11,702) providing that the parent entity's state applies its rules across each 
group. Under the HST, it n-my be that n-lore than one group taxation system would be 
hi force across the EIM. Yet, no tax base overlap Occurs if the calcLilathm of each 
group's tax liability is Subject to one single regii-ne. 
It should be noted that, under the HST, sorne 'foreign-held' 763 entities may be 4-7 
receivim-, less favourable tax treatment than domestically-held ones. That will occur 
where the domestic tax regime leads to a lower fiscal burden, as compared to that of 
the state of the group parent entity. The situation does not, though, point to 
infi-ingement of the EC Treaty. This is because the higher tax burclen would not 
result fi-om a fiscal provision of the Member State in which the sLibsidiaries are 
resident. It follows that no disci-iiiiiiiatioii/resti-ictioii, iii line with the Effs host- 
state analysis, 764 can be established under this set of facts. 
A scheme featuring the principles of US conibmed reporting does not appear to be 
an option for consideration within the framework of the EIM. Depending on the 
760 Tbat would bc of relevance if each Member State, host to one or more group ci-itities, applied its 
own rules to calculating its share in the gioup tax base. In such case. there would 
be no unifornlitY in 
the rules applicable wiý,, Iili each group. 
761 Under HST, a group's taxable base shall be computed pursuant to the law of the 
Member State in 
Z- 
which the groupýs parent company is tax resident. This involves both the computation of tht tax 
base 
Z7 of each individual group entity and the method of tax base integration (consolidation, pooling-, etc). 
See- HST (Lodin and Gamniie) 32. 
762 
ibid -) I para L 1, 763 The expression 'I'oreipp-held' is used for simplicity. The correct term would 
havc been 'held by a 
Z- 
parent company resident. in another EC Member State'. 
764 See in this thesis: Chapter 1, Part A, Section 11, Title (i), 
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remaining structural elements (e. g. FA or separate accountinLY), this Would probably 
re, semble ail extension of national systems across the border. That would defeat the 
fundainental rationale behiDd the initiative taken by the European Con-niiission for 
ail EC-wide group taxation system. Thus, the system would remain as fi-agniented as 
it currently is. Further, double taxation as well as double non-taxatioll would 
765 persist , 
It has been shown above that uniformity of the rules applicable within each group is 
necessary to prevent market distortion caused prh-narily by double taxation. Devising Zý 
a systen-i to apply across the EC meets additional needs which basically relate to 
simplicity. Still though, the objective of subjecting each MNE to one set of conu-non 
rules across the EC could be achieved through. a structure such as the HST. 
11. Harmoni. sation: Tax Base versus Tax Rates 
The proposals for group taxation, currently under consideration at EC level, put 
7 
forward that harmonisation shall cover the group tax base and FA StI-LICtLII, e. ()" The 
determination of tax rates should remain under Men-iber State competence, \, vith the 
aim of allowing fair tax coiripetition to flourish . 
767 This policy decision is not self- 
. 
761 
evident. Thus, not all aspects of a tax system need to be harmonised Evideuce is 
that, in the past, different harn-ionisation approaches were proposed by the Europewi 
765 Setting conin-ion rules in computing the gToup tax base is expected to lead to 
lower administrative 
costs for taxpayers. Further, it has been explailied in chapter 4 that the elirflInatIon of 
double tax,:, jjo,, 
may riot create an obliaCition enforce, against the Member States before the 
ECJ. Yet, it is laid Able , 
down mi TEC art 293 as one of the objectives of the EIM. 
766 Staff Paper 375 et seq.; COM(2001)58"'-, COM(2003)726 16 et seq., COM(2006)157 
6.. HST 
(Lodin and Gammle) 3-1. for a view that the rates should also be harmonised, scc 
Ruding, Report 
Chapter 10. 
767 
Staff Paper 373. 
768 Avi-Yonah (199 1) (page numbering not available on Nexis-Lexis) 
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ý, St it t1tio 1,76 9 For instance, i-n 1992, the report of the Ruding Committee set forth a 
proposal for a rninimum and maximum tax rate. 770 
It seems that there is no unanimous view about which elements of a group taxation 
system should be harnionised. As mentioned in Chapter 4 earlier, perfect neutrality 
771 
places a requireinent for uniforn-lit Y in all elements of a group taxatioii scheine. 
Since, however, such an approach could underinine a system's flexibility and also 
produce additional distortions '772 it is' believed that soine arnount of diversity should 
be allowed . 
773 Thus, some degree of tax con-ipetition has to be sustained withiii the 
EIM. On the other hand, disparity on a large scale would probably defeat the 
objective of devising an EC-wide group taxatiou system. This is because all 
obligation to comply with a nun-lber of different s steins (Yeiierates additjoiial y Z7 
investment costs and, as a result, a higher burdeii for con-1pliance. This is because 
market access becomes costly due to the inarket's fragryientation into twenty seven 
disparate national systen-is. Those have beeD some of the key arguinents put forward 
to justify the European Commission group taxation initiative. 774 zn 
As described under Section I above, the harmonisation of the, tax base is all 
indispensable element of an EC-wide cross-state group taxation scheme. The reasons 
have been elaborated on Linder Section 1. 
Contrary to tax base divergence, rates seein to be a more suitable element to leave to 
the decision of the Member States. Especially where tax rate diversity is coupled 
with base uniformity, the system becomes transparent and comparison can be carried 
769 See earlier in this thesis Chapter 2; The Ruding Report Chapter 8; Proposed Losses Directive, 
Commission Proposal 1975. 
770 The Ruding Report. 
. 
ficiency in the iniernational altocat' n of iew, agrees 10 77 1 Garm-me, in a less absolute vi that 'ecoiwmic ef 
yrs markedly'. resource ......... is unlikely to 
be anainable so long as each country's ta-V system tlýf -M 
Garfirnie, 'The Taxation of -Inward Direct. Investment in North America following the Free 
Trade 
Agreement' (1993-4) 49 Tax Law Review 615,631-6332, Musgrave (1987) 287-2189. 
772 See earlier Chapter 4, Part A. 
773 
it, 
ilable on Nexis, -Lexis)-, Cockfield 49, Staff Paper 
365 Avi-Yonah (1991) (pape numbering not aval 
& 373, A No%,, 'Tax Competition: An Aiialysis of the Fundarriental Arguments' (2005) 37 Týix Notes 
International 323,3-18 (hei-einaffer Nov). 
1 --, () 
out n-iore easily. 775 Tax competition is normally expected to lead to rates decreasim-, 
rather than to a so-called 'race to the bottom'. Practice has proved 776 that, Under sucl) 
circumstances, rates are inclined to drop but only down to a certain point. This 
actually appears to reflect a 'golden mean', since the negative impact of tax 
shopping would be expected to be outweighed by rate decreaseS. 777 At the sarne 
tiii-ie, the taxpayers will still reap the benefits of tax competition. 
Part C: Elements of the Tax Base 
The title above may create the impression of incorporating, a larger range of items 
than actually interided. This is why its content Should briefly be clarified before 
proceeding with discussion. The analysis that follows is not i-neam to cope witil 
specific individual elements of the tax base wl-tich one coines across at the of a 
simile ent ity. 778 Instead, it focuses oii iten-is ha\, iiig a precise relevance to group 
taxation. Primary attention will be giveii to the treati-neiit of intra-gl-OLII-) ti-aiisactimis 
and payinents, including transfers of capital assets. 
It should also be clarified that issues relating to the group's so-called 'water's 
edge , 779 will not be analysed in this chapter but will 11istead be part of Chapter S. For 
the purposes of this Part, it wilt be assumed that the envisaged EC-wide group 
taxation systeni does not extend beyond 'water's edge'. In an EC fran-iework-, this is 
roughly delineated as the territory of the. EIM. The concept usually excludes entities 
resident outside the EC which do not ji-mintain any intra-EC presence through a PE. 
774 Staff Paper 223-224. 
775 Avi -'Miah (199 1) (page nunit)ering not available on 
Nexis-Lexis). 
776 
Jbid; Nov 329-330. 777 
Avi-Yonah (1991) (p.,. -I()e nurnberMc, not available on Nexis-Lexis). 778 1- 
WG Doc on Taxable Income. 
2 3) 1 
Those cannot be part of the same EC group schen-ie, irrespective of being under 
Common ownership or closely linked to each other from an economic point of view. 
Aniong entities outside water's edge, a distinction should be drawn between: (i) 
those affiliated with. the group but resident outside 'water's edge' and (ii) those 
having comi-nercial dealings with the group but, otherwise, totally unrelated. The 
former are always tax residents outside the EIM; the latter may be resident either 
within the EC or in a third country. 
All categories of entities (i. e. off-'waters edge' and unaffiliated entities) fall outside 
the contours of the group taxatioii scherne. As a result, those trai-isactions/payn-ients 
will in practice be treated the same, irrespective of whether the payee or payer is iii 
close econoniic ties with the group. The critical matter Ps. to identify whether a 
specific entity is a group nieniber. In practice, giveii the existence of group 
re6stration forinalities, no uncertainty is expected to arise in this regard. Amoiig the 
various classifications of non-group members, extra attentioii will be required for 
EC-resident entities due to their obligation to coniply with the EC Freedoins. 780 
1. Revenues Qualifying as Part of the Group Tax Base Z7) 1 
Inti-a-group transactions and payments take place between entities registered as 
members of the same group. A question is whether the consolidated/pooled tax base 
should accommodate all these results or instead be limited to itenis specifically 
linked to the group's business activity. Intra-gro-up dealings may In principle take the 
form of trading transactions (i. e. sales of goods and supplies of services), transfers of tn Z-- 
779. , water's edge' is discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. Rou(-, -hly, [lie term is used in 
US 'combined 
I 
reporting' to describe revenues earned within the territory of the couiary or through 
foreign-1c. vated 
PEs ol- US-incorporated companies. 
780 'Mese entities are subject to the test of 'equal treatment' for compliance with the 
fundamen Lal 
freedoms. For more details, see earlier in this thesis Chapter 1, Part A. 
2 
capital assets or passive investn-lent proceed s/distribut ions . 
78 1 It should probably be 
assumed that the first category of dealings is, by definition, i-nextricably tied up to an 
entity's business. It follows that those revenues would normally he classified as 
business i-iiconie- Passive h-westiiient, on the other hand, gives rise to non-business 
income in most cases. 
The Unifbrni Division (? f Incomejbr Tax Purposes (UDITPA) 
In discussing the significance of the distinction between business and non-business 
income for the group tax base, refereme should be made to the UDITPA. 
This is a Model Act created with the ahn of a uniform approacli to the division of 
i11CO111e Of 111LIftl-, state enterprises across all eligible US States. The UDITPA dates ýý I 
back to 1957. It was then that the National Conference of Conunissioners oil 
Uniform State Laws wid the Ainerican Bar Association approved it and 
recon-m-lended its adoption to the StateS. 782 Further, the Multistate Tax Compact713 
784 has ah-nost verbati. m reproduced UDITPA. ' This is not a federal act laying down 
enforceable oblications. Rather, it is only a fi-ainework wNcli provides guidance on Z7 ý7 
how the US States should StRiCtUre their bUSIrIeSS tax systems. TIle objectives of 
UDITPA focus on minimishig n-iultiple taxation of inter-state mid foreign commerce. Zý 
Thus, a set of uniforin rules, consisting of a three-fitctor formula, has been proposed 
for allocating the gyroup tax base to the eligible US State S. 
785 That also included 
unifori-nity hi computing the cousolidated/pooled tax base. 
781 WG Doc 4 on Group Taxation paras 26-39. 
782 AP Sherrod, 'A Matter of (Statutory) Interpretation: North C, -Tolina Recog-mises the Functional 
Test for Corporate Taxation in Polaroid Corl). v. Offerman' (1999) 77 North Carolina Law Revitw 
2326,2327 (herel'nafter Sherrod). 
783 Uie Compact. is a model of' state tax statute and its application is currently under the supervisory 
control of the Multistate Tax Comi-i-fission. 
784 Sherrod 2336-2337. 
785 
ibid 2336, 
7 The UDITPA has been structured on the basis of a distinction between busmes S 
and iion-busýiess inCome. 787 The former is apportioned to the eligible US States 
whereas the latter is allocated to the state which the income is n-lost closely 
71,1 
associated witli. That is often the state of the, company's commercial domicile . 
The distinction between business and non-business incon-ie is inextricably linked to 
the concept of unitary taxation. This lin-iits the revenues which become consolidated 
at group level and apportioned through the three-factor forn-mla to those being part 
of the unitary business. Inevitably, therefore, non-business income, is kept outside 
the group. Under the US unitary rules, revenues and costs of passive investment are 
not hictuded in the group tax base -for apportiom-i-lent. 789 Zý 
In connection with non-bustness inconie, the UDITPA contains proposals for 
specific allocatio 11S. 790 More specifically, rents are taxable in the state where real and 
tangible personal property is situated or utilised. The same tiliks are in priiiciple 
relevant when it con-ies to the sale of property. Further, interest and dividends are 
allocated to the state of the beneficiary's doi-i-ticile. Finally, royalties (i. e. patents and 
copyright') are attached to the state in which the relevant intellectual property rights 
791 are exercised. 
The d'st'nctio not always, easy to IIm between business and non-business JI 
draw. The state Supreme Courts have often disagreed ()n the tests whiCh should be 
ehiployed to define income In the context of the UDITPA. The question has been 
whether the decision should be made exclusively on the basis of a transactional test 
or, instead, tramsactional and functional tests can be treated as alteniatives. The 
786 '... incotne arising. froin iransactions and activity in the regidar cour. w qfihe tavpqyer'. ý trade or 
business and inchides income from latigible and I-litangible propert, N, ýf the acquimlion, management 
and disj)osilion of the propertY c-otistitive integral parts qfthe mvpayer's wgular trade or 
busiiic, ýA 
operalions... 'UDITPA I(a). 
787 
... all income other than bttsiness inconw... 'UDITPA I(e. ). 7 88 Sherrod 2338. 
789 A Russo, 'Formulary Apportionment for Europe: An Analysis and A Proposal' [2005] European 
Taxation 2,11 (hercinqfter Russo). Weiner (2005). 
790 McIntyre (2004) 920-, Russo 13, for references to UDITPA through casc law analysis, see- 
JR 
C7 
Hellerstein (1982) 155 et seq., Sherrod 2342-2347. 
791 Russo 13. 
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jurisprudence of state Supreine Courts has answered t1lis question tlll-()Llgh the 
. iSio11,,. 792 language and legislative history of the relevant prov 
An example in this area is Polarol(j, 79-, ' decided by the North Carolina Supreme 
Court in 1998. The dispute involved the classification of proceeds fi-oin litigation. 
Polaroid Corporation received proceeds from liti. gatioii with Kodak, which it treated 
as non-business income. As a result, the amount was allocated to the compally's 
com-nercial domicile in Massachusetts. Disagreen-lent arose with the Departmem of 
Revenue which took the position that the amount qualified as business income. The 
North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the provision in issue and found against 
the taxpayer. It ruled that North Carolina,; corporate taxatioll accoil-in-lodates both 
the transactional and functional tests. Further, the court supported its position by 
referring to the wording of the statute. 794 
hi practice, this ineant that the proceeds In dispute could qualify as business income 
under either the transactional or functional test. The former is a narrow construction 
wliich looks Lit the nature of a transactiom It thus requires that the gahi be produced 
by a type of transaction iii which the corripany regularly engoýiges in its normaLCOLU'Se 
of business. 795 The ftinctional test is concerned witli the nature of the as,, et. To 
classify revenue as business income, it suffices that a certaiii asset was used to 
,; C, 
792 In the fol, oWincy Ca, -din- of' the relevant I-)ro\isions, came to t, s, the state courts, 
kiscd oil the w0, I 
the conclusion that the only test for defining business income W, 1,1; the transactional test. General Carc 
.f 
of Indlisir' s Inc. 875 P. 2d 278 Corp. v Olsen 705 S. W-2d 642 (Tenn. 1986), In, rc Appeal o Ch'e le - 
(Kan. 1994); Phillips Peiroleitin Co. ), Ioiva Dept qj'Reý, and Finance 511 N. W. 2d 608 (Iowa 1993). 
Again, following the language of the provision, decisions were taken in favour of both tc, t,, in: 
Texaco Cities Sen, ice Pipeline Co, i, McGraiv 695 N. E-21d 481 (111,1998). Sinipson Tiniber Co. v Dept 
of Reventie 953 R2d 366 (Or. 1998), Laurel Pipe Litic Co. v Cominomi. vall1i Board o/ 
Finance and 
Reventie 642 A. 2d 47-1 (Pa. 1994). 
793 Polaroid Corp. cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1576 
, 
fernian 349 N. C. 290,507 S. E. 2d at 284 (1998), 
(1999). 
794 
... includes incoineftom tangible and 
intangible property if'tlie acqi. tisition, iiianagenient andlor 
disposition ofthe property coiisiiiiite iniegral parts of die corporalimi's regidar trade or 
biislnr. ý. ý 
operati . ons' (N. C. Gen. Stat. 105-130.4(a) (1) (1997)): the 'and/oC wording of the statute vas 
taken 
to mean that the asset from which income is derived does not have to be an item of the corporation,,, -, 
normal course oftrade. This is so provided that the acquisition or management ofthe 1ýroperty is, 
an 
integral part of the taxpayer's ol)erations. 79-S Sherrod 2339. 
-2 -3 
generate business income, in-espective of whether the transaction itself was a regular 
part of the corporation's bushie SS. 
796 
The distinction between business and non- bu shiess iiicorrie operated by the UDITPA 
is closely related to the concept of unitary taxation. 797 Naniely, a strictly unitary 
definition of business leaves proceeds from passive investment outside the group tax 
base. That is a natural implication, as those items of Mcome do not derive from the 
group's trade activity. As explained iii chapter 6, it is doubtful whether a strict 
unitary approach would be an optimal solutiou for the EIM. Rather, it seems that an 
ownership- based test for group entitlei-neilt, coupled with sonie anti-abuse terms, 
would be easier to adopt. 798 
In. light of this, the exclusion of non-business income fi-om the tax base could create 
more. complexity than provide solutions. Thus, leaving non-business incon-le outside 
the group tax base and FA would result in subjecting a good Dumber of items to 
separate accounting source/residence rules. This would necessitate that transfer 
pricHigy rules be retained extensively in the system. Further, the group taxatioll 
scheme will be deprived of a number of opportunities to receive loss relief. 
799 
On the other hand, lin-liting the tax base of aji ow iiership- based group to solely 
business income could contribute to moi-e accuracy of the final tax liability. As 
explained in chapter 6,80') apportioning a gi-oup tax base which extends beyond the 
contours of a single business inevitably leads to distortion. 
8')' Yet, if only business 
income is incorporated in the tax base, a certain degree of coherence could be 
possible to attain among the amounts apportioned. Still though, an attempt to draw 
the distinction between business and non-busmess incon-le could prove a difficult 
exercise. The taxpayers would encounter sllyiilar problems to those of defining a 
796 
Ibid. 
797 For the concept of unitary tavation, see Chapter 6, P,, rt A, Sccljon Ill. 798 WG Doc 3 on Group Taxation paras 5-9; WG Doc 4 oii Group Taxation paras 13-14. 7 99 Russo 13, 
'soo Chapter 6, Part B, Section 1. 
unitary business. 802 Thus, if a unitary definition for group membership Is rejected 
due to its legal uncertainty, limiting the group tax base to business income does not 
appear a justified policy choice. 
A consequence of deterni-iiiing group men-ibership primarily fl-wouggh ownership tests 
is that, in principle, all transactions and payments can be entitled to Inckision in the 
scheme. This is because no consideration of business unity is part of the picture here. 
The Europem Commission has expressed its position on thýs matter iii the context of 
the debate on the CCCTB. 803 hi aii attempt to build the group tax base as widely as 
possible, the Corrimission seems to be in favour of inakii-ig passive ulcome part of 
the apportiolullent. 804 
11. The Categories of Transactions and Payments 
(i) Trading Transactions 
hitra-group trading transactions deal with sales of goods or services among group Zý -I- - 
members. Pursuw-it to rules on separate acCOLIIItiIIg, they constitute wi expense to the 
reciplent entity and an item of reVeDUe to the seller. Inteniational Tax rules normally 
render the sel-ler fiable to tax m the Membei- State of its tax residence, unless services 
are physically 805 provided at the reciplent's residence. This last situation is limited to 
"' W Hellerstem (1982) 158-, it was stated in Mobil and then repeated in Tý-xxml' 'tile 11"OlPill Of 
apportionalitv in thefield (? f state Income taxation is the imitary-biminess principle'. 802 
803 
For the various definitions of a unitary business, see: Chapter 6, Part A, Section 
Ill. 
Pie distinction between business and non-busiiiess income is relevant to Lill group taxation 
svstems. 'Merefore, the fact that the Con-u-nission expressed its view in connection with the 
CCCTB is 
of no practical significaiwe. 
804 Conirrýssion (EQ, 'Aii overview of the main issues that emerged at the third meeting of the 
sub, group on international aspects (SG 4)' (Working Document) CCCTB\NVP\049\(--Ioc, 
23 November 
1006,7 (hereinafter WG Doe 4 on Int'l Aspects). 
805 Weiner (2005) 32. 
L)7 
cases of PE presence, where a DTC is in place between the respective jurisdictions. 
In the absence of a DTC and provided that there is no PE presence, a withholding 
tax would nori-rially be applied at source. 
1. The Elimination of Intra-Group Transactions 
Sclienies of consolidatioi-i treating the group as a single entity normally also provide 
for the elimination, of intra-group transactions. This is denionstrated In national 
group taxation systeii-is applying consolidation. In Australia, intra-group transactions 
are ignored, as the assets and liabilities of each etitity are sin-1ply attributed to the 
head group company. 806 There is thus no iieed, unlike iiiost other countries, to keep I 
track of the cost of the shares or iiiterest in subsidiary iiienibers while they remain in 
the consolidated group. 807 When an entity leaves the group, the Current cost of the 
assets of the leavi-iig eiiti. ty less its liabilities is 'Pushed up' to the shares in the 
company. 808 In Spain, elimination applies but, once elimmated imoine is realised 
with third pat-ties, it is restored to the consolidated result. '()" Equally, inter-conipany 
items are adjusted, at entity level, to achieve single entity treatment in the USA. That 
involves the elin-thiation of dividends and an adjUStIllellt Of 111ter-COH-1pally sales 
which are deferred until realised Outside the group. 810 
A numbei- of options on how to hi'lplenient tl e Imunation of intra-group 
transactions are open to tax adinimstratiows. " 1 Depeiidýig on the path taken, there 
are certain implications mainly related to the treatinent of eliminated profits/losses 
once those are realised by a third party or the entity leaves the group. In that case, 
h8 06 O'Donnel and Spence in IFA CaIiiers 134; (; reenivoods and Freehill-ý (; mdc to'lax 
Consolidation 
fior Corporate Grouj)s in Australia (Greenwoods and FreehIlls Pty Ltd, 2005) 
<h tt I-) - //www. green woods andfreehi 11 s. conVs pb42 ") 9 accessed 
I August'2007. 
807 1 bi'd 12. 
SOS [bid. 
809 Grau Ruiz in IFA Cahiers 6222-623. 
SI Sparagna in fFA Cal-ilers 718. 
s1WG Doc 2 on Group Tax ation. paras 13 - 15. 
2'-')'S 
the ell. minated intra-group reSLIIts have to be recaptured wid added back to tile tax 
base. " 2 
The Working q-roup on the CCCTB has explored ways of dealing with inter- 
on is S c -lpany relations. Initially, two options were Put forward for d cu, sioii: intra- 
"14 
group payments may either be. disregarded coryipletely or recorded at C()St., ) The 
choice between the two basically involves a decision between rendering intra-group 
trail sactions iDvisible in the group tax base and allowHilg them to appear at cost 
value. Later on, a third. option was added for discussion: to record the intemal 
transfer price with eliniiiiation of intemal profits/losses. 8 15 However, it was finally 
concluded that no obligatiOn. should be placed oil groups to price their iliternal 
transactions at ann's length. SJ6 This is because the amount of profit or loss on which Z7ý 
the transfer price impacts is elindnated. 
Ignoring the intra-group transactions would contribute to S1111pliCity, SiFICe thLit 
would escape the need to devise a common definition Of CoSt. 
817 Further, the cost of 
transactions would have to be computed On art on-going basis, which does not seem 
to make a huge difference froni adjusting to arm's length. That would certainly 
require extra effort Hi the field Of compliance. In addition, it would bring hack some 
transfer pricing concerns, being one of the targeted areas mider the EC group Z-- Z7 
taxation initiative. On the flip side, the drawback Of this approach is that it does not 
allow a payinents' 'trail"ý" to be retained at group level. Still though, this is ITIOSt 
likely to be kept in the accounts of each participathig group entity. 
'19 By implication, 
in the event of a need to check those results, it would ý-i pruiciple be possible. 
I 
812 WG Doc 4 on Group Taxation paras 37-39. 
813 WG Doc I on Group Taxation p,, T,, ts 8-9. 
814 Ibid. 
815 WG Doc 2 on Group Taxation I)ara 15. 
816 WG Doc 4 on Group Taxation para 33. 
"' ibid para 34. 
81 8 ibid para 38 et seq. 
819 ibid para 38. 
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The bottom line in the atx)ve discussion is that there is no Perfect path in eliminating 
hitra-gyroup transactions. There are advantages and weaknesses on N)th sides. In 
such cases. a decisioli is often taken throUgh assessing external factors. For instance, 
given the unanin-ýity rule, the Member States may just opt for the solution on wlUch 
there is agreement. 
2. The Treatment of Losses 
Cross-border --intra-group losses are relieved throLigh the cmisolidation/pooling of the 
group members' individual results. Apart frorn this aspect, however. the treatmem of 
losses also becoi-nes an issue for consideration in a nuinber of other cases. 
The Working Group on the CCCTB has identified certain fields related to losses 
which require specific regUlation. 820 The first area concei-iis pre-acquisition losses. 
There seems to be agreement that those should be coii-Tensated with the part of the 
CCCTB attributed to the respective group member. This is roughly the principle 
shared by ii-iost riatiorial group taxation systems, applyirig consolidation/pooling. ' 
The ren-iaiiiii-ig three cases involve losses incurred by the group. Those shoLild in 
priiiciple remain at group level and not be shared by the individUal IIICIIIber, ý. Tile 
experts sitting in, the, Working Gi-()Lip were divided as regards the treatment of a loss- 
making group which termmates. Some, favoured attribution to the parent while 
others (ammig which the Commission) an allocation to all group members accordmU 
to the shares established in the last FA. '2' Fitially, agreement was reached that, 
within a loss-ýicurring CCCTB group, 1eavers' should not be entitled to relief for 
part of the losses. TI-tis is iii line with the thiý-tking that the agroup should be treated as 4- 
a sliVale e. Iltity. 823 
'20 WG Doc 4 on Group Taxation paras -11-25. 82 1 Austria, Denmark, France, Luxemtvurg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain: scc Endres 350-35 1. M 
dos Prazeres Lousa, 'Report on Group Taxation in Portugal' iýn IFA (ed), Cahlers de drolt. 11'scal 
international vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 547,555. 
WG Doc 4 on Group Taxation para 2-5. 
ibid para 24. 
. 240 
The above input produced as part of the work on the CCCTB is also valid for HSV 24 
as, well as any group taxation project envJsa,, (=Jng the creatIon of a single group tax 
base. 
Transfers of Capital Assets 
Transfers of capital assets broadly give rise to issues similar to those arisingy in 
trading transactions. Again, the Working Group for the CCCTB has produced 47 
interesting thoughts 825 relevant to any EC-wide groul3 taxation of 
consolidation/pooling. 
The treatment of underlying capital gains has been spotted as an area giving rise to 
tax avoidance concerns. In internal transfers, capital oains are eliniMated throuL111 
consolidation. 826 The question is whether this gaiii should be taxed when the entity 
which received the asset leaves the group Or the group terininates. 
127 11, the evelit Of 
a transfer of shares, a participation exemptioji inay apply, in whicli case the traiisfer 
is left untaxed. In , such a context, there is a risk of 
tax abuse Consisting Of 
transferrinc, assets tax-free to a group entity which soon leaves the (Troup. If that is a 
result of a sale of shares, participation exemptiou in principle allows the underlying 
capital gains to remain utitaxed. 828 The proposal put forward in the reports of the 
Working Group on the CCCTB is to treat sales of group entities as transfers of 
assets. The airn should be to escape application of a full participation exeniptiom'ý 
29 
No deffi-titive position has yet been reached on the above matter 
by the CCCTB 
Workii-ig Group. An aspect for further elaboration concerns cases of transfers of 
S2 4 HST(Lodin and Gammie) 32. 
88 2 -5 WG Doc 3 on Group Taxation paras 13-15. WG Doc 4 on Group Taxation paras 
36-46. 
826 WG Doc 3 on Group Taxation para 14. 
827 Ibid. 
828 WG Doc 4 on Group Taxation paras 42-43. 
8 211) ibid para 43. 
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, shares to companies outside the (Troup but otherwise resident i in the EC. In light of 
the proposal that sales of group companies should qualify as asset disposals, fliere 
could be a ri. sk of infringing the prohibition to impose exit taxcs. 130 This would thus 
be so if capital gains tax became due, upon the transfer. 
By way of an additional point, the Coinii-ýssion has highlighted the need to record 
"I assets on each group entity's accounts at their tax depreciated value. "' The aim is to 
ensure that, upon a transfer to a non-group member, the value of an asset is correctly 
depicted in the accounts. 83 2 This appears a necessary process to allow control over 
depreciation and prevent double depreciation. 
(iii) Payments of Dividends, Royalties and Interest 
Eliminating intra-group payments of dividends, royalties and iiiterest miplies that the 
respective provisions of the DTCs in force will not be applicable. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, this SlIOLIld not give rise to particular complexities in view of 
the priliciple of supremacy of EC Law. 
If the Meniber States opt for keepi-ng passive 111COMe outside the U11-OLIJ-) tax base, a 
decision on specific allocation rule,, inay iieed. to be taken. An alternative view is to 
devise a separate inechanism for the allocation of passive income. 
S ý3 If a system of 
specific allocation is established, the EC Directi VeS"34 on dividends, interest and 
royalties could be applied. That would allow the taxpayers to n-lake use of the 
fiscal 
830 See de Last(wrie; N; for the test of equal treatment, see Chapter 1, Part A. 
ý31 WG Doc 1. on Group Taxation paras 9-10. 
", 32 [bid. 
83 ý WG Doc 4 on Int'l Aspects paras 11-12. 
834 P-S Directive art 5 (on prohibiting withholding taxes Lit the state of the subsidiarv) 
& art 40) (on 
relid'i-nethods at residence), I&R Directive art 1 (1) (on prohibiting withholding taxes at source). 
See 
also earlier in [his thesis Chapter 22, Part 
B. 
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benefits attached to their provisions. 835 In addition, this is a legal framework which 
the Member States have been fan-ifliar with for years. In that way, extra regulation 
aimed at arrai. iging for a second allocation rnethod, possibly similar to UDITPA, can 
be avoided. 
Conclusion 
Au attempt was made in this chapter to clarify the main Concepts related to inodels 
of tax base integration. It has been shown that the apportiomnent of Hicome by 
formula (FA') may only be compatible with sYsten-Ls that involve the creatimi of a 
single group base. Pius, consolidation or pooling should in principle fulfil this 
requiren-ient. 
The degree of required hart-nonisation has also been discussed. It was concluded that 
distorted effects due to double taxation can be avoided so long ýIS U1401-111 I'LlIeS fOl' 
the tax base apply within each group. That would make a proposal sucli as the HST a 
valid option to consider. -Indeed, a sing-le set of rules across the EIM, iii the form of 
the CCCTB initiative, would certainly contribute to siinplicity. However, this is not 
a conditio sine qua non to fulfil the objectives set in the EC policy documents on 
company taxation. 836 Further, diversity in tax rates does not harm the system. 
On the 
contrary, it retains an amount of tax conipetition which is necessary to 
keep the 
market in balance. 837 
83-S Both Directives provide for no withholdin4c, tax to be applied at source; further, pursuant to the 
P-S 
Directive, the taxing Member States may make a decision between applying exemption or credit 
for 
Z71 
relief at residence. I ['they choose the second option, credit should 
be given for the underlying tax. 
836 Staft'Paper Part 1. 
837 A complete unifori-nity of tax bases and rates in the EC would be 
likely to cause market distortion 
in the sense that it would favour the larger econoniie, among the 
Member Status. t, 
243 
Finally, some thought was given to the possibility of linplellielitilIg the UDITPA 
distinction of business/non-business i-11come to the EC. The outconle has beell that 
adopting this concept iri the EC would. give rise to similar problems as those related 
to defining a unitary business. In any case, this disti-iictioii is inherent in the system Cý 
of unitary taxation. Therefore, if the option of aii o wne rship- based group is taken, 
there is no point in adding con-Tlexity to the sclienie. 
) 
8, TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE GROUP 
Introduction 
In discussing a group5s territorial scope, the principal concepts which coine to the 
fore are 'water's edge' and 'worldwide' conibined reporting. Both terms were 
created and then evolved in the context of US States , corporate taxation. The 
concepts feature two different (if not opposing) ways for delineating the 
geograpl-tical scope of a unitary business. They point to one of the most debated 
matters in the field of US sub-national mcome taxes. Roughly, the conflict boils 
down to whether combined report,, should incorporate the worldwide income of a 
unitary enterprise or be limýited to income earned within the US territory. 
Iii an EC-wide group taxation system, definhigy the territorial scoj-)e vs one of the kjy Z-- 
issues. Up to now, the clear policy choice of the EC has beert for a 'water's edge' 
scheme. It has been present in all policy docuinents on group taxatiori issued sInce 
2001 
. 
838 Further, literature iii the field of EC group taxatioil does not, iii principle, 
depart from waters edge. 839 
The choice for water's edge will not be challenged in this thesis. fn this chapter, it 
will be discussed how worldwide combined reporting created tension and allowed it 
to soar in US external relations. The evems of the 1980s and 1990s are convincing 
838 Staff Paper 375, COM(2001)582 15-16-, COM('2003)726 4&1.6 et seq. 
839 See generally: HST (Lodin and Gammie) 45-46. McLure & Weiner-, Weiner (2002a)- M Levin, 
Harnimusitig Corporwe Tax bases in the EU (Prospectus for CEPS Task Force, Centre f0r European 
Policy Studies, 20022). 
245 
enough to drive EC policy away from worldwide combination. 840 It should also be 
pointed out that worldwide con-ibination is complementary with the concept of 
unitary business, which, by definition, takes no consideration of state borders. 'ý4 1 
Yet, EC group taxation should not be expected to take the form of a scheme 
priii-iarily based on unitary principle S. 842 In fight of this, worldwide combination has 
not been given credit as a policy optioi. i for the EC. 
A number of issues arise ýi rendering water's edge workable within the EIM. It all 
boils down to how EC inbound and outbound payments interact with the group 
taxation system hi place. The key complexity will feature in the cases -vvhere the 
allocation of group profit through apportionment meets separate acCOLIntingy applied 
to foreign inconie. Part A will focus on outhiiing the historical eVOlL1t1O11 Of 
worldwide combined reporting and water's edge in the US. Features 11111erelit in 
worldwide reporting which fostered conflict will also bý analysed. Part B will bring 
the discussion to the 131M. An attempt will be made to justify the policy choice of 
cwater's edge' for the EC. Further, discussion will be carried out of the US and EC Z7 
constitutional principles and market objectives with a bearing on the territorial scope 
of the group. h-i addition, the elen. -ients which are relevant to an EC group taxation 
systern of water's edge will be examined in cletail. Analysis should involve the 
consideration of rules for detern-iining which affiliated entities are entitled to 
participate in water's edge. Finally, effort will be made to reach conclusions ml 
which group schemes and revenues should be included in, or excluded from, tile 
water's edge tax base. Schemes for tream-lent of inbound and outbound payments 
within a 'water's edge' system will be given special focus. The aim should 
be to 
identify the least troubleson-le options. 
840 Se 
.e later in this chapter Part 
A. 
841 ýfjljS is because the unitary tax base, by nature, ig-jiores entity structures. 
It, rather, nicorporate',; 
inconie on the sole criterion of deriving from the single unitary enterprise. 
No other qualIfying factor 
should be met. 
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Part A: How a Territorial Definition of the 
Combined Group Evolved in the US 
When it coi-nes to the discussion of worldwide combined reporting and 'water's 
edge', the US is the only jurisdiction to explore. Thus, there is no legislative 
franiework 
-for group taxation 
in Canada or Switzerland. As a result, the 
geographical scope of the group is an unknown comept M those Jurisdictions. N 
With California at the forefront of development, combined reporting emerged from 
US State-level incoine taxatioD and evolved throughout the twentieth-century 
American history. In this Part, an outline will be given of the historical path which 
brouoht combined reporting from the 1930s to Barclavs 
ý4, 
- just before the mid- 
1990s. Special reference will be inade to the reasons which led the US State', to 
concede the 'water's edge' election. Thus, kriowledge of the background to unitary 
combination in the US is expected to provide input in making policy decisions for 
the EIM. 
1. Historical Development 
Worldwide combination evolved in parallel to unitary taxatIon Ili the twentieth 
century. 
842 The tests t' detern group membership entitlement are discussed n 
Chapter 6 of the thesis. or -fl 1111 
al test based on holdiii- percentage appears to suit the 
EC structure c7l L- lbe position taken is that a technic, 
aiid objectives better thart my other alteniativus. 
843 Barcla. vs Bmik v Fraiichise Rix Board 51-1 US. 
298,114 S. Cl- 22268 (1994) (hereinafier 
Barclav. q 
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The precursor of combination involved apportioning ti, revenu s of a . 'ingle fi ee 
operating a business which extended to more than one US State. ýý44 It thus arose out 
of the same needs which generated the concept of a unitary business. Illinois adopted 
a state railroad tax In 1872 that allocated tax liability to 'each count-v, citY or tolvil b. ), 
r&rence to the length of track within the locality coml)ared vvith the total length of 
track'. 845 That n-iethod of apportionn-ient was later extended to the newJY introduced 
state income taxes. 
The. way to coi-i-ibined reportiiie, was led by Califoriiia. The apportionment of 
combiiied incorne of a group of corporatioi-is, understood to form a Unitary 
business, 846 is a developii-ient of the 1930s. More specifically, combined reporting 
was initially proposed by the California Francl-tise Tax Board (FTB). The ann was to 
combat a practice of the n-iotion picture ii-idustry, consisting of producing films in 
Califorma alid then transferring them out of state for distribution. ý47 At aroLind the 
same time, there are reports of the first cases extending across the US border to 
incorporate affiliate foreign con-1panies. 848 
Matson Navigation'ý-'9 was the first judgment of the California Supreme Court tinder 
the Bank- and Corporatimi Franchise Tax Act. The, Court held that tax liability arose 
fi-on-1 iiicome attached to both interstate and foreign commerce, despite the absence 
of relevant reference hi the tax statute. 
850 The above Act was amended M 1939, for 
the purpose of incorporatiiig the chai-iges already in place throLtgli 
jmispi-Lideiice. It 
should be mentioned that, until the 1960s, there was no concrete view that 
worldwide combination should be the rule in determiniDg corp-oratioll 
fi-ailcllise tax 
liability. The focus was on reporting imome, fairly. The precise metliodology 
did not 
844 Carlson & Galper 5. 
845 Houghton 4-57. 
846 Carlson & Galper 5. 
847 Houghtori 457, Miller 137. 
848 Carlson & Galper 6. 
849 Matson Navigafion Co v State Board of Equalisailon S. F. No 15137 Cal Sup Ct. (1935)- 
3) Cal. 2d 
1; 43 P. 2d 805 (heremal'ter Matson Navigation). 
850 Miller 138. 
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attract much attention. 15 1 Rather, separate accounthig appears to have been the I'LlIe. 
Con-ibined reporting and the allocation of the tax base by formula were only 
employed where tax avoidance issues were raised. 852 Further, it has also been in the 
1930s that the League of Nations concluded that the FA should be rejected in faVOL11- 
of arm's length separate, accountijig. 853 zn 
11 IUS-54 I Hono 1. and Superior'5- jurisprudence i-narked a sl-tift towards combinat on. 
Briefly, the California Supren-le Court ruled that, whenever there is a unitary 
business, FA and worldwide combination stiould be applicable. '56 Worldwide 
conibi-ned reporting became the rule in calculating corporation francl-iise tax in 
California throLIglI0LIt the 1960s and 1970s. Foreign banks seem to have been the 
first area in which income derived from foreign-contro lied bLisinesses was 
considered. 857 Further, in July 1972, the above practice was institutionalised through 
the adoption, by the FTB of California, of a set of working rules for incorporating 
foreign corporations into combined reports. 858 Other US States followed later. 
Florida launched worldwide combinatioti in 1983'ý9 when controversy xvas already 
well on. 
Signs of potential conflict on worldwide combination were shown as early as the 
1970s. A 'water's ed(ye' provision, was initially agreed in the context of the US-UK 
DTC of 1975 but was then (i. e. 1978) not retained by the Senate at the ratification 
, stage. 
860 The US States experieticed pressure fi-om foreign goverimients, MNE,, and 
851 
ibid 137-138. 
852 Ibid. 
853 Houghton 457-458-, see (Yener, Ily- JM Kane, 'International Tax Treaties and 
State Taxation: Call 
the Federal Government Speak with One VoiceT (1991) 10 Virginia Tax Review 
765, C Thomas, 
L, 
'Customary International Law and State Taxation oil' Corporate Income. Uie Case 
for the Separate 
Accounting Method' (1996) 14 Berkeley Journal of International Law 99. 
854 
_, 011011,1111 ()j, Co v Franchise Tax Board S. F. No 21210 Cal Sup 
Ct (1963). 60 Cal. 2d 417,386 
R2d 40 (hereinqfter Honolulu). 
85ý' - 60 Cal. '2d 406,386 P. Superior Oil Co v I, 'ralichlse Tax Board L. A. No26672 Cal Sup 
Ct (1963). 
Id 33 (hereinafter Superior). 
8-56 Miller 139. 
857 ibid 140. 
8-58 Houghton 458. 
8S9 Ibid. 
860 
ibid 458. 
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the US Federal Goverrmient to do away with worldwide combinatimi. In litigation, 
worldwide combination was challenged as regards its compatibility with the 
constitutional clauses of Due Process and the 'dorrnant' Foreign Commerce. 
These concepts have extensively been discussed in chapter 3 of tl-ds thesis. 
The US Supreme Court was called -upon to rule on the constitutionality of 
California's worldwide reporti-fig for the first time in 1983. Container, 862 the 
taxpayer, was a US-based MNE with Subsidiaries across the US and abroad. It 
challenged the three-factor FA employed in California against its conformity to the 
Due Process and Commerce Clauses. The Court, nothig that it is often impossible to 
allocate values to territories with precision, went on to say that there is no 
constitutional requirement for a sij. igle US States' FA. It was held that FA should be 
fair and non-discri-i-ninatory. Those requirements were not found to he infi-im-yed if 
i soine income that did not have its source in the taxing State is subject to 
taxation. 
Applying J(, 1pan Line, the Court set forth arg)-timents for the purpose of proving that 
the Foreign Con-in-lerce Clause was not in breach. In considering InUltiple tLIXatIon 
risks, it was mentioned that double taxation was not inevitable. Therefoi-e, no) 
violation of one of Jaj)an Line's tests Could be Sustained. Yet, the Court refi-ained 
fi-orn adjudicating on whether the same cORCILISIOn would be reached iii the event of 
a foreign-owned MNE. 864 The matter was resolved in. Barclays ten years later. As 
regards federal untfairnity, no infringement was found. 
86-) The Court based its 
861 SC Altonian, 'Constitutional Law - Application ofCaliforni Li's 
"Worldwide Combined Reportin2 
to Compute Corporate Franchise Tax of Foreign-B&;, fd Multinational Business - Barclays Bank PLC 
v Franchise Tax Board' (1995) 29 Suffolk UnivtrsIty Law Review 11.53,1155-1156 
(hereinafter 
Altonian), SL Barone and K Zerrenner, "Over the Edge: State Taxation of Multinational 
Corporation.,; 
in the Wake of Barclays' (1995) 10 St.. John's Journal of Legal Commentary 
343,350-351-, Carlson 
& Galper 3-, DS Vvlbitmui, 'Barclays Bmik v Franchi. w J-(I-v Board (? f Calýfi)rnia: Worldwide 
COmbined Reporting Survives for State Taxation of'Multinational Enterpriscs' [ 19951 Wane Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 265,267-268 (hereinafter WI-liti-nan). 
862 Conlamer Corp. (? f Ainvrica i, Franchise Ta-i-Board 463 U. S. 159 (19833) (hcreitiqfter 
Container). 
863 ibid 170. 
864 Alton lan 11,58, Whitman 270. 
86-S Altonian 1160. WI-ii[man 270. 
250 
thinking on two grounds: 0) there was no implication of the country's foreign 
relations, and (Ji) there was no indication of a federal policy against the use of FA. 
hi the afteruiath of Container, US President Reagan did not file a motion for 
rehearing. Instead, lie forn-ied a Worki-ng Group, comprising federal and state 
government representatives as well as members of the business community. The 
aiý-. n was to reach agreen-lent on restricting the application of worldwide combiiiation. 
867 However, the attempt turned out unsuccessful, which led the UK to threaten 
retaliatory measures in 1985 . 
86' As a consequence, some states passed 'water's edge' 
legislation. 869 
The situation escalated m 1993 when the UK announced retaliatory measures a(Tamst 
US-based con-ipanies active in the UK. The clash was prevented, as California 
reformed its 'water's edge' election, already in force since 1986.8 A) No fee was 
required any longer for tax years beginning on, or after, I" Jaimary 1994. The filmL, 
of a doinestic disclosure spreadsheet was also abolished. 17 1A year later, the US 
Supreine Court ruled on the constitutionality of California's worldwide combmatimi 
iii Barclays. 
The case coricerned a UK-based parent , vith US , Ltbsidiai-je,.,, treated as a unitary 
business for California franchise tax PLIll-)OSCS. ý_"' The system was a(wain, found to be Z7 
in conformity with the Due Process and Comn-lerce Clauses. The Court produced an 
interesting reasoning- on multiple international taxation which was the outcome of 
applying FA. It was held that separate accounthig does not, in principle, offer any 
better guarantee for elii-i-ýnating (or lessening) ii-lultiple taxation. Further, the 
Court 
866 Houghton 458. Z7, 967 Ibid. 
'6' 
Ibid 458-459. 869 See generally for individual States policies: Houghton 463 et seq. 870 
ibid 459. 871 Ibid. 
872 See generally T Sullivall, 'The Future of State Unitary Taxation of 
Fore,. (-Tn-O\, viied US 
Subsidiaries After Barclays Batik PLC )? Franchise T(Lv Board' (1995) 28 George Washiligton 
Journal ofInternatlonal Law & Econonucs 691. 
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saw no reason why foreign-owned MNEs should be treated differently from 
domestic ones as regards multiple taxation risks. It was asserted that, in tx)tll cases, 
double taxatiort depends oil the facts of each individual case. The COUrt also dealt 
with the test of federal uniformity in-ipairment contained in Japan Line. Use was 
made of the concept of the 'dormant' Comn-lerce GaLlSe. The Court accepted that 
worldwide corribination had implicated the US foreign relations but held that there 
had been a passive acquiescence in that practice. 873 Thus, abstention from taking 
action to do away with the practice was found to hidicate an implicit pernussion. 
Colgate, S74 a case which was decided by the US Supreme Court in a consolidated 
action with. Barclays, 875 atten-ipted to establish that there had beeii a clear federal 
policy against altowing, worldwide combined reportimy. Yet, the Court's reaction to Z-- 
this was that the power to regulate foreign commerce rests with the Congress and not 
with Oie Executive. 870 
ft. The Post-Barclays State of Affairs 
The Judgment in Barclays was followed by litigation generated in the US States 
applying the 'water's edge'. ' 77 The question,,, raised often Uivolve the validity of 
such systems under the Foreigi-i Commerce and Due Pivccss Clauses. Ground for 
challenge has Usually been the incorporation of foreign dividends into *water's edge' 
reports wNIst the foreign payers' factors remain. absent from the FA. 
878 
L- 
873 Altoniaii 1160-, Whitman 273-274. 
874 (704, aw-Palinolivc Co., Inc. v Franchise lav Board 284 CAL RPTR 
780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)-. 
L 831 P. '2d 798 (Cal, 1992)- 13 CAL. RPTR 2d 761 (Cal. Ct. App. t992), rev ew 
den ed. 
875 11, Colgate, the US Supreme Court initially denied rtvitw but, f ollowing a petition by both 
Colgate and Barcla , 
y. ý, gralited certiorari in a consolidated action. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994). 
876 Barcla vs ? 285. 
177 For details, sccý JH Peters, 'The water's edge Combined Report Method: A 
Troublesome Concept, 
(200 1) -13 
Tax Notes In Il 1305 (hereinafter Peters). 
87 1, ý ibid 1-3 306 et seq. 
-152 
Tile US States did not, in principle, react to Barclm. ys by switchiiig back to 
worldwide con-ibinatiom 879 It should be noted, though, that the work of the 
Multistate Tax Commissimi (MTC)88) reveals an intention to return to more 
expansive unitary filings. 881 More specifically, a uniformity proposal for a Model 
Con-ibiiied Reporting Statute was passed by Resolutioii of the MTC (m 176' August 
2006. SS2 Section 5. A. lists which ii-iembers of a unitary group shall be part of the 
combined report if a 'water's edge' electioii is made. Details will be givell under 
Title 11 of Part B of th-is chapter. Yet, it should be noted, at this stage, that tile 
proposal is for a broad definition of 'water's edge'. For instance, when it comes to 
unitary members incorporated outside the US, the combined group is not fin'Uted to 
income derived fron-i a PE of the above rneii-ibers located in the US. Rather, tile 
contours of the (Troup extend to all unitary iticon-le generated in, or attributed to, 
so rce" withi tj US. 883 u 11 le That is, nan-iely, irrespective of the existence of a PE. 
111. Comments on the Conflict Generated by Worldwide 
Combination 
Worldwide coji-ibmatioDin the US has beeii a creatioti inextricably linked to unitary 
taxation. In that context, each eligible State is allocated a portion of a business' 
overall. revenue, for the purrx)se of cliargiii, () tax. The overall revenue (i. e. LYI'0LIP tax 
base) is coinputed according to principles of unitary taxation wl-dcli aim at retainill'ur 
the unity of business. This is because the fi-aginentation of a single business distorts 
879 ZE Husain, 'Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board of California- Does the Application of 
Worldwide Unitary T, m-ition to Non-US Parent Corporate Groups Violate the Con-inierce Clause'. )' 
(1995) 18 Fordham International Law Journal 1475,1524ý 
880 Hotiah ton 46 1. 
ibid 457. for details on the works of the MTC, see. ibid 460 et scq. 
882 Multistate Tax Commission. Proposed Model Stanne. for Combuied Repormig, Lis approved by thu 
MTC Executive Comrluttcr- I'or Bylaw 7 Survey, _2 I June 2005 (hereinafter NITC 
Model. ). 
883 
ibids5. A-iv- 
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the outcome of tax base allocation. 884 Worldwide combined reporting is an outcome 
of the above practice. It is namely part of the method Used to arrive at the Unitary tax 
base. 'Water's edge', on the other hand, retains only the part of a sillLyle business 
attachinu, to a delineated territory. Therefore, as a point of principle, it compromises 4-- 
business unity. Yet, a number of reasons necessitated departure from worldwide 
combination in the US. In the discussion below, an attempt will be n-lade to identify 
them. 
Two words seem to incorporate all rationale behind the controversy which 
worldwide combination gave rise to: Wgher costs. Op )sition to this state practice P( 
can-ie fi-oi,, -ii d-tree different groups of interest: MNEs, the US federal goverm-new and 
881ý foreign govermuents. '- The reasons which incited reactimi were strai. ahtforward. 
MNEs did not wish to endure h1ohier taxes and corripliance costs than under as stem tr y 
of traditional international tax r-uIeS Of SO LII'Ce/1'e side nce. The US federal governi-nent 
was concenied that iiivestnient may be driven out of the country due to worldwide 
combination actim-T as a disincentive. Further, foreign states exerted pressure on the 
US federal goven. iment fii support of their con-ipanies' exporting finanýial interests. 
One of the key iiegative aspects of worldwide combMation M the US is that it cmises 
double taxation. SItUations which lead to double taxatimi are: (i) the tax base overlal-) 
and (ii) the differences in profitability among jurisdictimis which have taxMg, rights 
over members of the (worldwide) unitary group. 886 
By way of Mitial comment, it should be noted that both the above factors caushig 
double taxation are also present in 'water's edge' schemes. Narnely, each US State 
determines its taxable share individually. There are no unifoni-. 1 rules for tax base 
composition. What's more, each State makes use of its owDversiOn of FA. Under 
such circumstw-ices, a tax base overlap is inevitable. Yet, the differences an-iong state 
rules are not huge. This is partly because the federal tax base and the 'Massachusetts 
See generallY: McLure (1984), 
8z , Houghton 458 et seLl. lý 
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Formula' for apportionment constitute common starting points for taxation. By 
contrast, in a worldwide framework (i. e. US and foreign unitary members, ), 
disparities in fiscal systenrs are significant. Further, profitability gaps are expected to 
be iiiuch sharper in a global context than domestically. All this renders double 
taxation severe under a worldwide combination structure. 887 
Profitability differences, as a cause of double taxation, require some further 
explanation. Foreign corporations are, by average, more profitable than US-resident zn 
men-lbers of a unitary business. 888 That is expressed by a lugher ratio of income to 
apportionment factors for overseas unitary members, as compared to US-resident 
olles. 889 The result is that the US States attract, upon apportionnient, a lal-(-, er portion 
of the combined group base than they would under 'water's edge'. That is because, 
due to 1-tigher returns in certai-a parts of the Linitary bLUSiReSS, hicon-le grow's whereas 
the factors rei-nain stable in the FA. Therefore, within a sclieme of wol-Idwide 
combination, Jurisdictions of lower profitability benefit from the results of higher- 
profitability states., In practice, part of the incoine eanied by foreign inembers of the 
unitary group becomes taxable within the US, which equals extraterritorial 
taxation. 890 
Complex adn-unistrative con-ipliance obligations are another considerable , ý()Ltrce of 
cost for non-US incorporated group members. PLirsuant to the MTC Model, 
"' those 
members are required to adjust their Profit and Loss Statement, so that it conforms 
to the accounting principles generally accepted in the US. Further, adjustments shall 
also be rnade to the Profit wid Loss Statement to bring it in line with tax accounting 
standards required by the State Tax Code. Income apportioned to each US State shall 
be translated in. US Dollars. Finally, the Profit and I-k)ss Statement as well as the FA 
886 JR Hellerstem (1993) 415. 
887 As re! ýards tax base overlap, in ])articular, It should be meiitioned that differences in the elements I 
of tax ba, -der may also lead to leaving items untaxed (i. c. double non- " ses oil the two sides of the 
boi 
taxation). 
8" Carlson & GAper 24. 
889 ibid, Houghton 459. 
"0 Carlson & Galper 24-25. 
891 s3. C'. 1)(A)-(E). 11.0 
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factors of each group n-iember shall be translated into the currency in which the 
parent company maintaiiis its books and records. 
The above identified costs point to additional charges which place groups 
incorporating foreign-based men-ibers at a disadvantage, as conipared to purely 
domestic ones. As mentioned in Section I above, though, worldwide combinatimi 
was not held discriii-ii-natory by the US Supreme Court. Rather, it was found to be in 
conforn-iity to the Foreign Con-m-ierce and Due Process Clauses. It is true that firms 
competing in the same industry ii-iay be subject to different levels of tax, depeiidmg 
on the geographical contours of the group. This Should, however, be an expected 
outcoii-ie, as it reflects al-OLIgh approximation being inherent in tax base allocation 
through FA. 892 
Part B: A Policy Choice for the EIM 
1. Water's edo-e for the EC t) 
This Section discusses the rationale beh-ind the policy choice of 'water's edge' for 
definhig the territorial scope of an EC-wide group. 893 
S()) Carlson & Galper -14-25-, Houghton 459. 
, S()3 S Cnossen, 'Reform wid Ccx-)rdmation of Corporation Taxes in the European Union: all 
Altemative Agenda' (2004) 34 Tax Notes Intemational (Special Supplement) 1327,1346, Gammie 
and M Levin, An EU Compaiiy ivithout an (2001) 240-241 *, Hellerstein & McLure 92-94; K Laiinc)o C 
EJI Tax"' A C'Orporaie T(Ly Action Plan For Advancitig the Lishon Process (Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2002) 23*, McLure & Weiner, Mntz (2002) 7, Weiner (2002a), idem (2005) 34-37. 
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Worldwide combination in the US has largely been the outcome of constraints 
placed by the US CO IIStitution. 894 Briefly, unitary taxation was shaped to allow the 
US States to remain iii conforn-ifty with the Commerce and Due Process Clauses 
when charging corporate taxes on activities across their borders. The global 
din-iension of combined reporting has then been a necessity for computing unitary 
income, as this is, by nature, con-iputed without reference to territorial fi-ontiers. 195 
Rather, the maintenance of busii-tess integrity is the primary objective. Finally, the 
concession of a 'water's edge' election has been an outcome of political pressure 
and not ail effort to comply with principle. 
The EIM has been structured to serve different principles and objectives, which are 
mainly derived from the EC Freedoms and the vision for a sinule market. The 
constitutional fi-arnework relevant to taxes is set by the Treaty of tile Europeall 
Community. In that context, firnitations to Member States' sovereignty iii tax 
matters are placed by iioii-discriii-iiiiatioii/iion-i-estrictioiI 896 as well as the long-term 
objectives for a Simyle Market. 897 As discussed earlier, 898 there i,, a vital difference 
between the above two guiding principles. Infi-ingei-nent of the former provides legal 
growid to bring aii action before the Court899 whereas the latter is uot, as such, 
enforceable, as it is not contaiiied in provisions with direct effect. New legislatimi ZN 
normally aims at contributing to both the above principles. 
The fact that worldwide con-ibination gave rise to conflict and caused tension to US 
commercial relations. suffices to justify the clear choice for ýwater's edge' in the EC. 
894 For a discussion of this, see in this chapter Part A. 
89-5 See generally McLure (1984). 
896 See Chapter 1, Part A, Section 11 for a detailed analysi,; of how discrinunation/restriction ha%, 7e 
been Hiterprcted by the ECJ. 
897 See Chapter 4, Part B, Section 11, Title 1. 
8*98 See Chapter 4, Part B, Section 1. 
899 Actions can be brought, before the national courts, against dornestic law which is in breach of the L- C- EC Treaty. Standing shall be determined by virtue ofthe national rules ofAdi-runistrative Procedure. 
In this cýtse, the ECJ may have only indirect involvement through a reference for preliminary ruling 
(TEC art 234). 111 the same context, an alternative 
is to initiate infrincTement procecdings through an 
action wilich is brouglit directly before the ECJ. In that case, standing is only given to other 
Member 
States (TEC art 227) or the Con-imission (TEC Cirt 226). See: Craig & De BOrca on prelimijiTy 
rulings and eiii'orcement actions against 
Member States. 
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Further, if this option is also evaluated by reference to principle, it appears that there 
are some points that justify it. 
PUSUant to the Conclusions reached on flie entitlei-nent to group membersliip in 
Chapter 6 above, the EC group taxation scheme should not incorporate pi-Irnarily 
unitary features. 90') Rather, the test shall be a technical ownership-oriented one. It 
follows that worldwide combination, originally devised to allow tile accurate 
computation of the unitarY tax base, may now ren-min absent from the system. A test 
of entitlement to group n-len-ibership based on ownership is in principle compatible 
with 'water's edge'. As regards the risk of distortion or tax avoidance, due to the 
exclusion of third-country affiliates from the FA, it remains the saIlle as under a 
worldwide group. This is because the above risks are directly related to the rules for 
deteniiining group men-lbership9()l and not its geographical scope. Z-- 
Another reason for giving EC group taxatimi a territorial scope limited to '\vater's 
edge' touches upon the fact that the EC is a lot less tolerant to double taxation than 
the US. 902 The latter Linderstands market efficiency to be primarily attached to tax 
competition and de-j-egulation rather thaii to harn. -ionisation . 
903 As a i-esLilt, double 
taxation is, not regarded as a distorting factor which ShOLIId necessarily be 
elin-ýinated. By contrast, the EC seems to seek attainment of inal-ket efficiellcy 
tl-u-ou(-Yli neutral treatinent and liai-ii-loi-Lisatioii/appi-oxiiiiatioii of laws. 9()4 Thus, the Zý 
elimination of double taxation is one of the long-term objectives envisaged foi- the 
EIM. A harmonised EC group taxation systen-i would suffer severe double taxation if 
it acco mmo dated a global dimen Sioll. 905 put mother way, the EC share of group 
revenues, coinputed, in a global context, pursuant to EC con-u-non rules, would not 
9')') Set Chapter 6, Part B, Sect]on 11. 
90, Set Chapter 6, Part A. 
902 Elimination ofdouble taxation is one of the EC Treaty objectives for the EIA stc TEC art 293. 
903 See Chapter 4, Part A. 
904 Ibid. 
Iii the legal framework ofthe EC, there is no constitutional principle equIvdent to the Commerce 
or Due Process Clauses. Those are understood to redu(ý, e the occurrence of tax base overlap which 
causes double taxation. Read: Bittker 8--336 - 8-37, Moore 1450-145 1. 
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cause any tax base overlap. However, taxpayers Would, in effect, be charged double 
taxes, as a result of their tax liability in third countries which host group members. 
11. Tests for Determining Participation in 'water's edge Z: ) 
This section will discuss rules for detenuming which 'affiliated entities 906 should be 
treated as part of the 'water's edge' consolidated group. 
(i) The USA 
In the US, there is no uniform State legislation oll t1liS. 
907 However, over the last 
years efforts have been inade through the work of the Multistate Tax Con-mussion 
(MTC)9()' to achieve soine ainount of uniformity. In that comext, the MTC Model"')(' 
deals with the 'water's edge' election and provides a list of qualifyin, (, i Linitary 
members. The followino entities liave been identified as eligible for a 'waters edgge' 
electiol-1: 
(1) those ii-icorporated in the US or formed under tlie laws of any State, the D. C. or 
any territory or possession,, 
(ii) those with an average of FA factors within the US of 20 percent or More, 
(iii. ) those of the specific corporate types of doi-iiestic fi. itemational sales corporations 
or foreign sales or export trade corporatimis, 
(Iv) those not falling within any of the above categories should report their part of 
income derived from, or attributable to, US sources, 
006 , Affiliated' are those entities whfch fulfil the requirements for group membership but may not be 
admitted to the EC-wide group due to being incorporated/tax resident outside the contours of' 'water's 
edge'. 907 Houghton 463 et secl. 
')0' JR Hellersttin (1993) 411-412, Weiner (1999) 11. 
()09 s5. A. MTC Model. 
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(v) those that earn more than 20 percent of their revenues from business with other 
combined group members 6. e. revenues being, for the other group memhcrs, 
deductible business expenses)-, 
(, vi) Controlled Foreign Companies (CFCs); 
(vii) those doing business in a tax haven (subject to exception,, -, ). 
The above delineatioii of 'water's edge' entitlement points to a broad scope of tile 
concept. The systern goes beyond the territorial limit of the US. The purpose is to 
tackle tax avoidance or address issues that relate to the concept of a Lmitary business. 
As regards tax avoidance, the ai. m is to discourage practices of artificial shiftinc, of 
income beyond the 'water's edge. To this end, provisions have been incorporated 
on CFCs and on affiliated entities doing business in tax haven. s. Furtlier, point (v) 
above is an attempt to cancel possible benefits fi-on-i driving business 1'eVeIILIeS Out of 
'water's edge' ti-n-ough over-priced inter-company char(yes. Zýý 
The scheme manifests an effort to keep distortion arising from fi-a-o tile nt In u the 
unitary business low. In that sense, the presence, in the US, of the three FA factors 
(i. e. property, payroll and sales) at 20 percent or n-iore, by average, I,, critical. The Cý 
legislator's thougl-it has possibly -been that those cases maimain so stroug a link to 
the 'water's edge' part of a unitary busi-ness that -fi-agmelitation WOUld be very 
distorting. 910 Tax avoidance may also be relevant here, as worldwide taxation in the 
US cart be escaped through incorporation abroad. 
By way of final con-iment on the MTC Model, no reference is made to PEs of non- 
US con-ipanies. This is a form of business presence wl-ficli would probably be 
included into a 'water's edge' electiori. Some coi-11111ems can be made in connectioli 
witli this. The provision incorporated is of a significantly broader construction, as it 
makes all US-source income part of 'water's edge' tax base. This memis that even a 
260 
limited business presence, not an-lounting to PE, becornes taxable at sub-national 
level in the US. The above option seems to derive from the nature of a unitary 
business. It namely is not defined by reference to corporate structure but, instead, 
fl-wough substantive criteria of business activity. Thus, the use of the concept of 
4source' witnesses a material action of income generation. It may also be all 
indication that source taxation and FA, despite being different approaches to 
taxation, both serve sin-iilar needs. 9" That is namely to trace revenue and tax it in the 
jurisdiction it is attached to, regardless of institutional framework (e. g. corl-X)rate 
form of revenue beneficiary). 
(ii) The CCCTB Working Group qf the European Commissim 
The. Meinber States' view on the entitlement of affiliated entities to participate in 
water's edge' has been set out in certain of the CCCTB Working Group',, 
Docun-lents. 912 Those also contaiii the thinking of the EUropean Cominissiom 
In the mialysis of 'waters edge' so far conipleted by the Worknig GrOLIP, it appears Z7 
that more attention has been given to clarifyingo, which iterns of income SIIOLIld be 
part of the group, tax base. RLIIeS for determining which affiliated entities fall withill 
4 
water's edge' may only be derived indirectly from the availabte working 
documents. 
91" Tl-Us reflects the importance of business integrity in unitary taxation as- well as the fcact that a 
unitary definition of the group is by nature not limited by jurisdictional contours: Dexter 328-. 
McIntyre (2004) 917 et seq. 
911 McIntyre (2004) 924, 
912 Comimssion (EQ, 'The Territorial Scope of the CCCTB' (Workim! Document) 
CCCTB\WP\O'-)6\doc, 17 February 2006 (hereinafter WG Doc on Territorial Scope), idern -An 
overview of the main issues that emer-ed at the first meeting of the subgroup on international 
aspects' (Working Document) CCCTB\NVP\029\doc, 2 March'2006 (hereltlafter WG Doc2 on Int'l 
Aspects); idern 'An overview of the main issue.,, that emerged at the second meeting of [lie subgroup 
on in tern ational aspects (SG 4Y (Working Document) CCCTB\WP\033\doc, 24 May 
2006 
(hereinqfter WC; Doc 3 on Int'l Aspects), WG Doc 4 on Int'l. Aspects, WG Doc 2 on Group Taxation. 
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Tax residence is the basic test in place, for the purpose of identifying. aniong 
913 affiliated entities, those being part of 'water's edge'. Further, use is made of the 
term PE. 9 14 Both the above concepts are in principle connected with arm's length 
separate accounting. One issue raised hi this regard is whether Men-lber States 
should be allowed to retain their existing definitions of tax residence9l" and PE-9'6 
The alternative would be to enact cornmon rules. The aim would be to discourage 
distortion of investment decisions, due to disparities In definitions. Should con-inion 
rules be found necessary, the OECD Model could be a good starting point. 917 
No further elaboration mi the above matters is contained in the CCCTB WG 
documents issued so far. As, however, this is an ongoing process, new input should 
be expected i-n this field. 
(iii) Commentary 
The main test for a 'water's edge' clection under the US MTC Model is the place Of 
incorporation (and law of formation). In the EC Working, DocLiments, there is use Of 
the terms 'residence' and TF. The principal reason for this divergence probably 
relatcs to the US test for worldwide taxation, being iiationality instead of tax 
resideiice. Domestic corporations in the US are those formed Linder the law,; of one 
of the States, 9 without any additional criterion applying. 
Furtlier, the US systeni is construed a lot more broadly dian the EC one, as it attracts 
all revenues sourced within the US territory. By coDtrast, the EC Member States 
envisage laying down a i-ni-nim-uni requirement of PE presence within the EIM. L- 
913 it. 11d paris II et seq. -, WG Doc on Territorial Scope. 
914 In considering a NAFTA-wide ý; ystern of group taxation, MCI]ItýTe doubts about whether the 
concept. of PE will continue to be a minimurn physical presence for Lixation. McIntyre 
(2004) 780. 
WG Doc 2 on Int'l Aspects paras 16-17, 
')t6 
ibid paras 18-21. 
917 
ibid p(ara 19. 
QIS Y Brauner, 'EU and Third Countries: Direct Taxation - The United State,; Report' (Conference 
'The EU and Third Countries Direct. Taxation', P- 14 October 2006). 
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Some of the tax avoidance provision,, of the US MTC Model could be worth 
considering for the EC. In relation to CFCs and Tax Havens, it appears more Z: 7 
practical to leave those cases out of the group system and allow the Men-lber States 
to continue applying their domestic legislation. In particular, CFCs involve con-iplex 
sets of rules i. n most cases. Mak4ig thern part of a 'water's edge' (Yroup would 
require that comn-ion rules be enacted, which would add coi-ilplexity to the system. 
Indeed, the system would not suffer a con-iprornise if CFC rules remaiýned 
decentralised. The san-le is true for tax havens. This is because, in these areas, son-le 
amount of coordination of doii-lestic practice already exists at global level through 
guidelines issued by international orgaiiisations. 9'9 
111. Ttie EIM: Delineating the Contours of the Group 
II 1. Identýfting the Payers- and Payees 
Defining a 'water's edge' group presupposes that the source and destination of 
inflows and outflows are respectively identified. The following payers Or payees, as 
the case rnay be, are relevant: 
919 The OECD has embarked on a long-term project against harniful tax competition, which also 
involved drawing a list of uncooperative tax heavens- OECD (ed), Ha"'nful 'I(I_x- 
Conipetition: An 
Ernvqing Global Issue (OECD, Paris 1998)-, OECD (ed), The 0LCUs Proleci on [Monflil I'ax 
Practices: The 2001 Progress Report (Paris, OECD 2001), OECD (ed), The OECD's ProJect. on 
Harnýful T(Lv Practices: Hie 2004 Progress Report (Paris, OECD 2004)-, OECD (ed), The 0ECD's 
oý, 11 Project on IM. r1plul Tav Practices: 2006 Update on Pr gress in Member Cottmr'es 
(Paris, OECD 
2006). In the context ofthe EC, the Primarolo Group was entrusted with the task to identify 
harmful 
tax features in the business taxation provisions of the Member States. The Report, delivered in 
1999, 
is referred to as the Code of Conduct: Council (EQ, 'Code of Conduct (Business 
Taxation)' (Report) 
SN 4901/99,23 November 1999. On CFCs, . see. OECD 
(ed), Cowrollcel I"oreign Company 
Legislation n Stn(fies in 7-tivallon of Foreign Source Income (OECD, Paris 1996). 
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III coll"ectiorl with entities set up in a third country 
920: 
(i) affiliated entities, which do not take part in the ýwater's edgye' group because, 
being resident in a t4ird country, they fall outside its territorial scope; 
(ii) third-country- located PEs of 'waters edge' affiliated entities, insofar as the 
group taxation rules provide that the PEs should be incorporated into the group-, and 
(iii. ) third-country resident non-affiliated entities. 
Within the EC: 
(iv) non-affiliated entities resident anywhere in the EC-, 
(v) EC-located PEs of affiliated entities resident in a third country, and 
(vi) if eii-hanced cooperatio 11 921 is in place, affiliated entities or PEs residem iii 
Member States which do not participate in the EC group scheme. :n 
2. Defining the Contours of*EC-Wide Groups 
A series of case studies will be set out below. Those have been sliziped to 
den-ionstrate the complexities caused by flows of revenue MtO, Ol- OLIt Of, the ýkvater's 
edge' consolidated gl'OLII'). 
In deciding on the territorial width of the group tax base, trading proceeds alld 
passive inconie will be considered without distinction. In general, the challenges and 
complexities inherent iii group incorl-vi-ation or exclusion do not differ between 
business and non-business revenues. Passive iýncome in the form of dividends, 
interest and royalties, when derived fi-om non-affiliated entities resident in the EC, is 
relevant to delineating the intra-EC territorial contours of the group. -- 11, principle, 
920 T, -C I are not EC Member States. term s used ]or countries which 
921 L Cerioni, 'Tbe Possible Introduction of Common Consolidated Base Taxation via Enhanced 
Co()peration- Some Open Issues' 120061 European Taxation 187 et scq, Hellerstem & McLure 90: 
Stall'Paper 372. COM(2001)582 17, COM(2003)726 26. 
922 WG Doc 4 on MCI Aspects para 10. 
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such intra-EC flows of revenue do not set forth issues hi addition to tll()se teaturilILT 
in dealings with third COU11trieS. It Cannot be excluded that, margymally, non- 
discriiiiiiiatioii/iioii-restrictioii concerns under the EC Treaty Freedoms Could anse 
but the scope is sinall. 
(i) The Treatment of Third-Country Proceeds in the EC 
I(a). Proceeds from a Third Country: 
PE in a Third Country 
l(b). Proceeds from a Third Country: 
Dividends 
1(c). Proceeds from a Third Country: 
Interest & Royalties 
The qLiestjon arising in connection with the three scenarios above is how the 
proceeds paid to the parew entity (P) SIIOLIld be treated in the EC. It is pi-esunied that 
the PE, being located in a third country, bears income tax at source. Further, 
dividends, interest and royalties, paid by a group subsidiary (S) or a non- affiliated 
entity (A), are also charged withholding tax. 
The Option qf Territoriality, 
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Under a strictly 'water's edge' sclien-ie based on ten-ltorlallty, thil-d-COUntr, y proceeds 
should be left out of the group tax base, since they are generated in a third 
country. 923 In that case, each Member State will in principle apply its DTC with the 
third state and give relief by exemptioDor credit on a bilateral basis. 914 T'his is also 
amoug the. options set out by the CCCTB Working DocumentS. 925 It is however of a 
broader relevai-ice, as it can be applicable to any 'water's edge' scheme of 
consolidated/pooled group tax base (notably, the HST 926 ). Retaining the principle 
that third-courttry proceeds will be kept outside the group tax base, a slightly 
different version of this has also been suggested by the CCCTB Working Group. 927 
That is, con-mion rules are laid down by the Member States, for the purpose of 
providing relief for tax paid abroad. Hence, a decision will have to be i-eached on 
either exei-i-iption or credit. 
Incorporation in the Group Tax Base 
The second option is to incorporate proceeds guenerated in a third-countr 
into the Z, y 
consofidated/pooled tax base. The idea behind this approach is that, irrespective of 
SOLII-Ce, income earried by group rnen-ibers should he part of the group tax base. 
The conflict in the US regardino the tax treatment of foreign dividend,, Lit. the level of US States C, ý7 L- 
only indirectly concerns the EC. Foreign dividends in the US irt primarily subjected to tax at federal 
level. Thus, the payees are relieved for tax borne in the state of' source through the federal 
governmentýs network of DTCs. The matter wl-tich led disagreement to surl*ace was whether foreign Z11 
ates. The background of this dividend payments should additionally be taxed at the level (-)I' the US SIL 
relates to unitary taxation and the controversv around worldwide reporting. Narnely, the US States, 
following concession of worldwide combined reporting, wished to retain their taxing rights on Z71 Z7' 
dividends sourced outside the US territory. This was one of the key causes for putting off a deal on 
water's ed(, e' as well as for failing to pass federal legislation renouncing worldwide combination in 
the 1980s. A detailed account of the above US conflict would go beyond the scope of this work. For a 
comprehensive analysis of foreign dividends' taxation in the US 'water's edge' unitary system, read 
generally- Brown 762-763; Carlson & Galper; JR Hellerstein (1982); McDaniel 720-7222, McLure 
(1986a), CE McLure Jr, 'State Taxation of Foreign -Source Dividends: Starting from First Principles' Z7 
(1986) 86 Tax Notes Today 975 (hereinafter McLure (I 986b))-, Peters. 
924 OECD Con-imentary art 23A paras 39-43. 
92-5 WG Doc on Territorial Scope para 21-, WG Doc 3 on Iiit'l Aspects Annex. 
926 In HST, the territorial scope of the group and the interaction with third countries is due to be 
regulated cell trally through the Home State Convention- HST (Lodin and Gaminle) 24. 
927 WG Doc 3 on Int'l Aspects Annex. 
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Again, this matter has been elaborated upon by the CCCTB Working Group. 92", Yet, Z-7 
it has a wider scope of application which makes it relevant to ally group taxation 
system of a single 'water's edge' base (incl. the HST"2" ). It follows that a decision 
should be reached by the Member States on a con-imon rriethod of relief Uniform 
provislons will therefore be introduced for the elimination of double taxation. Those 
will take the forn-i of either exemption or credit. It is also noteworthy that, under 
such a scherne, a re-negotiation of DTCs may be necessary, which appears the most 
s serious drawback of the systern. 
If relief by exeii-iptioii is given preference, all Member States witl have to switch 
their laws to this. 930 Indeed, the CCCTB Working Group has, pointed out that 
conin-ion rules will. have to be enacted to determine what coDstitutes foreign 
inCCIMe. 93 1 Other-wise, the system will be prone to severe risks of tax avoidance. 
Tliose would in principle consist of artificially shifting income out of the EC and 
into jurisdictions that apply low tax rates. 932 Specifically in a Head Office - PE 
iig form: the Head Office is structure, a scheine of tax abuse could take the follmvl , 
set Lip in a Member State with a broad definition of foreign income and the PE in a 
third cotintry applying a low tax rate. 
In the case of relief by credit, the tax paid abroad will. inevitably have to be 
apportioned across the. group entities. 933 Equally, tile I'CVCIILIes already taxed in a 
third country will be added to the coi-isolidated/poo led group tax base. As a result, 
rules for the apportionment of credit will have to be laid down. 
934 Significant 
complexity is expected to arise in iniplen-leming this, wliicli could require a re- 
negotiation of DTCs. The ii-min concern is that the, state of source could challenge 
92ý. WG Doc on Territorial Scope paras 222) et seq.; WG Doc 
3 on Int'l Aspects Annex. 
929 HST (Lodin and Gammie) 24. 
930 Most, Member States employ credit relief. Switching from one system to the other has been 
referred to by the Member States as 'a mqj . or (political) chmige in lax policy' WG 
Doc 3 on Int'l 
Aspects para 6. 
()3 1 Exemption ofnon-NAFTA unitary income is also the choice favoured by McDaniel: see McDaniel 
(1994), 720, WG Doc on Territorial Scope para 22. 
()I-) Ibid. 
933 WG Doc 3 on Int'l Aspects Annex. 
()1,4 WG Doc on Territorial Scope para 15. 
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the method for apportioning credit at residence, bringing forth claims that this is in 
breach of the DTC in force. In addition, disputes would be likely to arise aniong 
Mei-yiber States regarding the amount of apportioned credit allocated to each state. 
Finally, where relief consists of ordinary credit, additional complexities should be 
expected, as there is no obvious way of computing it. 935 
The allocation of incon-le by FA is a system that ftmctioris independently of 
source/Tesidence principles. 936 hi that sense, it does not accommodate re side nce- state 
relief ii-lethods (i. e. credit/exemp tioll). 937 M contrast, a scheme that allocates tax base 
shares by apportiomnent allows the prevention. of double taxation through its owil 
structure. Hence, no double taxatim is generated to the extem that: 0) comn-ion rules 
ply to computation of the, group tax base-, and (ý) a L11401-111 fO ap I rmula is operated 
across all jurisdictions with a right to tax. 938 
A clash is inevitable where the FA ineets traditional international tax principles. ' 
In the US, the allocation of combijied unitary hicome by apportionment is applied in 
connection with taxatimi at sub-national level.. Further, DTC obligations are settled 
by the federal goveriu-nent, as it is only fecleral-level taxes that may contain a foreign 
element. 940 The above structure is far fi-om the regulatory fi-amework which shapes 
direct taxation in the EC. Namely, tax is exclusively charged by the Member 
States. 94 1 No central authority at European level is allowed to interfere with this. It is 
therefore tl-te Member States that should provide relief for double taxation through 
their DTC network. Meanwhile, under an EC-wide (YrOLIP taxation scheme, these 4ý 
93-5 
ibid para 17. 
936 McIntyre (1994) (numbering is not available in the electronic version). 
937 McIntyre ('2004) 925-926. 
938 McLure and Weiner 253; (indirectly) Moore 1450. 
939 The problem has also been identified in connection with passive Income In PR McDaniel, 
'Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone' (1993-4) 49 Tax Law Review 691,720 
(herelmqficr McDaniel (1994)); for a view which does not take account ol'the DTC asl)ect, see Porrip 
800-801. 
Q40 Wei n er ( 1999) 1 S. 
941 In confirmation of the above, the following statement is present in the vast majoritv of ECJ 
decisions in direct taxation: '... it should be noted that, according iosculrd case-law, although di1rct 
taxation fialls within their cotnj)etem-C, the Member States must notic the excrcim- that 
(, on1pejelit-c (-onsistently vvith Comn-umity laiv... '. 
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states will be taxed on an apportioned share of the 'water's edge' base. Inevitably, 
these two mechanism-is (i. e. DTCs wid FA) clash. 
It is hence doubtful whether- third-country proceeds can be part of the 
consolidated/pooled tax base without going through a process of DTC re- 
negotiation. Still though, i-ileclianisms for relief in the US and UK tax systenis could 
possibly provide art opportunity to apportion credit without amendi-ng tax treaties. 
The UK. facility gives relief for underlying tax paid in the state of source where 
dividends are distributed into the UK on or after 21" Mai-ch 2000.942 The payer 
should be a consolidated group of con-1panies which is treated as a single emity for 
double tax relief PW., -)()Se S. 943 The schei-ne involve,, apportioning the tax liability of 
the consofidated group for the purpose of calculating the tax share of the emity 
which made the dividend distribution. Relief by credit is then given iii tile UK oil Z-- 
that basis. The UK Finance Act (diagram 2 below) involve,, a reversed set of facts to 
that of diagran-is I (a), (b) and (c): 
2. Relief in the UK for Underlying Tax 
Paid at Source 
fivide. 
UK iI 
s4tc) 
It is clear that a single DTC (i. e. UK and source state) is applicable. A single entity 
(S4) is under the obligation to give refief. However, the aniourit of underlying tax 
borne by the payer (S2) can only be computed by FA, since the group under P is 
treated as a single entity. 
942 FA 2000 s803A. 
943 A Mwiro, Tolle'y's Double Ta-valion Relief (7"' edn Lexis Nexis Tolley) 148. 
-169 
In the US, apportioni-i-ient is applied in a similar ConteXt. 944 The purpose is to 
corripute the tax share Corresponding to a US-resident entity which has been 
subjected to tax abroad, as part of a consolidated group. Relief is then given in tile 
US for taxes paid abroad. This is a con-m-ion situation, where a certain entity is 
transparent under foreign law (i. e. law of the groupýs state) wl-dIst it qualifies as a 
company in the US. 
The above bear sin-iflarities to the settings of diagrams I(a), (b) and (c) involving a 
group in the EC. The combined facts are showi-i in diagram 3 below. The group is 
now on the 'side' wh-ich should give relief. So, it is the credit that has to be, 
apportioned and not the tax payable in the state of source. DTCs will typically 
continue to apply at a bilateral level. In the diagrain below, the applicable DTCs 
should be: (i) third country - Meinber State of P in relation to dividends, interest and 
royalties; and (ii) third cotiatry - Member State of S3 for PE relTuttailces. The 
apportionment of credit will bring together the entire group. Nall-lely, all Member 
States hosting (water's edge') group entities (i. e. P, S1, S2, S3) will be involved fil 
apportioiiing the credit for taxes paid M the third country(-ies). 
3. Relief in the EC for Tax Paid In Third 
Country 
i ei ii it I: ýr i( ei 
div"Ielic 
illlo, ýl 
loyalties 
UG 
The above scheme should not cause coniplexity with Men-lber States' external 
network of DTCs (i. e. DTCs with tl-tird countries). The relations rel-flain bilateral. 
Further, coumiitn-ient to give relief, as undertaken under the DTC vis-a-vis the third 
944 See generally DP Hariton, 'Revising the US Reg. on. the Allocation of 
Foreigii Taxes Among 
Related Persons' 1-2005] 38 Tax Notes hiterriational 989. 
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country, is coniplied with, insofar as credit is actually given. The precise way of 
meeting DTC. obtigations is left to the contracting parties. 
(ii) The Treatment of Proceeds Earned within the EC 
4(a). Proceeds earned in the EC: PE Held 
through Company In Third Country 
4(b). Proceeds earned in the EC: 
Dividends 
4(c). Proceeds earned in the EC: 
Interest and Royalties 
The transactions shown iii diagran-is, 4(b) and (c) above do not create problems fi-om 
aii EC perspective. Group members' taxable iiicome (i. e. P, S1 and S2) will be 
consolidated and allocated by FA. Apart fi-om that, payn-ients of dividends, interest 
and royalties involve specific aii-iounts and derive ft-om an identifiable payer (i. e. 
S2). So, that should allow relief for withholding tax at source (and possibly for 
underlying, tax on dividends. ) to be given withoLit problems in the state of residence. 
It is irrelevant whether the recipient is affiliated (S_3)) or not (A). hi the event that the 
third country gives relief for underlying tax paid at source, it may provide foi- 
apportioni-tig the group tax base. 945 
945 See above in this chapter Part B, Section 111, Title 2. (') for the UK system. 
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PE income is earned within the territory of 'water's edge' (diagram 4(a)). The 
qUeStI011 is whether the PE's taxable income should be consolidated/pooled with the 
parent company's (P) revenues, given that the Head Office (S) is tax resident in a 
third CoUlltry. 
946 
The starting point would probably be to argue that PE income should be part of the 
group tax base, as it is itself located withiii the territorial scope of the 'water's edge' 
group. Sharing affiliatimi with the parent entity, the PE is most likely to be ail 
integral part of the group's busijiess iii the EC . 
947 So 
, fron-i a point of view of 
substance, making the PE's reveinies part of the comsol idated/poo led tax base 
appears to also contribute to a rnore accurate I-eSL[lt of the apportionment. 
948 111 
contrast, exclusion would encourage the creatioii of tax avoidance schemes 
consisting of shifting income, otherwise generated within the 'water's edge' (-Ti-()up, 
out of the group tax base. 949 
If the PE is kept outside the group tax base, its tax liability at source will be 
detern-iined pursuant to domestic law and the provisions of the applicable DTC (if 
one is in force). All Men-iber States apply the arm's length principle when 
calculating profits of PEs. 9 ý' (' Further, most DTCs have been drafted in line with the 
OECD Model and, as a result, incorporate ai-L equivalent to Article 7 OECD Model 
oil the attribution of profit to PEs. The. provision is Currently under review by the 
OECD. 95 ' The new approach which attracted men-ibers' support at the OECD is 
referred to as the 'Authorised OECD Approach' (AOA). 
95 The position taken is 
946 
WG Doc on Territorial Scope para 30. 
9J7 
ibid para 31. 
948This derives from the rationale behind unitary combined reporting. The membership ofthe group, 
and thus subjection to apportionment by formula, is determined by referenct to business integrity 
rather than the corporate structure. See also Chapter 6, Part A, Section Ill. 
949 WG Doc on. Territorial Scope para 31, 
')-ýo WG Doc 4 on Intl Aspects para 14. 
161 OECD (ed), 'Discussion Draft ofthe revised commentary on Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention' (10 April 2007) <ht tl): //www. oecd. org/datac)ecd/0/2/38'i6 17 11. pdf> accessed 30 July 
2007 (hereinqfler Draft Revised Commentary). Comments have been invited. 
9S2 ibid. para 44. 
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that, ill computing tax bases, PEs and Head Offices should be treated as completely 
953 
separate entities 
Making PE inconie a component of the consolidated/pooled group tax base raises 
problems due to the 'uneasy' ii-iteraction between the FA and DTCs. 
I'm DTC is in force between the Meniber State of the PE's location and the country 
of the Head Office's residence, no complexity arises. Namely, the reveimes of the 
PE will become part of the group tax base shared aniong the eligible Member States 
by apportionment. In tWs context, double taxation is impossible to ellmInate but its 
occurrence does not cause illegitiniacies. 
More parameters should be taken into account for legitimacy if a DTC applies. As 
n-ientioned, the PE's tax liability at source should typically be coii-iputed Pursuant to 
dornestic law and the DTC possibly in force. Arm's length IS 1101111ally tile gUidiiig 
principle in this process. Yet, once the PE becomes, part of a group of 
cmisolidation/pooling, its taxable share will have to be computed through FA, as a 
constituent element of the group tax base. 954 Considering that the majority of DTCs 
contain rules for a computatioi-i of the tax base oii the ariWs lejigth standard, the Z7 
allocatioii of taxable shcIres by FA would infi-iiige DTC obligatimis. Thus, wheiiever 
the an-iount of tax due through FA is higher thaii the armýs length liability. the state 
of residence of the Head Office would be likely-to object. Being a third country, this 
is not bound by EC Law. More specifically, the claim Would most probably be for a 
breach of contractual obligations undertaken tinder a DTC. That brings forth the 
need for DTC re-negotiation once again. 
953 ibid para 14: '... the profits to be altributed to a perniaTivia establishinew tire those ithich that 
pernianew esiabli4nnew ivould have inade ýf instead of dealing ivith the resi of the enterprise, 11 
h(MI 
beeii dealitig vvith all enlireýy separate enterpi-i'se under conditions and (it pri . (-(,. N prevailing hi the 
ordinar. i., rnarkei. This corre, ýpoiidv to the "artn's length principle- disciisvd ill the coinillenial-Y, oil 
Article 9'. 
954 It should be clarified that, even under such a scheme, arm's length Is still tyýicffly used in 
ck)mputing, the PE's tax results which are then consolidated/pooled to create [he group tax 
base. 
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It seen-is that, unless the longer-terrn objective of DTC reiiegotiation is Zý 
accomplished, arm's length will continue to be an indispensable element of tile 
system. That allows separate accounting concerns to survive, whicli undermines 
some of the key benefits expected to be derived fi-oin the envisaged EC schen-ie. 95-ý It 
further leads to increased adii-linistrative costs, rendering the system less efficient. It 
appears, however, that no better workable SOILItiOn can be devised for the EC, 
considei-ii-ig the current state of embryonic integration in direct taxes. 956 
iii) PE in the Position of Parent Entity (000 0 
5. Parent in Third Country Holds EC 
Subsidiary through EC-located PE 
Despite bearing final tax liability Outside the 'water's edge' group, a PE may still he 
allowed to occupy the position of a group's parent. Its status, fron-1 a tax point of 
view, is identical to that under diagram 4(a). Thus, the tax liability of the parent 
entity (P) in the Member State of PE's location will need to be calculated under both 
arm's length arid group taxatlon rules. Further, the tax due by the PE in the state of 
source will have to be determined as specified under Title (ii) above. 
Responsibilities specifically attached to the parent entity under ail EC group taxation 
scheine involve the computation of a common tax base and its allocation by FA. 
Establislu-nent through a PE should iiot be an impediinent to carrying out those tasks. 
955 11-ils primarily refers to transfer pricing formalities. Under an EC-wide group taxation systern, 
those formalities and costs are specifjcallý! targeted throug, a FA. Z-1 956 wh, For Lin outline of at has been attained through positive integation in the EC, see earlier In th'. 
thtsis Chapter 2. 
ý-:? 74 
(iv) The Parent Entity in a Third Country 
6. Parent in a Third Country with 
Subsidiaries in the EC 
The question is whether the EC part of the group can be ruii by any of the two 
subsidiaries (S I or S2). This meaw, that one of the two emitles would LIDdertake to 
register the group and carry out the apportionmem procedure. 
In the UK loss relief system, transfers are allowed between sister compailles. 9'ý 7 Yet, 
the UK group taxation scheme does not accon-in-iodate corisoli&tion/pooling. 
Indeed, Linder a consolidated Structure, the situation is not comparable to that of loss 
relief, since the latter does not the COMPLItation of a single group tax base. Zý 
Allowing the creation of a group Without, in practice, a parent entity could distort the 
accuracy of profit allocation in a landscape of consolidation/pooling It is all the Z-- I 
inore so if one considers that the structure is not ii-leant to endorse unitary principles, 
which by nature retain sorrie miniii-ium business integrity. 
0 (v) Third-Country Subsidiary Indirectly Held by a 'water's edge' 
Entity 
9-57 Rupal iii IFA Caluers 693. 
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7. EC Subsidiary Held through Company 
in Third Country 
This is a structure which could crive S2 entitleinent to group men-ibership. The 
decision is purely a matter of policy choice. The jurispi-udeDce of the ECJ oil the 
Free Movement of Capital and tMrd countries has made it certain that no aspect of 
the Freedom of Establishment extends to third states. " 58 There is therefore no ground 
for sustaining infringement of the Treaties if subsidiary S2 is excluded from the 
group. However, were S2 indirectly held through an EC-1-Usident entity, the 
precedent of ICI959 would create an obligation to include S22 in the group. 
Conclusion 
In the current shape of the EIM, a group taxatioii systei-yi of comsolidated and 
apportioned common tax base cannot be implemented without severe drawbacks. 
Con-iplexity arises in the following fields: 
(A) Part of the advantages expected to be derived from saving transfer pricing 
compliance costs will be cancelled. 960 The above risks defeating one of the key 
9z " For a comprehensive survey of the Jurisprudence on the FreedOMS Ltnd third countries, stýv, 
Chapter 1, Part A, Section 11, Title (iv). 
q59 See Chapter 1, Part B, Section 11, Title A. 
960 Staff Paper 255 el ,; cq. 
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objectives of the EC group taxation project. Thus, tackling trwisfer pricin, U 
compliance obligations has been one of the n-lain reasons for justifying the EC group 
taxation initiative. 961 If arm's length separate accounting retains a presence in the 
scheme, 1-tigh transfer pricing costs will persist. 
(B) The lietwork of DTCs between the Member States and Tlill-d Countries clashes 
with the intra-EC allocation of profit through FA. 962 
DTCs are concluded in line with international tax principles. That is, they allow 
relief (by exemption or credit) in the state of residence for tax paid in the state of 
963 
Source. Further, the attribution of Jncon-ie within Head Office - PE deal] L or 
parent - subsidiary company transact ionS965 is) checked for complimice mi the arm's 
length standard. By contrast, a group taxation systern accommodating FA does not 
provide for relief at residence. Indeed, the concepts of residence and source are not 
even relevant to the scherne. 966 
Where relief should be given within 'water's edge' for tax paid in a third country by 
a PE (or for withholding tax on inflows of dividends, interest or royalties), some 
SOILItiOll can be worked out. It has thus been shown that certain provisions in tile 
DTC systerns of the UK and the US could offer aSOILItiOll. 
11 
011 the other hand, the system appears deadlocked where iticome of a PE held by a 
tliii-d-country entity is taxed within 'waters edge' as part of the group tax base. III 
that case, approval of the PE's tax liability at source exclusively depends oii the 
approval of the state of the Head Office. 
9"1 Ibid. 
962 WG Doc 2 on hit'] Aspects paras 7&8. 
903 OECD Model arts 23A & 23B. 
()()ý4 
ibid art 7(2). 
965 ibid art 9(1. ); Transfer Pricing Guidelines 1-3 -1-6 (mainly). 
966 y is not available in the electronic ; crs on). McfDtNTe (1994) (numberin., I II%I 
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Overall, the discussion on 'water's edge' demonstrates that the EC is still 
inadequately integrated to accon-imodate an EC-wide group taxation system. DTC 
re-negotiation could offer a number of solutions, especially if Coupled with ail EU 
Model DTC. Considering, thougli, that this would require a coordinated effort by the 
Member States, there seen-is to be little prospect for bringing such all attel-lipt into 
fi-uition in the short term. In addition., the process can be extremely tin-ie-consun-ling 
anyway. 
It seen-is that no EC-wide group taxation project can be implemented properly under 
the current state of development of the EIM. FA is a system to apply internally 
with-in highly integrated markets. It is not made to accommodate international 
elements, Unless those apply globally. In the US, international commitnients are 
dealt wit. h. at federal level, on the basis of international tax prInciples of 
so-urce/re side ace. 967 It is also at this level that DTCs are ne(yotiated. Yet, in the EIM, 
competence in direct taxes conceded to the EC is next to non-existent. 
96'ý Therefore, 
Men-iber States deal with tax matters at all t1ree levels: mterriatimial, EC and 
don-iestIc. In such a context, implen-lentation of FA would convert a profit allocation 
mechanism, aimed at internal application, into aii iristrumerit of mtergoverni-nental 
nature. This is, by definition, a flawed approacti, which cannot go very far. 
The complexities highlighted above do not render an EC-wide consolidated gn-oup 
in-ipossible to operate. it seen-is, though, that the system will inevitably SUffer 
significant drawbacks if it has to be ii, i-lpleii-iented in the CUITent setting of the EIM. 
967 In contrast., combined reporting, applying at sub-federal level, operates independently of 
DTCs, 
Z_ - 
which prevents clashes. 
968 ty has lea slated only in few areas ofrelev, nce to d rect t' xat on: P-S Drechve, 
I& The Comilluni C11 I (I 1 11 1 
R Directive-, S(avings Directive, Exchmge of Information Directive, Mutual Assistance Directn'c. 
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9. FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT 
Introduction 
The altocation of the group tax base by Forintilary Apportioninent (FA) is one of the 
key eleinents attached to the i-nitiatives for an EC-wide (, ), "1'0Up taxation system. This 
is a vnechaniSM used in detern-ý-ning the amount of tile group tax base taxable by 
eacli of the eligible Member States. It is an alternative to income attributed by 
separate accounting at arm's length. That has so far been the intemational norill 
969 
proposed by the OECD Model . 
FA is aenerally treated as suitable for allocating erititleri-ieut to tax witllill Ilig"Illy 
integrated markets, which allows it to apply at SUb-national level. The metliod was 
devi. sed in the US and evolved iii conjurictioil with unitary conihmatioji. Iii the 
absence of group taxation, FA may still be applied to allocate the taxing emitlemem 
over a single entity's tax base to n-iore than one jurisdiction. This is the case iii 
Canada and Switzerland. Namely, a share of an eritityýs tax base is allocated to those 
provinces or cantons entitled to taxing it. Further, it has beell discussed whether a 
unitary definition of the group is a requirement for apportiomi-mit by formula. 
970 It 
was also shown that FA presupposes the existence of a single group tax base. 
97 1 That 
iniplies, that schemes sucli as those of loss-relief or profit contribution, in whicli 
entities retain full integrity, cannot accommodate FA. 
969 Houghton 457-458- in the 1930s, the League of Nations concluded that FA should be rejected ill 
favour ot arm's lengtb separate accounting 
970 See at Chapter 6, Part B, Section 1. 
971 See at (Mapter 7, Part A, Section 11, Title (i). 
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In the fran-iework of aii EC-wide group taxatiou systern, FA has- always been the 
envisaged method for allocathig tile group tax base. It lies at the heart of all 
proposed systen-Ls, si-nce it fulfils a null-lber of functions and objectives, such as 
eliminating transfer pricing con-ipliance obligations. 972 
This thesis is not meant to incorporate a detailed analysis on the economics of tile 
forn-itila. Rather, it focuses on discussing. the core structures of an EC zggi-oup taxation 
system from a legal perspective. The aim will be to identify and discuss those 
elements of the FA relevant to the EIM. 
Part A: Methods of Allocating Profits within a 
Corporate Group: Arm's Length Separate 
Accounting versus FA 
Separate accounting has, always becii the international iiorm wlicil it comes to 
computflig tax liability. It is also the metliod put forward by the OECD Model Tax 
Conveiitioii iii connection with profit allocati0ii betweeri associate compames 
973 and 
iii Head Office - PE dealings. 
974 The OECD Tratisfer Pricing guidelines coiitam a 
con-1parison betweeri the arm's leiigtli principle and FA. 
975 More specifically, the 
issue considered is the implen-ientation of a worldwide apportioinnent and the 
position takeu is clearly against any such prospect. The specific argurneilts put 
forward will be considered later. Generally speaking, part of the discussion deals 
with deficiencies inherent in FA. Another aim is to den-lonstrate that FA could only 
()72 Staff'Paper 373-378- HST (Lodin md Ganinue) 24. 9- 973 OECD Model DTC art 9. 
974 Ibid art. 7. 
975 Transfer Pricing Guidelines 111-20 - 111-24ý C, 
2, so 
be implemented within highly integrated markets, wliicli rendep . s it wi inappropriate 
choice for a global system. 
In the early 1990s, the Ruding Report rejected the prospect of applying FA to EC 
integration hiltiatives in the field of corporation taxes. It was 11wed that: 
... altocation is suitable only ýf States have reached an advanced deoree ()J' 11) 
integration, stich as cotninon currencY, common company km, ', common accowitancy 
, 976 standards and common exlwaise in tax administrations. .-. A decade later, the EC 
approach to FA appears to have changed. The proposed comprehensive approaches 
to group taxation9" have ei-idorsed FA as a necessary element for the allocation ()f 
the group tax base. 
Below, ati atten-ipt will be j'nade to draw a comparison between ann's length separate 
accouiithig ai-id FA. The ain-i should be to pinpoint advantages and drawbacks of the 
two methods and to further demonstrate how inarket integration may set forth 
different requirements. 
(i) Separate Accounting 
Incoii-ie is attributed to each entity or branch, primarily on the basis of their own 
accounts. The system is primarily based on traditional source wid residence rules 
used in allocating tax jurisdiction within a cross-border framework. 
hi. cross-border transactions between affiliated entities, transfer pricing niles are 
nori-nally in place to check compliance with arm's length standards. That is an 
amoum Corresponding to the price of the transaction had the pal-ties been unrelated. 
In tN, s process, transactions between affiliated entities or dealiligs fn a PE - 
Head 
976 Ruding Report Chapter 6 'Arm's Length versus Allocation Formulae'. ; cc also AJ Cockheld, 
'Formulary Taxation Versus the Arm's Len-th Principle- Tlie Battle Among Doubting -Momasses, 
Purists and Pragmatists' (2004) 52 Caiiadian Tax Journal 114,119 (h(, relti(ijict-Cývkl'ield(2004)). 
977 Stafl'Paper 370 el seq. 
-)Sl 
Office context are often found not to conform to arin's length standards. 
Adjustaients are then can-ied out to bring pricing to the level of ann's lengith. 
(ii) Formulary Apportionment - 
FA is an alternative to separate accounting. It is mother method for allocatinLy the 
tax base to eligible taxing jurisdictions. 978 in determining each taxable portion, the 
'factors' (nonnally, payroll, property and sales) play a key part. Thus, the heavier 
their weight in a certain tax jurisdiction or entity, the bigger the portion of tax base 
which they attract. FA is iiormally found in computiiig coil-)orate taxes at sub-federal 
level. This is a system which fits structures of highly integrated markets bettei- thaii 
separate accounting at arrn's length. The reasons will be discussed later. By contrast, 
the FA cannot in principle accouin-iodate international elements. 979This is because 
the allocation of revenues by apportionn-lent is not compatible with so urce/re side jice 
rules. 980 In a global fran. -iework, those regulate, through DTCs, relations between 
COUntries. 
Worldwide, there is 110 Ulliform formula. Divet-sity may ýflso exist witliln the sai-ne 
country. This is partly the case in the US and Switzerland, wliereas in Canada, the 
provinces liave agreed on uniforn-lity. "" In addition. the so-called 'Massachusetts 
Formula', a three-factor equal] y-weighted formula, is used in the US as a con-inion 
starting point subject to adjustments by eacli State. Canada en-1ploys a two-factor 
forn-mla based on sales and payroll. It also is not uncon-ii-rion that different weight is 
assigned to the factors of the formula, for the purpose of achieving a specific 
outcome. For instance, sorne US States double the weight of sales to enhance 
inward 
97S In the context of groups, FA naay consist of two levels: (1) apportionment to allocate the group tax 
base to cligible taxing "urisdictions-, and (n) within each jurisdiction, apportionment of 
the allocated 
I I-- i 
share to ell,,, I'ble entitles. This is how FA has been implemented in [lie 
US. 
971) Transfer Pricing Guidelines 111-20. 
()'0 See Chapter 8. 
(), Sl See Chapter 3. 
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in v estment. 
982 As sales are taxed at destination, placing double weight ml sales 
should give an incentive for SettilIg LIP Ii-ian u fact uri na activities do niest ic ally. 
FA does not require that a group taxation system is in place. It may also be used ill 
apportioning the tax base of a single elltity il1CLln'll1g tax liability ill more thall olle 
jurisdiction. This is the case in Canada and Switzerland at provincial and cantonal 
level respectively. 983 
In the context of groups, apportionn-ient is applied to allocate a consolidated/pooled 
group tax base. Therefore, the, existence of a single tax base. is a prerequisite for 
apportionn-lent. Yet, as said irt chapter 7, consolidation does not always require 
attribUtiOli of Income by FA. However, so urce/re side nce separate accounthig rules 
are possible ortly in a limited number of case,,. This is when consolidation/pooling ill, 
performed for the purpose of con-iputing the parent entity's tax liability, whereas the 
subsidiaries have beeii charged taxes on an individual basis. Where tile gyroLip is 
defined pursuant to unitary business tests.. FA is the only possible method for profit 
allocation. This is a natural OLItCOme, as unitary tests for group definition and tile FA 
were developed in the. U-S to meet similar needs. As a result, the two concepts have 
grown to be inextricably linked. - 
(iii) A Comparison 
There is a inain. conceptual difference in the way that FA and arm's leiigth sepal-ate 
accounting treat taxable reveimes. The former looks at the con-u-noll business itself, 
rather than the branches or group entities . 
984 By contrast, the latter focuses on the 
982 McIntyre (2004) 920. 
983 McInty&re (2004) 919. 
, -r Z- "4 This is a dernonstration of the close ties between 
FA and ýt (Y oup defined accordinc, to the 
principles of unitary taxation. As discussed in chapter 6, a unitary definition of group would 
be the 
optimal choice to combine with allocation ot'profit by FA. However, practical 
drawbacks as well 
the tradition ofnational group taxation systerns in Europe suggest that pi-cference should 
be gken to L- Z7 
an ownership-based approach. See also McIntyre (22004) 933-934. 
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constituent parts of the busi-ness, being the ineans for earning inconie. 95 Under the 
FA, taxes are levied on 'sonw portion qfeach dollar ivithin each taxing. jurisdict"O" 
in vvhich (il)l. )ot-tionlnei7t, fý. i(-tot-s are located . 
986 An in-ii-nediate consequence of this is 
to allocate a portion of the taxable base even to loss-makii-Ig countries. Thus, the 
objective is to attain fairness over a reasonable period of time. The tax base in each 
jurisdiction cannot be prol-mi-tional to the factors located therein on each separate 
occasion. In that sense, the advantage given to One jurisdiction over wiother I, -" 
occasional and by no means predictable. 987 
Ihi an international context of limited economic integration, separate accountiii-L, can 
lead to satisfactory solutions. Nan-lel y, where there is lin-iited sharim, of corporate 
resources in a group, the concepts of source and residence are easier to ideiitify. 9" 
Tfids is inainly because corporate entities retain their integrity as well as a siginficam 
amount of hidependence. In addition, FA is not a suitable system to apply 
ii-iternationally. Below, it will be shown that large disparities among national 
systen'is cannot be acco mino dated, without arbitrary results, within a schume of 
apportionn-ient. 989 Thus, FA provides better solutions than separate accounting w1mi 
it comes to highly integrated MNE structures. Further, a fair result 990 caii oiflý,, be 
achieved if the scherne is implemented withm a re(tUlatOry framework of some 
uniformity. It is often the case that, in federal-type markets, one comes across both 
the above conditions. 
(a) Allocation of taxable profit within NINES 
Business organisation in MNEs is oftel, highly integrated, which brings forth a 
number of implications in calculating the tax liability of h-idividual group entItles. 
"'q-5 ibid 933. 
986 Mcfiitýlre (1994) (numbering not available in the electronic version). 
9" McIntyre (2004) 9,17 et seq. 
988 McLure (1984) 95-96 in conjunction with Nlusgravc (1984) 
9'9 Tbis is also the outcome of the discussion in Trwisfer Pricing Guidelines. 
9')0 McIntyre (1994) (numberin a not available in the electronic version). 
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The bottom line appears to be that separate accounting cannot meet the challenues. It Z, 
is a system mainly designed to compute tax liability In relations arnong unrelated 
entities. 
A first issue is the risk of tax avoidance through mcoine shiffing. 99' Sepal-ate 
accounting cannot always effectively deal with tax planning techiliques of shifting 
accounting profits towards low-tax jurisdictions. Within a context of increased 
capital mobility,, such as an MNE within an integrated market, the above risk of 
manipulation is even more increased. For instance, loans and intellectual property 
rights may be transferred to a country with a low business tax rate. The country may 
also have a grood DTC network With jUrisdictions iii which manufacturing entities of 
the i-, roup are located. Under such a structure, withholding tax at source will most Z__ 
probably remain low or nil (, depending on the applicable tax treaty provisimis. ). At 
the san-ie time, a considerable aniount of group revenues will be generated in a low- 
tax jurisdiction. 
A widely-Identified992 drawback of separate accounting, related to the atvve, is the 
adnih-iistrative forn-lalities attached to transfer pr1c, _ng rules. 
Compliance involves a 
Costly Process Of ti. 11le-C011SLIming sLibmission of detailed d0CUIY1eIItatI0II More the 
tax aL111101"Ities. The ain-i is to provide evidence that arms leii(Tth standards, havc been Z7 
ol-),, --. ei-ved in transactions between associated companies 
991, 
or iii Head Office - PE 
dealing S. 994 
In addition to the above, arm's length pricing can be very difficult to work out in the 
context of intra-group transactions, as there is often no Comparable Uncontrolled 
t)Ql Muso-rave (1984) 236-, Staff Paper 261. 
992 11-20 and 111-2 1. elimination of transl' Staff Paper 262; Transfer Pricing Guidelines I _2 -II 
er pricillu, 
compliance obligations has been cited as one of' the main objectives pursued 
by the Europzýan 
Commission's initiatives for aii EC-wide go-roup taxation systein. 993 
OECD Model DTC art 9(l), Transfer Pricing Guidelines 1-3 - 1-6 (mainly). 
994 
OECD Model DTC art 7(2). 
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Price (CUP) for certain goods or services. 9" This is a common complex twc Iv 111 11 
becomes more frequent and intense within global MNEs. Those produce highly 
'speciallsed products, being worldwide brand names, which are exclusively identified 
with a specific MNE. Under such circunistances, fixing a CUP often turn'; out to be 
an unsuccessful exercise. 
The identification of the source of revenues is a key process in attributing income to 
taxable entities under separate accouiithig. However, tests of source do not often 
lead to satisfactory results. Especially in a cross-border comext, it is often 
impossible to trace an unambiguous geographical location . 
996 That is because more 
than one factor may be important in determinýig the source of incon-ie. For instwice, 
a inaJor decision is whether Source should be attached to the location where income 
originates or where the profit is obtained. 997 When it comes, to MNEs, source can be 
very hard to identify, as incon-ie is likely to have iinportant links to more than one 
country. 998 Further, the capital of MNEs, n-mmly, consisting of intangibles, cannot 
easily be attributed to a specific geographical locatjon. 999 
Awther field m which separate accounting often proves deficient is in separating the 
profit attributable to each group merriber. Allocation Of l')I'Ofit th"OUgh arm's lemyth 
may lead to all ai-bitrary procedui-e, '0()() which falls to reflect the MNEs' cconoinic 
realities. ")Ol In practice, flus inewis that shared values and costs creating economies 
of scale aDd scope inay ofteii not be reflected ill the grOLIP'S tax liability. 
Allocation of profit by FA provides solutions to the above problems, specifically 
centred on MNEs. The need to apply traiisfer pricing rules and work out price 
995A Sclid. fer and C Spengel, 'The Impact of ICT on Profit Allocation within Multinational 
Groups- 
Arm's Length Pricing or Forn-tula Apportionment? ' Discusslon Paper No 03,53 (Zentrurn 
ffir 
Europdische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH, 2003) 13 (herclnqfter Schdfer & Spengel). 
996 McIntyre (2004) 926. 
997 Ibid. 
() () ýCý . ibid 928. 
999 
. ibid 929. 
100() Mus ave (1984) 236. . gr. 1001 Cockfield (2004) 116-117, Trmsfer Pricino Guidelines 111-20 - 111-2 1. 1ý 
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comparables (CUP) will be limited. Thus, the groupýs income is consolidated/ 
pooled into a single base of wNch shares are then allocated to eligible States and 
entities on the basis of substantive elements ('factors'). As regard,, the possibility of 
revenue shiffing, it cannot be entirely eliminated under that scheme either. However, 
anti-avoidance rules should now aim at different practices. Narnely, income shifting 
may be attempted here through a n-ianipulation of the factors. 10()2 The FA places no 
requirement for identifying a certain geographical locatloji as the source of inconw. 
Rather, revenue is attached to a jurisdiction according to the factors' tests. 
Finally, the allocation of revenues by FA allows a inore accurate cornputation of 
each affiliated entity's contribution to the overall profit of the NINE group. ")()' It 
Should be pointed out, though, that a business' economic realities may still not be 
reflected accurately in the group entities' tax liabilities. Unless the group is defined 
in line with unitary principles, the above is a real risk. 
(b) The requirement for an integrated internal market 
FA ma only be operative within liighly iwegrated markets. It thus cannot be applied y 1ýý 
internationally, unless a global schen-it were launched - Li rather unlikely prospect. Zý 
This is n-lainly because a certain ai-nouut of Liiiiforn-iity is required witliiii the 
regulatory fran-lework whicli accon-iniodates the forinula. For instance, a coillmoll 
currency as well as tax and accowiting rules 
1004 appear necessary. Otherwise, 
compliance may end up being more burdensome than transfer pricin(g documematioii 
obligations. Further, as discussed in chapter 8 on 'water's edge', FA creates all 
interaction of incompatibility with separate accoumin at an-n's lenuth 
Considering 9 L- * 
that the latter is the norm in states' bilateral fiscal relations, FA is, in principle, 
excluded fron-1 the international context. 
1002Mclntyre (2004) 935 & 940-941. 
10"' Transfer Pricing Gwdelilies 111-20. 
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An accurate outconie of FA cannot be sustained where sharp disparities mark tl)e 
jurisdiction,, eligible for a share of the tax base. Integrated markets usually manifest 
a certain an-iount of coordination- FA does not take specific acc(, )uiit of differences in 
profitability, 1005 as the airn is to produce a fair final OLItCOITIe reflective of business 
econornic realities. The exaryiple of railways in the US highlights this thinking. 1006 
Nan-iely, even the least busy parts of the railway are treated as contributing to the 
value of the overall business. A large part of such value is derived from the actual 
fact of connectirig, by railway, the starting and destfiiation points. In the above set of 
facts, a profitability difference does not conipromise acCLIracy. The outcon-ie is 
evaluated at the level of the entire business rather than by looking at each bit 
separately. However, had market integration been absent, the I-esLilt of FA Would 
have been arbiti-ary'007 due to favouring higlier profitability units. The above is also 
in close ties to a un-itary definition of the group. As acknowledged m cliapter 6, 
ownership tests for entitlement to group n-iembership risk distorting the FA if the 
lines drawn among affiliates are artificial. 
Part B: FA in the US, Canada, Switzerland and 
Germany 
In discussing, the FA ul the EC, reference should be made to the above four 
countries. All of them being organised in federal-type structures acco nimo date 
systems of apportionment in aBocating the tax base at sub-federal level. Canada, 
Switzerland aDd Gennany apply FA in the context of a single eatity, rather than III 
groups. This is because there is no group taxation at regional level (i. e. provmces, 
1004 
ibid 111-23. 
1005 JR Hellerstein (1993) 414-415, 
1006 Ibid. 
1007 Transfer Pricim, Guidelines 111-22. L- 
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cantows, and Ldnder). The Canadian and Swiss systems, in particular, do not comain 
any group taxation at all. Germany allows poolin-o (Organschaft) at federal le\el. It 
follows t'hat, inevitably, the focus of discussion in this chapter will be oii the US. 
whicli operates an elaborate system of sub-natioiial group taxatioii Wiowii as 
ýunitary taxation' or 'conibined reportiýng'). 
The analysis below is not ain-led to be a comprehensive survey of FA iii the countries 
mentimied. It is meant to contain, a short historical survey of FA's developil-lent as 
well as a discussion of its key elei-i-lents, beirýg of potential interest to the EC. 
1. The United States of America 
FA developed in the US as part of the concept of unitary taxation. It flierefore 
evolved in conjunction with the definition of a unitary business and withiii tile legal cl--- 
fi-arnework- of the Due Process and Comn-m-ce Clauses. hi the mid- to late- I 800s, FA 
was used irt calculating the value of railroads. 10" At the time, application was, within 
the contours of a , In fle firm. Since the advent of con-ibined reporting, 
")()Q it ha,, heell g 
structured to apply at two tiers. At first, it is used to apportimi the combilled base 
among eligible States and then, within each State, to allocate shares to eligible 
entities. 1010 In 1911, FA. was first connected to corporation tax, which was then 
levied at the States' level for the first time. 10" The developri-lent took place In 
Wisconsin and FA employed three factors: property, the cost of manufacture and 
sales. In 1920, the US Supreme Court found constitutional the FA for the 
loo' See earlier in this thesis on unitary taxation: Chapter 6, RTI. A, Section 111. 
1 oo') Ibid. 
1010 Mclntvre 917 et seq. 
1011 Weiner (2005) 1L 
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distribution of net incoine of a manu fact uring corporation across States. ""' The 
early formulae incorporated numerous factors. 1013 
As early as the 1930s, thoLigh, son-le an-iount of uniformity i-n FA factors had already 
been achieved. Thus, the so-catled 'Massachusetts' fonmila of three equally- 
weighted factors gradually became the norm. In 1933, the 'Massachusetts' formula 
was put forward by the National Tax Association (NTA) as a reconullended choice 
for apportion ment. 1014 Further, the Uniform Division for Income Tax Purposes Act 
(UDITPA) proposed the three-factor formula in its common definitions, in 1957. 
Attempts to harn-lonise fOl-111LIlae contMued on the initiative of Congress. hi 1959, the 
'Willis Committee' was created with the task to document States' corporate tax 
practices. 1 016 The report that carne out proposed the adoption of a two-factol- formula 
based on property and payroll. Congress followed tip oii the work of the Willis 
Con-unittee but was never successful iii its efforts to pass Bills layiilg dowil 
uniformity. measures. Developmem came from the States themselves which, iii 1967, 
created the Multistate Tax Commissimi (MTO. The MTC devised the Multistate 
Tax Compact, an iiistrun-lent of soft law which incorporated the iiicome divisioii 
rules of UDITPA. The States have broadly fol. lowed this ever since. "" 
7 The US 
Supren-ie Court has acknowledged the risk of overlapping, tax bases, due to the 
absence of un-i-formity of factors amojig the States. 
1018 It however pointed out that 
only Congress can decide oji whether uniform rules should be enacted. 
UDITPA endorsed the 'Massachusetts' Formula. Equal weight of the three factors 
creates a potential for wider entitlement to tax to the State of 11.1anufacture. Property 
and payroll carry a weight amounting to two thirds of FA. It follows that an hicrease 
1012 thulervvood TyPeivriter Co. v (7hanibertain 254 U. S. 113 S. Ct. 4-5 (1920). 
1013 McLure & Weiner 266-267. Weiner (2005) 11. 
_jIle 
1014 We 
_r (1999) 
10. idem ('2005) 11. 
1015 ]bid 1'2-, the UDITPA is a Model Act aimed at providing a framework ot'uiill'()rm regulation 
for 
I- Z- 
the States. 
1016 Weiner (1999) 10. 
1017 - Weiner (1999) 11, JR Hellerstein (1993) 411-4129 
1018 moon-n(III, 
No 
of equal value in investment in the State of manufacture and in sales in the State of 
destination does not impact equally on the taxing entitlement. Namely, the State of 
inanufacture impacts, throuOh property and payroll, on FA twice as strongly as sales 
in the marketing State. 
UDITPA contains definitions of the three factors. A short outline is given below. 10'9 
Property comprises real estate and tangibles owned or rented and used bi the eligible 
State. Val-Lies are reported at historical cost, as adjusted to account for additions and 
effliancements. Depreciation is not taken account of, to prevent fragmentation of 
regulatiort among the States eligible for part of the tax base. The treatment of 
intangibles, being excluded fi-orn the factors, has raised severe debate. '"'" The main Z-- 
questioii to be answered is, to what extent, given the exclusion, tl-le result of FA 
remains accurate. Business' iriodus operandi. is nowadays far from the Structure of a 
traditional manufacturing company. In this context, trade in intangibles has IlLigely Cý 
increased. ) whicli could challenge the choice to exclude sucli income from FA. 
Payroll involves the total amounts paid for compensati0ii to employees. A 
conin. -lission paid to independent contractors SlIOUld clearly be left out of FA. 
Sales include all gross receipts, ii0t specifically allocated as non-business 
iii. coine, '02' after deducting returns, discounts and allowances. The factor does not 
only deal with goods but also witli supplies of services, rentals, royalties and 
business operations. Sales are taxed at destination. Briefly, in sales of tangible 
property, the point of taxation shall be where the purcliaser is located. When it 
comes to other than tangibles, the ab, ii is to identify where the income-producingy 
activity is perfornied. If that is ýupossible, the relevant aniounts of bushiess income 
are 'th-rown-out' of FA. 
101() S Christensen, 'Formulary Apportionment. - More Simple - On Balance Better,. y (1997) '28 
1-mv 
and Policy in International Business 1133,1147-1152 (1wreinafter Cliristensen), 
Genetelli 15-16, 
Weiner (1999) 15-16. 
1010 JR Hellerstein (1993) 415-416: the debate will be discussed Lin Part C of this chapter. 
The current situation still reflects the tendency of the 1980s, which consisted of 
increasing the weight given to the sales/gross receipts factor. Under the n-iost 
common structure, sales are double weighted. The rationale behi-nd this has been to 
provide an incentive for inward investment by reducing the overall weight of the 
State's taxing entitlen-ient. Accordirtg to data referring to the state of affairs on I"t 
January 2007, twenty US States apply, exclusively or partly, a double- weighted sales 
factor in FA. Further, only fourteen have, exclusively or partly, retained the 
'Massachusetts' rule. 1022 
An interesting conclusion can be derived from comparing current year data to that of 
2004.1023 The tendency to increase the weicylit awarded to sales appears to have 
gathered inipettis all tl-iis tinie and remains alive. Over the last three years, ail 
obvio-Lis trend can be detected to adopt FA structures exclusively based on sales. 
More specifically, three States (i. e. Illinois, Iowa aud Nebraska) exclusively applied 
a single-factor sales FA on I" January 2004. Three years later, 1024 the number has 
risen to six (i. e. Louistana, Oregon and Texas) with another tlvee States (i. e. 
Georgia, New York arid Wisconsin) due to jOill in 2008 and a fourth (i. e. Minnesota) 
in 201 _3 3. 
In Moon-nan, the US Supreine Court -ruled that the single-factor FA of Iowa, 
exclusively based on sales, did not violate the Due Process and Con-flnerce Clauses. 
It was fotuid that it is adequate to sustain a 'nunimal connection' between interstate 
activities and the taxina State. Cý 
'021 Genetelh 27. 
1022 Federation of Tax Adn-unistrators (ed), Staie Apportiomnent (? f Corporale hicome (March 2006) 
<Iittl): //www. tax, idmiii. ()r, g/FTA/r, ite/,, tf)pc)rt. pdr> (hereinafter State Apportionment 
Formulae-2007). 
1023 Weiner (2005) 13-14. 
1024 Slate Apportionmeiit Formulae 2007. 
292 
I. I. Canada 1,025 
It has been explaitied, in chapter 3 how Canadiaii sub-federal corl-wation taxes 
developed into a structure Of Ulliformity, allowing divergence only in connection 
with tax rates. Apportionment in Canada applies for the purpose of allocating shares 
of a single entity's tax base to eligible taxiiig provinces. There is no group taxation 
to acconumdate consolidation or pooling. 
Coordination between the two levels ofgovernment (i. e. federal (Yoveri-tinent and the 
provinces) came after World War 1.1026 In allocating taxiD g entitlemem, current 
uniformity has largely been the result of the so-called Wartm-le, Tax Agreen-lents Z7 
concluded over World War 11. The amount of coordiiiati0ii reached then, by levyilig" 
tax at federal level, was retained to some extent after the War and throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
The Canadian system of allocati-119 taxing entitlement to provinces is not Ukely to 
cause dOUl-)lC taxation. Thus, the existence of uniforniity in both the tax base and the 
formula should in principle prevent overlap. Further, FA in Canada draws a balance 
between the inanUfacturiiig and inarketing provinces, since it allocates equal weight Z: ý 
to payroll and gross receipts. 
1027 This certahily does not enhance cornpetition and z: - 
reduces the scope of tax plail-iiing practices. Yet, competition is maintained ill the 
systeni through other inechanisnis. Tax rate divergence, being a result of allowing Z71 -- 
rates to be determined individually by the provinces, contributes to this. 
111. Switzerland 
102-S see - EH Smith, 'Allocating to Provinces the Taxable Income ofCorporations- How the , generally. 
Federal - JDý-ovjncial Allocation 
Rules Evolved' (1976) 24 Canadian Tax Journal 545 et sal. 
1026 Weiner (2005) 14, 
293 
Switzerland does not accommodate a group taxation system As a result, the 
allocation of taxable profit to the cantons is carried out within the COIItOUI'S of a 
single entity. 
Despite the prohibition of double taxation contained in the Federal Constitution, 
there is typically 110 Ulliform, formula for profit allocation applicable to all 
camons. 1028 That inevitably causes double taxation due to tax base overlap. Namely, 
each eligible canton would apply different rules on the same ai-nount Of 1'eVCIILIe f01- 
the purpose of computing its taxable share. The cantons' fiscal legislation has never 
contained adequate guidance iii connection witli the allocation of I-)I-ofit. 
Development came fi-om the Swiss Federal Tribunal's i urisprude lice. 1029 Over tinie, 
case law gave rise to the formation of certain. lirinciples whicli provide odeiitatioii to 
the cantons in determining their tax. share. 
The Court clarified that eacli canton may only tax a certain part of ari eritity's profit. 
That should correspoW to the proportioii betweeii the productive factors M the 
canton and all productive factors of the eritity, 1030 There is no geiierally-applicable 
fori-nula. Instead, the factors vary, depending oii the type of activity carried oii by the 
entity. Foi- instance, mdustrial enterprises apportioi-i iacome km the basis of assets 
ai. -id payro 11 103 1 and coininercial I-)usiriesses 1032 oi-i the basis of tuniover. Finally, iii 
insurance, the factors are premm-ris earned and capitalised assets. 
IV. Germany 
1027 ibid 15. 
1028 MB Carroll, laxaoori qj'Foreign and National L-werprises vol. iv - Methods (? f Allocaling 
Taxable Incorne (30 September 1933) LN Doc 425(b) M -1 17(b) 
1933 IIA 67 (Iiereinqfter CaiToll). 
10,29 ibid 67-6& 
1030 ibid 68, LC Ulestin, 'The Formulary Apportionment to the Taxation of Transinitional 
Corporations: A Realistic AlternativeT (PhD thesis, University of Sydney 2000) 138 & 119 
(herein, after C61est, ln). 
1031 Carroll 69. Cý, Iestln 139, Ruding Report Oiapter 9, Section 11. 
1032 
/ Carroll 70, 
194 
In Germany, use of FA is made by the municipalities. That is the third tier ()f 
administration in a federal structure. ' 034 It concerns the all(-)catioii of entitleinei-it to 
levy trade tax, for whicl-i the taxing jurisdiction is witil the, municipalities 
exclusively. Thus, all ri-itinicipalities in which an operating Unit 1035 of a cornpaiiy is 
located shall be attributed sonie aniount for the p-urlx)se of subjecting it to trade 
taxation. That is a sbigle-factor FA based on payroll. 1036 
Part C: FA in the EC Group Taxation Initiative 
Allocation of profit by FA contributes decisively to fulfilment of a key objective of 
the EC group taxation initiatives. That is to render transfer pricing compliance 
obligations redundant. 1037 Devishig the specific elements of the forn-mla is normally 
a task for econoinists. FUrther, a policy choice ()f such scale is expected to bem- a 
strongy impact on business decisions. As a result, prior to g*vi"(-t shape to a fx)llcy 
cho ice for FA, macro-economic implications need to be examined and measured. 
Sime this thesis explom-es group taxation in the EC from a le(Yal perspective, analysis Zý 
will be limited to law-related aspects of an EC-wide formula. 
1. A Uniform FA for the EC? 
1033 C6leStII, 140. 
1034 M Ardizzoni, German Tax and Business Laiv (Sweet & Maxwell, Londoi-i 2005) §6-003. 
1035 
ibid §6-012. 
1036 j Nhntz and JM Weiner, 'Explorilic, Formula Allocation for the Europemi 
Union' (2003) 10 
hitemational Tax and Public Fimuice 695,701. 
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The implementation of FA by virtue of common rules is not a self-evident policy 
option. Historical data set out in Part B above witness a clear trend towards 
harn-lonisation of FA rules applying at sub-federal level, The ten Canadian provinces 
in principle apply a uniform regime, 1038 WitlI the eXCeptiOII Of Quebec. In 
Switzerland, the jurisprudence of the Federal Court had formed common principles 
for apportioninent as early as the 1930s whilst tax base harmonisation only came 
Ce into force in the 21" _11tury. 
1039Finally, the US, staying generally firm to practices 4L_ 
that favour tax competition, accominodates disparate forniulae. '()40 Still though, a 
certain degree of uniforinity has been attained through the adoption of the 
'Massachusetts' Fol-I-IILI]a in the context of UDITPA and the Multistate Tax 
Compact. Further, inaintaining fijiancial accounts based on US GAAP as vvell as the 
existence of a slitule currency add to commou features. 
1041 In light of the above, the 
question is whether au EC grOLIP taxation ýystein should provide for one single FA 
or, instead, allow diversity. This draws upon the policy discussioil Oil I-egLilatioil or 
de-regulation in multi-jurisdictional StI-LICtLI1'eS. 1042 
One prerequisite for attaiiiiiig, the EC objective for the abotitimi of double taxation 
JEC art 293) is to apply uniform apportimiment rule,, within each group. However, 
I 
this objective cannot, in all cases, sustain a requiren-lent for uniformity of regulation 
across the entire EIM. As regards the formula, it suffices, for double taxatimi to be 
prevemed, that entities of each sML11C are subject to cominoii rules. hi this 
way, no tax base overlap should occur. Under the proposed EC schemes, 
apportionment is carried out by the parent entity for the entire group. It follows that 
1037 COIIIIIIiSS I oil (EC), 'Company Taxation in the hiternal Market' (Conmission Staff Working 
Paper) SEC (2001) 1681,23 October 2001,372-3373 (herel"wifier Staff Paper). 
1038 Harvey Perry (1.990) 168-169-1 regarding Ontario's participation in the Tax Collection 
Agreemen is (TCAs), see: <Iittp: //www. crLi-ai-c. (Yc. cLVwhatsiieAl/iteiii,, /cLao-e. htnil > and LI Z7, 
<http: //www. crýi-Ltrc. gc. c, -Ywhatsiiew/iteiiis/ct, ýic)-q, t-e. htnil>. zn 1039 Bundesuesetz W)er die Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern der Kantone und Gerneinden (StHG) 
of 14 December 1990-, art 129 ofthe Federal Constitution of IS April 1999 (Federal Constitution of2 
given May 1874 art 42quinquies, as amended bv the Referendum of 1-1 June 1977). The cantons vv(--rc a, 
until 31" December 2000 to bring tl-ieii- tax regimes in conforrruty with the Tax HarmoinsaLion 
Lm, 
it- 
(THL 
'040 Genetelli 13, Weiner (2002a) 526. 
1041 Transfer Pricing Guidelines 111-23- McLure & Weiner 260. Z, 
91- 
1042 See Chapter 4, Part A. 
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double taxation risks are tackled, provided that common regulation (i. e. the parent 
company's rules) applies across each group. Beyond this, no further uniformity 
required by the Treaty. 
As pointed out in chapter 7,1043 overlap in the US is caused because apportion-ment is 
not centralised within each combin-ed group. Nan-iely, each State, hostiiig at least one 
unitary entity computes its tax share individually. As a result, the sarne gi-oup 
revenues become elements of more than one tax base calculation. A sin-lilar 
approach is taken by the cantons in Switzerland but withi-n the context of a single 
entity being taxable in more than one jurisdiction. Therefore, the envisaged EC 
schemes involve a fundamental difference fi-om existent allocation mechanisn-is in 
federal countries. 
Allowing each Member State, host to a parent company, to apply its own I-LIleS 
across the group places a requiremew for 111LItuality. This means that Member States 
accommodating subsidiaries should accept the allocation of taxable share perfomied 
by the parent entity's state. 
Discriinination or restriction risks do not appear to arise. More specifically, no 
comparison cati be sustained from the perspective of the subsidiaries' origiii state. 
Foreign-held subsidiaries rnay bear a higher tax burdeii tliaii those held locatly, due 
to the fact that they are subject to the, tax rules of the state of their parent. 
1044 This is 
a result of disparities in EC national tax systems. Thus, by crossing the border to 
raise capital, entities subject themselves to auother Member State's tax rules. Those 
rules may lead to higher taxation. No guarantee is giveii for lower taxes iii those 
cases. 1045 From a host state perspective, the parent entity applies the same rules to 
both domestic and foreign group members. So, no discrimination/restriction comes 
to fore, as a result of this treatment. 
10,43 See Chapter 7, Part B, Section 1. 
" -flils is possible under the HST proposal. 
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Allowing diversity of FA, as set out above, enhances tax competition among tile 
Member States, without giving rise to n-iarket distortions. It is Obvious that tile 
ultimate objective of creating one single Set Of rules for NINES' complimice M the 
EC could be compromised to soi-rie extent. This should not be feared in all cases 
though. Namely, NINES will be faced with more than one set Of rules in the EC only 
if they operate through ii-lore than one group in the EIM. 1046 
However, a consideration of the above in conjuiictioii with the prol-x)sed owiiership- 
based definition of group' 047 creates an increased risk of abuse. More specifically, 
MNEs could be attracted by the prospect of artificially putting together, under the 
same parent entity, groups engaged in unrelated activities. The parent entity, 
possibly a holdmg company, would be set up in the ji-lost attractive EC tax 
jurisdiction to grant tfie entire group the niaminu-in of heiiefit. It follows that, to deal 
with the above abUsive behaviour, ' 048 anti-avoidance meaSUres should be taken in 
determining the group membership entitlement. 
To conclude on the above discussion, FA does not necessarily have to take a 
uniform structure across the EC. Apparently, a Uniform EC-w1de applicable FA 
offers sti-i-il-flicity. It is, however, possible that Member States fall to agree on one 
slii(-, Ie formula. In sLich a case, the Treaty objectives could still be fulfilled, provided 
that each oroup is regulated by a cominon set of rules. This can be achieved if the 
rules of the parent entity's state apply across the group. I'Lirther, FA diversity would 
enhance coinpetition. Yet, it would also place increased abuse risks, possibly shaped 
to manipulate the group defiDition. Hence, an attempt should be made to tackle those 
practices through curbing attempts of tax avoidance at the level of group 
membership emitleinent. 
10"ý A CTGLO para 46. 
gh separate 1046This would normally mem that wi MNE operates totally unrelated busnessts throu" 
corporatestructures ol'which the EC parts do not fall under common ownership. 
1047 See Chapt-cr 6, Part B, Section 11. 
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11. The Factors 
As regards the choice and content of factors, the EIM, in principle, does not appear 
to raise specific requirements, peculiar to its constitutional structure. So, general 
discussion on FA should be a guiding principle for EC policy decisions - at least, as 
a starting point. 
(i) Can the 'Massachusetts' Formula Stay Aliveftv Long. `ý 
A decision on which factors should be included into FA is noi-mallY i-eached oil the 
basis of public finance considerations. Different approaches can be identified as 
re(yards the choice of factors. For instance, the 'Massachusetts Formula' C01IStitUtes a 
startiqgy point 1_11 the US1049 whereas, in Switzerland, the partIculai-ities of eýtch 
industry are the focal issue. [050 
The 'MaSSaChLISMS' n-iodel is widely referred to and still occupies a proininem 
positioii amorigy the US States' choice of forimilae. Yet, as already cxplamed, 
'()ý' 
there currently is an apparent shift toward,,, a siiigle-factor f0rimila based oil sales. 
Coinpetitimi amoiig the US States is one reasori for this developmem. 
")-' Still, the 
shift cari also be explained ori other grounds. ThLus, the equal ly-wei ghted three-factor 
formula was created to n-leet the needs of manufacturing business, which, at the tin-le, 
dommated the rnarket. 1053 Ever since the first half of the twentieth century, though, 
the world economy has undertakeii radical changes and services became a crucial 
part of it. In the EC, they currently account for 60 to 70 percent of ecorion-Uc activity 
104S tion 11 With spec -& ('i)- Ste Chapter 6, Part B, See I aI focus on (i) '1 
t 049 According to data of 'I JanuarV'2007, twenty five (25) US States have adopted substantial portions 
of the UDITPA formula, which actually corresponds to the 'Massachusetts' 
fori-nula- State 
Apportionment Formulae 2007. 
1050 Carroll 69. 
10-ý' See carlier in this chapter Part B, Section I (on the USA). 
1052 For competition for inward investment, see McliM., rt (2004) 920. 
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and a sinfilar (and risingl) proportion of overall employment. 1054 It is obvious that a 
formula tailored to fit into manufacture may no more prove suitable for the entire 
Q -Yin spectrum of cot -ierciat activity in the EC. 
In light of the above, a forn-iula for the EIM should apparently accommodate factors 
suitable to produce a fair result when apportioning revenues derived fi-om servIces. 
For instwice, sales and payroll appear to be much more closely related to services 
than property. That would lead to a two-factor FA with weight equally balanced 
between the Member State of the provider's establishment and the locations where 
services are supplied. 
The literature 1055 extensively covers risks of i-i-iampulatioi-i Usually attached to payroll 
and sales. Overall, those involve taking advantage of certam mobile elemems of the L- 
above factors, to the end of shifting incoi-ne. Typical examples Include LISilig 
contractors, instead of employees based in a fixed location, as the former mi-mally 
fall outside the scope of payroll. 1056 Sales, placing weight at destination, may easily 
be directed towards a certain jurisdictioii for the purpose of prodLicii1g, all 
advantageous result. As the above abuse risks do not seem to create complexities 
specifically related to the EC, no further elaboration will he Illade here. This Is a 
il-iatter, inherent in FA, which should be researched m that context rathei- thaii Lis part 
of this thesis which has a different focus. 
(ii) Industry -Specýfjc Formulae 
Considering the iinportance of services b. i the EIM, the prospect of devising 
industry- specific formulae should be discussed. A possibility could be to create two 
1053 Christensen 1150-1153 (esp. on the problem ofintwigibics). 
10-54 For details on services in the Single Market, see: 
a. eu/ ilter"al market/top -n> accessed 3 August 2007. <http: //ec, europ(, I -layer/Index_ 
I 9_en. htt 
10ý5 Foi- instance, see. Christensen 11.48-1152. Weiner (1999) 24 et secl. 
l 056 McIntyre (1004) 941. 
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types of FA: a 'Massachusetts' formula to apply to manufacturing business- and a 
two-factor scherne, based on payroll and sales, to apportion revenue fi-om service,,,,. 
Industi-Y-s, pecific forn-itilae do not always fit sinooffily into vertically integrated 
MNE structures. Globalisation has led to business structure,,, which brin-gy activities 
such as manufacture and various services related to produced brands mider the sarne 
economic ownership. 1057 Industry-specific formulae would require that revenues 
derived from n-lanufacture ai-id the sale of goods be apportioned separately from 
those earned through providing services. Such a practice Would overtly defeat the 
purpose and objectives of a unitary definition of the group, as flows of values 
between the different parts of the business would -he ig(mored. Further, it should be 
expected that income would be shifted towards services, ain-mILT at taking advantage 
of the more imbile factors of payroll, through use of contractors, aild of sales. 
Even under a test of legal ownership for group definition, the use of different FAs 
should, in substwice, create the same problems as under the unitary rule. This may 
only be avoided if, iD a specific case, ties among the group members are merely 
artificial. This is, though, a situation to he avoided through anti-avoiclance rules. 
Defining the Factors 
Elements contained In the definition of FA factors often impact oil 
busilless 
investment decisions. For histance, as said, if payroll is linuted to employees, it Is 
highly probable that busmesses will try to shift part of their commercial activity to 
contractons,. In that way, the value of payroll will, be reduced considerably. 
Furtlier, 
as regards the incidence of tax, McLure'0`9 has shown that, through 
FA, US States 
transforined State Corporate Income Tax into a direct tax on FA factors. 
It follows 
10-57 236-237. - Mus, r. Ive (1984) Schäfer & SPengel 2 et seq., 
10" Wein er ( 1999) 21 et seq. 
1059 McLure (1986a) 70. 
"Ol I 
that tax is likely to i-nainly be bonie by immobile elements of the factors. ""'(' That is, 
those parts of the factors which cannot be sh-ifted out. "'ide the State's tax base. They 
often involve residents of the taxing state iii their capacity as consumers, immobile 
workers and owners of land. 
The precise defmition of factors in the EC will largely depend on public finance 
decisions. This is certainly a matter with political ranifficatimis. 106 ' Broadly, art 
increase in weight of in-state factors would favour maxiii-iisation of the domestic tax 
base. 1062 Conversely, double-weighting sales at destination would create art ilicelitive 
for inward investment through limiting the taxing emitlemeut of the productimi state. 
Meniber States may be faced with difficulty in strikmg, a deal mi this. Thus, the 
European UnioD, despite being, in part a ji-ionetary union (EMU), has ]lot yet 
accomplished ecomtnic integration. As a result, the Member States do not share 
similar priorities in their public finance policies., If coi-npromis-, e cannot be reached, it 
may be, worth considering the prospect of allowing each parent compaiiy's Member 
State to apply its own FA across the gr()UP. 1063 
Financial Accounts versus Tax Accounts 
106-4 
None of the EC group taxation initiatives provides for the hannoinsatioji of financial 
accounting rules of the Member States. Ujilformity plans do not go any furthei- thaii 
the creation of a commoii tax base. Indeed, accounting practices vary among the 
Member States. 1065 Further, the, obligatiou to apply IFRSAAS is limited to 
companies of which securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market of a 
Member State. 1066 
1060 Bird and Brean 1399. 
1061 Weiner (1999) 21 et seq. 
106'2 McLure & Weiner 2166-269. 1063 
see earlier in this Chapter: Part C, Section 1. 
1064 Transfer Pricing, Guidelines 111-23, McLurt &- Weiner 260. 
1065 Weiner (1999) 26-27. 
1066 Council and EuropeanParliament Regulation (EQ 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the applicition 
of international accounting standards [20021 OJ L243. 
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In light of this, the question arising is which accounts the values of factors will be 
derived fi-om. If the aim is to create a Ulliform f6miula, then the factors should be 
coinputed under conni-ion rules. In threel 067 of the four EC initiative, -, ggroup entities 
have to prepare tax accounts under common rules. Using these accounts to compute 
the factors' values appears the only feasible solution, given the divergence in ZI 
financial accounting rules. It is, though, financial accounts which depict a 
company's results more accurately. Adjtistinents inade to them, for tax purposes,, 
may partty distort the initial picture. Yet, there does not seem to be any better option 
to consider. 
( ) The VAT-based FA 
The EL11-Opearl COIIUIIiSSiOll POIICY CIOCUIIIeltSIO68 propose an acýjusted version of the 
harmonised VAT base' 069 as a starting point ii-i creating a single-factor FA. Given 
the. difficulties connected. with working out con-in: ion rules for sales, property or Z7 
payroll, this is an option worth considering. 
The proposal has been for an origin-based value-added factor, wlIjclI implies that a 
number of adjustments to the current structure will be reclLtired. 
1070 More, 
specifically, exports will have to be brought into the tax base and imports to be 
excluded. This is necessary to protect the taxing entitlement of the Member State in 
whicli the econoinic activity originates. Otherwise, there would be an effect sucli as 
1067 CCCTB, EUCIT and the SInale Harmonised Tax Base. 
an Staff Paper 504-, COM(2003)726 21. apart from the policy documents of the Europe, 
institutions, Lodin and Ganuýnie's FIST also elaborates on the prospect of a t'Ormula 
based on value 
added: HST (Lodin and Ganin-ýe) 47-50. 
1069 Council Directive (EEC) 77/388 of '17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws ofthe Menaher 
States relating to turnover taxes - Coi-yu-non system of value added tax: uniforni 
Nisis ofassessment 
[1977] OJ L1451 key textbooks on VAT include: P Farmer and R Lyal, I,, C J'(LA- Law (Oxford 
University R-ess, Oxford 2003)1 B Terra and J Kajus, A Guide to the l-, -uropean VM'Directive. ý: 
Iniroduction io European VAT and Other Indirect Txyes vol I (Boek-Werk Studio, the Netherlands 
21006). 
1.070 Weiner (2005) 47. 
11) 0 11 
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that of sales allocated to destination, which is applied by several US States to 
support inward investment. 
As the aiii-i is to catch value-added at origin., FA will take the form of an implicit tax 
on the factors of prodUCtiOll. 1 07 1 Given the absence of tax rate harmonisation in 
VAT, the origin approacti may raise income shifting concerns. Thus, the destination 
principle was adopted as a transitional regime to tackle manipulation in cross-border 
cases and preserve neutrality of the system. 1072 In the absence of tax rate uniformity, 
detact-ting tax fi-om the location of consumption would encoUrage artificial income- 
shifting schemes to flourish. In that sense, the objective of combatilig, transfer 
pricing tl-rrouý)Ji consolidation and apportionment would be sel-IoLisly Lindermined. 
Further, 
) there are economics at-gunients 
1073 which favour allocatioii of some value to 
the niarkethig location. 1 074 Taking account of the mterplay between SLIPPly and 
demand is also treated as leading to inter-jurisdictional equity. 1075 
Further, the VAT regime ou hivestment goods will have to be replaced by 
depreciation I-LI]eS suitable to apply with-M a direct taxation framework. Under the 
Sixth Directive, the entire amount of mput VAT incun-ed in connection with 
jilvestinent goods is set off against output VAT upon acqUISItIoll. The amouut of 
input VAT that has beeii deducted Lipoii acqLiisitioii is theii Subject to a five-year 
adjustment. "" Such a schenie is not suitable for a systei'n of direct taxes. 
1071 
ibid 48. 
1072 1 Roxan, 'Locating the Fixed Establishment in VAT' [1998] British Tax Review 608,618 et seq. 
1073 Musg-rave (1984) 233-234 & 242-243. 
1074The i-narketing location does not necessarily coincide with the production state. It 
liom, ever, a 
suitable direct tax proxy for consumption. 
1075 Mu s oTave (1984) 231. 
1076 Th 
-is is so, provided 
that the sector of the company's business served by those goods en-a0es iii C7 Z7 1ý 
am activity taxable for VAT purposes. 
1077 No adjustment shall be applied insofar as the investment goods are used iii VATable traiisactions. 
In the event that the goods cease to serve VATable activity before the 5-year period is ()\tr, an 
adjustment is required to account For the remaining time. That is 1/5 of the overall mput 
VAT for 
each year of the adjustment period. So, in the case that VATable activity ceases 
iii the coLtr, ýc ()fthc 
third year, 3/5 ofthe input VAT already deducted upon purchase shall be adjusted. 
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Macro-econon-tic approaches'O'8 to the matter have also been put forward. It ", 
suggested that allocation may be done in accordaiice with each country's share of 
the aggregate EU VAT base. 
Evaluating the prospect of adopting a VAT-based FA is mainly a task for economics 
which lies beyond the scope of this thesis. The legal perspective pri-InarIly deals with 
how the scbeme sbOLIld be scheduled once econoiyýc research arrives at the 
conclusion that it is worth implementfi-ig. 
Conclusion 
The EC project relating to FA raises interesting challenges. Exan-iples can be derived 
fi-om the experiences of countries with long-lastiiig expertise in the field. Howcvcr, 
choices should be actiusted to the realities of the EU. The absence of conillion rule,, 
for financial accountincy makes the implementation of factors, already tried in the LIS 
and Canada, a complicated process. Further, lack of economic integration is bound 
to be aii impedi-ii-lent to a Meniber States' agreement on the FA factors. It is normal 
that states do not share similar public finance priorities- In light of this, a formula 
based on value-added is a prospect wl-Lich cannot be excluded at this stage. It seems 
though to suffer a major drawback related to trwisfer prices if scheduled as ail 
origill-based scheme. Econoii-iists' research may provide ii-iore input on d-lis in the 
near future. For the tiriie, being, a value-added formula which balances pl'OCILICtl()Il L_ 
and marketing states can certaii-ily be an option for consideration. 
To conclude, FA may be structured to fulfil the objectives of an EC-wide group 
taxation system. Even where not fully fiw-monised, no complexity is caused imsofar 
1078 PB Sorensen, Company T(ix Refom. lit the European Union (Economic Policy Rescarch Unit, 
Institute of Economics University ofCopenhagen, 2003) 9. 
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as the parent state's rules are applied across the group. Further, in determining FA 
factors, accOUIIt should be taken of the large share that services occupy EC 
Member States' econon-fies. The 'Massachusetts' formula does not appear the best 
Solution for accornmodatirig conuilercial structures of the 21" century. 
CONCLUSION 
The main research question of this thesis has dealt witli the prospect for creating a 
group taxation system meant, to allow groups of con-ipanies active III more t1lall one 
EC Member State to be taxable under one single set of rules. The objective has beell 
to specify what shape the elements of such a system should take as wetl ýis to 
identify the areas of complexity or probable impasse. 
It has been explained in the Introduction to this thesis that the creatioii Of SUCh a 
schen-le for group taxation has no precedent internationally. This is where its nmelty 
derives fi-oin An EC-wide group taxation systern is intended to extend across 
national jurisdictions within an internal market which has set itself objectives of 
close integration. A novel setting is thLis created by the scheine's 11-11,11ti-Jurisdicti0iial 
dimension and the effort to strike a balance betweeii the objectives of market 
integration and Men-iber States' sovereignty. Z7 
g feature, generally relevant to direct. taxation, is the limited amount Another strikin( 
of EC legi. slation i-n the field of corporate taxes. Most development accomplished in 
the area is a result of the ECJ's jurisprudence. This is, however, a fi-aginented 
approach, since the court cai-mot go beyond the facts of the case brought before it. 
Inevitably, therefore, the Effs rulings have an impact of lilifited scope - even 
occasionally strong. 1079 
Devising a group taxatioii schen-ie is a totally distinct process fi-om that leading to 
the Effs jurisprudence. As explained in Chapter 4 of tl-tis thesis, the former 
involves rules which refer to broader objectives inherent in the EC Treaty. 
'080 Those 
objectives do not have direct effect, wl-tich ineans that they are not individually 
107" For instwice. M&S; see earlier in this thesis Chapter 1, Part B, Section 11, 
Title B. 
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enforceable before the courts. It follows that group taxation is not about devising a 
scherne to fix an infringement of the EC Treaty, which is broadly what the ECJ 
focuses on. Still though, any created scheme for group taxation should not comaiii 
features that breach the j ioi i-discrimin at io n/no ii - restrict io n tests of the ECJ. 
Considering this, two background chapters on the ECJ's jurisprudence aiid positive 
integration respectively have been incorporated into this thesis. They set the current 
state of affairs in corporate taxation in the EIM. This is the setting in which group 
taxation initiatives should fit. 
Before n-ioving on to exploring each individual ele. ment of the group taxation 
scheme, the following questioii had to be answered: whether regulatim, ain-iing at 
the elin-imation of disparities, is necessary in creating a setting of efficiency for the 
EIM. 1 08' In effect, the conclusion has been that, despite the silence of the EC Treaty, 
some degree of uniforii-Lity appears a necessity iii paving the way to inarket 
ii-itegration. Examples were drawn frorn the structure of sub-national corporate taxes 
in the US and in Switzerlaiid. Those countries do not, in principle, share the view 
that regulation contributes vitally to accomplisliing n-larket integration. It was 
explained, thougfli, that these states acconin-iodate certaiii fe atures ensuriýng a degree 
of approxýiiation at sub-federal level. Further, it was shown that the meclianisms 
wliicli led to such approxii-i-lation iii the two countries are absent from the EC. As a 
result, the discussion concluded that regulation should be treated as the primary 
means to establish a certain amount of ut-tity within the EINI. 
11. The Elements of the Scheme 
1080 See Chapter 4, Part, B, Section 1. 
1081 Ibid. 
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The conclusions reached in each individual chapter of the thesis on the elements of 
an EC-wide group taxation scheme will be discussed below. In addition to surveyllhy 
each feature separately, the identified interactions will also be explored. 11182 
(i) Entitlement to Group Membership 
Different tests for group membership, also derived fi-oill fields outside direct 
taxation, were explored. Arriong them, the unitary business incorporates a 
fundament ally distinct concept of group definition. It is built through the use of 
substantive criteria and its existence is buttressed on the unity of commercial 
activity. The other three tests (i. e. ownership, control and VAT ý-'I'OLIPIII(, ) are more 
technical in nature. Ownership is measured by reference to holding percentage. 
Further, control in principle features in company law and deals with votflig rights. 
Finally, the rules applying to VAT grouping employ the same parameters (i. e. 
holding percei-itage) as ownership tests. So, in practice, this cannot be a self- staild ill g, 
""Olutioll. 
The choice made m this thesis is for a techtiical test. The principal argyLimem behind 
is the uncertainty inherent in defining a unitary bLtsiiiess. 
""ý" This Sh()Uld be 
considered iii coiijuilctimi with. the assumptimi that group inembership will be 
deten-rýiiied by one simyle authority - most possibly, that of the parem emity. 
It is 
tý 
thus clear that mi uncertain test on group n-lembership would increase the number of 
disputes aniong the participating states over the decision on group membership. 
It is true that technical tests for group membership do not interact smoothly witil the 
allocation of the group taxable base by FA. Indeed, FA, by definition, pi-oduces 
1082 'njose interactions mainly concem the compatibility of a techilicA tvl; l 
for determining 
entitlement to (7Trouf) membership with FA. Tbe relation between the methods for tax hase inteffation 
and FA is also relevant 
1013 See Chapter 6, Part. B, Section 11. 
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accurate results only iii the context of a single business. 1084 Otherwise, differences in 
profit a]. -)ili, t y and ii-i the weight of the factors distort the outcome Of the 
apportionment. Thus, this is also demonstrated by the fact that, at the level of group 
taxation, FA has so far been linked to a Un-itary definition. Considering this, the 
con-clusion is that there should be a certain degree of coherence in the business fields 
iii which a group engages. Otherwise, significant distortion would be inevitable and 4-- 
the schen-ie would be prone to manipulation. It should be noted, though, that, ]n 
Canada and Switzerland, FA is applied to apportion revenues of a single entity to the 
efigible provinces and cantons respectively. Typically, it is not necessary that only 
one business activity is carried on through a certaii-i entity. So, there is a precedent of 
apportioning more than one business tl. uou(yli the sarne FA. 
Tecl-mical tests may also give rise to concerns of tax abuse. to'ý This is, in principle, 
related to the fact that the lack of substantive criteria allows manipulation consisting 
of artificially incorporating, bushiess activities into a group. It has been proposed that 
a system of monitoring be put In place. In that context, transfers of business into 
group entities, shortly before or after their registration as group members, should be 
tested for their commercial purpose. The taxpayer may also bear the onu., "- of 
providing evidence that there is no tax avoidance purpose in bringing a new activity 
MtO the group. 
In deciding for a technical test, this thesis also advanced a position in favour of ail 
1086 
ownership criterion as opposed to control. It was thus argued that control 
highlights a degree of unity which shareholding tests alone are not in a position to t--1) 
ensure. However, tWs is no guarantee of unity of the business activity. Rattier, it is 
instead a management-related unity. So, control tests do not add substantive 
elements to the tax system. In that sense, control does not make a 
better solution 
than ownership. Further, ownership was found to be a ii-lore suitable policy clioice 
than control. More specifically, the items attached to control IiighliLYI)t issues wli1cli 
1084 See Chapter 6, Part B, Section 1. 
1085 See Chapter 6, Part B, Section 11. 
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are crucial to conipany law. In contrast, wheii it comes to taxatloii, the decisive 
elemem is profit, since it rougl-tly provides the basis for computatimi of the fiscal 
liability. N this context, ownership, in the form of shareholding, is naturally the 
decisive factor iii detennining entitlernent to distributed profit. 
(ii) The Group Tax Base 
f 
Exai-yiples were drawn froni national group taxatioii systems to show that the terin's 
'coiisolidatiou' and 'pooling' are ofteii used intercliaiigeably. There is no clear 
distinction betweeii the two but this is not a matter of practical sigmificaiice in aii EC 
group taxation system It has also beeii demmistrated that coil-inioll rules should 
apply to computing the tax base witliiii each UTOUP for the purpose ()f preveritim-, 
overlap. That is, unlforn-iity does not necessarily need to extend across the EC. It 
rather suffices to have comi-rion rules confined to each group. Iii this way, tile 
taxpayer is still subject to one set of rules. Conversely, rate divergence does not 
cause distortion. Instead, it contributes to retaining a certam aniount of tax 
competition within the i-narket. 
This thesis also explored how a system of cmisolidatioii/poolflig ii1teracts witli 
separate accounting and FA in comptitimT taxable profit. It was concluded that, iii a 
framework comprising more than one taxing jurisdiction, coiisolidation/poolincy is 
ilicompatible with separate accounting. On the other hwid, there is an inextricable 
link between FA and consolidation when it con-ies to a cross-border group. Thus, the 
allocation of the taxable base by FA in principle presupposes the existence of a 
single tax base. Apart from that, the degree of integration of the single group base 
does not seem to have an impact on the FA. 
1086 fbid. 
As regards the elements to be incorporated into the tax base, the view takeil in tills 
thesis is for a broad definition. ' 087 The aim is to bring as mai-ly elemems as possible 
into the FA. A distinction between business and non-busli-less income, sin-lilal- to that 
of UDITPA, would allow transfer pricing to survive into the system. This Ps because 
non-consolidated iten-Ls would need to comply with the forn-ialities of prichig at 
arn-i's length. Considering that combathig transfer pricing con-ipliance costs is one of Z Zý 
the key objectives of the EC-wide group taxatioii inltiatl\! e, -', 
1088 keeping these low 
should be a guiding pr4iciple. 
(iii) The Territorial Scope 
The term which doininates discussion on the territorial scope of an EC group 
taxation systein is 'water's edge'. This thesis does not challen(Ye the policy choice to tý 
apply 'water's edge' to EC group taxation. 1089 Rather, it builds on that assumption. 
In Chapter 8, the analysis demonstrated how the concept evolved, III COIIjLIIICtiOII 
with unitary taxation., throughout the twentieth century. There is also discusslon of 
the rules on 'water's edge' as set out in the US Multistate Tax Model. 
In deciding on the territorial. width of an EC-wide UTOLIJ) taXat1OII System, trading 
proceeds and passive incon-ie, were considered without distinction in this tliesis-'("" 
That is in line witli the view that the group tax base subject to apportioninent should 
be the broadest possible. '('91 Account has also been taken of the intra-EC aspect of a 
possible distinction between business and non-business income. TWs has an 
impact 
on delineathig the iritra-EC territorial contours of the group. Namely, the 
Member 
States rriay decide to exclude ii-Lflows of passive income derived frorn non-affiliated 
entities resident in the EC from the group tax base. Those will then 
have to be 
1087 This is, also the position of the European Conmssion: scc WG 
Doc 4 on Intl Aspects para 7. 
10" Stafl'Paper 2255 et seq. 10"' See Chapter 8, Introduction. 
1000 See Chapter 8, Part B, Section 111, Title 2. 
10"' WG Doc 4 on Int'l Aspects pýTa 7. 
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allocated to the recipient group on the basis of arm's leng. tli pricing whicli brinLys 
forth obligations for compliance witli transter pricing nonTis. 
The focal matter in defining an EC-wide group's territory touches upon the clash 
caused as a result of applying FA internally and international tax rules In deafin(=)ýrs 
with entities outside 'water's edge'. From the perspective of the EC, two sets of facts, 
have been identified: 
(1) Where relief should be giveii within 'water's edge' for tax paid in a third country 
by a PE or for withholding tax on inflows of dividends, interest or royalties, 
(2) Where income of a PE held by a third-country entity is taxed within 'water's 
edge' as part of the group tax base. 
In connection with (1), the analysis in this thesis was built on the thoughts put 
V- 092 
torward by the European Commission as part of the CCCTB project. ' There are 
two alter-native ways to regulate the obligation to provide relief: 
(a) hicome geuerated outside 'water's edge' is iiot adinitted as part of the group tax 
base. This would imply that transfer pricing compliance obligations enter Into the Z7 
picture. As iricome will be allocated to the eligible Member States by attribution, the 
taxable value of individual transactions will have to be fixed at ann's length. As a 
result, hioli costs for compliance with transfer pricing reporting obligations will 
persist, which will cancel part of the advantages expected to be derived from 
operatilig FA. 
(b) Inco nle sourced outside 'water's edge' is incorporated ýIto the 
coiisolidated/pooled tax base. A problen-i surfaces where the Member State of the 
Head Office's residence is bound by the DTC concluded with tile state of tile PE's 
location to provide relief by credit for source taxation borne by the PE. Provided the 
PE income is consolidated/pooled and apportioned across tile grOL11), the credit 
should also be apportioned. It has been explamed how DTC obligations clash ý, \)ith 
10"2 WG Doc 3 on hill Aspects Annex. 
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the possible methods for allocating that credit across the group. 11193 In this i-egard, it 
was found that mechanisms for relief In the US and UK tax systems could Pl-o\](-'C 
1094 TI, le exist- an example of apportioning credit without a need to amend DTCs. is MU 
US and UK schemes do not involve identical sets of facts as those in issue hut the 
U11derlying question is corm-lon to both. A critical matter is that the EC-\\,, ide group 4-- - 
should typically qualify as a single entity - if a parallel is to be drawti to the above 
US and UK schemes. However, given that the Member States are meant to retain 
their full sovereignty -in taxation, each group member will be due to settle its tax 
liabilities individually. That points to a structure clearly distinguisliable from the 
concept of single entity. 
The situatioti under (2) is most likely to create problen-is at the DTC level if the PE's 
tax liability C011-1pUted by FA is higher than the outcome of au attrIbUti0ii at arin Is 
length. Thus, the third country (where the Head Office is resident) is theii likely to 
object that the jUrisdiction of source goes beyond its tax. mg ejititlemellt. " )0_1ý hi that 
context, the need to i-e-negotiate DTCs con-les to the. fore once again. The challces of 
a solution, throulgh accepting the result of FA, M principle depend (m the third 
country. No apportiomnew is required Ilere for tlIe PUI-POSe Of C0II-1PLItIII(-Y the amomit 
for WIIICII relief ShOUld be granted. This is because the PE's taxable base and fiscal L- 
liability Iii the Men-iber State of source are 1dentifiable. 
Formulary Apportionment 
It was shown that the formula does not have to be uniform across the EC. bideed, to 
the end of preventhig distortion, it suffices that common rules apply to each single 
group. Further, this thesis casts doubt on whether the. 'Massachusetts' formula is 
appropriate to apl-x)i-tion incon-le fi-om services. Finally, the possibility of a VAT- 
1093 WG Doc -2 on 
Int'l Aspects paras 7&8. 
1094 See Chapter 8, Part B, Section 111, Title 2. (1). 
'095Chaptcr 8, Part B, Sectim 111, Title 2. (11). 
-1 
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based formula is also explored but it is mentioned that any in-depth study is 
primarily a task for economists. 
(v) Administrative Matters 
A number of areas relevant to administering au EC-wide group taxatioii systern were 
explored. In most fields, it has beeii very complicated to work out solutions and t1iis 
is more precisely true for dispute resolutioii and tax audits. Still thoug, 11. , "oIlle 
proposals have been made. 
Pie analysis was divided into four sections: conTliance, enforcement, disputc, 
resolution and re-assessment of tax liability. 
In the field of conipliaiice, possible options were considered for group reoristratimi 1=ý 
and return filing as well as for deteriiiining the taxable periods. Where relevalit to 
the issues discussed, examples were drawii from national group taxation system', lil 
Europe ()I- the practice of US Unitary states. Ail effort has beell ]I-lade to strike a 
balance betweeii integration objectives and Member States' sovereigmy. 
It was thus put forward that registration forinalities should be carried out ]n the 
parent entity's -state, whilst a mechanism should be set up to allow the Member 
States to object to that. 
Regarding return filing, the prospect of a single tax return seems to be out of the 
question, since each Men-iber State is due to retain its own taxing 
jurisdictioil. Oil 
that assun-iption, the only significant contributioDof a scheine akin to a 
'ojie-stop- 
shop' would be to allow the taxpayer to deal with only one tax adn-finistratiOll. 
"" 
1096 E-Commerce VAT Directive. 
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In relation to fixing tax periods, this author's view is that no definitive conclus'01's 
can be reached. The niatter appears to be more of a policy choice. Further, 
international practice witnesses a clearly fi-agmented approach. In tl-Lis the,, Is, the 
position taken is for accounthig years which coincide, as otherwise coordination 
problems are bound to emerge. 
A sophisticated system for the exchange of iDformation is a necessity. In that 
context, mechanisms for the auton-iatic transfer of data among the Member States 
will have to be created in specific inatters. M addition, it is hievitable that extensive 
disclosure takes place in the context of audits. That could face the Member States' 
strong opposition. 
Brief reference was also inade to the prospect of laying down. a cominon fi-ainework 
for rulings. It was found that this will be necessary where the questions referred 
affect other states' tax base entitlement. "'9" 
In the field of tax audits, it was explained that allowing the Member States to audit 
group entities separately would lead to chaotic situations. As a result, this thesill. 
treats the prospect for furnishing the parent emity witti the responsibility to carry OUt 
audits across the, group as the only optioii. '('" It has been discussed that Issues of 
sovereignty could trigger possible resistance to such a scheine by the Member 
States. In addition, it has been stressed that coordination and assistance an-loiig the 
Member States iii the course of audits will be a condition for a successful operation. 
More specifically, given that financial reporting norms will remain disparate, local 
accountant*s' assistai-ice is expected to be valuable in reading the results of the group 
subsidiaries. 
TI-ds thesis takes a two-fold approacli to dispute settlement. That is, procedures for 
resolution should be in place to deal with 
disputes between Member States, on the 
'1097 See Chapter 5, Part B, Section 11. 
1098 See Chapter 5, Part B, Section 111. 
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one liand, wid taxpayens, and revenue authorities, on the other. TNs is allodler 
reflection of the balance sought to be achieved between intergovernmental reality 
and market integration objectives. 17, 
In diSpUtes between Member State-s, the proposal has been for a fast-track procedure 
Of reSOILItiOll. 1099 It is suggested that an initial period of six rnonths for direct 
negotiation should be coupled with an arbitration panel, due to produce a binding 
decision in the next half-a-year. It is also set forth that tile ECJ could provide the 
appropriate institutional st. ructure to accorni-nodate the above. Namely, TEC art 239, 
supplemented by a new set of Rules of Procedure, could be a suitable legal 
hainework. 
On the front of disputes between taxpayers and revenLie authorities, the positimi 
taken is that the parent entity should be entitled to represent the group before the 
national (tax) courts and the ECJ. These cases will in principle fall witliin the 
competence of national courts wid may be considered by the ECJ through a 
reference for prelin-iiiiarY ruling. "00 
111. Evaluation of the Prospects for Implementation and Future 
Potential 
On a consideration of purely tecl-inical matters, a group taxation system meant to 
subject MNEs to a single set of rules across the EC is a feasible project. This is true, 
irrespective of the complexities likely to emerge at the implementation stage. 
The 
tý 
discussion of the structural elements of such a scheme hi the core chapters of this 
thesis has revealed areas which require specific regulation. This is primarily 
due to 
109L) See Chapter 5. Part C, Sectioti 11. 
'100 See Chapter 5, Part C, Section 111. 
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the new concepts iiiherent in group taxation, such as the rules for group definition, I -- Zý 
the computation of the group tax base and the structure of FA. 
In this author',,, view, i-ilost of the technical difficulties related to in-1pleinenting an 
EC-wide group taxation system are in principle possible to work out. The 1-nost 
complex part of the scheme touches upon the group's international dirriension and, 
unore precisely, involves the interaction between FA and pricing at arm',, lengyth. ""' 
This thesis sets forth examples from the UK and the US DTC practice in dealing 4-7 
with cases of apportionnient. 1102 Still though, where an EC-based PE is held by a 
third-country Head Office, the chances of arriving at a solution entirely depend oil 
the third country. Iii other fields, ancillary measure,, may be needed to SLIPJAenlent 
the principal rule. For instance, the entitlenlent to guroul-) n-len-ibership, if defined by 
reference to ownership, raises tax abuse concerns. ' 103 So, anti-avoidance legislation Z7 
should be enacted to properly deal. with this. 
H owever, apart t rom the difficulties attached to the substance, political choice is also 
a crucial factor which often causes deadlock i-n a decision-Illaking process. In ail EC 
group taxation context, tN. s implies that the Member States will have to be 
convinced that such an bl-itiative is in faVOL11' of their interests. In fight of this, it is 
vital that the proposed regulatory framework is oiven a forni that the states would be 
likely to accept. For histance, in the CCCTB initiative, quarterly consultations take 
place between the Comi-nission. and a Working Group C011-1poSed of national 
representatives. This should allow the Member States to make their views clear 
ahead of the Proposal for a Directive expected in 2008. 
Awther path for attracting the Member States' positive vote could be to inake the 
group taxation proposal part of a wider cornpronfise. This is a strategy successfully 
followed in the 'Tax Package', an initiative wl-flch the Council agreed to embark on g Z: ý 
in 1997. Two Directives (i. e. I &R and Saviýigs Directives), together with a Code of 
1101 See Chapter S. Part B, Section 111, Title 2. (1) & (iii). 
1102 Ibid 
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Conduct foi- business taxation, became part of a single deal. The three acts could 
thus be adopted by the Member States either as a whole or not at all. That allowed a 
balance to be struck an-iong conflicting national interests. ' 104 ALý 
The legislators could also make aii effort to render the new scheii-ie n-iore familiar to 
the Member States. That would definitely increase the chances for a Positive 
reception. An example set forth in this thesis is to use the ECJ's institutional 
framework, under a new set of Rules of Procedure, iii resolving disputes 1vtween the 
Member States. ' 105 In addition, the cfioice for an ownership test of group definition 
also draws on the Member States' familiarity with the holding percentage in their 
national group taxation systems. ' 10" 
Europe does not currently seen-i determined to engagge in pioneeriug, action. 
Considering this, a failure to convince all Men-iber States to adopt the group taxation 
schei-ne should be faced as a probable occurreiice. This is all the more so, since 
unanimity in taxes is expected to be retamed under any near-future replacement of 
the CLIlTellt treaties. Under these circi-IIIIStances, it could be wortli considering the 
prospect for laying down a fi-ainework of enlianced cooperation, so that the project 
can be advanced by the Member States wishing to inove ahead. 
' 107 The drawbacks 
attached to the i mp lei nentation of enhanced cooperation would be significant. More 
specifically, market fraggmentatioD would persist. Further, transfer pricing and DTC 
matters inherent iii the function of 'waters edge' groups would now SLIrVIVe WitI1111 
the system on a larger scale. This is because priciiig at arin',, -, IejIgtlI would not only 
be relevant to flows to and fi-oni third countries but also non-cooperating Member 
States. 
1103 See Chapter 6, Part B, Section 11(it'). 
1104 <http: //ec. europýi. euJLaxatioii - customs/taxati 
on/compan yý-tax/gen-overvie w/i ii dex-en -h till> 
"0' See Chapter 5, Part C, Sections 11 & 111. 
1106 See Chapter 6, Part. B, Section 11. 
1107 Commission (EC). 'A Common Consolidated EU Corporate Tax Base' (Non-Paper to Informal 
ECOFIN Cotincil of 10 &II September 2004), 7 July'2004,4. 
)19 
Overall, the creation of aii EC-wide group taxation system does not appear a 
prospect for the very short-tenn A Proposal for a Directive may come out in 2008. 
It could take, however, years until it reaches adoption by the Council. The history of 
decision-n-laking at the EC level indicates that this may tum out to be a long 
process. '1108 In. the meantime, it could perhaps be worth moving gradually towards a 
4cornprehemsive' group taxation schen-ie through targeted approaches. ""9 Such a 
process would familiarise the national administrations with the new concepts. It 
would at least constitute a step forward. 
This thesis has only meant to analyse the broad structural elements of aii EC-\vide 
group taxation system. It stayed at the level of framework and attempted to cover all 
the major policy decision,,, attached to a potential schenie. Given the current state of 
EC integration in direct taxes, more detailed research placed in a nalToWer scope 
could easily miss the target. So, this work is more of a start than an end. 
Group taxation at EC level is a field which started to receive researchers' attention In 
the last six years. That has obviously been in the aftermatli of the Staff Paper. It is 
certain that EC group taxation will attract n-iore interest in the con-iing years as ideas 
reach soii-le maturity. Further, the European Comn-iission's initiative on the CCCTB 
is in progress and should take the forti-i of a Proposal for Directive in the course of 
2008. Significant I)eadway should therefore be expected in the near future. This will 
primarily be at the policy-making level of the EU institutions. As said, the reception 
of those projects by the Member States remains doubtful. 
I'llis author's ahn will have been fulfilled if this work is still useful 
background 
reading in teii years' time. 
1108 See earlier in this thesis Chapter 2, Part A&B for the Directives, adopted in 
the carly 1990s. 
1109 Staff Paper 325 et seq. 
32 0 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
HE Abrams and RL Doeniberg, Essentials (ýI'United Stwes T(tx(ttion (Kluwer Law 
Internationat, the HagUe 1999) 1110 
Advisory Commission on- Intergovemmental Relations, 'State Taxation of 
Multinatimial Corporations' (1983) 18 Tax Notes 995 
D Aigner, 'The Bosal Holding BV Case: Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Freedom 
of Establi. slin-ient' (2004) 32 Intertax 148 
D AigDer, 'Freedom of Establisliniera and Deduction of Participation Expenses' 
[20031 SWI 63 
I Althaus-Houriet, 'Law of Taxation' in F Dessemontet and T Ansay (eds), 
Introduction to Swiss Law (3rd edn KILlwer Law International, the Hague 2004) 217 
SC Al. tonian, 'Constitutional Law - Application of Califorma's "Worldwide 
Con-ibined, Reporthig" to Compute Corporate Franchise Tax of Forelgil- Based 
Multinational Business - Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board' (1995) 29 
Suffolk University Law Review 11533 
C Amby, 'Report on Group Taxation i-n Denmark' iii IFA (ed'), Cahiers de droit 
fiscal international vol. 89b (Cahiers de drolt fiscal intemational, IFA, 2004) 233) 
M Ai-dizzoni, German Tax and Business Laiv (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005, ) 
A Arnull, The European Union and its Court of* Justice (''2"" edn Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2006) 
M Aujean, 'European Comn-ýssioii Laullches Compreheiisive Strategy to Promote 
Tax Coordination iný the-EU' (editorlab (2007) 16 EC Tax Review 63 
JF Avery Jones, 'Flows, of capital betweeii the EU and third countries and the 
consequences of disharmony in European international tax law7 (1998) 7 EC 
Tax 
Review 95 
JF Avery Jones, 'What is the, difference between Schumacker and GillY? ' [ 19991 
British Tax Review II 
JF Avery Jones, 'A Comn-lent on "AMID: The Wrong Bridge or a Bridge Too Far"T 
251 [2001 ] European Taxation'. 
1110 -11-le bibliography listed below is compiled in alphabetical order in conformity to the rules of 
OSCOLA 2006 - 'Me Oxford Stcuidard for Citation of 
Legal Authorities. 
322 
RS Avi-Yonah, 'Tax Policy Forum - The Implications of Federal Tax Systems for 
European Tax Harmonisation' (1991) 45-27 Tax Notes International (page 
numbering not available on Lexis-Nexis) 4n 
P Baker, Double Tax Conventions: A Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention 
on Inconte and C(tpital (loose-]eat) (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005) 
SL Barone and K Zerreimer, 'Over the Edge: State Taxation of Multinational 
Corporations in the Wake of Barclays' (1995) 10 St. Jolm's Joumal of Legal 
Con-unentary 34-33 
F Baylis, 'Advance PI-iCiDg Agreeinents: What Will They Offer? ' [20001 European 
Taxation'229 
RM Bird (ed), Fiscal Dimensions of'Canadian Federalism in Financing Canadian 
FederatioD No 4 (Financing Canadian Federation, Canadian Tax Foundation, 
Toronto 1980) 
RM Bird and DJS Brean, 'TI-te hiteijurisdictional Allocation of Income and the 
Urtitary Taxation. Debate' [Nov/Dec 1986] Canadian Tax JOUrnal 1377-1416 
RM Bird and JS Wilkie, 'Source- vs. Residence- based Taxation in the European 
Union: the Wrongr Question? ' in KG Banting, DM Brown and TJ Courchene (ed), 
The Future of Fiscal Federalism. (chapter 4) (SCIIOOl Of POIICY StUdies Queen's 
University Kingston, Ontario 1994) 79 
RM Bird, 'A Cornparative Perspective on Federal Finance' in KG Bantfilgy, DM 
Brown and TJ Courchene (eds), The Future (ýf Fiscal Federalism (chapter 9) (School 
of Policy Studies Queen's University Kingston, Ontario 1994)29-') 
BI Bittker, Regulation of Interstate and Foreiqvi Commerce (Aspen Law & 
Business, New York 1.999) 
G Blokland, 'Inaugural Lecture by Prof. Dr D. M. Weber: In Search of a (New) 
Equilibriuni between Tax Sovereignty and the Freedom of Movement in the EC' 
[2007] European Taxation 69 
zerischen Stetterrechts (6"' edn E Blumenstein and P Locher, System. des Schwei. 
Schulthess, Airich 2002) 
RW Boadway and PAR Hobson, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
in Canada 
Canadian Tax Paper No 96 (Canadian Tax Papers, Canadian Tax Foundation, 
Toronto 1993) 
BA Boczek, 'Taxation in Switzerland' in Harvard Law School International Tax 
Proorram (ed), World Rix Series (World Tax Series', Commerce Cleai-inL) House, 
1976) 
PJ te Boekhorst, 'Tax Reform at Final Stage: Law of 14 December 1990 oil the 
Federal Direct Tax & Law of 14 Decen-iber 1990 on the Harmonisation of the Direct 
Taxation of Cantons and Municipalities' 119911 European Taxation 215 
S Bond and others, Cotporate Tax Harmonisation in Europe: A Guide to the Debate 
(Tlie Institute for Fiscal Studies, May 2000) 
JA Borrat and A Bassiere, 'Report on GroUp Taxation in FraDce' in IFA (ed), 
Cah *ers de droit I I fiscal international vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 
IFA, 2004) 271 
I Brandstaetter and others, Investment in Austria (KPMG, Viemill 2004) 
JS Brown, 'Formulary Taxation and NAFTA' (1994) 49 Tax Law Review 759 
D de Buitleir, 'Europe and the Growth of Multinational Enterpi-Ises' MM Ganimie 
(ed), Striking the B(. tl(tn(-e: Tax Adminismition, Etift)rcement and Compliance in the 
1990s - 6"' Residential Coqfiýrence 16-17 April 199ý (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
London 1996) 
G De Burca and JR. H Weiler (eds), The European Court qf Justice (Oxford 
UnIvei-sity Press, Oxford 2001) 
F Cagianut, 'Art. 42quinquies' in J-F Aubert and otliers (eds), Kommentar Zur 
Bi.. indesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eitliiosseiis(ýh(ýfi 1, ()111 29. Maj 187,4 (Helbill, 
& Lichtenhalin Verlag AG, Basel 19961) 
JM Calderon, 'European Trarisfer Pricing Trends at the Crossi-oads: Caught between 
Globalisation, Tax Competition and EC Law' (2005) 3-3) Intertax 103) 
GN Carlson and H Galper, 'Water's Edge Versus Worldwide Unitary Combination' 
iii CE McLure Jr (ed), The Suite Corportmon Income Tax: Issues in Worldvt7ide 
Unitary Combimition (Hoover Institution Press Stanford University, California 
1984) 1 
D Carey, K Gordon and P Tliati-nai-iii, 'Tax Reform ill Switzerland' in OECD (ed), 
Working Papers vol 7 No 60 (OECD Workuig Papers, OECD, Paris 1999) 
MB Carroll, Ta. vation qf Foreign and National Enterprises vol. A. - 
Methods qf 
Allocating Ta. vable Inconie (30 September 1933) LN Doc 425(b) M 
217(b) 19'--*)3 IIA 
A Cassese, International Law (2 nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005) 
324 
RE Caves, Multinational enterprise and economic analYsis (Cambridge Llimtrsity 
Press, 1982) 
LC Celestin, 'The Fomiulary Apportionment to the Taxation of Transnational 
Corporations: A Realistic Alternative? ' (PhD thesis, University of Sydney 2000) 
L Cerioni, 'The Possible Introduction of Common Consolidated Base Taxation via 
Enhanced Cooperation: Some OpenIssues' 12006] European Taxation 187 
S Christemse. n. 'Forn. -itilary Apportionment: More Simple - On Balance BetterT 
(1997) 28 Law and Policy in hiternational Business 1133 
TBR Christenson 11, 'Cuno v DaimlerChrysler: A Normative Change in the 
Application of the Dormant Cominerce ClaUse as Applied to State Taxation' (2006) 
32 Ohio Northern University Law Review 23 
B Cleave, 'The Election ]ssue in Pirelli: Was There a Countervailing Advantage 
After All'? ' 1_2004] British Tax Review 78 
S Cnossen, 'Taxing Capital Income in the Nordic COL111trIeS: a Model foi- tile 
European Union"' i. u Cuossen (ed), Capital Income Taxation in the EU: Issues and 
Optionsfiv R(fimn. (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) 180 
S Cnosseii, 'Reform and Coordi-iiatiou ot Corporatiou Taxes in the European Union: 
aii Alternative Agenda' 12004134 Tax Notes Int'l (special SLIPPI. ) 1327 
AJ Cockfield. 'Tax Inteorat1k)n under NAFTA: Resolvinky the Ckmfllct between ZI 
Economic and Sovereignty Interests' (1998) 34 Stanford Journal International Law Zý 
AJ Cockfield, 'Formulary Taxation Versus the Anifs Length Principle: The Battle 
among Doubti-ng Thomasses, Purists and Pragn-latists' (2004) 52 Canadian 
Tax 
Journal 114 
Commission (EC), Report qf the Cominittee qf hidependew Experts ot'i Comptm. v 
Taxation (Office for Official Publications of the European Commumnes, 
Luxembourg 1992) 
A Cordewener, 'Cotyipany Taxation, Cross-Border FiDancMu and 'fl-tiii 
Capitalisation in the EU hiternal Market: Soine Conunents oii Latibl. orst-Hohorst 
Gm-bH' 12003] Europeaii Taxatimi 102 
A Cordeweiier, 'Foreign Losses, Tax Treaties and EC Fundamental Freedoms: A 
New Gerinan Case before the ECY 12003] European Taxation 294 
A Cordewener and others, 'The Tax Treatment of Foreign Losses: Ritter, M&S and 
the Way Ahead' [20041 European Taxation 135 (Pt 1) and 218 (Pt 2) 
A Craig and othens, 'UK Tribunal Rejects Loss Offset for EUI-opean SLihsidlarlcs' 
(2003) 29 Tax Notes Int'l 125 
A Craig and others, 'Challenge to UK CFC Legislation Referred to ECY (EC Tax 
Scene) (2004) 32 Intertax 530 
P Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 
P Craig and G De BUrca, EU Lavv. Text, Gises and Materials "-d edu Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2003) 
M Cuerrier, The Hann-onisation of Federal Tax LeIgIslation tx)oklet 7 (Canada Dept 
of Justice, Ottawa 2001 ) 
B Dafflort, Fiscal Federalism in Sývi t7erland: a surivi, ofcon-Mtutional i, ýsltes, 
budget responsibilitY and equalisation (Working Paper No 278) (Working Papený, 
University of Fribourg, Frilxmrg 1999) 
M Daly, 'Tax Coordination and Competition in Canada: Soine Lessoils for the 
European Community' Annex 9A in Commission of the European Cojnnlwlltlelý 
(ed), Rej)ort qf the Coml-nittee qfIndependent Experts on Company Taxation (Office 
for Official Publication,, of the European Communities, Luxembow-g 1992) ' 383 
M Daly and J Weiner, 'Corporate Tax Harn-ionisation wid Con-ipetition iii Federal 
Countries: Sorne Lessons for the ELtropean Con-iiminity"' (1993) 46 Natimial Tax 
Journal 441-61 
N Davies, Ettrope (Pinilico, 1997) 
PL Davies, Gower and Dai! ies' principles qf inodern coinpany law (7"' edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, I-A)ndon 2003 )) 
LA Denys, 'Previous EU Proposals for Cross-Border Loss Relief' 12006] European 
Taxation 443 ) 
MP Devereux, 'The Ruding Committee Report: An Economic Assessment' (1992) 
1-3 Fiscal Studies 96-107 
MP Devereux, 'The Harnionisation of Corporate Taxes in Europe: the RLidiILI 
Committee Report' (1992) 13) Fiscal Studies 
MP Devereux, "Prospects for Co-ordination of Corporate Taxation and the Taxation 
of Interest Income in the EU: A Comment' (1999) 20 
Fiscal Studies 1 -55-161 
WD Dexter, 'Attribution of a Multinational Corporation's Net Income: The Position 
of Unitary States Regarding Combined Reporting' (1985)) 18 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 311 
R Dien-ler and T Neale, 'The European Union's longer-tenn plans for MtrodLICillg a 
cominon consolidated tax base for the EU-wide activities of companic, "', ill IFA (ed), 
Cahiers de droitfiscal international vol 89b (CaNers de droit fiscal international, 
IFA, 2004) 69 
A van Doesuyiý H van Kesteren and G-J van Norden, 'Tfie Internal Market Wid 
VAT: h-itra-group transactions of branches, subsidiaries and VAT Crroups (2007) 6 
EC Tax Review 34 
M Dougan, 'Mininium Hannonisation aDd the h-tternal Market' (2000) 37 Common 
Market Law Review 853 
S Douina and C Naumburg, 'Marks & Spencer: Are National Tax Systems Echlir(-', '. l' 
[2006] European Taxation 43- )1 
S Douina, 'The Pree Ds of Direct Tax Jurisdiction: Disparity, Discrimination and 
Double Taxatioii' 1_20061 European Taxation 522 
AP Dourado, 'Free Movement of Capital and Capital Income Taxation within the 
European Union' (1994) 3 EC Tax Review 176 
AP Dourado, 'From the Saint-Gobain to the Meta IIg eselisch qft case: scope of non- 
di. scrimi-nation of pern-ianent establishments in the EC Treaty and the most-favow-ed- 
nation clause iii EC Member States tax treaties' (2002) 11 EC Tax Revicw 147 
PJ Douvier wid D Bouzoraa, 'Court of Appeal Confirms Incon-ipatibility of CFC 
Rules with Tax Treaties' 1200 11 European Taxation 184 
P Dukes, Paths to a New Europe: From Premodern to Postmodern Times (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2004) 
R Duss and R Bird, 'Switzerland's "Tax Jungle"' (1979) 27 Canadian Tax JOUrnal 
46 
A Easson., 'HarmonisatiOn of M-ect Taxation in the European Conummity: From 
Neumark to Ruding' (199'22) 40 Canadian Tax Journal 600-63- )8 
AK Eaton, Essa 
- 
vs in Rixation Canadian Tax Paper No 44 (Canadian Tax 
Papers, 
Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto 1966) 
P Eck],, 'The Tax Regime of Controlled Foreign Corrx) ratio n s' (Germany) J20031 
Europe: m Taxation 2 
P Eckl, 'Business Taxation: Heavy Tax Increase Imposed by the Tax Privilege 
Reduction Act' 120031 European Taxation 91 
HM Eckstein, 'Report on Group Taxation iii Germany' in IFA (ed), Cahiers de droit 
fiscal international vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 29) 
K Eicker,, 'The ECJ is likely to decide in a case relating to direct taxes on the 
relationship between freedom of establislunew and free movement of capital' (2000) 
28 Intel-tax 51 
K Eicker, 'CFC rules mider the scrutiny of the ECF (2002) 30 Intertax 478 
U Eisenhardt, Geselischaftsrecht (Beck, MUnchen 200. 2) 
MJ Ellis, 'Tax Law and Policy M an Adolescent Europeart Union - Response to Paul 
Farmer' [2007] Bulletin, for International Taxation 46 
D Endres, 'The Concept of Group Taxation: A Global Overview' (2003) _3 I 
Intertax 
"'49 
.3 
J Englisch, 'Fiscal Coliesion in the Taxation of Cross-Border Dividends' 120041 
Europewi Taxation '-: )2'-)--')27 (Pt 1) and 355-363 (Pt 2) 
J Encylisch, 'Shareholder Relief and EC Treaty Law - Supranational "Alms and : --n Effects"? ' (2005) 33) Intertax 200 
J Engfisch, 'The ELII'Opean Treaties' linplications for Direct Taxes' (2005) 33 
Intertax 3 10 
P Essers and others, 'Some Fiscal Aspects of Financing Structure,., within a Group of 
Coinpanies and Thin Capitalisation Approaches in Europe' (Report of the 
Wintercourse 1994) (1994) 3 EC Tax Review 167 
P Farmer md R Lyal, EC Tax Lmi, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 
P Fari-ner, 'National Anti-Ahuse Clauses and Distortion of the Sirtgle Marl'-'et: 
Corm-nents on Prof. Dr Radler's Article' [ 1994-1 EuropeariTaxation 3 14 
P Farmer, 'EC law aDd national rules on direct taxation: a phoney war? ' (1998) 7 
EC 
Tax Review 13 
P Farmer, 'The Court's case law on taxation: a castle built on shifting sands'. 1, (2003) 
12 EC Tax Review 75 
P Farmer, 'Tax Law and Policy in an Adolescent European Unýion' 12007] Bulletiji 
for International Taxation 42 
MT Fatale, 'Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional Nexus, Intangible Property and 
the State Taxation of Income' (1994) 23 Hofistra Law Review 407 
NIT Fatale, 'Federalisni and State Business Activity Tax Nexus: Revi.,, -, itin('t Public ltý Law 86-272' (2002) 21 Virginia Tax Review 435 
Federation des Experts Con-iptables Europeens, 'Controlled Foreign Corripany 
Legislations irt the EU' (Fee Position Paper) (April 2002) 
L Flynn, 'Con-iing of Age: The Free Movement of Capital Case Law 1993-2002' 
(2002) 39 Conuilon. Market Law Review 773 
GV La Forest, The Allocation qf Taxing Povver under the Canadian Constitution 
Canadian Tax Paper No 65 (Canadian Tax Papet-s, 2"' edn Canadiall Tax 
Foundation, 1981) 
VvT Fox, MN Murray and L Luna, 'How Should a SLibnational Corporate Income 
Tax on Multistate Businesses Be Structured' (2005) 58 National Tax Jounial U )9 
M Gammie, 'The Taxation of Inward Direct Investment ui North America followingy 
the Free Trade Agreenient' (1993-4) 49 Tax Law Review 615 
M Gaii-m-tie, 'Taxation Issues for the European Company' (1998) 7 EC Tax Review 
159 
M Ganimie, 'EU Taxation and the Societas Europaea - Harmless CreatUre or Trojan 
HorseT [20041 European Taxation -3 )5 
M Ganin-Ae, 'Corporate Taxation in Europe - Paths to a Solution' 120011 Biitish Tax 
Review 233 
M Gaminte, 'The Role of the European Court of Justice M the Developalent of 
Direct Taxation in the European Union' 12003] Bulletin for Intemational Taxation 
86 
M Gami-nie, 'The Compatibility of "National Tax Priliciples of the Member-States" 
with a Fully Integrated Market' Congress of the European Association of 
Tax Law 
Professors (2004) 
M Gaminie, 'The Inipact of Marks & Spencer Case on US-European Plaminig' 
(2005) 33 Intertax 485 
FA Garcia Prats, 'Exchange of Information under Article 26 of the UN Model Tax 
Convention' 119991 Bulletin for International Taxation 541-548 
RW Genetelll, 'Apportionment Factor Issues' 617 Practicijig Law Institute/ Tax 
(Tax Law and Estate Planning Course HandN-)ok Series, Practising Law Institute, 
2004)7 
M Gerard, 'Inter-jurisdictional Coinpany Taxation in Europe, the German Reform 
and the new EU Suggested Direction' CESifo Working Paper No 636(. 1) (CESifo 
Working Papers, CESifo, MilDich 2002) 
M Gerard, 'Neutralities and Non. -Neutralities in. Inteniational Corporate Taxation: 
An Evaluation of Possible and Recent Moves' (2002) 48 ifo StUdien 533 
B Gibert, 'A French Reaction to the Con-u-n-Linication fi-om the Commission 
'Towards an Internal Market without tax obstacles" 120021 European Taxation 309 
S Goldstein, 'Resident Taxpayers: Mternal Consistency, Due Process and State 
Inconie Taxation' (1991) 91 Columbia Law Review 119 
JM Gora, Due ProcessQf Law (National Textbook Company In conjuliction with the 
American Civil Liberties Union, 1977) 
SL Gordon, 'The United States of America' in IFA (ed), Taxation Issues in (I 
Federal State and Economic Groupings ývith Concurrent Taxing Authorities vol 21a 
(Kluwer Law International, the Hague 1996) 3-22 Z_ 
B Gouthiere, 'Rerrioval of Discrimination -a Never-Endingy Story' 119941 Europeall 
Taxatlon'296 
B Gouthiere, 'Thin Capitalisation RLdes and the Non-Discrimination Principle' 
[20021 European Taxation 159 
MJ Graetz wid AC Waffell, 'Income Tax Discriniýiation and Political and Economic 
Integration of Europe" (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1186 
OT Graf Kerssenbrock, 'German Fiscal Ui-tity 20033' (2004) 32 Intertax 2 
JF Graham, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationshij)s: Fiscal Aýjustment in a Federal 
Countjý, Canadian Tax Paper No 40 (Canadian Tax Papers, Canadian Tax 
Foundation, Toronto 1964) 
A Grau aiid PM Hen-era, 'The lirils-_ betweeii tax coordiliation aiid tax 
harmoilization: 
limits mid alteniatives' (2003) 12 EC Tax Review 28 
3 3) 0 
MA Grau Ruiz, 'Report on Group Taxation in Spain' in IFA (ed), Cahiers de droit 
fiscul international vol 89b (Cahiens de drolt fiscal international, IFA, ý M04) 609 
JM Greene, 'ASARCO and Woolworth: Anomalous Anaclu-onisms with L11111ted 
Precedential Value' 1198-3 )1 18 Tax Notes 795 
Greenvvoods and Freehills Guide to Tax Consolidation. fbr Corporate Groups in 
Australia (Greenwoods and Freehills Pty Ltd, 2005) 
http: //www. g reenwoodsandfreehi I Is. com/spb42329-internals. pdf 
S Griffin, Coinpan_v Lvvv: Fundamental Principles 41' edn Pearson Longman 
Harlow, '. 2006) 
D Gutmann, 'The Marks & Spencer case: proposals for an ýilteriwtive way of 
reasoning' (200-3)) 12 EC Tax Review 154 
D Gutmaim and L Hiniiekens, 'The Lankhorst-Hohorst case. The ECJ finds German 
thin capitalisation rules incompatible witli freedom of establishment' (2003) 12 EC 
Tax Review 90 
P GyOngyl Vegh, 'Towards a Better Exchange of Inforn-lation' 1200221 Europeall 
Taxation 394 
U Hafelill and W Haller, ScInvelzerisches Bundessatatst-echt (5"' edn Schulthess, 
Zurich 2001) 
Hansen and Jorgensen, ýConsumption Taxation and Fiuancial Servicus in Denmark' 
in IFA (ed, ), Caluers, de droitfiscal international vol 88b (Cahiers du drolt -fiscal 
international, IFA., 2004) 292-'2193 
DP Hariton, 'Revising the US Reg on the Allocation of Foreign Taxes among 
Related Persons' 38 12005] Tax Notes International 989 
J Harvey Perry. 'Taxatioii iii Canada' Canadian Tax Paper No 89 (Caiiadiaii Tax 
Papers, 5"' edn Canadiaii Tax Foundation, 1990) 
Haunold, 'Coiisuniption Taxatioii and Financial Services iii Austria' in IFA (e(I 
Cahiers de droitfiscal intonational vol 88b (Calliers de droit fiscal intemational, 
IFA, 2004) 16-3)- 164 
JR Hellerstein, 'Allocation and Apportionment of Dividends and the Delineation of 
the Unitary Business' 11982] 14 Tax. Notes Today 155 
JR Hellerstein, 'Federal hicoine Taxation of Multmationals: Replacement of 
Separate AcCOLIIAIII, ý-)- with Fonnular Apportionment' 11993] 5 State Tax Note,, 
407 y 
W Hellerstein, 'State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corrmations, Part 11: 
Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth' (1982) 81 Micliigan Law Review 157 
W Hellerstein, 'Is "Internal Consistency" Footish? Reflection.,,, on an Emel-L-6ilLy 
Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation' (1988) 87 Michigan Law Revic%v 
138 
W Hellerstem., MJ- McIntyre and RD Pon-ip, 'Con-u-nerce Clause Restraints oil State 
Taxation After Jefferson Lines' (1995) 51 Tax Law Review 47 
W Hellersteiii and CE McLure, ýLost in Translation: Contextual. Considerations in 
Evaluating tt-te Relevance, of US Experience for the European Comi-ni,, "sion's 
Conipany Taxation Proposals' 12004] Bulletin for International Taxation 86 
M Helil-tinen, 'Dividend equivatent benefits and the concept of profit distribution of 
the EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive' (2000) 9 EC Tax Review 161 
M Helminen, 'Is There a Future for CFC-regýnes in the EU"' (2005) 33) Intertax 117 
M Heli-ninen, 'The Esab Case (C-231/05) and the Future of Group Taxation Regill-les 
in EU' (2005) '33 Intertax 595 
MJ Heruler, 'European Tax Allocation Systein (ETAS): A ProlX)sal for a 
Consolidated European Tax System' 120041 European Taxation 246 
C Higy, The Svilliss Tax System: adapted by the Federal Tax Administration (Bern 
1970) 
L Hinnekens, 'Compatibility of Bilateral Tax Treaties with European CODIMU111ty 
Law - Applicatious of the Rules' (1995) 4 EC Tax Review 
202 
L Hin-nekens, 'Non-Discrin-fination in EC Incoine Tax Law: Painting in the Colours 
of a Clia. inelemi- Like Principle' [ 1996-1 European Taxation 286 
L Hinnekens, 'AMID: The Wrong Bridge or a Bridge Too Far? Aii Analysis of a 
Recent. Decision of the European Co urt of Justice' [100 1] European Taxation 206 
L Hinnekens, 'The search for the fi-ainework conditions of the fundal-nental EC 
Treaty principles as applied by the European Court to Member-States' 
direct 
taxation' (2002) 11 EC Tax Review 112 
L Hinnekens, 'European Court (--, oes for robust tax principles for treaty fi-eedoills. Zý 
What about reasonable exceptions and balances'? ' (2004) 13 EC Tax 
Review 65 
J Hobster, 'European Transfer Pricing: At the Crossroads'. " (2002) 13 Journal of 
hiternational Taxation 55 
F Hoenjet, 'The Leur-Bloern judgment: the Jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice and the interpretation of the anti-abuse clause in the Merger Directlý, e' 
(1997) 6 EC Tax Review 206 
FC de Hosson, 'Restrticturing the businesses of multinational groups operating in 
Europe' (1996) 24 Intertax 80 
FC de Hosson, "On the controversial role of the European COLirt in coiTx)i-ate tax 
cases' (2006) 34 Intertax 294 
KL Houghton, 'Unitary/Combined FiN-igs: Old Concept, New Focus' (2004) 33 
State Tax Notes 457 
DM Hudson and DC Tumer, 'biternational and Interstate Approaches to Taxing 
, B-Lisiiiess Incoine' (1.984) 6 Nortliwestern Journal of Intl Law & Business 562 
HO Hunter, 'Federalism and State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises' (1983) 32 
Emory Law Journal 89 
H van den Hurk, 'Is the ability of Member States to conclude tax treaties challied 
upT ('2004) 13 EC Tax Review 17 
H van den Hurk. and B Wagenaar, 'The Far-Reaclihig Consequences of the ECJ 
Decision in Bosal and the Response of the Netherlands' [20041 Bulletlil for 
hiternational Taxatioji')69 
H van den Hurk, 'Cross-Border Loss Compciisatioii - The ECFs Declsl()ii ill Marks 
& Spencer and How It was Misimerpreted iii the Netherlands' 120061 Bulletill foi- 
Intemational Taxatimi 178 
ZE Husain, 'Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board of California: Does the 
Application of Worldwide Unitary Taxation to Non-US Parent Corporate Groups 
Violate the Comn-lerce ClauseT (1995) 18 Fordham hiternational Law Journal 1475 
M Isenbaert and C VaIjemark, 'M&S judgment: the ECI caught between a rock and 
a hard place' (2006) 15 EC Tax Review 10 
JH Jackson, The World Trading Sýwem: Laýv and Policy of'International Economic 
Relations (2 nd edn The MIT Press Can-ibridge, Mass 1997) 157-173 
M Jann, 'How does EC Law Affect Benefits Available to Non-Resident Taxpayers 
under Tax TreatiesT in W Gassner, M Lang and E Lecluier 
(eds), Tax Treaties and 
EC Law (Series on International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 
Vienna 1996) 
3 -72 33 
T Johnson, 'Tax Avoidance' in British Tax Reporter vol 1: Principles qfIncome Tax 
(Wolters Kluwer (UK) Limited, 2004) 
MR Jung, Stetterneutr(de Uiitet-iiehinens-(Jiiistrltktlii-iei*iitigeti im harmonisierten 
Stelierrecht (Helbhig & Licliten-lialin, Basel 2004) 
JM Kane, 'International Tax Treaties and State Taxation: Can the Federal 
Goverun-ient Speak with One VoiceT (1991) 10 Virginia'Tax Review 765 
TA Kaye, 'Coi-tgressional Liii-Litations on State Tax Sovereignty' (1998) 1 35 Harvard 
Journal on Legislatioi-i 149 
TA Kaye, 'Tax Discrin-iination: A Comparative Analysis of US and EU Approaches' 
(2005) 7 Florida Tax Review 47 
E Kenuneren, 'The termination of the 'most favoLtred nation clause' dispute in tax 
treaty law and the necessity of a Euro Model Tax Convention' (1997) 6 EC Tax 
Review 146 
W Kessler md P Dolfinuetler, 'The Tax Jungle Of Working Cross-Boi-der In Z7 
Europe: The European Company As A Potential Pilot Project'? ' [2002_1 Jounial of 
International Taxation 5 1, 
JAM Klaver and JM Thm-nermans, 'EU Taxation: policy competition or policy 
coordination'? ' (1999) 8 EC Tax Review 185 
A KOrner, 'Refereiice to the ECJ by the German Federal Fiscal Court for a 
Prellininary RUIiI12-: Does European Lam/ Require Cross-Border Loss Relief " (2003)) 
II Imertax 489 
HE Kostense, 'The Saint-Gobain case and the application of tax treaties. Evolution 
or revolution? ' (2000) 9 EC Tax Review 220 
S Kotan. idis, 'French Exit Tax Incompatible with the Freedom of Establishilleilt' 
[2004] European Taxation 375 
J-P Lagae, 'Advance pricing agreements' (1999. ) 8 EC Tax Review 8 
M Lang and J Schuh, 'Europe on its way to a Multilateral Tax Treaty' 
(2000) 9 EC 
Tax Review 3 )9 
M Lang, 'CFC Legislation and Conuminity Law' ['. 20021 European Taxation 374 
M Lang, 'Marks and Spencer - niore questions than answers: an analysis of 
the 
Opinion delivered by Advocate General Maduro' (2005) 14 EC Tax Review 9-5 
M Lang, 'The Marks & Spencer Case - The Open Issues Following the ECJ's Filial 
Word' 120061 European Taxation 54 
M Lang, 'Direct Taxation: Is the ECJ Heading in the New Direction"' 
European Taxation 421 
K Lannoo and M Levin, An EU Company ivithout an EU Tax? A Cotporate Tax 
Action Plan For Advancing the Lisbon Process (Cei-itre for European Policy Studies, 
2002) 
B Larking, 'Fokus Bank: the end of Withholding Tax as we know itT (2005) 14 EC 
Tax Review 69 
JPLeGaIl and P Morel, French Compaw, Lmv (Longman, I-A)iidon 199 1) 
M Lehner, 'Linutation of the nationat power of taxation by the fundan-lental 
freedoms and non-discrimination clauses of the EC Treaty' ('2000) 9 EC Tax Review 
5 
R Lenz, 'The Sharing of the Taxim-, Power between the Federal State, the 26 
Cantons and their Municipalities' in Rassegna TribUtaria: Dottrina - Giurispnidenza 
- Prassi Administrativa (E. T. I. edii, Ronia 1987) 201 
JC Leontiades, Multinational . C. ()iporate Strategy: Planning ft)r World Markets 
(Lexing-ton Books, . 
1985) 
P Leslie, RH Neumaini and R Robinson, 'Managing Canadian Fiscal Federallsin' in ý] Z7 
JP Meekison, H Telford wid H Lazar (eds), Reconsidering the Institutions qf 
Canadian Federalism (Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, School of Policy 
StUdieS, QUeell", University, Montreal 2002) 
M Levin, Hannonising Cotporate Tax hases in the EU (Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2002) 
P Locher, Tinanzordnung des Bundes' in D Thürer, J-F Aubert and JP Müller (eds), 
ver 1 üi-*ch'-)001) 
. 
ffissungsrecht der SchweilDroit consütutionnel suisse (Schulthess, Z1 
P Locher, Einfährung in das interkantonale Stetterrecht (2nd edn Stäii-iptli Verlag 
AG, Bern 2003) 27 
SO Lodin, 'The linputation Systeii-is and Cross-Border Dividends - the Need for 
new Solutions' (1998) 7 EC Tax Review 229 
SO Lodin and M GaiTinue, 'The Taxation of the European 
Company' 119991 
European Taxation 286-294 
SO Lodin and M Gaminie, Home State - Taxation (IBFD Publications, Amsterdam 
2001) 
A Lupo, 'Reliefs fi-om Economic Double Taxation on EU Dividen&: Impact of the 
Baars and Verkooýjen Cases' 120001 European Taxation 270 
R Lyal, 'Non-discrimination and direct tax in Community law' (2003) 122 EC Tax 
Review 68 
CM Lyons, 'The Constitutionality of the Worldwide Con-ibi-ned Reporting Method 
of Taxation of Multinational Corporations: Barclays Bank v. Francl-iise Tax Board' 
(1995) 37 Boston College Law Review 183 
TJ Lyons, 'Asscher: The Bounds of Fiscal Sovereignty' [ 1996] British Tax Review 
641 
TJ Lyons, 'Futura Participations: discrii-riiiiatory accounting' 119981 British Tax 
Review 61 
TJ Lyons, ACI v Coliner Affirms ComnlunitY Supremacy' 119991 British Tax 
Review 65 
TJ Lyons, 'Tax in, a Single Market - Bosal and Marks & Spencer pic' 12003 1 BrItIsh 
Tax Review 44-3 ) 
111ZI 'P. Martin, 'The Marks & SI)encer EU Group Refief Case -a Rebuttal of tile -Tax 
Jurisdiction Argument" (2005) 14 EC Tax Review 61 
Y Masui, 'General Report on Group Taxation' in IFA (ed), Cahlers dc drol't. liscal 
international vol 89b (Cahiers de drolt fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 21 
MN Mbwa-Mbonia, 'The Push Towards Pan-European Tax Consolidation: A French 
Perspective on Marks & Spencer Case' [2003130 Tax Notes Int'l 457 
PR McDaniel and JR Repetti, 'Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The 
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange' (1993) 1 Florida Tax Review 607 
PR McDaniel, 'Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone' (1993- 
4) 49 Tax Law Review 691 
MJ McIntyre, 'Contrasting Methodolo, (Jes: A Systematic Presentation of the 
Differences between Arrn's-Length/Sotirce-Rule System and a Combined- 
Reportijig/Foil-iii-Lilai-y-Appol-tioiunent System' (1994) National Tax Association 226 
MJ McIntyre, P Mines wid RD Poinp, 'Designing a Combined Reporting Regime for 
ltý a State Corporate Income Tax: a Case Study of Louisiana' (2001) 61 Louisiana Law 
Review 699 
MJ McIntyre, 'The Use of Combined Reportýig by Nation States' 120041 '35 Tax 
Notes Int'l 917 
CE McLure Jr, 'Defining a Unitary Busi-tiess: An Econon-ýist', -.,, View' hl CE McLUre 
Jr (ed), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary 
Combination (Hoover Institution Press Stwiford UniversitY, Stanford 1984) 89 
CE McLLII-e Jr, 'Operational Interdependence is not the Appropriate 'Bright Line 
Test' of a Unitary Business - At least, Not Now' in Special Report The UnitarY Tax 
Controversy: Articles and Commentan.. Y. Chapter V. Dýfining the Unitary Business 
[ 1986186 Tax Notes Today 70 
CE McLure, 'The Elusive Incidence of Corporate Income Tax: the State Case' 
[ 1986170 Tax Notes TodaY, 108 
CE McLure Jr, 'State Taxation of Foreign-Source Dividends: Startuig fi-oll-I First Z-- 
Prin-ciples' 11986186 Tax Notes Today 975 
CE McLure Jr and JM Weiner, 'Decidijig Whether the ELII'Opean Union Should 
Adopt Formula Apportioinnent of Con-1pany Income' in S Cnossell (ed). Taxing 
Capital Income in the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) -14' 3 
CE McLure, Jr, 'Tax Harn-ionisation, Fiscal Federalism and Regional Econonlic 
Inte)-ration: International Experience and Lessons for Brazil' 120011 22 Tax Notes g 
International 2861 
H-R Merz, 'The Swiss Taxation System: Federalism in Action' Position Paper on 
International Tax Competition (Federal Dept of Finance, Bern 2007) 
GTK Meussen, 'The Marks & Spencer case: reaching the bomidaries of the EC 
Treaty' (200-3)) 12 EC Tax Review 144 
GTK Meussen, 'Bosal Holding Case and the Freedom of Establishment: A DLItCh 
20041 European Taxation 59-64 Perspective' [. 
GTK Meussen, 'The Marks & Spencer Case: The Final Countdown Has Begun' 
[20051 European Taxation 160-163) 
GTK Metissen, 'Cross-Border Loss Retief in the European Union following the 
Advocate General's Opinion iii the Marks & Spencer Case' 12005] ELII*01-)eaii 
Taxation 282-286 
GTK Meussen, 'Recent EU Developn-ients in Relation to the Mark's & Spencer 
Case' [20061 European Taxation 449 
G Michie, 'General Report in Consumption Taxation and Financial Services' in IFA 
(ed), Cahiers de droit fiscal international vol 88b (Cal-ýers de droit fiscal 
ii-tternational, IFA, 2004) 
BF Miller, 'Worldwide Unitary Combination: The California Practice' in CE 
McLLire Jr (ed), The Stwe Cotporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldvt, lde Unitary 
Combination (Hoover Institution Press Stanford University, Stanford 1984) 133) 
JM Mintz, 'Company Taxation and the Internal Market - European Company Tax 
Reform: Prospects for the Future' (2002) CESifo Foruin '3 
J Militz and JM Weiner, 'Exploring Forniula Allocation for the European Union' 
(2003) 10 International Tax and Public Finance 695 
D Molenaar and H Grams, 6The Arnoud Gerritse Case of the European Court of 
Justice' (2003) 31 Intertax 198 1 
KL Moore, 'State and Local Taxation of Interstate and Foreign Corninerce: the 
Second Best Solution' (1996) 42 Wayne Law Review 1425 
K Morteh-nans, 'The Cominoi-i- Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market, 
What's in a MarketT (1998) 35 Cornmou Market Law Review 101-136 
M Mulders, 'Compensation. of losses within the EC' (1996) 5 EC Tax Review 123 
J Muller, 'Cadbury Schweppes Case: A Review' 06 BNA Tax PlaimijIL) 
hitemational-European Union Focus 07 dII 
A Murtro, Tolley's Double Taxation Relid'(7'J' edn Lexis Nexis Tolley) 148 
RA Musgrave and PB Musgrave, 'Inter-nation Equity' i1i RM Bird and JG Head 
(eds), Modern Fiscal Issues: Essa-vs in Honour of Carl S Shoup (University of 
Tormito Press, 1972) 63-85 
PB Musgrave, 'Principles for Dividing, t1he State Corporate Tax Base' essay no 6 ill 
CE McLure Jr (ed), The State Corporation Inconi-e Tax: Ismes in Worldlv, de 
Unitarv Combination (Hoover histitLition Press Stmford University, Stanford 19841) 
228 
PB Musgrave, Uterjurisclictional Coordination of Taxes oil Capital Income' in S 
Cnossen (ed), Tax Coordination in the Ettroj)ean Community (Kluwer, 1987) 197- 
225 
PB Musgrave, 'Fiscal -Coordinat ion and Competition in an Intemational Setting' In L 
Eden (, ed), Retrospectives on Public Finance (Duke University Press, 1991) 276-305 
PB Musgrave, 'PI-h-tciples of Interjurisdicti(mal Fiscal Relatimis' in H Nadaro-alu 
(ed), Fiscal Relations Between Central and Local Governments (Marmal-is- 
Altinyunus, 1991) 113-139 
PB Musgrave, 'Inter-jurisdictional equity in corrTany taxation: principles and 
applications to the European Union' fii S Cnossen (ed), Taxing Capital Income in the 
European Union (Oxford University Press, 1.995) 182-213 
PB Musgrave, 'Tax Policy in the Global Economy'in Studies in Fiscal Federallsin 
and State-Local Finance (E Elgar, Northampton Mass 2002) 
L Neville, Brown and T Kerinedy, The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (5"' edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 
F Nobili and MA Lanza, 'Synthesis of Italian Tax Reform' (12004) 32 Intertax 564 
A Nov, 'Tax ConTetition: ADAnalysis of the Fundamental Argun-lents' 120051 37 
Tax Notes IntematiOnal 323 
X Obei-,, --, on, Droitfiscal suisse (2 nd edn Flelbing & Liclitenhahn, Basel'2002) 
P O'Donnell and K Spence, 'Report on Group Taxatiou in Australia' ]n IFA (ed), 
Cahiers de droitfiscal internation(il vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 
IFA, 2004) 121 
OECD (ed), Controlled Foreign Compan 
-v 
Legislation in Studies in Taxation 
Foreign Source Income (OECD, Paris 1996) 
OECD (ed), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD, Paris 
1998) 
OECD (ed), Ttwn, ýfer Pricing Guidelines f6r M"Itinational Entetprises and Tax 
Administrations (OECD, Paris 2001) 
OECD (ed), The OECD's Project on HaillIfIll T(lx Practices: The 2001 Progress 
Report (OECD, Paris 2001) 
OECD (ed), The OECD's PrQject on Harn#ill Tax. Practices: The 2004 Progress 
Report (OECD, Paris 2004) 
OECD (ed), Model Tax Convention on Income and oil Capital condensed version 
(OECD, Paris 2005) 
OECD (ed), The OECD's Project on Haripffil Tax Practices: 2006 Update on 
Progress in Member Countries (OECD, Paris, 2006) 
OECD (ed), Report on the Attribution of Projits to Pertnanent Establishments 
(Centre for Tax Policy and Adii-ýJnistration, Paris 2006) 
OECD (ed, ), Improvitig the Resolution Tax Treatv Disputes (OECD, Paris Feb 1 
2007) 
H Oechslin, Die Entwicklung des BundessteuersYstems der Schwel, -, von 1848 bis 
1966 (Einsiedeln Etzel-Druck AG, 1967) 
R Offermanns and C Romano, 'Treaty Benefits for Permanent Establishments: The 
Saint-Gobain Case' [2000] ELIrOpean Taxation 180 
JDB Oliver, 'Clause 118 - Conti-oiled Foreign Companies' 119931 Britis-11 Tax 
Review 281 
JDB Oliver, 'Group Relief after ICI i, Colmer' 119991 British Tax Review 155 
JDB Oliver, 'Tax Credits and Exemptions for all' [2000] British Tax Review 572 
P Oliver and W-H Roth, 'The Intemal Marl, -, et and the Four Freedon-Ls, (2004) 41 
Common Market Law Review 407 
N Orow, General Anti-Avoidance Rules: a Comparath`e International Almlysis 
(Jorclans, Bristol 2000) 
F Ortino aud E-U Petersmaim (eds), The WTO Dispitte Settlement System 199-5-2003 
(Kluwer Law Internatiorial, the Hague 2004) 
T O'Shea, 'The ECJ, the 'D' case, double tax conventions and most-favoured 
nations: comparability and reciprocity' (2005) 14 EC Tax Review 190 
T O'Shea, 'Marks and Spencer v Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes): Restriction, 
Justification and Proportio n alit y' (2006) 15 EC Tax Review 66 
T O'Shea, 'Dividei-id Taxation Post-M(mninen: Shifting Sands or Solid 
Foundations*? ' 12007] Tax Notes Int'l (Doc 2007-3338) 887 
2001) 29 Intei-tax RP Ostern-ian, 'Sweden Submits to the European Court of Justice' (. 
56 
M Persoff, 'Marks & Spencer: More Questions than Answers' (case con-ullent) 
12005] British Tax Review 260 
340 
JH Peters., 'The Water's Edge Con-lbined Report Method: A Troublesome Concept' 
(2001) 23 Tax Notes hit'l P )05 
M Peters, 'Capital movements and taxation in the EC' (1998) 7 EC Tax Review 4 
P Pistone, 'Tax Treatment of Foreign Losses: an Urgent Issue for the ELII-Opeail 
Court of Justice' (2003- )) 12 EC Tax Review 149 
P Pistone, 'Kirchberg 3 October 2006: Three Decisions, that Did ... Not Change the Future of European Taxes' (editorial) (2006) 34 Intertax 582 
P Pistont, 'Expected and Unexpected Developi-i-lents of European Integration ill the 
Field of Direct Taxes' (editorial) (2007) '35 Intertax 70 
P Pistone, 'Tax Treaties and the Internal Market in the New European Scenario' 
(2007) 35 hitertax 75 
SRF Plasschaert, 'Comprehemsive Approaches to EU Compauy Taxation: To Which 
Companies Should They Apply'? ' [2002] European Taxation 7 
SRF Plasschaert, Turther thoughts on the 'European Union Company lilcome Tax, 
and its First Cousins' [2002] European Taxation 336 
RD Porap, 'Issues in the Design of ForinLilary Apportionmem in the Coiltext of 
NAFTA' (1993-4) 49 Tax Law Review 795 
R Portner. 'Advance Pricing Agreements - Don-iestic Aspects and Treat", Law' 
1- 19961 European Taxation 50 
R Portner, 'Tlii-ii Capitalisation and Tax Treaties: Unlimited Right to Ta. \ Dividends 
w-id Interest at Source'? ' 11996] European Taxation 267 
M dos Prazeres Lousa, 'Report on Group Taxation in Portugal' in IFA (ed), Cahiers 
i fiscal international vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal iriteniatimial, IFA, )004) de dro't 
547 
A Rainer, 'ECJ Hear Case on Cross-Border Mergers' (EC Tax Scene. ) (2005) 3-3) 
Intel-tax 405 
M Reich, 'Gedan-k-en zur U-iisetzung des Steuertialil-ionisieruiigsgesetzes' 
62 Arcluv 
ffir Schweizerisclies Abgaberecht (Geiger AG, Beni 1994) 10 
Reiss, *Consumption Taxation and Financial Services in, Germany' in 
IFA (ed), 
Cahiers tie droit fiscal international vol 88b (Cahiers 
de drolt fiscal international, 
371 IFA, 2004) 3 
, 41 
J Richard, 'Coinparison between UK and French Taxation of GI'OLIPS of Companies' 
(200-3)) 31 Intertax 20 
G Richards, 'Group Relief - Past Its Sell-By Date' [ 1992.1 British Tax Review 197 
MH Richardson, 'The Hoechst and Pirelli Cases: The Adventures of aii Innocent 
Abroad or The Curious Case of the Foreign Parents and the, Missing Credit' 119981 
British Tax Review 283 
W Ritschard, Commission de coordination pour I'harmonisation fiscale 
(Governmei-tt Printer, Berne 1973)) 
J-M Rivier, 'La relation entre le droit f6deral et le droit cantonal en matiýre dimp6t,, 
directs: hannonisation et uni-formisation' hi Proble'ines actitels A droit fisca/ - 
Melanges en I'honneur A PrqfRaoul Oberson (Helbi-ng & Lichtenhalin, Bale 1995) 
157 
KL Roin, 'Due Process Limits on State Estate Taxation: An Aiialo(-, y to the State 
Corporation hicoine Tax' (1985) 94 Yale Law Jounial 1.229 
G Rolle, 'Is Corporate Incoine Tax a Withholding Tax? Soine Comments on the 
Athinaiki Zythopoila Case' (2003) 12 EC Tax Review 36 
C Romano, Advance Tax Rulings and Principles qfLaiv: Twvards a European Tax 
Rulings S-vstem.? Doctoral Series vol, 4 (Doctoral Series, Internatioual BUreau of 
Fiscal Docun-m. itation, Amsterdam 2002) 
I Roxan, 'Locating the Fixed Establist-mient in VAT' 119981 British Tax Revicx 608 
HO Ruding, 'US Tax Policy Is Hurtijig US Multiliationals Operatim-, In the EC' 
[19941 J01.11-flal of International Taxation 4 
HO Ruding, 'The Past and the Future of EU Corporate Tax' in editorial (2005) 14 
EC Tax Review 2 
Y Rupal., 'Report on GroUp Taxation in the United Killgdotil' in IFA (ed), Cahl(,,., s, 
i fiscal internat*onal vol 89b (Cahier de droit fiscal international, 
IFA, 2004) de dro't Is 
685 
A A Russo, 'ForniularY All-, portionji-lent for Europe: 
An Analysis and A Proposal' 
[2005] Europemi Taxation 2 
A Schafer and C Spengel, 'The Impact of ICT on Profit 
Allocation ývitliiii 
MultiDational Groups: Ann's Length Prichig or Formula Apportionnlellt'ý' 
Discussion Paper No 033-53) (Zentrurn Mr Europaische Wirt schaftsforschLing, 
GmbH, 
20 03) ) 
'41 I- 
D Schelpe, 'The Denkavit-Vitic-Vool-illeel- Case' (1997) 6 EC Tax Revieý, k 17 
A Schenk and 0 Oldi-nan, Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach (Cwnbridge 
University Press, New York 2007) 
MP Sclieunernann, 'Decision in the Marks & Spencer Case: a Step Forward, but No 
Victory for Cros,, -Border Group Taxation In Europe' (2006) 34 Intertax 54 
H Schneider and M Heidenhain, The German Stock Corporation Act (CH 
Beck/Kluwei- Law International, Munich 2000) 
W Sch6n, 'CFC Legislation and EUropean Con-imunity Law' [20011 British Tax 
Review 250 
J SchOnfeld, 'The C(i(ll)ur_)., Schweppes Case: Are the Days of the United Kinj-.,, dom's 
CFC Legislation NumberedT [20041 European Taxation 441 
FP Schoettle, 'Cormierce Clause Challenges to State Taxes' (1991) 75 Minnesota 
Law Review 907 
J Schwarz, 'Ruding Conuyýttee Sets EC Tax Agenda for the 90s' 119921 Journal of 
International Taxation 117 
J Schwarz, 'European Corporate GroUp Sti-LICtures and Financhig: The Impact of the 
European Court Decisions and Europeaii Legislative Developmems' 1200-3) 1 Bulletin 
for International Taxation 514 
M Sedlaczek, 'Capital and Payments: The Prohibition of Discrimination aild 
Restrictions' [20001 European Taxation 14 
R Seer, 'The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice: Limitation of tile Legal 
Consequences'? ' 120061 European Taxation 470 
LA Sheppard, 'Companies Have Rights Too: The EuropeaDCourt of Justice Speaks' 
[2004] 34 Tax Notes Int'l 135 
AP Sherrod, 'A Matter of (, 'Statutory) hiterpretation: Nortli Carolina Recognises the 
FutictioDal Test for Corporate Taxation in Polaroid Coil). 1.?. Oft. ýýrmall' (1999) 77 
North Carolina Law Review 2-3 )26 
PM Smit, 'Mirks & Spencer: The Paradoxes' [2006] European Taxation 411 
EH Srnith, *Allocating- to Provinces the Taxable IncOnle of Corporations: 
How the s 
Federal - Provincial Allocation 
Rules Evolved' (1976) 24 Caiiadiall Tax Journal 
545-571 
34. ) 
PB Sorensen, Company Tax Rtftwin in the European Union (Economic Policy 
Research Unit, Institute of Economics University of Copenliaggren, 2003) 
GT Sparagna, 'Report on Group Taxation in the United States' in IFA (ed ' 
), Calliers 
de droitfiscal intern(itional vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal intemational. IFA, 2004) 
711 
C Spengel, 'Common Corporate Consolidated Tax Base - Don't Forget the Tax 
Rates' (editorial) (2007) 16 EC Tax Review 118 
.K 
Stahl, 'Free movement of capital between Meniber States and third countries' 
(2004) 13 EC Tax Review 47 
C Stangl, 'The Concept of Tax Coherence According to the Decisions in Baars and 
Verkooijeii' 120001 SWI 46-3) 
I Stavropoulos, 'ECJ: Greek Income Tax Provision is a Withholding within tile Z-ý 
Meaning of the Parent-Subsjdiary Directive' 12002 1 ELlropean Taxation 94 
J van Steenwhickel and J van Vaeck, 'Court of Justice, 8 March 2001, joined cases 
C-3 397/98 and C-410/98 ' (case note) (200 1) 10 EC Tax Review 176 
MC Stefäner, 'Die NeLle Gruppenbesteuerung in Osterreich als Kernstück der 
Steuen-eform' [200418 SWK 418 
T Stetter and C Spengel, 'Taxati0ii of Corporatimis in Canada: a Comparismi of Tax 
Burdens with the U-nited States and Selected Member States of the ELIrOptall U111011 
Using the European Tax Analyser - Part F 120061 Emopeaii Taxation 307 
T Sullivan, 'The Future of State Unitary Taxatimi of Foreign-Owned US 
Subsidiaries after Barclavs Bank PLC i, Franchise Tax Board' (1995) 28 George 
Washington Journal of International Law & Economics 691 
JA Swain, 'State hiconie Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective' 
(2003) 45 William and Mary Law Review 319 
BJM. Terra, Eitroj)ean Indirect Tax Law: VAT and other indirect taxes (Boek-Werk 
Studio, tl-te Netherlands 2003) 
BJM Terra and J Ka us, A Gifide to the Ein-opean VAT Directives: 
Introdliction to i 
European VAT and Other Indirect Taxes vol I (Boek-Werk Studio, the 
Netherlands 
2006) 
BJM Terra and PJ Wattel, Euroj)ean Tax Laiv (4"' edn Kluwer 
Law Internati6nal, the 
Hague 2005) 
P Thalinann, 'Tax Coordination and Competition ýi Switzerland' Annex 9B ill 
Commission of the European Communities (ed), Report of the Committee of 
Independent Experts on Company Taxation (Office for Official Publications of the 
Eui-opean Cornmunities, Luxembourg 1992) 397 
C Thoinas, 'Custon-lary International Law and State Taxation of Corporate Income: 
The Case for the Separate AcCOL111tillg Method' (1996) 14 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 99 
0 ThOmmes, 'The European Dimension in Inteniational Tax Law' (1990) 18 
Intertax 464-476 
0 Th6mmes, 'Groupfinancing and EC Law' (editorial) (200-3)) 31 Intertax 2 
0 ThOiymes, 'CFC Legislation and EC Law' (200-3)) 31 Intertax 188 
0 Thommes, 'ECJ Holds Dutch Tax Treatment of Group Financing- Costs 
2 Discrin-driatory' (2004) 32 Intertax 6. 
0 ThOrm-nes wid A Rainer, 'When Practice Converges with Principle: European 
Companies and the Slow March toward Freedom of Establishn-lent' (EC Tax Scene) 
(2004) 32 Intertax I 18 
0 ThOrnmes, 'Con-in-iission's Reluctance and Membei- States' OVerTeactions -A 
Perfect Recipe for Chaos' (2004) 32 Intertax 124 
0 ThOmn-ies, 'Thin Capitallsation Rules and Non-Discrimination Principle,, -, -, an 
analysis of thin capitalisation rules in light of the non-discrimination principle in the 
EC Treaty, double tax treaties and ftiendship treatjesý (2004) 32 Intertax 126 
0 ThOn-unes and S Mueller, TO to Decide on Protection of Non-EU Con-1pailies 
against Discrimination' (2004) 32 Intertax 448 
J-M Tirard, 'The European Union's SolutiOns' in IFA (ed), Taxation Issues in a 
21a Federal State and Economic Groupings vvith Concurrent Taxing Authorities vol 
(Kluwer Law hiterfiational, the Hague 2004) 47-66 
G Toifl, 'Can discrimiliation m the state of residence be justified by the taxable 
situation 41 the state of source? 
' (1996) 4 EC Tax Review 165 
G Tolfl and T Polivanova-Rosenauer, 'Prelin-miary Ruling 
Requested fi-om ECJ oil 
Austrian Taxation of Foreign Dividends' [20011 European Taxation 
87 
E Tomsett, 'Advocate General Gives Qualified Support for Cross- Border Loss 
Relief Clamis in Marks and Spencer Case' (EC Tax Scene) (2005) 14 EC Tax 
Review 303) 
A Tontsch, 'Corporation Tax Systerris and Fiscal Neutrality: the UK and German 
Systems wid their Recent Changes' (2002) 30 Intertax 171 
S Tredicine, 'Withholding Tax on the Equalization Tax Refund in Breach of EC 
Law' [20021 Europewi Taxation 257 
JP Valuet and A Lienhard, Code des Societes et des, mar(Vsfinanciers (Dalloz, 
Paris 2005) 
H van Dam, 'Rebirth of the APA Regime' [20031 European TaxatiOn 290 
R van der Linde, 'Son-ie thoughts on most-favoured-nation treatment within the 
European Community tegal order in pursuance of the D case' (2004) 13 EC Tax 
Review 10 
A van Doesun-i, H van. Kesteren and G-J van Nordeii, 'The Internal Market and 
VAT: intra-group transactions of branches, subsidiaries and VAT groups' (2007) 16 
EC Tax Review 34 
van Hilten, 'Consumption Taxation and Financial ServIces in the Netherlands' in 
IFA (ed), Cahiers de droit fiscal international vol 88b (C'ahiers de drolt fiý, cal 
international, IFA, 2004) 603 
S vaii Thiel, 'The, Prohibition of Incoine Tax Discrin-iination in the European Union: 
What Does It MeanT [ 19941 European Taxation 303) 
S van Thiel, 'Removal of income, tax barriers to market jiitqi-afioii iii the Europtaii 
Union: litigatimi by the Con-ununity citizen instead of hai-i-noilizatioii by the Z7 
Community legislatureT (2003) 12 EC Tax Review 4 
F Vanistenclael, 'Impact of European tax law mi tax treaties with third countries' 
(1999) 8 EC Tax Review 163 
F Vanistendael, 'Tax Revolution in Europe: The Impact of Non-Discrinimation' 
1-2000] European Taxation 3 
F Vanistendael, 'Memorandum on the taxing powers of the European Union' (2002) 
11 EC Tax Review 120 
F Vanistendael, 'The ECJ at the Crossroads: Balancincy Tax Sovereignty against the 
impei-atives of the Single Market' [2006] European Taxatioii 
41 
346 
W Vernieend, 'The Court of Justice of the European Commurfities and direct taxtf,.,: 
"Est-ce que la justice est de ce monde"? ' (1996) 5 EC Tax Review 54 
N Viýnther and E WerlaUff, 'The need for fi-esh t4in-ki-ng about tax rules on thin 
capital isation: the consequences of the judgment of the ECJ in Linkhorst-Hohorst' 
(2003) 12 EC Tax Review 97 
K Voget, 'Probleins of a Most-Favoured-Nation Clattse h-I Intra-EU Treaty Law' 
(Forum) (1995) 4 EC Tax Review 264 
K Vogel, 'Soine observations regarding Gilly' (1998) 7 EC Tax Review 150 
RJ De Vries, 'Report oi-. i Group Taxation in the Netherlands' in IFA (ed), Cahiers de 
droitfiscal international vol 89b (Cali-iers de droit fiscal international, IFA. 2004) 
461 
R Wareham and A Dolton, Tolley's Value Added Tax 2006 (, 2,, d edn LexisNexi,,, 
Butterworths, United Kuigdoii-. i 2006) 580 
M Wathelet, 'Direct taxation and EU law: integration or discrimination' (2004) 13 
EC Tax Review 2 
PJ Wattel, 'Corporate tax jurisdiction in the EU with respect to branches and 
subsidiaries; dislocation distinguished froin discrii-nination and disparity-, a plea for 
territoriality' (200-)) 12 EC Tax Review 194 
PJ Wattel, 'Red Herrinos in Direct Tax Cases 'before the ECY (2004) 31 Legal t7lý 
Issues of Economic Integration 81 
D Weber, 'The Bosal Holditig Case: Analysis and CritICILIe' (2003) 1-1 EC Tax 
Review 220 
D Weber, ýThe "D Case": Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and Compensation of 
Legal Costs before the Europewi Court of Justice' 12004_1 European Taxation 65 
D Weber, 'In Search of a (New) EqUilibrium between Tax Sovereignty and the 
Freedom of Moveii-lent within the ECý (2006) 34 IDtertax 585 
J Weiler, 'The, Transformation of Europe' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403 
JM Weiner, 'Tax Coordination and Competition in the United States of America' 
Annex 9C in Commission of the European Cominunities (ed), Report of the 
Committee of Independent E. vperts on Comp(my Taxation 
(Office for Official 
Publications of the ELiropeaii Conin-iLmities, Luxembourg 1992) 
417 
JM Weiner, 'Transfer Pricing: The Opinion of the US Tax Authorities' [ 19951 
European Taxation291 
JM Weiner, 'Using the Experience in the US States to Evaluate Issue.,; in 
Implen-lenting Fon-nula Apportionment at the hiternational Level' Paper 83 (Office 
of Tax Analysis - US Department of Treasury, April 1-999) 
JM Weiner, 'News Analysis: Institute for Fiscal Studies Issues Report oil EU 
Corporate Tax Hamionisation' 12000] 20 Tax Notes Int'l 2267 
JM Weiner, 'The European Union and Formula Apportion-n-ient: Caveat Eiuptor' 
[2001 ] ELiropean Taxation 380 
IM Weiner, 'EU Coii-iii-iission Study oil Company Taxatioii and the Internal Market 
Considers Con-iprelien-sive Company Tax Reform' [2001124 Tax Notes Int'l 511 
JM Weiner, 'Would Introducing Formula Apportionment in the ELiropeall Union Be 
a Dream Come True or the EU's Worst Nightmare? ' (2002) 48 ifo Saidien 519 
JM Weiner, 'An Exploration of Forinula Apportionment In the Europeau Union' 
120021 European Taxation 346 
JM Weiner, 'Consolidated Taxation in the European Union' 120031 32 Tax Notes 
I nt'l 149 
JM Weiner, 'Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: 
Insights fi-on-i the United States and Canada' Working Paper No 8 (Taxation Papers, 
European Commission, 2005) 
USA 2006) 
'fýrlll 
'n the Eurolwan Union (Springei JM Weiner, Cottil)(m). 1 Tax Re I 
WH Weissman, 'A Review of the Unitary Business Theory iii Light of the Nature of 
the Firm Today' [2004] 33' State Tax Notes 267 
B Westberg, 'Consolidated Corporate Tax Bases for EU-Wide Activities: Evaluatioll 
of Four Proposals Presented by the European Coi-yin-ý, ssion' 
12002] European 
Taxation 322 
DS Whitman, 'Barclays Bank iý Franchise Tax Board of Califin-nia: Worldwide 
Corribined Rep orting Survives for State Taxation of Multinational 
Enterprises 
[ 1995 ] Tulane Jounial. of hiternational and Comparative Law 265 
D Williams, 'Asscher: The European Court and the Power to Destroy' (1997) 
6 EC 
Tax Review 4 
B Wiman, 'Equalizing the Income Tax Burden in a Group of Conipanie., s' (2000) 28 
Intertax 352 
B Winian, 'Report on Group Taxation hi Sweden' in IFA (ed), Cahiers de droit 
fisctd international vol 89b (Cahiers de droit fiscal international, IFA, 2004) 633 
F Wooldridge, Groups of Companies: the Lavi, and Practice in Britain, France and 
Germun-v (Institute of Advariced Legal Studies, London 198 1) 
M Ziiger, Arbitration under Tax Treaties: Improving Legal Protection in 
International Tax Law Doctoral Series vol 5 (Doctoral Series, Intemational Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation, Anisterdani 2001) 
LEGISLATION 
Binding Legal Acts"" 
I. Directives 
Council Directive (EEC) 76/308 of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the 
recovery of claims resultingy from operati ing part of the systen-i of financing 'oils forrni 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee FUIId, and of agricUltUral levies 
and customs duties and in respect of value added tax [ 19761 OJ 1-73 
Council Directive (EEC) 77/388 (If 17 May 1977 on the harn-ionisation of the law,, of 
the Member States relatiiig to turnovei- taxes - Con-inion system of value added tax: 
uniflorm basis of assessment [ 1-9771 OJ L 145 
COLIIICil Directive (EEC) 77/799 (if 19 December 1977 concernmg, 111LItual assistance 
by the conipetent authorities of the Men-lber States in the field of direct taxation 
11977_1 OJ L336 
COLHICH Directive (EEC) 83/349 of 13 June 1983 based oil Article 54(3)(G) of tile 
Treaty on Consolidated Accounts 119831 OJ L193 
COLIIICil Directive (EEC) 88/361 of 24 JUne 1988 for the implementation of Article 
67 of the Treaty [1.988] OJ L178 
CoLincil Directive (EEC) 90/434 of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation 
applicable to inergers, divisions, transfer of assets and exchanges of shares 
concerniýig companies of different Member States [ 19901 OJ L225 
Council Directive (EEC) 90/435 of 23-3 July 1990 on the common system of taxatioll 
applicable in the case of parent con-1panies and subsidiaries of differe"t Me"Iber 
States [1990] OJ L225 
Council Directive (EC) 2001/44 of 15 June 2001 amending Directive 76/308/EEC 
on mutual assistance for die recovery of claims resulting fi-oni operations forming 
part of the system of financing the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund, and of agricultural levies and customs duties and in respect of value added tax 
and certain excise duties 1200 1] OJ L 175 
'Melegislation listed below is compi led in chronological order pcr ty c of legal act. in conl'orill1tv L- ,pI 
III les. to t1le rules of OSCOLA 2006 - The Oxford Standard for Citat Oil of Le"gal Author ti 
Council Directive (EC) 2002/38 of 7 May 2002 amendinu temporank Directive 
77/-')88/EEC as regards the value added tax arrangements applicable to radio and 4-- television broadcasting services and certain electronically supplied services 120021 
OJ L128 
Council Directive (EC) 2003/49 of 3 June 2003 oji a com-noii system of taxatioii 
applicable to interest and royalty payments n-lade between associated companies of 
different Member States 1_20031 OJ L 157 
Council Directive (EC) 2004/56 of 21 April 2004 ainending Directive 77/799/EEC 
concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Meniher States ill 
the field of direct taxation, certain excise duties and taxation of insurance preilliLlills 
12004] OJ L 127 
Council Directive (EQ 2004/76 of 29 April 2004 amending Directive 200-3/49/EC 
as regards the possibility of certaiii Member States to apply transitional periods 
[20041 OJ L157/0106-0112 
11. Regulations 
Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a EUrOpeall 
Con-ipany (SE) 120011 OJ L294/0001 -00") 1 
Council and European Parlianient RegUlation (EC) 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on 
the application of Inte. niational accoumbig standards 120021 OJ L24-3) 
111. Conventions 
Convention (EEC) 90/436 of 23 July 1990 on the elin-iniation of double taxation 
in 
comiectimi with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises - 
Final Act - 
Joint Declarations - Unilateral Declarations 
[19901 OJ L225 
B. Soft Law 
1. Codes of Conduct 
Code ot . Conduct (EC) of 23 November 1999 in Business Taxation [19991 SN 
4901/99 
Code of Conduct (EC) of 28 July 2006 for the effective iinplementation of the 
Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment 
of profits of associated enterprises 1-20061 OJ C 176/02 
11. Resolutions 
CottDcil Resolutioii (EC) of 27 JUlle 2006 on a code of conduct on transfel- pricillU 
doctin-ientation for associated enterprises M the Eui-opean Union 120061 OJ C176/01 
POLICY 
DOCUMENTS 
LIST OF EC POLicy DoCUMENTS1112 
Commission (EEC), 'Le Development d'Lm Marche Europeeii des CapitaLix' (Report 
of the Group of Experts), 1966. 
Commission (EEC), 'Proposal for a Directive on the HarmonisatiOn of Systems of 
Company Taxation and of Withholdino Taxes mi Dividends', I August 1975 and L- Bulletin of the European Comn-lunities, supplenmit 10/75. 
Corrunission (EC), 'Scope for Convergence of Tax Systen-is in the Con-initillity' 
(Report) COM (80) 139 final, 27 March 1980. 
Con-imission (EC), 'Proposal for a Council Directive on the Hamionisation of the 
Laws of the Men-iber States relating to Tax Arrangen-ients for the Carry-Over of 
Losses of Undertakings' COM (84) 404 final. 
Comn-tission (EC), 'Proposal for a Council Directive Concemincy ArranLements for 
Taking into Account by Enterprises of the Losses of their Pern-ianent Establishment.,, 
mid Subsidiaries Situated in Other Member States' COM (90) 595 filial, 28 
Noven-lber 1990. 
Conirntsslon (EC), 'Taxation in the Ettropeaii Union' (DiSCLI, ', ',,; ]Oll Paper for the 
Inforn-ial Meeting of ECOFIN Ministers) SEC (1996) 487 ffiial. 20 March 1996. 
Con-unission (EQ, 'A Package to Tackle Harniful Tax Competition in the EU, 
("Con-iii-i-Linication) COM (97) 564 final. 
Council (EC), 'Code of Conduct (Business Taxation)' (Report) SN 4901/99,2.3, 
November 1999. 
Connuission (EC), 'Tax Policy in the European Union, priorities for the years 
ahead' (Communication) COM (2001) 260 final, 23 May '2001. 
ComUssion (EC), 'Towards an Internal Market without Tax Obstacles' 
(Coim-lunication) COM (2001) 582 final, 23 October 2001. 
1112 The documents listed below are compiled ui chronological order in conforn-flty to the rules of 
OSCOLA 2006 - The Oxford Standard for Citation ot'Legal Authorities. 
Commission (EC), 'Company Taxation in the Intemal Market' (CoiYunission Staff 
Working Paper) SEC (2001) 1681,23 October 2001. 
Commission (EC), 'An Internal Market without Company Tax Obstacles. 
achievements, ongoing initiatives and remaining challenges' (Communication) L-7 
COM (200' 3) 726 final, 24 November 2003. 
Con-imis, sion (EC), 'Proposal for a Council Directive amendiiig Directive 
2003/49/EC on a common system of taxation applicable to interest wid royalty 
payments made between as,,, -, ociated companies of different Member States" COM 
(2003) 841, '10 Decen-iber 2003). 
Con-u-i-iission (, EC), 'On the Work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum iii the 
Field of Business Taxation from October 2002 to December 2003) and oil a Pi-ofx),,, al 
for a Code of Conduct for the Effective finplementatioii of the, Arbitratloil 
Convention' (Comnatiiiication) COM (2004) '2297 final, 23 April 2004. 
Con-ni-tission (EC), 'A Common Consolidated EU Corporate Tax Base' (Non-Paper 
to I nforinal. ECOFIN Co uncl. l. of 10 and II Septen-iber 2004), 7 July 2004. 
Conin-iission (EC), 'European Tax Survey' (Commission Staff Working Paper) SEC 
(2004) 1128/2,10 September 2004. 
Commission (EQ, 'The work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum on transfer 
pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the EU' (Con-uminication) COM 
(2005) 543 final, 7 November 2005. 
European Parlian-ient, 'Taxation of Undertakings in the European Union: a Common 
Consolidated Tax Base' (Report) FINAL A6-0386/2005, I December 2005. 
Commission (EC), 'Irriplementinc, the Community Lishon Progran-une, prooress to Z-- cý 
date and next steps towards a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB)' 
(Communicati(m) COM (2006) 157 final, 5 April 2006. 
Conimission (EC), 'Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations' 
(Conu-nunication) COM (2006) 824 final, 19 December 2006. 
CommissiOri (EQ, 'Annex, to the Corninumcation on the Tax Treatment of Losses in. 
Cross-Border Situations' (Conimission Staff Working Document) SEC (2006) 
1690, 
19 Decejuber 2006. 
Commission (EC), 'Exit Taxation and the Need for Coordination of Member 
States' 
Tax Policies' (Coin: nunication) COM (2006) 825 final, 19 December 
2006. 
Commission (EC), 'The work of the EU Joint Tran,, ý. Xer Pricing Forum 
in the field of 
dispute avoidance and resolution procedures and on 
Guidelines for Advance PricinLy 
356 
Agreements within the EU' (Con-u-nunication) COM (2007) 71 final, 26 February 
2007. 
Coniii-fission (EC), 'Iniplementing the Con-imunity Progran-me for improved th Z, - and employment and the enhanced competitiveness of ELJ business; further progress 
during 2006 and next steps towards a proposal on the Common Consolidated 
CoiTx)rate Tax Base (CCCTB)' (Communication) COM ('2007) 223 final, 2 May 
2007. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION CCCTB WORKING GROUP 
Conimission (EC), 'Taxable Incoine' (WorkinLi Document) CCCTB\WP\017\doc. 
Septeniber 2005. 
Conunissiou (EC), 'International Aspects iii the CCCTB' (Working Docuinent) 
CCCTB\WP\O 19\doc, 18 Noveinber 2005. 
Commission (EC), Trogress to date and -ftiture plans tor the CCCTB' (Workill" 
Document) CCCTB\WP\020\doc, 15 November 2005. 
Corrinlissioli (EC'), 'The Territorial Scope of the CCCTB' (Working Document) 
CCCTB\WP\026\doc, 17 February 2006. 
CommissiOn (EC), 'An overview of the main iSSLICS that emerged at the first mectingy 
of tile subgroup Oil international aspects, (Working 
DoCLIIIICllt) 
CCCTB\WP\029\doc, 2 March 2006. 
Conullissioll (EC), 'Administrative and legal fi-amework/qUestionnaire' (Woi-king 
Docuinent) CCCTB\WP\030\doc, '-) March 2006. 
Commission (EQ, 'Aii overview of the main issues that emerged at the second 
meeting of the subgroup on international aspects (SG 
4)' (Working Document) 
CCCTB\WP\O'- )3\doc, 24 May 2006. 
Coji-m-lission (EC), 'Issues related to group taxation' (Working Document) 
CCCTB\VvT\035\doc, 5 May 2006. 
Con, iii-lissiol, (EC), Toints tor Discussion oil 
"AdmInistrative and Legal 
Fran-lework... (Working Document) CCCTB\WP\036\doc, 19 May 
2006. 
Comims, sion (EC), 'An overvieýx of the maiii issues that einerý(tyed at the first meeting, 
of the subgroup on group taxation' (Working Document) CCCTB\WP\044\doc. 24 
August 2006. 
Coilmni, ý ision (EC), Trogress to date and future plans for the CCCTB' (ýVorking, 
Docunient) CCCTB\WP\046\doc, 20 November 2006. 
Comi-nission (EC), 'The Mechanism for Sharing the CCCTB' (Working Docurrient) 
CCCTB\VvT\047\doc, 1.7 November 2006. 
Commission (EC), 'An overview of the main issues that emerged at the second 
meeting of the subgroup Oil group taxation' (Working Docurrient) 
CCCTB\WP\048\doc, 23 November 2006. 
Commission (EC), 'An overview of the inain iSSLICS that emerged at the third 
ixieeting of the subgroup on international aspects (SG 4), (Working Document) 
CCCTB\VvT\049\doc, '-? 3 Nove. mber 2006. 
Commission (EQ, 'An overview of the rnain issues that en-ierged dUriM4 the 
discussion on the mechanism for shariDg the CCCTB' (Working Docuil-lent) 
CCCTB\WP\052\doc, 27 February 2007. 
Conn-nission (EC), 'Aii overview of the inain issLies that ei-nerged at the third 
meeting of tlie subgroup 011 21-OUP taxatl, (-)n' (Workzing Document) C 
CCCTB\WP\05-')\doc, 1 Marcb2007. 
LIST OF CASES 
JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE (ECJ)1113 
Case 6/60 A-vii-E. Humblet v Belgian State [ 1960] ECR 00559 
Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v, Commission [19631 ECR 95 
Case 6/64 Flaininio Costa v E. N. E. L. [1964] ECR 00585 
Case 22-70 Cornmission of the Eliropean Communities v Council ofthe European 
Communities 1- 19711 ECR 002 3 263 (ERTA) 
Case 152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotglu v Deutsche Bundespost 119741 ECR 153 
Case 8/74 Procureur A Roi v Benott and Gustave Dassonville [ 19741 ECR 00837 
Case 106/77 Administral-ione delle Finmize dello Stato v Sunmenthal SpA 119781 
ECR 00629 
Case 120/78 Revve-Zentral AG v Bttiidesttioiiol)oli. ýerw(iltuii, ý. itit- Bralmmvili 119791 
ECR 00649 (Cassis de Dijon) 
Case 113/80 Commission of' the European Comm un I ties v Ireland 119811 ECR 
0 '25 162 
Case C-270/83 Commission qfthe European Communities v French Republic 119861 
ECR 273 (Avoir fiscal) 
Case 81/87 Rv HM Treasury, ex parte Dailýy Mail & General Trust Plc 119881 ECR 
54 8-3 
Case C-204/90 Hanns-Martin Bachmann v Belgian State [ 19921 ECR 1-00249 
Joint Cases C-267/91, &, C-268/91 Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993 1 ECR 
1-06097 
1113 -17he compilation of cases below is done in conforrrýty to the rule,,., of OSCOLA 2006 - -17he 
*on ofLegal Authorities. More specil-Ically, the Judgments and 01) 11 ons of Oxford Standard for Citati L- IItII 
[tie ECJ are listed in chronological order. The Jurisprudence of the UK and US court,, is arranged 
alphabetically 
360 
Case C-330/91 R vIRC, exparte Commerz, bankAG 11993 1 ECR 1-4017 
Case C-1193 Halliburton Services BV v Stawssecretaris van Financien 119941 ECR 
1- 11'37 
Case C-279/93 Finanzaint Kijln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker [ 19951 ECR 1-225 
Joint Cases C-358/9-3) and C-416/933 Criminal proceedings against Aldo Bordessa 
and Vicente Man Mellado and Concepcion Barbero Maestre [ 1995] ECR 1-0361 
Case C-415/93 (i) Union Ro-vale Belge des Societes de Football Association ASBL v 
Mr Bosinan 
(ii) Ro 
, val 
Club Liegois SA v Mr Bosman, SA d'Economie Mixte Sportive de Wnioll 
Sportive A Littoral de Dunkerque, URBSFA and Union des Associations 
Europeennes de Football (UEFA) 
(iii) UEFA v Mr Bosinan [ 1995 ] ECR 1-0492- 1 
Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson v Ministre dit Logenient et de I'Urbatzisme 
[1995] ECR 1-3955 
Case C-55/94 Gebhctrd v Consiglio dell'Ordine degll* Avvocatj' e Procuratori di 
Milano 119951 ECR 1-4165 
Case C-80/94 G. H. E. J. Wielockv v Inspecteur der Directe Behistingen 119951 ECR 
1-2493 
Case C- 107/94 Asscher v St(tats-s-ecretaris van FinanciOi 119961 ECR 1-3089 
Johit Cases C- 163'/94, C- 165/94 & C-250/94 CrUninal proceedings agaInst Lucas 
Enifflo Sanz. de Lera, Rainnindo Dfu, -, Jiinene, ý. and Figen Kapanoglit 119951 ECR I- 
4821 
Jobit Cases C-2833/94, C-291/94 and C 292/94 Denkavit International BV a. o. v 
Bundesaintfi. ir FinanZen 11996-1 ECR 1-5063 
Case C-28/95 Letir-Bloem v Impecteur der Belasti ngdien stlOnde mem ing ell 
Amsterdam 2 [1997] ECR 1-04161 
Case C-250/95 Futura Participations SA and Singer 17 Administration 
des 
contributions [19971 ECR 1-2471 
Case C-H8/96 Jessica Sqfir v Skattemyndigheten i Dalarnas Ldn [1998] 
ECR I- 
01897 
361 
Case C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries p/c (ICI) v, Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her mt(jest 
* v's 
Ins 
pector qf Taxes) [ 19981 ECR 1-04695 
C, ase C-3336/96 Mr and Mrs Robert Gill 
-vv 
Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas- 
Rhin [ 19981 All ER (. EC) 826,119981 '3) CMLR 60 
Case C-294/97 Eurowings Lulherkehrs AG il, Finanzanit Dortlinind-Unna 119991 
ECR 1-7447 
Case C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassling Deutschland v, 
Finanzana Aachen-Innenstadt [ 19991 ECR 1-06161 
Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Ellin iko Dimosio (Greek State) 119991 
ECR 1-2651 
Case C-391/97 Gschwind v Fin a tram tAc ichcl t-A itýenslc 01119991 ECR 1-5451 
Case C-439/97 Sandoz GmbH v Fiii(iiiý-itiiidesdii-ektioi7, fiii- Wien, Nieder6sterreich 
und Burgenland [ 19991 ECR 1-7041 
Case C-35/98 Smatssecretaris van Financibi v Vcrkooýjen [20001 ECR 1-4071 
Case C-200/9 8XAB& )l ABv Riksskatteverket 11999 ] ECR 1- 8261 
Case C-251/98 B(tars II In'spectelir der Belastingthenst 
Ptit-ticiiliei-eiilOnderiiei-tziii, ýeii Gorinchein 120001 ECR 1-2787 
Joint Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesdiscliqft Limited, Hoeclist AG and 
Hoechst UK Limited v Commissione'-s qfInIand Revenue, H. M. Attorne-N, General 
1'2001] ECR 1-4727 
I'( 1 11 lig Case C- 141/99 Algemene Maatscappij voor Investering en Diensti 'r ei NV 
(AMID) v Belgian State 1_20001 ECR 1- 11619 
Case C-294/99 Athinatki Zythopoiia AE v Elleniko Dilliosio 12001 ] ECR 1-06797 
Case C- 13 WOO RD Danner [1002] ECR 1-0 18 147 
Case C-208/00 Oberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagern. ent 
GmbH (NCC) [2002] ECR 1-9919 
Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzalnt Steii? furt [20021 ECR I- 
11779 
Case C-3 385/00 De Groot v Stawssecretaris van Financi0i [20021 
ECR I- I IS 19 
36' 
Case C-43- WOO X and Yv Riksskatteverket 120021 ECR 1- 10829 
Case C- 167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v li-ispire .4 rt Ltd 1200-3 )I EC R 1- 10 15 5 
Case C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV v Stawsecretaris van Financii; n 120031 ECR I- 
09409 
Case C-234/01 Gerritse v Finanz-ana Neuk6lln-Nord [20031 ECR 1-05933 
Case C-364/01 The heirs of' H. Bat-bier v Inspecteur van de Belasting(lienst 
Particu lie reiLlOn de rn eming en bultenland te Heerlen [2003) 1 ECR 1- 150 1 _3 ) 
Case C-9/02 Hughes de Laste 
- vne 
A Saillant v Ministere tie I'Econonlie, do 
Finances et de VIndustrie [20041 ECR 1-02409 ' 
Case C-3 3 15/02 Anneliese Lenz, iý Finan-landesdirektion fýir Tirol 120041 ECR 1-7063 
Case C-3 3 19/02 Manninen, Petri Mikael [20041 ECR 1-7477 
Case C-334/02 Commission qf the European Communities i, French Republic 120041 
ECR 1-02229 (Fixed Levy) 
Case C--' )65/02 Marie Lin(Ifors 120041 ECR 1-7 183 
-amt Ca, ýe C- 15'22/033 Hans-Pirgen and Monique Ritrer-Coulais i, Finaw 
Gernierscheini. 1'2,0061 ECR 1-01711 
-ian W. Wallantin i, Riksskattev, erket 120041 ECR 1-0644' Case C- 169/0-3 3 Floi 
Case C-253/03' CLT-UFA SA i., Finanzailnt. K61n- West [20061 ECR 1-01831 
Case C-268/03 Jean-Claude De Baeck i, Belgische Swat 120041 ECR 1-05961 
Case C-376/03 D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdien stlPa rti cu lie i -enlOi i 
dern eming en 
buitenland te Heerlen [2005_1 ECR 1-05821 
Case C-403/03- ) Egon Schempp v Finanzatnt Miinchen 
['20051 ECR 1-642 1 
Case C-41 1/03 SEVIC Systems Aktiengesellschaft v Arntsger*icht Nellwied 
[20051 
ECR 1- 10805 
Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer v David Halsey (HM Inspector qf'Taxes) 
120051 
ECR 1-10837 
Case C-513/0-3) Heirs of* M. E. A. van Hilten-van der Heiiden v Inyectelir vall de 
Belasting(lienst 120061 ECR 1-01957 
Case E- 1/04 (EFTA Court) Fokus Bank ASA v The Nonvegian State, represented bY 
the Directorate (ýI'Taxes of 23 November 2004 
Case C- 150/04 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark 
[20071 ECR 1-00000 
Case C- 196/04 Cadbury Schvveppes plc and Cadbury Schiveppes Overseas Ltd v 
CIR 120061 ECR 1-07995 
Case C-265/04 Margaretha Bolminich v Sk-attevel-ket 12006] ECR 1-0092-3 
Case C-290/04 FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH v Finanzaint H(illiblirg- 
EinisNittel 120061 ECR 1-09461 
Case C-292/04 W Meilicke, HC Weyde, M Stiýjfer v Finanza. tnt Bonn-Innenstailt 
['20071 ECR 1-00000 
Case C--' 345/04 Centro Eqli. (--,, s, tre da Lezirui Grande L 
da v Bundesaint. flir Finmu-en 
[20061 ECR 1-00000 
Case C-346/04 RH Coniin v Fin(1117(1111t Hamburg-Nord [20061 ECR 1-06137 
I Case C-347/04 Reive Zen trallinanz-, eG v Finan-laint Kiihi-Mrte 120071 ECR 1-00000 
Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation V 
Commissioners (ýflnland Revenue [20061 ECR F 11673) 
Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioners qf 
Inland Revenue 12006-1 ECR 1- 1175' 3 
Case C-470/04 Nv Inspecteur van de Belustingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo 120061 
ECR 1-07409 
Case C-471/04 Finanzatnt nbach am. Main-Land v Keller Holding GmbH 120061 fe 
ECR 1-02107 
,, vs Laser Case C-492/04 Lisertec GeselIsch(iftfifir Stanjý)rmen 111.15H (fi)rmerl-v Rit 
BandstahIschnitte GmbH) v Finan.. ana Enunendingen 1-1007] ECR 1-00000 
Case C-5 1-3 V04 M Kerckhaert and B Morres v Belgische Smat 120061 ECR 1- 
10967 
Case C-524/04 Test Clau-nants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation I. Commissioners qf 
Inland Revenue 12007-1 ECR 1-00000 
64 
Case C- 10 1 /05 Skatteverket vA Reference (OJ) OJ C 106.30 April 2005 (peiidmp 
Case C- 102/05 Skatteverket vA atid B [20071 ECR 1-00000 
Case C-157/05 Winftied L. Holbeick v Fbianzanit Salzburg-Laiid 120071 ECR I- 
00000 
Case C- 170/05 Societe Denkavit International BV and Denkavit France Sarl v 
Ministre de 1'6onomie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 120061 ECR 1- 11949 
Case C-2231/05 Oy AA v Keskitsverolautakunta [2007] ECR 1-00000 
Case C-3379/05 Amurta S. G. P. S. v In. specteur van de Belastingdienst AG Opinion 
11. OPINIONS OF THE ECJ 
Opinion 1/76 delivered pursuant to Article 228(l) EEC Treaty. - 'Draft Agi-eenlem 
establishin. g a European layingy-up fund for inland waterway vessels' 119771 ECR 
00741 
Opinion 2/91 delivered Pursuant to Article 228( 1, ) second subpara EEC Treaty. - 
'Convention No 170 of the International Labour Organizatioll colicel-11,11L, ,, afety ill 
the use of chemicals at work' 11993_1 ECR 1-01061 
Opinion 1/94 delivered pursuant to Article 228(6) EC Treaty. - 'Competelice of tile 
Community to conclude international agreeinews coticei-iiing, services and tile 
protection of intellectual property' [ 19941 ECR 1-05267 
111. JURISPRUDENCE OF UK COURTS 
Marks and Spencer p1c v Halsev [20031 STC (SDC) 70. 
Marks and Spencer plc v Halsey 2003 WL 217293-5-3 ) (ChD). 
Pirelli Cable Holding NV v Inland Revenue Commissioners 120041 STC 130 (CA 
(Civ Div)). 
IV. JURISPRUDENCE OF US COURTS 
Allied-Signal Inc v Director, Division of Taxation 504 U. S. 768 (1992) 
Arm, co Inc v Hardest, 467 U. S. 6338 (1984) 
ASARCO Inc v Idaho State Tax Commission, 102 S. Ct. 103 (1982) 
Barclays Bank v Franchise Tax Board 512 U. S. 298,114 S. Ct. 2268 (ý 1994) 
Brown, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat. ) 419 
Butler Bros v McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942) 
Colgate- Palm, olive Co., Inc. v Franchise, Tax Board 284 CAL. RPTR 780 (Cal. Ct. 
"I App. 199 1); 831 P. '2)d 798 (Cal. 1992'); 133 CAL. RPTR 2d 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992') 
Complete A uto Transit In(- v BradY, 4' 10 U. S. 274 (1977) 
Container Coil). of America v Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S. 159 (1983)) 
Cooley v Board qfWcirdens, 53 U. S. (12 How. ) 299 (185 1) 
Edison Calffivnia Stores v McColgan, IS '-) P. 2d 16 (Cal. 1947) 
Exxon v Wisconsin Department qfReventie, 447 U. S. 207,100 
S. Ct. 2109 (19801) 
Flint v Stone Tracey Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911) 
"29 U. S. 249 (1946) Freeman v Hewit, ') 
General Care Coil). v Olsen 705 S. W. 2d 642 (Temi. 1986) 
Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat. ) I (1824) 
Goldberg v Sweet 488 U. S. 252 (1989) 
Honolulu Oil Co v, Franchise Tax Board S. F. No 21210 Cal Sup Ct (196-'), )-, 60 Cal. 
2d 417-, 386 P. 2d 40 
Industries' Chi(-, J'Inc., Re Appeal 875 P. 2d 278 (Kan. 1994) 
Japan Line Ltd v Coun(v qf Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979) 
Laurel Pipe Line Co. v Commonwealth Board qf Finance and Revenue 642 A-2d 
472 (Pa. t994) 
Matson Navigation Co v State Board of Equalisation S. F. No 15137 Cal Sup Ct 
(1935); 3 Cal. 2d 1-, 43 P. 2d 805 
Miller Bros v Maryland, 347 U. S. 340 (1954) 
Mobil Oil corporation v Conimissioner qf'Taxes (#'Vermont, 445 U. S. 425,100 S-Ct- 
1223 (1980) 
Moorman Manqfticturing Co. v Bair, Director of Revenue of lowa 437 U. S. 267 
(1978) 
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v Illinois, 386 U. S. 754 (1967) 
Phillips Petroleurn. Co. v lowa Dept of'Rev and Finance 511 N. W. 2d 608 (, I()%\-a 
199, 
-, ), ) 
Pollack v Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895) 
Polarold Corp. v Qffi? rimn 349 N. C. 290, -507 
S. E. 2cl at 284 (1998)-, cert. deilicd. 
119 S. Ct. 1576 (1999) 
Q11.111 Coq)oration v North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (, 1992) 
Sim. pson Timber Co. v Dept ol'Revenite 953 P-2d 366 (Or. 
1998) 
Smith v Alabama 124 U. S. 482 (1888) 
State Freight Tax, 82 U. S. (15 Wall. ) 232 (1872) 
State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875) 
Superior 01*1 Co v Franchise Tax Board L. A. No 26672 
Cal Sup Ct (1963), 60 Cal. 
2d 406; 386 P. 2d 33 
Texaco Cities Service Pilmline Co v McGavv 695 N. E. 2d 481 (Ill. 
1998) 
, 67 
Undeavood Typewriter Co. v Chamberlaili 254 U. S. 113 S-ct- 45 (1920) 
Union Tank Line v Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919) 
Western Live Stock v Bureau qfRevenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938) 
Wisconsin v J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940) 
F. W. Woolworth Co, v Taxation and Revenue Department of Nevv Mexico, 102 S-Ct- 
3128(1982) 
)68, 
